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THE JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CHIEF JUDGE
MONROE G. McKAY
Judge McKay was born in Huntsville,
Utah, in 1929. He graduated from Brig-
ham Young University in 1957 with high
honors. Judge McKay then received his
J.D. from the University of Chicago in 1960
and was the law clerk for Justice Jesse A.
Udall of the Arizona Supreme Court for the
1960-61 term. From 1961 to 1974, Judge
McKay practiced with the law firm of Lewis
and Roca in Phoenix, Arizona; however, he
did take a two year leave to serve as Direc-
tor of the United States Peace Corps in
Malawi, Africa. Judge McKay was a law
professor at Brigham Young University
from 1974 until 1977. In 1977, he was ap-
pointed to the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Tenth Circuit. Judge McKay
currently resides in Provo, Utah.
JUDGE JAMES K. LOGAN
Judge Logan was born in Quenemo,
Kansas, in 1929. He received his B.A. from
the University of Kansas in 1952 and was
graduated magna cum laude from Harvard
Law School in 1955. He became law clerk
for United States Circuit Judge Walter
Huxman and subsequently practiced with
the Los Angeles law firm of Gibson, Dunn
& Crutcher. Judge Logan became a profes-
sor at the University of Kansas Law School
in 1957 and was selected in 1961 as Dean
of that school. He served in that capacity
until 1968. Since 1961, Judge Logan has
been a visiting professor at Harvard Law
School, the University of Texas Law
School, Stanford University School of Law,
and the University of Michigan Law School.
He lectures at Duke University Law School.
He was a special commissioner for the
United States District Court for the District
of Kansas from 1964 until 1967 and was a
candidate for the United States Senate in
1968.
Judge Logan is a Rhodes Scholar, a
member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the
Coif, Beta Gamma Sigma, Omicron Delta
Kappa, Pi Sigma Alpha, Alpha Kappa Psi,
and Phi Delta Phi, and has co-authored
books and numerous articles on estate
planning, administration and corporate
law. In 1977, he was appointed to the




Judge Seymour was born in Battle
Creek, Michigan in 1940. She was gradu-
ated magna cum laude from Smith College in
1962, and from Harvard Law School in
1965. After graduating from law school,
Judge Seymour practiced law in Boston,
Massachusetts from 1965 until 1966, in
Tulsa, Oklahoma in 1967 and in Houston,
Texas from 1968 until 1969. From 1971 to
1979 she practiced with the Tulsa law firm
of Doerner, Stuart, Saunders, Daniel & An-
derson. In 1979, she was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit.
She is a member of Phi Beta Kappa
and the American and Oklahoma County
Bar Associations. Additionally, Judge Sey-
mour served as a bar examiner from 1973
through 1979; she served on the United
States Judicial Conference Committee on
Defender Services, 1985-87, and as chair,
1987-90.
JUDGE'JOHN P. MOORE
Judge Moore was born in Denver, Col-
orado in 1934. He received his B.A. from
the University of Denver in 1956 and re-
ceived his LL.B. from the University of
Denver College of Law in 1959. Judge
Moore then practiced law with the Denver
firm of Carbone & Walsmith until 1962.
From 1962 until 1975, he worked in the
Colorado Attorney General's Office. Spe-
cifically, Judge Moore served as Assistant
Attorney General from 1962 until 1967, as
Deputy Attorney General from 1967 to
1972, and as Attorney General for the State
of Colorado from 1972 until 1975.
Injanuary, 1975,Judge Moore was ap-
pointed to the Bankruptcy Court of the
United States District Court for the District
of Colorado where he served until 1982.
Judge Moore was then appointed to the
United States District Court for the District
of Colorado. In 1985, he was appointed to




Judge Anderson was born in 1932. He
attended Eastern Oregon College from
1949 to 1951, and Brigham Young Univer-
sity from 1955 to 1956 when he graduated.
Judge Anderson then attended the Univer-
sity of Utah College of Law where he re-
ceived his LL.B. degree in 1960. He was
Editor in Chief of the Utah Law Review,
Order of the Coif, and Phi Kappa Phi. He
then served as a trial attorney in the tax di-
vision of the United States Department of
Justice until 1964.
Judge Anderson subsequently joined
the law firm of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker in
Salt Lake City, Utah in 1964 where he prac-
ticed until he was appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit in 1985.
Judge Anderson has appeared as lead
counsel in federal courts in seventeen
states, and in the United States Supreme
Court. He has served as President and
Commissioner of the Utah State Bar. Addi-
tionally, Judge Anderson has been a mem-
ber of the Utah Judicial Counsel and the
Utah Judicial Conduct Commission, and he
has served as Chairman of the Utah Law
and Justice Center Committee. Judge An-
derson's civic activities include lectures at
the University of Utah College of Law,
member of the Executive Committee of the
Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce, and
director of numerous corporations. He is a
Master of the Bench, American Inn of
Court Number VII.
JUDGE DEANELL R. TACHA
Judge Tacha grew up in Scandia,
Kansas. She received her B.A. in American
Studies from the University of Kansas in
1968 and was a member of Mortar Board
and Phi Beta Kappa. Judge Tacha then
attended law school and received her J.D.
from the University of Michigan in 1971.
In 1971, she was selected to be a White
House Fellow. During her year as a White
House Fellow, Judge Tacha was sent on
official trips to southeast Asia, east and
central Africa, and the European Economic
Community. After her fellowship, Judge
Tacha was an associate with the law firm of
Hogan and Hartson in Washington, D.C.
In 1973, she returned to Kansas and
entered private practice in Concordia,
Kansas.
Judge Tacha was appointed to the
faculty of the University of Kansas Law
School in 1974. In 1979, she became
associate Vice Chancellor of Academic
Affairs, and in 1981, she became the Vice
Chancellor for Academic Affairs.
Judge Tacha was appointed to the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit in
1985.
JUDGE BOBBY R. BALDOCK
Judge Baldock was born in Rocky,
Oklahoma, in 1936, however, he grew up in
Hagerman and Roswell, New Mexico.
Judge Baldock attended the New Mexico
Military Institute, where he graduated in
1956. He received his J.D. from the Uni-
versity of Arizona College of Law in 1960.
From 1960 until 1983, Judge Baldock
practiced as a trial lawyer for the firm of
Sanders, Bruin & Baldock, P.A. In 1983,
he became a federal district judge in Albu-
querque, New Mexico and was appointed
to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit in 1985. In 1988, Judge
Baldock received an Outstanding Judge
Award from the State Bar of New Mexico.
JUDGE WADE BRORBY
Judge Brorby was born May 23, 1934
in Omaha, Nebraska. He was raised in
Upton and Newcastle, Wyoming. Judge
Brorby attended the University of Wyo-
ming and received a B.S. in Business. He
graduated with a J.D. with Honor from the
University of Wyoming in 1958.
Judge Brorby served in the United
States Air Force from 1958 to 1961. He
engaged in the private practice of law in
Gillette, Wyoming from 1961 to 1988.
Judge Brorby was appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit in 1988.
Judge Brorby served on the Uniform
Laws Commission and was Chairman of the
Wyoming Judicial Supervisory Commis-
sion. He has served on numerous Bar
committees.
JUDGE DAVID M. EBEL
Judge Ebel was born in Wichita, Kan-
sas in 1940 and grew up in Topeka, Kansas.
He received his B.A. in economics from
Northwestern University in 1962 and re-
ceived hisJ.D. from the University of Michi-
gan Law School in 1965, where he
graduated first in his class. While at the
University of Michigan Law School, he was
elected to the Order of Coif, the Barrister
Society, and he was Editor-in-Chief of the
Michigan Law Review.
Judge Ebel then clerked forJustice By-
ron R. White of the United States Supreme
Court during the 1965-1966 term. From
1966 until 1988, he practiced as a trial law-
yer with the Denver law firm of Davis, Gra-
ham & Stubbs. In 1988, Judge Ebel was
appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Judge Ebel's civic activities include
teaching Corporations as an adjunct pro-
fessor at the University of Denver College
of Law, teaching Professionalism and Eth-
ics at Duke University School of Law, teach-
ing the confirmation class at the St. James
Presbyterian Church and participating in
numerous Bar Association activities. He
has served as vice-president of the Colo-
rado Bar Association and is a fellow of the
American College of Trial Lawyers, a se-
nior judge of the Doyle Inns of Court, and
a member of the Town & Gown Society.
SENIOR JUDGE OLIVER SETH
Judge Seth was born in 1915 and grew
up in Santa Fe, New Mexico. He received
his A.B. degree from Stanford University in
1937 and his LL.B. from Yale University in
1940. During World War II he served as a
Major in the U.S. Army and was decorated
with the Croix de Guerre. In 1962, he was
appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. He served
as Chief Judge from 1977 until 1984. In
1984, Judge Seth assumed senior status.
Judge Seth has served as director of
the Santa Fe National Bank, chairman of
the Legal Committee of the New Mexico
Cattlegrowers' Association, Regent of the
Museum of New Mexico and as a director
of the Santa Fe Boy's Club.
SENIOR JUDGE
WILLIAM J. HOLLOWAY, JR.
The son of a former Oklahoma gover-
nor, Judge Holloway was born in Hugo,
Oklahoma in 1923 and later moved to
Oklahoma City in 1927. During World
War II, he served as a First Lieutenant in
the Army. After the war, Judge Holloway
returned to complete his undergraduate
studies at the University of Oklahoma, re-
ceiving his B.A. in 1947. Judge Holloway
then attended Harvard Law School, where
he graduated in 1950.
In 1951 and 1952,Judge Holloway was
an attorney with the Department ofJustice
in Washington, D.C. He subsequently re-
turned to Oklahoma City and entered pri-
vate practice. Judge Holloway was
appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in 1968 and
became ChiefJudge in 1984. He is a mem-




Judge McWilliams was born in Salina,
Kansas, in 1916 and moved to Denver in
1927 where he has lived since. He received
his A.B. and'LL.B. degrees from the Uni-
versity of Denver. In 1971, he was awarded
an Honorary Doctor of Law degree from
the University.
During World War II, Judge McWil-
liams served in the United States Army and
was with the Office of Strategic Services.
He has served as a Deputy District Attorney
and as a Colorado District CourtJudge. In
1961, Judge McWilliams was elected to the
Colorado Supreme Court where he served
until he was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in
1970. In 1984, he assumed senior status.
Judge McWilliams is a member of Phi
Beta Kappa, Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi
Delta Phi, and Kappa Sigma.
SENIOR JUDGE
JAMES E. BARRETT
Judge Barrett was born in Lusk, Wyo-
ming in 1922. He is the son of the late
Frank A. Barrett, who served as Wyoming's
Congressman, Governor and United States
Senator. Judge Barrett attended the Uni-
versity of Wyoming for two years prior to
his service in the Army during World War
II. Following the war, he attended Saint
Catherine's College at Oxford University
and Catholic University of America and re-
ceived his LL.B. from the University of Wy-
oming Law School in 1949. In 1973, he
received the Distinguished Alumni Award
from the University of Wyoming.
Judge Barrett was in private practice in
Lusk, Wyoming for eighteen years. He also
served as County and Prosecuting Attorney
for Niobrara County, Town Attorney for
the towns of Lusk and Manville and attor-
ney for the Niobrara County Consolidated
School District. From 1967 until 1971,
Judge Barrett served as Attorney General
for the State of Wyoming. In 1971, he was
appointed to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. In 1987, he
assumed senior status.
Judge Barrett was a member of theJu-
dicial Conference Subcommittee on Fed-
eral Jurisdiction, the United States Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review,
and was a trustee of Saint Joseph's Chil-
dren's Home.
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In Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co.,' the Supreme Court held that
where a notice of appeal fails to adequately describe all appealing par-
ties, a court lacks jurisdiction over the appeal of the unnamed parties.
2
Despite Torres, federal circuit courts continuously receive notices of ap-
peal that fail to specifically name the appealing parties. Recently, the
Tenth Circuit in Storage Technology Corp. v. United States District Court 3 held
that each appealing party must be specifically named in the notice of
appeal or in a functionally equivalent document that is filed within the
time period required for a notice of appeal.4 The Tenth Circuit's ex-
traordinary remedy of a writ of mandamus, which ordered the district
court to dismiss approximately 68 appellants not named in the notice of
appeal, underscored its strong belief that the notice of appeal must be
absolutely unambiguous. 5 Despite the import of Torres and its progeny
and the ease with which Rule 3(c) is satisfied, deficient notices of appeal
are continuously filed and unnamed parties suffer the harsh conse-
quences of dismissal for failure to comply with Rule 3(c) requirements.
6
II. STATUTORY REQUIREMENTS UNDERLYING FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 3
"The notice of appeal shall specify the party or parties taking the
appeal; shall designate the judgment, order or part thereof appealed
from; and shall name the court to which the appeal is taken." 7 The Ad-
visory Committee Notes to Rule 3 indicate that "[b]ecause the timely
filing of a notice of appeal is 'mandatory and jurisdictional,' compliance
* NancyJ. Gegenheimer, Partner, Holme Roberts & Owen, Denver, Colorado; B.A.
University of Colorado at Boulder, 1975; J.D. University of Denver, 1978. Ms.
Gegenheimer specializes in trial and appellate work. The author wishes to thank Sheryl A.
Rogers, Associate, Holme Roberts & Owen, for her assistance with this Article.
1. 487 U.S. 312 (1988).
2. Id. at 314.
3. 934 F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1991).
4. Id. at 248.
5. Id. at 248 (an appellate court can not be relegated to the vagaries of belatedly
trying to determine who the appropriate appealing parties may be).
6. Torres, 487 U.S. at 318 (harshness of the result is imposed by the legislature and
not by the judicial process).
7. FED. R. App. P. 3(c) (Rule 3 and Rule 4 combined require timely filing).
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with the provisions of [the] rules is of the utmost importance."'8 In the
past, however, courts have dispensed with literal compliance with the
rules in cases where the time of filing can not fairly be exacted.9 Such an
approach restates the provisions found in Civil Procedure Rule 5(c)' °
and Criminal Procedure Rule 37.1 1 Accordingly, courts have historically
placed substance over form in construing the contents of the notice of
appeal. 12
Recognizing this judicial preference, one well known authority on
federal practice and procedure writes:
Defects in the wording of the notice of appeal are generally
overlooked if the true intentions of the appellant can fairly be
ascertained, if the courts have not been misled, and if the other
parties have suffered no prejudice. The notice is not to be
parsed on a technical basis; nor is the appellant to be deprived
of his right to appeal because he has misspelled a party's name
or misdesignated the court to which the appeal is being
taken. 
1 3
Courts therefore, in the interest of expediting decisions or for other
good cause shown, may suspend the requirements of the appellate rules
in a particular case on application of a party or on its own motion, and
the court may order proceedings in accordance with its direction.
14
While the courts may exercise their power to enlarge the time pre-
scribed by the rules to do "any act," Rule 26(b) strictly prohibits enlarg-
ing the time permitted for filing a notice of appeal.' 5 Upon a showing of
excusable neglect or good cause, however, Rule 4(a)(5) permits the dis-
trict court to extend the time for filing a notice of appeal upon a motion
filed not later than 30 days after the time prescribed by Rule 4(a).' 6 The
8. Id. (advisory committee note citing United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 224
(1960)). See also PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO THE UNrrED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
TENTH ClRcurr 13 (1989) ("[p]rescribed times for filing a notice of appeal are jurisdic-
tional and may not be extended by the court of appeals.").
9. Id. See, e.g., Fallen v. United States, 378 U.S. 139, 144 (1964) (notice of appeal by
a prisoner, in the form of a letter, delivered to prison authorities for mailing well within
the time fixed for appeal, was held timely filed notwithstanding that it was received by the
clerk after expiration of the time for appeal; the appellant "did all he could" to effect
timely filing); Richey v. Wilkins, 335 F.2d I (2d Cir. 1964) (notice filed in the court of
appeals by a prisoner without assistance of counsel held sufficient); Halfen v. United
States, 324 F.2d 52 (10th Cir. 1963) (notice mailed to district judge in time to have been
received by him in normal course held sufficient); Riffle v. United States, 299 F.2d 802 (5th
Cir. 1962) (letter by prisoner to judge of court of appeals held sufficient).
10. FED. R. Civ. P. 5(c).
11. FED. R. CRIM. P. 37.
12. See, e.g., Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974).
13. 16 CHARLES WRIGHT, KENNETH A. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCE-
DURE § 3949, 355-56 (1977) [hereinafter.WRIGHT] citing Hoiness v. United States, 335
U.S. 297 (1948); Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178 (1962) (the Supreme Court has insisted
that notices of appeal are to be construed liberally rather than hypertechnically). How-
ever, not all courts adopted a liberal construction of Rule 3(c). See, e.g., Van Hoose v.
Eidson, 450 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1971); Farley Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co.,
778 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1985).
14. FED. R. App. P. 2.
15. FED. R. App. P. 26(b).
16. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) (the 1991 amendment to FED. R. App. P. 4, which added
subdivision 6, permits a district court to reopen the time for appeal for a period of 14 days
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Tenth Circuit has strictly construed excusable neglect and does not ex-
tend it to palpable mistakes by lawyers that are merely too busy,17 how-
ever, the Fifth Circuit does indicate that there should be flexibility in
granting extensions of time to file a notice of appeal.' 8 For these rea-
sons, if a defective notice of appeal is filed omitting the name of one or
more appellants, and an appellant attempts to use the extension pro-
vided for in Rule 4(a)(5) to cure the notice of appeal, a motion for leave
to amend the notice to include the unnamed parties must be filed within
the time limit for filing the notice of appeal.' 9 If the appellant fails to
file the motion to amend within the prescribed time period, the court
will not have jurisdiction over the unnamed parties.
20
As an example, the First Circuit in In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel
Fire Litigation,21 allowed an extension of time to file a notice of appeal
under Rule 4(a)(5) because the appellant had failed to specifically name
all parties. 22 The original notice of appeal designated the appellant as
"Plaintiffs Steering Committee" but had failed to specifically name all
2,000 appellants. The appellants sought leave in the district court pur-
suant to Rule 4(a)(5), to extend the original filing time so that a cor-
rected notice of appeal specifically listing each appellant's name could
be filed. In affirming the district court's grant of a time extension, the
First Circuit found that the appellants' conduct may have been "excusa-
ble" in that: (1) the notice may have been adequate as filed since the
Steering Committee by its very nature represented all plaintiffs; (2) the
plaintiffs group was of extraordinary size; and (3) the original notice was
reasonable under the circumstances. 23 Additionally, the district court
had jurisdiction to consider the motion for extension of time because
the defective notice of appeal did not deprive it ofjurisdiction over the
unnamed parties who, in effect, had not appealed.
24
from the date of entry of the order reopening the time for appeal if the district court finds:
(a) that a party entitled to notice of the entry of a judgment or order did not receive such
notice from the clerk or any party within 21 days of its entry, and (b) that no party would
be prejudiced by reopening. The motion to reopen must be filed within 180 days of the
entry ofjudgment or within 7 days of receipt of notice from the clerk, whichever is earlier.
FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(6)).
17. Maryland Casualty Co. v. Conner, 382 F.2d 13 (10th Cir. 1967) "The Committee
intended that the standard of excusable neglect remain a strict one, however. [lit is not
meant to cover the usual excuse that the lawyer is too busy .... " Id. at 16.
18. Chipser v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 600 F.2d 1061 (5th Cir. 1979). Under amended
Rule 4(a), flexibility is intended in the granting of extensions but the amendment does not
apply in this case. Id. at 1063 n.2.
19. Because of the limited circumstance set forth in FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(6), this subdi-
vision would not assist an appellant who failed to designate the appealing parties. See supra
note 16.
20. Kowaleski v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs, 879 F.2d
1173, 1177 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990) (citing Torres v. Oakland
Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312 (1988)).
21. 888 F.2d 940 (Ist Cir. 1989).
22. Id. at 942.
23. Id. Cf. 650 Park Ave. Corp. v. McRae, 836 F.2d 764, 767 (2d Cir. 1988) (excusable
neglect must be based either on acts of someone other than appellant or his counsel or
some extraordinary event).
24. Id. See Baylis v. Marriott Corp., 906 F.2d 874 (2d Cir. 1990); Torres, 487 U.S. at
317 (courts of appeal have no jurisdiction over parties not named in an appeal).
1992]
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Rule 4(a)(4) provides that if a timely post-trial motion is filed in the
district court by any party under Rule 59, the time for filing an appeal
runs from entry of an order granting or denying the motion.25 A notice
of appeal filed before the disposition of the motion has no effect. 26 A
new notice of appeal must be filed within the prescribed time measured
from the entry of the order denying the Rule 59 motion. Rule 4(a) re-
quires that a notice of appeal be filed 30 days after a final judgment or
order, except the United States or an officer or agency thereof has 60
days.2 7 Unfortunately, a combination of the language from the Advisory
Committee's Notes suggesting that literal compliance is not required,
the Notes' reliance on opinions which liberally construe the require-
ments of Rule 3(c), and the language from Wright 28 have caused appel-
lants to relax the vigilance required in filing a notice of appeal. Of
paramount importance in the Advisory Committee's language is that the
timely filing of a notice of appeal is mandatory andjurisdictional. 2 9 This
means that a defective notice of appeal can not be cured after the time
for filing because this would be the equivalent of extending the time for
filing a notice of appeal.
3 0
III. TORRES V. OAKLAND SCAVENGER Co.
Jose Torres was one of sixteen plaintiffs who intervened in an em-
ployment discrimination suit after receiving notice of the action pursu-
ant to a settlement agreement between Oakland Scavenger and the
original plaintiffs. After the district court dismissed the intervenors'
complaint, Mr. Torres filed an appeal in the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and re-
manded the case for further proceedings.3 l The result of a clerical error
by the secretary ofJose Torres's attorney, was the omission of Torres's
name from both the notice of appeal and the order of the court of ap-
peals.3 2 On remand, Oakland Scavenger moved for a partial summary
judgment against Mr. Torres arguing that the prior dismissal was final
by virtue of Torres's failure to appeal.3 3 The district court granted Oak-
land Scavenger's motion and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that
"[u]nless a party is named in the notice of appeal, the appellate court
does not have jurisdiction over him."'3 4 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in order to resolve the conflict among the circuits as to
25. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(iv). See also FED. R. Civ. P. 59.
26. Barnett v. Petro-Tex Chemical Corp., 893 F.2d 800, 804 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. de-
nied, 110 S. Ct. 3274 (1990) (pendency of motion renders notice of appeal nullity).
27. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(1).
28. See supra text accompanying note 13.
29. FED. R. App. P. 3 (advisory committee's note).
30. Torres, 487 U.S. at 315 (permitting courts to exercise jurisdiction over unnamed
parties after time for filing notice has passed is equivalent to permitting courts to ex-
tending time for filing notice of appeal).
31. Bonilla v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 697 F.2d 1297 (9th Cir. 1982).
32. Torres, 487 U.S. at 313.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 314 (quoting Martinez v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 807 F.2d 178 (9th Cir.
1986)).
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whether a failure to file a notice of appeal in accordance with the speci-
ficity requirements of Rule 3(c), presents a jurisdictional bar to the
appeal.
3 5
The Supreme Court held that the specificity requirement of Rule
3(c) is met only by some designation that gives fair notice of the specific
individual or entity seeking to appeal.3 6 Failure to name a party in the
notice of appeal constitutes a failure of that party to timely file a notice
of appeal.3 7 Failure to timely file a notice of appeal deprives the court of
jurisdiction.3 8 Accordingly, an appeal is not perfected where a party:
(1) was never named or otherwise designated on the notice of appeal;
(2) did not file the functional equivalent of the notice of appeal; and (3)
did not seek leave to amend the notice of appeal within the time limit
prescribed by Rule 4.39 In so holding, the Court noted that although
Rule 2 gives courts the power "for good cause" to suspend the require-
ments of the rules, courts may not waive the jurisdictional requirements
of Rules 3 and 4.40 The Court recognized that construing Rule 3(c) as a
jurisdictional prerequisite would occasionally lead to a harsh result, but
held this was the only manner in which to ensure that both the opposi-
tion and the court could be certain of the identity of the appellants.
4 1
The last sentence to Rule 3(c) states that "[a]n appeal shall not be dis-
missed for informality of form or title of the notice of appeal."'4 2 The
Supreme Court explained that the Advisory Committee Note stating
"the court should dispense with literal compliance in cases in which it
cannot fairly be exacted" refers generally to cases later addressed by the
1979 amendment. 43 Permitting imperfect but substantial compliance
with a technical requirement is not the same as waiving the requirement
altogether as a jurisdictional threshold.
4 4
Strict compliance with Rule 3 is of utmost importance because juris-
dictional hurdles can never be waived by a court.4 5 No party need raise
the jurisdiction question because it is the duty of the court to determine,
sua sponte, whether it has jurisdiction over a case before it.46 Accord-
35. Torres, 487 U.S. at 314 n.1 (comparing Farley Transp. Co. v. Santa Fe Trail
Transp. Co., 778 F.2d 1365, 1368-1370 (9th Cir. 1985) (failure to specify party to appeal is
jurisdictional bar); Covington v. Allsbrook, 636 F.2d 63, 64 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451
U.S. 914 (1981); Life Time Doors, Inc. v. Walled Lake Door Co. 505 F.2d 1165, 1168 (6th
Cir. 1974), with Ayres v. Sears, Roebuck & Co. 789 F.2d 1173, 1177 (5th Cir. 1986) (ap-
peal by party not named in notice of appeal is permitted in limited instances); Harrison v.
United States, 715 F.2d 1311, 1312-1313 (8th Cir. 1983); Williams v. Frey, 551 F.2d 932,
934 n.1 (3rd Cir. 1977)).
36. Torres, 487 U.S. at 318.
37. Id. at 314.
38. Id. at 315-17.
39. Id. at 314-18.
40. Id. at 317.
41. Id. at 318.
42. FED. R. App. P. 3(c) (sentence added by the 1979 amendments).
43. Torres, 487 U.S. at 315.
44. Torres, 487 U.S. at 315-16.
45. Id. at 315. See also FED. R. App. P. 3 (advisory committee's notes).
46. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 541 (1986); Masquerade
Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 664 (3d Cir. 1990); Griffith v.Johnston,
899 F.2d 1427. 1429 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 712 (1991); Kowaleski v. Direc-
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ingly, if a party fails to perfect an appeal as required by Rules 3 and 4,
the court is powerless to invoke its equitable discretion to assist that
party.47 Rules 3 and 4 as construed in Torres, therefore, require the
court "to insist on punctilious, literal, and exact compliance" with the
requirement in Rule 3(c) that the "notice of appeal ... shall specify the
party taking the appeal."'48 Torres and its progeny illustrate the necessity
for lawyers to be familiar with applicable legal procedural rules and to
comply with them. The requirement of Rule 3(c) that the notice of ap-
peal specify the party or parties taking the appeal serves two purposes:
1) finality, in that courts of appeals may not exercise jurisdiction over
unnamed parties after the time for filing notice of appeal has passed;
and 2) fairness, because the requirement provides notice to the opposi-
tion and to the court of the identity of the appellant or appellants.
4 9
IV. PRE-TORRES CASE LAW
A. Strict Compliance with Rule 3(c)
Prior to Torres, several circuits had already interpreted Rule 3(c) to
require strict compliance. In Farley Transportation Co. v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co., 50 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals found that a lit-
eral interpretation of Rule 3(c) created a bright line distinction and
avoided the need to determine which parties were actually before the
court long after the notice of appeal had been filed. 5 1 In Farley, only one
company was named as an appellant, and a related entity was omitted by
clerical error. The Ninth Circuit held that the named company was the
only appellant before the court of appeals. Similarly, in Van Hoose v.
Eidson,5 2 four students were denied relief by the district court in declar-
ing a hair code unconstitutional. The subsequent notice of appeal
named "Van Hoose et al." as the appellants. The Sixth Circuit dismissed
all parties but Van Hoose, holding that "[t]he term et al. does not inform
any other party or any court as to which of the plaintiffs desire to appeal
in this case." 53 In a separate patent infringement case,54 the Sixth Cir-
cuit dismissed an appeal because the notice of appeal named only the
patent licensee and not the patent owner who is the only person having
tor, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs, 879 F.2d 1173, 1174 (3d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990); Spiess v. C. Itoh & Co., 725 F.2d 970, 971 (5th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984); In re Kutner, 656 F.2d 1107, 1110 (5th Cir. 1981), cert.
denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982). See also Smith v. White, 857 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1988) (appeal
dismissed sua sponte because untimely).
47. See e.g., Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663, 664 (3d
Cir. 1990).
48. Kowaleski v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs, 879 F.2d
1173, 1176 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Allen Archery, Inc. v. Precision Shooting Equip. Inc.,
857 F.2d 1176, 1177 (7th Cir. 1988)), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990).
49. DeLuca v. Long Island Lighting Co., 862 F.2d 427, 429 (2d Cir. 1988).
50. 778 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1985).
51. Id. at 1369.
52. 450 F.2d 746 (6th Cir. 1971).
53. Id. at 747.
54. Life Time Doors, Inc. v. Walled Lake Door Co., 505 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1974).
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a claim for infringement.55 Finally, in Covington v. Allsbrook,56 the Fourth
Circuit required actual signing by pro se parties desiring to join in the
appeal noting "[tihe only means of determining which litigants are in-
terested in pursuing an appeal is by requiring each pro se party to per-
sonally sign the notice of appeal."
5 7
B. Liberal Compliance with Rule 3(c)
Prior to Torres, the Fifth, Eighth, Seventh and Third Circuits permit-
ted appeals in limited instances by parties not named in the notice of
appeal.58 The Third Circuit allowed amendments to the notice of ap-
peal despite its own language admonishing attorneys in multi-party
cases to designate, with specificity, which parties were appealing.59 In
exercising jurisdiction over the unnamed parties, each court found there
was no surprise, prejudice or detrimental reliance present.60 Each court
relied upon language such as that cited ih the Advisory Committee
Notes to Rule 3 and in Wright,6 1 which suggest that courts dispense with
literal compliance to the rules. Further, the courts relied upon language
from the United States Supreme Court indicating that the rules are to be
liberally construed and that "mere technicalities" should not stand in
the way of consideration of a case on its merits.6 2 For example, in Foman
v. Davis,63 the district court dismissed the plaintiff's complaint on the
grounds that the oral agreement on which the complaint was based was
unenforceable under the statute of frauds.64 The plaintiff filed a motion
to vacate the judgment and to amend the complaint to assert a right of
recovery in quantum meruit. The district court denied the motion and
the plaintiff filed a notice of appeal. 65 The court of appeals dismissed
the appeal from the first judgment because the first notice of appeal was
premature and the second notice did not specify that the plaintiff was
appealing both judgments. 66 The Supreme Court reversed, holding the
55. Id. at 1168.
56. 636 F.2d 63 (4th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 914 (1981).
57. Id. at 64. See also, Oxendine v. Williams, 509 F.2d 1405 (4th Cir. 1978) (per
curiam) (competence of a layman representing himself is too limited to allow him to risk
the rights of others by representing them in a class action in which he proceeds pro se).
58. Ayres v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F.2d 1173 (5th Cir. 1986) (notice of appeal
failed to name additional party. The court permitted party to be an appellant noting lack
of prejudice.); Harrison v. United States, 715 F.2d 1311 (8th Cir. 1983) (court recalled its
mandate and allowed the notice of appeal to be amended to add party); Williams v. Frey,
551 F.2d 932, 934 n.1 (3d Cir. 1977) (permitting addition of two unnamed appellants);
Brubaker v. Board of Education, 502 F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965
(1975).
59. Williams v. Frey, 551 F.2d 932 (3d Cir. 1977) (two unnamed parties added as
appellants); Samuel v. University of Pittsburgh, 506 F.2d 355, 356-57 n.1 (3d Cir. 1974)
(attorneys in multi-party cases must designate with specificity which parties are appealing
and which are not).
60. E.g., Ayers v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 789 F:2d 1173, 1177 (5th Cir. 1986).
61. See WRIGHT supra note 13.
62. Id.
63. 371 U.S. 178 (1962).
64. Id. at 179.
65. Id.
66. Foman v. Davis, 292 F.2d 85, 87 (1st Cir. 1961), rev'd, 371 U.S. 178 (1962).
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court of appeals read the second notice too narrowly.6 7 The Court rea-
soned that the second notice "did not mislead or prejudice the respon-
dent" and that it was "contrary to the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure for decisions on the merits to be avoided on the basis of such
mere technicalities." 6 8
In Torres, the Court explained that Foman stood for the proposition
that the rules should be liberally construed to determine compliance
with the rules, but failure to comply with the rules can never be harmless
error because a litigant's failure to clear ajurisdictional hurdle can never
be "harmless" or waived by a court.69 The Court explained that the
mandatory nature of the time limit contained in Rule 4 would be vitiated
if courts of appeals were permitted to exercise jurisdiction over parties
not named in the notice of appeal.7 0 Permitting courts to exercise juris-
diction over unnamed parties after expiration of the filing time would be
the equivalent of permitting courts to extend the time for filing the no-
tice of appeal, which is not permitted under the appellate rules.7 1 For
this reason, Torres did not establish a new rule of law, it clarified an ambi-
guity.72 Only those circuits previously allowing amendments to the no-
tice of appeal have experienced a change in the law as a result of
Tortes.
73
V. NOTICE OF APPEAL AFTER TORRES
Once Torres confirmed that proper naming of an appellant in a no-
tice of appeal was a jurisdictional prerequisite, courts of appeals could
no longer open the door retroactively to allow an unnamed appellant to
be added to the notice of appeal. 74 As a result, appellate courts have
searched for ways to aid dilatory appellants who failed to specifically
name all appealing parties in the notice of appeal, struggling to construe
the existing notice of appeal as adequate. Analysis of the cases and par-
ties dismissed due to inadequate party name specifications, reveals that
dismissal occurs most frequently in cases where there are numerous ap-
pellants and an abbreviated form of caption is used to avoid the mun-
dane task of naming each of hundreds of appellants. 7 5 The defects fall
67. Id. at 181.
68. Id.
69. Torres, 487 U.S. at 316-17 n.l.
70. Id. at 315.
71. Id.
72. Akins v. Board of Governors, 867 F.2d 972, 974 (7th Cir. 1988).
73. Allen Archery, Inc. v. Precision Shooting Equip. Inc., 857 F.2d 1176, 1177 (7th
Cir. 1988); See also Akin v. Board. of Governors, 867 F.2d at 974 (Supreme Court re-
manded and directed court of appeals to reconsider earlier judgment that had found no-
tice of appeal adequate).
74. See Santos-Martinez v. Soto-Santiago, 863 F.2d 174, 175 (1st Cir. 1988) (Torres
made clear that the specificity as to who is appealing is a jurisdictional requirement).
75. See, e.g., Storage Technology Corp. v. United States Dist. Court, 934 F.2d 244
(10th Cir. 1991) (only one of 68 appellants named); Baylis v. Marriott Corp., 906 F.2d 874
(2d Cir. 1990) (one of 200 appellants named); In re San Juan Dupont Plaza Hotel Fire
Litig., 888 F.2d 940 (1st Cir. 1989) (over 2,000 plaintiffs appealed but only steering com-
mittee was named); Shatah v. Shearson/American Express Inc., 873 F.2d 550 (2d Cir.
1989) (only first named plaintiff in three of 25 consolidated cases named in notice of ap-
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into one of four categories: (1) failure to name the party in any fashion
in either the notice of appeal or a functionally equivalent document; (2)
naming the party in some representative capacity as opposed to listing
the name of each individual appellant; (3) use of "et al." together with a
plural designation of plaintiffs or defendants in the body of the notice;
and (4) omission of a name from the notice of appeal, but the name is
present in some other timely filed document which may serve as the
functional equivalent of the notice of appeal.
A. Complete Absence of Appellant's Name
Omitting the appellant's name from the notice is common. Most
courts, however, find that if the appellant's name appears somewhere in
the notice of appeal body or caption, the court has jurisdiction over the
appellant. 76 Appellants who are not named anywhere within the notice
of appeal are considered to have failed to perfect an appeal.
7 7
B. Naming the Appellant in a Representative Capacity
In Brown v. Palmer,78 failure to designate the capacity in which the
party is appealing does not render the notice of appeal ineffective. 79 In
Brown, Peterson Air Force Base Commander James 0. Palmer, and
Colonel Eugene T.M. Cullinane, the Commanding Officer of the Head-
quarters of the Air Forces' 3rd Support Wing, were sued in their official
capacities. Plaintiffs sought preliminary injunctions allowing them to at-
tend an open house on Peterson Air Force Base and sought declaration
that bar letters issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1382 violated the First
Amendment. The notice of appeal read "Joan Brown et al., Plaintiff-
peal) Gonzalez-Vega v. Hernandez-Colon, 866 F.2d 519 (1st Cir. 1989) (one appellant
named and the remaining 143 represented by et al.).
76. Tri-Crown, Inc. v. American Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 908 F.2d 578, 580 (10th Cir.
1990) (party named in caption not required to be named in the body; caption should be
looked at as part of the entire notice); Mariani-Giron v. Acevedo-Ruiz, 877 F.2d 1114,
1116 (Ist Cir. 1989) (caption should be looked at as part of the entire notice). Butsee Pride
v. Venango River Corp., 916 F.2d 1250 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1696 (1991)
(naming a party in the caption of the notice of appeal or in collateral documents does not
satisfy the specificity requirement of Rule 3(c)); Bigby v. City of Chicago, 871 F.2d 54, 57
(7th Cir. 1989) Allen Archery Inc. v. Precision Shooting Equip. Inc., 857 F.2d 1176, 1177
(7th Cir. 1988).
77. Pratt v. Petroleum Prod. Management, Inc., 920 F.2d 651, 655 (10th Cir. 1990)
(only the named company properly appealed); Barnett v. Petro-Tex Chemical Corp., 893
F.2d 800, 805 (5th Cir. 1990) (body of timely filed notice of appeal named only one party;
court held he was the only appellant and therefore refused to exercise jurisdiction over the
appeals of 56 other parties); Main-Piazza v. Aponte-Roque, 873 F.2d 432, 433 (1st Cir.
1989) (only the party named in the notice of appeal is properly before the court); DeLuca
v. Long Island Lighting Co., 862 F.2d 427,429 (2d Cir. 1988) (judgment imposed Rule 11
sanctions against attorney; notice of appeal was filed in the name of the client; award of
sanctions runs only to the attorney as the party in interest and therefore the attorney must
appeal in his or her own name); In re Woosley, 855 F.2d 687, 688 (10th Cir. 1988) (Torres
is controlling. An unnamed appellant fails to appeal); See also Riggs v. Scrivner, Inc., 927
F.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 196 (1991) (court lacked jurisdiction
over attorney against whom sanctions had been imposed since notice failed to list the
name of the attorney).
78. 915 F.2d 1435 (10th Cir. 1990), aff'd reh'g, 944 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1991).
79. Id. at 1439-40.
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Appellee v. Colonel James 0. Palmer et al. Defendants-Appellant." 8 0
The notice of appeal did not indicate whether Colonel Palmer was filing
the appeal in his official capacity or as commander of Peterson Air Force
Base. 8 ' The Tenth Circuit held that the United States had perfected its
appeal because the appellee and the court had the requisite fair notice of
the specific individuals or entities seeking to appeal.8 2 Further, the
court held that the appellees clearly understood that an appeal by Colo-
nel Palmer was in effect an appeal by the United States. The court rea-
soned that since the appellees had sued Colonel Palmer and Colonel
Cullinane only in their official capacity, designation of one or the other
was sufficient to perfect the appeal by the United States.
8 3
In King v. Otasco, Inc.,8 4 a father failed to specify in the notice of
appeal that he brought the suit individually and on behalf of his chil-
dren. The Fifth Circuit found that the children did not sue as independ-
ent parties and, therefore, the case did not concern itself with the
omission of a party from the notice of appeal but rather a party's failure
to designate all the capacities in which the suit was brought.8 5 Because
Mr. King was in fact the appellant, suing on behalf of himself and his
children, the notice properly warns of a pending appeal.8 6 However,
the named appellant must truly be acting in a representative capacity.
The designation "partnership" is insufficient to confer jurisdiction over
individual partners. In McLemore v. Landry, 8 7 River Villa was a partner-
ship composed of fifteen partners. Landry, one of River Villa's partners,
acted as an agent and an attorney in fact for River Villa and all but three
of the partners in certain land transactions. When the partnership de-
faulted on the loans securing the land transactions, the lender sued and
a judgment was entered in its favor.8 8 The parternership's notice of ap-
peal read, "[C]omes River Villa, A Partnership, and the respective indi-
vidual partners therein, defendants.., and moves this Court to allow an
appeal .... ",89 The Fifth Circuit held that the notice of appeal con-
ferred the court's jurisdiction solely over River Villa, the partnership.
The court stated:
80. Failure to name appellees is immaterial because FED. R. App. P. 3(c) does not
require specificity in naming the appellees. See, e.g., International Union, United Auto.,
Aerospace & Agric. Implement Workers v. United Screw & Bolt Corp., 941 F.2d 466 (6th
Cir. 1991); Haas v. Farmers Ins. Group, 930 F.2d 33 (10th Cir. 1991); Longmire v. Guste,
921 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1991); Chathas v. Smith, 884 F.2d 980, 986 n.3 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Fed. R. App. P. 3(c) requires specificity of appellants and does not require appellees to be
specified), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1095 (1990). But see Kinnell v. Roberts, 931 F.2d 63 (10th
Cir. 1991) (only two named appellees were parties to the appeal).
81. Brown, 915 F.2d at 1439.
82. Id.
83. Id See also Battle v. Anderson, 946 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1991) (official capacity
suits are an exception to the general rule of Torres); King v. Otasco, Inc., 861 F.2d 438, 443
(5th Cir. 1988) (failure to designate the capacity in which a party appeals does not render
notice of appeal ineffective).
84. 861 F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1988).
85. Id. at 443.
86. Id.
87. 898 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1990).
88. Id. at 999.
89. Id.
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[T]his case demonstrates the problem inherent in assuming
that a generic designation, without more, automatically covers
all persons ostensibly aligned on one side of litigation. River
Villa is composed of 15 partners. Interplan Development, Inc.,
of which Landry is president, is one. As noted, it was named as
a third-party defendant by River Villa. Its interests obviously
are not consistent with the interests of the other partners.
90
In Kowaleski v. Department of Labor,9 1 Peter Kowaleski sued for black
lung benefits. Although Kowaleski's wife Anna died five years prior to
initiation of the suit, an Administrative Law Judge inexplicably entered
the order "Anna Kowaleski, widow of Peter Kowaleski" as the claim-
ant.92 Upon loosing the suit, Mr. Kowaleski filed a notice of appeal in
the name of "Anna Kowaleski, widow of Peter Kowaleski." While noting
that Anna Kowaleski could not be Peter Kowaleski's' widow because she
had predeceased him, the appellate court dismissed the appeal for lack
of a real party in interest since Peter Kowaleski died in the interim and
the benefits could only be awarded to, the claimant or a survivor of the
claimant. Unfortunately, Kowaleski's attorney was not permitted to
amend the notice to change the name of the appellant to Charles
Kowaleski, son of Peter Kowaleski.
93
In certified class actions, the designated representative of the class
may be named in the notice of appeal. 94 In Al-Jundi v. Estate of Rockefel-
ler, 95 the court upheld an appeal by the entire class,, although the notice
of appeal named only Al-Jundi as the appellant. The court held that the
other members of the class were designated by implication since the
amended complaint listed all plaintiffs as representatives of the plain-
tiffs' class. The Second Circuit found that both the Estate of Rockefeller




Post-Torres courts of appeal have dealt with innumerable designa-
tions, other than specifically naming the individual or entities, which ar-
guably give fair notice of the specific individual or entity seeking to
90. I.d at 1000 n.6. See also Dalton Dev. Project v. Unsecured Creditors Comm., 948
F.2d 678 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that each partnership must be specifically named in the
notice of appeal); Wise v. Parkman, 932 F.2d 745 (8th Cir. 1991) (inclusion of Sheriff's
name acting in official capacity was insufficient to confer 'jurisdiction over the county,
where state law did not give the sheriff authority to appeal judgments against the county).
See also United States v. Spurgeon, 861 F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1988) (no person asserting
the interest of the trust, nor the trust were named as appellants, trust failed to appeal).
91. 879 F.2d 1173 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070 (1990).
92. Id. at 1174.
93. Id.
94. See e.g., AlJundi v. Estate of Rockefeller, 885 F.2d 1060, 1060 n.1 (2d Cir. 1989);
Renden v. AT&T Technologies, 883 F.2d 388, 398 n.8 (5th Cir. 1989). See also Cotton v.
U.S. Pipe & Foundry Co., 856 F.2d 158, 161 (11 th Cir. 1988) (certified class had settled,
only named appellants Cotton and Herod were proper appellants).
95. 885 F.2d 1060 (2d Cir. 1989).
96. Id. at 1061 (citing King v. Otasco Inc., .861 F.2d 438, 442-43 (5th Cir. 1988)).
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appeal. The Torres court stated that "the specificity requirement of Rule
3(c) is met only by some designation that gives fair notice of the specific
individual or entity seeking to appeal."
'9 7
In Laidley v. McClain,98 only one of four plaintiffs was named in the
notice of appeal followed by the "et al." designation. The Tenth Circuit
dismissed the remaining unnamed plaintiffs for lack of jurisdiction. 99
Similarly, in Pratt v. Petroleum Production Mgmt., Inc. Employee Savings Plan
& Trust, 10 0 the caption contained what the court referred to as "the
troublesome et al. designation."10 lIn Pratt, the caption named only "Pe-
troleum Production Management Employees Savings Plan et al." as the
appellant, and the body of the notice stated "[n]otice is hereby given
that Petroleum Production Management Inc. Employee Savings Plan
and Trust et al., defendants above named hereby appeal .... -"102 The
Tenth Circuit, citing Laidley as its most extensive analysis of Torres, re-
jected the argument that the use of the plural "defendants" gave fair
notice of the entity seeking to appeal. 10 3 In support of its decision, the
Tenth Circuit cited the Sixth Circuit's opinion in Minority Employees v.
Tennessee Dept. of Employee Security 10 4 and the First Circuit's opinion in
Rosario-Torres v. Hernandez-Colon.105
In Minority Employees, the Sixth Circuit sitting en banc reversed its
holding in Ford v. Nicks, 106 finding that a named corporate appellant fol-
lowed by the et al. designation was inadequate identification of the par-
ties and therefore inconsistent with Torres.'0 7 As long as the party
names appeared anywhere on the face of the notice of appeal it might be
sufficient although it is preferable that the name of each party appear in
the body of the notice itself.' 0 8 In Rosario-Torres, only one of nine appel-
lants was named in the notice of appeal.' 0 9 Although the body of the
notice stated "[niotice is hereby given that plaintiffs through their un-
dersigned attorneys, appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit from the final judgment entered in the case of caption,"
the First Circuit found that only Miguel Rosario-Torres, the one appel-
lant named in the caption, was properly before the court.1 10 The First
Circuit stated unequivocally that inserting the words et al. can not fulfill
the mandate of Rule 3(c) and for this reason the notice is wholly inade-
97. Torres, 487 U.S. at 318.
98. 914 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1990).
99. Id. at 1388.
100. 920 F.2d 651 (10th Cir. 1990).
101. Id at 654.
102. Ia
103. Id at 655.
104. 901 F.2d 1327 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 210 (1990).
105. 889 F.2d 314 (1st Cir. 1989) (en banc).
106. 866 F.2d 865 (6th Cir. 1989) (however inartful the "et al." designation may be in
identifying the defendants in addition to Nicks, when read with the words "the defend-
ants" in the body of the notice, the notice satisfactorily communicates that Nicks and the
other defendants from the court below are appealing).
107. Minority Employees, 901 F.2d at 1332.
108. Id. at 1335.
109. Rosario-Torres, 889 F.2d at 317.
110. Id.
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quate as to the identification of the remaining plaintiffs.I1 1
When courts reject the use of the troublesome term "et al.," there
is often a factual basis for their denial peculiar to the circumstances of
the case. In Torres, the Supreme Court stated:
The purpose of the specificity requirement of Rule 3(c) is to
provide notice both to the opposition and to the court of the
identity of the appellant or appellants. The use of the phrase
"et al.," which literally means 'and others' utterly fails to pro-
vide such notice to either intended recipient. Permitting such
vague designation would leave the appellee and the court un-
able to determine with certitude whether a losing party not
named in the notice of appeal should be bound by an adverse
judgment or held liable for costs or sanctions.
1 12
This language could be construed as rejecting. any use of the phrase et
al., however, the plaintiffs in Torres purported to proceed on behalf of
themselves and others similarly situated even though no class was certi-
fied. In Torres, the et al. could have referred to a large class of unnamed
individuals or only a few. The Supreme Court did not make this distinc-
tion but the Fifth Circuit has so interpreted Torres.
113
In Storage Technology, the caption of the notice of appeal recited the
name of the appellants as "Comite Pro Rescate, et al, defendants-appel-
lants."' 114 The body of the notice of appeal stated: "Comite Pro
Rescate de la Salud, et al., and all the Defendants of record herein, ap-
peal to the District Court for the District of Colorado .... ,"115 The
district court declined to dismiss the unnamed appellants, finding there
was no ambiguity in the notice of appeal. The Tenth Circuit issued a
writ of mandamus to dismiss all unnamed appellants, holding that pre-
cedent dictates 1 6 that each appealing party must be specifically named
in the notice of appeal or a functionally equivalent document properly
listing the appealing parties and filed within the appeal period. 1 7 Here,
the list of defendants in the body of the notice was not helpful because
of the three complaints filed, no two listed the same defendants. "Thus,
the reviewing court is left to somehow determine the identity of 'all the
Defendants of record herein' absent any clear point of reference. The
mischief created by this approach is exactly what Torres sought to elimi-
nate by the requirement of listing the appealing parties."
' 18
111. Id-
112. Torres, 487 U.S. at 318.
113. Pope v. Mississippi Real Estate Comm'n, 872 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1989) (only
two plaintiffs existed below, therefore, the et al. caption on the notice of appeal coupled
with "plaintiffs do hearby appeal" in the body of the notice is sufficient identification of the
parties).
114. Storage Technology, 934 F.2d at 246.
115. Id. at 245.
116. See Hubbert v. City of Moore, 923 F.2d 769, 772 (10th Cir. 1991); Laidley v. Mc-
Clain, 914 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1990); Pratt v. Petroleum Prod. Management Employees
Say. Plan & Trust, 920 F.2d 651, 655 (10th Cir. 1990).
117. Storage Technology, 934 F.2d at 248.
118. Id.
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In Santos-Martinez v. Soto-Santiago, 119 the First Circuit explained that
et al. was inadequate under circumstances where, although the notice
was purportedly filed on behalf of all plaintiffs, two of the plaintiffs vol-
untarily withdrew and the claims of a third plaintiff were not mentioned
anywhere in the appellants' brief.120 Accordingly, the court held that it
lacked jurisdiction over the appeals of the three remaining unnamed ap-
pellants who purportedly sought to appeal. 12 1 In Gonzalez-Vega v. Her-
nandez-Colon,122 the First Circuit again rejected the use of the
designation et al., but explained, "[a]s defendants point out, the show-
ing made below in the summary judgment proceedings was weak or
nonexistent as to some plaintiffs' claims making it all the more conceiva-
ble that fewer than all plaintiffs had decided to appeal."'
123
In Griffith v. Johnston,124 the Fifth Circuit indicated that four excep-
tions exist where the use of et al. would suffice for purposes of the notice
of appeal: (1) where only two parties are named in the lawsuit; (2) when
the notice lists only the representative in a class action; (3) where par-
ents sue on behalf of their children; and (4) a functional equivalent of
the notice is filed in a timely manner. 125 A description of each excep-
tion follows. First, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that if only two parties are
named in the lawsuit, the use of et al. would clearly refer to the unnamed
party. 12 6 Critical to the Fifth Circuit's analysis is that there be only one
appellant to which the "et al." could be referring. In Torres for example,
all defendants were specifically named except Jose Torres. If Jose
Torres was the only unnamed appellant, under the Fifth Circuit's rea-
soning in Pope v. Mississippi Real Estate Comm 'n, 12 7 the et al. designation
could only refer to Jose Torres. Torres is distinguished by the Fifth Cir-
cuit, however, because the plaintiffs purported to proceed on behalf of
themselves and other persons similarly situated. Although the phrase et
al. translates literally to "and others," the designation in Torres could
have referred to a large class of unnamed individuals as well as, or in-
stead of, Jose Torres. 12 8 The Fifth Circuit noted that in the case before
it there were only two plaintiffs, James and Mary Pope, and the body of
the notice of appeal used plural "plaintiffs" which could only include
119. 863 F.2d 174 (lst Cir. 1988).
120. Id. at 175-76.
121. Id. at 176.
122. 866 F.2d 519 (1st Cir. 1989).
123. Id. at 520.
124. 899 F.2d 1427 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, II S. Ct. 712 (1991).
125. Id. at 1430.
126. See, e.g., Chandler v. Barncastle, 919 F.2d 23, 25-26 (5th Cir. 1990) (use of et al. is
sufficient in the limited context of a two-party action where one of the parties is named,
since et al. can refer only to the one unnamed party); Pope v. Mississippi Real Estate
Comm'n, 872 F.2d 127, 129 (5th Cir. 1989) (where there are only two plaintiffs in the case
et al. could only refer to the unnamed plaintiff). The use of the designation et ux. which
means "and wife" has similarly been found to refer to an unnamed plaintiff. See, e.g., Mila-
novich v. Costa Crociere, 938 F.2d 297, 298 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Sweger v. Texaco, Inc., 930
F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1991).
127. 872 F.2d 127 (5th Cir. 1989).
128. Id. at 129.
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James and Mary Pope. 129 Accordingly, in the limited context of a two
party action, the Fifth Circuit distinguished Torres and found that the et
al. designation could only refer to Mary Pope.
Second, the notice of appeal may list only the class action represen-
tative. In Rendon v. AT&T Technologies,' 30 the notice of appeal desig-
nated "Gilbert Rendon, et al.," as the appellant.' 3 ' AT&T argued that
the phrase et al. gave no notice of the party seeking appeal. The Fifth
Circuit disagreed, holding that while AT&T's argument may have merit
where no class certification exists, the specificity requirements of Rule
3(c), as strictly construed in Torres, do not apply in actions where a class
has been certified.' 3 2 The court reasoned that since Rendon was desig-
nated the class representative below, his actions bound the entire class
and, therefore, the et al. designation was sufficient to bring the certified
class of plaintiffs under the court's jurisdiction.'
33
Third, parents can sue on their own behalf and on behalf of their
children.'34 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that when parents sue on their
own behalf and on behalf of their children, the et al. designation pre-
serves the appeal, because the opposing party could anticipate that the
parents would appeal in both their individual and their representative
capacities. 135 Finally, when the notice of appeal defectively employs the
et al. designation, the appellants can file a functionally equivalent docu-
ment within the 30 day deadline provided by Appellate Rule 4.136 Be-
cause there can be no ambiguity as to the identity of the appellants, the
safest route is to specifically name each appellant.' 3 7 Three circuits,
129. Id.
130. 883 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1989).
131. Id. at 398 n.8.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. King v. Otasco Inc., 861 F.2d 438, 443 (5th Cir. 1988).
135. Id.
136. Brotherhood of Ry. Carmen v. Atkinson, T. & S.F. Ry., 894 F.2d 1463, 1465 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 131 (1990).
137. Hubbert v. City of Moore, Okla. 923 F.2d 769, 772 (10th Cir. 1991); Pratt v. Pe-
troleum Prod. Management, Inc. Employee Savings Plan & Trust, 920 F.2d 651, 654 (10th
Cir. 1990); Laidley v. McClain, 914 F.2d 1386, 1389 (10th Cir. 1990); Tri-Crown, Inc. v.
American Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 908 F.2d 578, 580 (10th Cir. 1990). See, e.g., Walter v.
Int. Ass'n of Machinists Pension Fund, 949 F.2d 310, 312-13 (10th Cir. 1991); Resolution
Trust Corp. v. Sonny's Old Land Corp., 937 F.2d 128, 129 (5th Cir. 1991); Chennareddy
v. Bowsher, 935 F.2d 315, 318 n.2, (D.C. Cir. 1991); Biros v. Spalding-Evenflo Co., 934
F.2d 740, 742 (6th Cir. 1991); Pontarelli v. Stone, 930 F.2d 104, 108-109 (Ist Cir. 1991);
Moran v. Farrier, 924 F.2d 134, 136-37 (8th Cir. 1991); Samaad v. Dallas, 922 F.2d 216,
219 (5th Cir. 1991); Rivera v. Puerto Rico Tel. Co., 921 F.2d 393, 395 (1st Cir. 1990);
United States v. Tucson Mechanical Contracting, Inc., 921 F.2d 911, 913-14 (9th Cir.
1990); Delancey v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 918 F.2d 491, 493 (5th Cir. 1990);
Baylor v. United States Dept. of Hous. & Urban Dev., 913 F.2d 223, 224-25 (5th Cir.
1990); Barnett v. Petro-Tex Chem. Corp., 893 F.2d 800, 805 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 3274 (1990); Rosario-Torres v. Hernandez-Colon, 889 F.2d 314, 317 (1st Cir. 1989)
(the notice of appeal was sufficient to bring only the one named appellant before the court;
remaining eight plaintiffs failed to appeal); Mariani-Giron v. Acevedo-Ruiz, 877 F.2d 1114,
1116 (1st Cir. 1989); Shatah v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 873 F.2d 550 (2d Cir.
1989) (twenty-five cases were consolidated for pre-trial purposes, notice of appeal named
only first named plaintiff in three of the actions; all unnamed appellants failed to appeal);
Gonzalez-Vega v. Hernandez-Colon, 866 F.2d 519, 519-20 (1st Cir. 1989) (only one of
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however, have accepted generic designations finding there was no ambi-
guity under the particular facts of the case. 13 8
In National Center for Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. Immigration & Naturali-
zation Service,' 3 9 the Ninth Circuit considered whether the term "defend-
ants" fairly indicated that all and not just some of the defendants were
appealing. 14 0 The Ninth Circuit held that Torres did not require that the
individual names of the appealing parties be listed "in instances in which
a generic term, such as plaintiffs or defendants, adequately identifies
them."' 14 1 In so holding, the Ninth Circuit relied on the Sixth Circuit's
opinion in Ford,14 2 which the Sixth Circuit had since overruled with Mi-
nority Employees. 14 3 With the decision in Adkins v. United Mine Workers, 14 4
however, the Sixth Circuit has recently clarified Minority Employees and
accepted a generic designation of appellants.14 5 In Adkins, the Sixth Cir-
cuit distinguished Minority Employees in that its notice of appeal failed to
indicate more than one appellant. In Adkins, the notice of appeal ade-
quately alerted defendants that "all the plaintiffs" to the action below
sought to appeal.
14 6
The Ninth Circuit has continued to rely on the reasoning of Ford
and accept designations of the plural of defendant or plaintiff. In Cam-
mack v. Waihee,14 7 the caption read "Nell A. Cammack, et al.," and the
body stated "plaintiffs above-named hereby appeal .... -14 8 The court
relying on Ford, found that a bare reference to the plural plaintiffs in the
body of the notice, coupled with the use of et al. in the caption, clearly
indicated the plaintiffs' intention was that all of the plaintiffs be included
in the appeal.149 The court found that in order for the court to have
jurisdiction over the unnamed parties, the et al. designation in the cap-
tion must be coupled with the use of the plural term of plaintiffs or de-
144 plaintiffs was named in the notice of appeal, therefore the court had jurisdiction only
over the appeal of the named party). But see, Adkins v. United Mine Workers, 941 F.2d 392
(6th Cir. 1991) (6th Cir. 1991) (court refused to dismiss appeal on jurisdictional grounds
where the body of the notice made specific reference to "all of the plaintiffs" named in the
complaint), reh'g denied (en banc), [1991 U.S. App. Lexis 266291,petitionforcert. filed,Jan. 2,
1992; Gilbreath v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 931 F.2d 1320, 1323 (9th Cir. 1991).
138. Adkins v. United Mine Workers, 941 F.2d 382 (6th Cir. 1991) (all the plaintiffs to
this action as set out in the complaint which has been filed herein as well as in all amend-
ments thereto) reh 'g denied (en banc), [1991 U.S. App. Lexis 26629J, petitionfor cert.filed,Jan.
2, 1992; Baylis v. Marriott, 906 F.2d 874 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 210 (1990) (body
of notice of appeal referenced "all of the plaintiffs in the action"); National Center for
Immigrants' Rights, Inc. v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 892 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.
1989) (appellants referred to as defendants).
139. 892 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1989).
140. Id. at 815.
141. Id. at 816-17.
142. 866 F.2d at 865.
143. 901 F.2d at 1327.
144. 941 F.2d 392 (6th Cir.), reh'ddenied, (en banc) [1991 U.S. App. Lexis 26629] (6th
Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed, Jan. 2, 1992.
145. Id. at 397.
146. Id.
147. 932 F.2d 765 (9th Cir. 1991).
148. Id. at 768.
149. Id. at 768-69. See also Montes v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 531, 534 n.3 (9th Cir.
1990).
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fendants in the body of the notice. 150 One without the other will not
suffice.
Use of the plurals defendants or plaintiffs, coupled with the "et al."
designation in the caption will not suffice in the First, Seventh, Eighth
and Tenth Circuits.15 1 In Baylis v. Marriott Corp.,152 the plaintiffs ap-
pealed from a final judgment dismissing their complaint against Marriott
Corporation for alleged tortious inducement of breach of the plaintiffs
collective bargaining agreement with their employer. The caption of the
notice of appeal was styled "James Baylis, et al.," [sic] and stated that
"James Baylis, et al., [sic] all of the plaintiffs in this action, hereby appeal
: . . .- 53 Marriott moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate
jurisdiction as to all plaintiffs other than Baylis. The Second Circuit
concluded that the notice of appeal was adequate to give it jurisdiction
over all of the plaintiffs. It found that "the body of the notice contained
a precise indication as to which parties sought to appeal, since it stated
that the appeal was being taken by 'all of the plaintiffs in this action.'
Thus, the ambiguity of 'et al.' was resolved."' 5 4 In a confusing explana-
tion, the court stated that "[w]e conclude that the specification that the
appeal was taken by 'all of the plaintiffs in this action' was the functional
equivalent of a plaintiff-by-plaintiff listing."' 5 5
D. The Notice of Appeal Can Never Be the Functional Equivalent of a Notice
of Appeal
In Torres, the Supreme Court held that if a litigant files papers in a
fashion that is technically at variance with the letter of a procedural rule,
a court may nonetheless find that the litigant has complied with the rule
if the litigant's action is the functional equivalent of what the rule re-
quires. 156 "The notice of appeal can never be the functional equivalent
of a notice of appeal."' 57 Either the notice of appeal is sufficient or not.
150. See United States v. Tucson Mechanical Contracting, 921 F.2d 911, 914-15 (9th
Cir. 1990) (Although the caption contained the "et al." designation, the body stated that
only one of the defendants appealed. The court found that the use of"et al." contradicted
the use of the singular in the text of the notice and therefore it had jurisdiction only over
the party specifically named in the notice.); Sauceda v. Washington Dep't of Labor & In-
dus., 917 F.2d 1216, 1218 (9th Cir. 1990) (Caption of appellants' notice of appeal specifi-
cally named five of the six plaintiffs and the body stated that "plaintiffs, each of them,
hereby appeal." The court found that to have jurisdiction over the appeal of the omitted
plaintiff, the plural designation in the body must be coupled with an "et al." designation in
the caption).
151. Storage Technology Corp. v. United States Dist. Court for the Dist. of Colo; 934
F.2d 244 (10th Cir. 1991); Pratt v. Petroleum Prod. Management, Inc., Employee Sav. Plan
& Trust, 920 F.2d 651, 654 (10th Cir. 1990); Laidley v. McClain, 914 F.2d 1386, 1389
(10th Cir. 1990); Madewell v. Roberts, 909 F.2d 1203,1206 (8th Cir. 1990); Rosario-
Torres v. Hernandez-Colon, 889 F.2d 314, 317 (Ist Cir. 1989); Akins v. Board of Gover-
nors of State Colleges and Universities, 867 F.2d 972, 973-74 (7th Cir. 1988).
152. 906 F.2d 874 (9th Cir. 1990).
153. Id. at 876.
154. Id. at 877.
155. Id.
156. Torres, 487 U.S. at 316-317, citing Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266 (1988).
157. Allen Archery, Inc. v. Precision Shooting Equip., 857 F.2d 1176, 1177 (7th Cir.
1988).
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If it is not, but some other document filed with the court within the 30
day time limit for filing a notice of appeal under Rule 4(a)(1) clarifies
who the appellant is, that document may serve as the functional
equivalent of a notice of appeal.
The United States Supreme Court recently reaffirmed in Smith v.
Barry, 15 8 that some document filed with the court within the deadline for
filing a notice of appeal may serve as the functional equivalent of a no-
tice of appeal. 159 Although in Smith the functionally equivalent docu-
ment was a brief, the circuits were split on the question of whether an
appellate brief may serve as the notice of appeal required by Rule 3.160
The Court reiterated that satisfaction that Rule 's requirements are a
jurisdictional prerequisite but that a brief could constitute the functional
equivalent of a notice of appeal if the brief met all the prerequisites of
Rule 3.161 The Court remanded Smith for a determination of whether
the brief contained all the information required by Rule 3(c). If so, it
was the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal without regard to the
appellant's motive.
16 2
The Tenth Circuit held in Hubbert v. City of Moore, 16 that defects in
the notice of appeal may be remedied by filing other documents supply-
ing the omitted information. 164 The appellants in Hubbert filed a docket-
ing statement specifically identifying each appellant within 30 day limit.
The Tenth Circuit found that this docketing statement cured the defec-
tive notice of appeal. 165 Such a timely filing of the correction is distin-
guished from Laidley v. McClain 16 6 where the docketing statement was
filed after the time for filing the notice of appeal had expired. In Hub-
bert, the Tenth Circuit cited with approval, Masquerade Novelty, Warfeld,
and Brotherhood of Railway Carmen.
16 7
158. 112 S. Ct. 678 (1992).
159. Id. at 682.
160. Id. at 681 (citing Smith v. Galley, 919 F.2d 893, 895 (4th Cir. 1990)) (informal
brief is not the functional equivalent of the notice of appeal that FED. R. App. P. 3 re-
quires), rev'd sub nom., Smith v. Barry, 112 S. Ct. 678 (1992); Jurgens v. McKasy, 905 F.2d
382, 385 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (appellate brief cannot substitute for notice of appeal);
United States v. Cooper, 876 F.2d 1192, 1196, (5th Cir. 1989) (appellate brief will not
substitute for a notice of appeal even if it otherwise meets the requirements of FED. R. App.
P. 3 and 4); Allah v. Superior Court of State of California, 871 F.2d 887, 889-90 (9th Cir.
1989) (brief treated as notice of appeal); Finch v. City of Vernon, 845 F.2d 256, 259-60
(I th Cir. 1988) (brief treated as notice of appeal); Frace v. Russell, 341 F.2d 901, 903 (3d
Cir.) (treating brief as notice of appeal), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 863 (1965).
161. Smith, 112 S. Ct. at 682.
162. Id.
163. 923 F.2d 769 (10th Cir. 1991).
164. Id. at 772.
165. Id. See also Walter v. International Ass'n of Machinists Pension Fund, 949 F.2d
310, 312-13 (10th Cir. 1991) (in conformance with Hubbert, a docketing statement filed
outside the time for filing an appeal will not suffice). But see Persyn v. United States, 935
F.2d 69, 71-2 (5th Cir. 1991) (a docketing statement prepared by the clerk and not the
party is not the functional equivalent of a notice of appeal because the Rule requires a
party to file the document).
166. 914 F.2d 1386 (10th Cir. 1990).
167. Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., 912 F.2d 663, 664-65 (3d Cir. 1990);
Warfield v. Fidelity and Deposit Co., 904 F.2d 322, 325 (5th Cir. 1990); Brotherhood of
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In Masquerade Novelty, 1 68 the notice of appeal stated: "Walter Z.
Steinman, Attorney for Plaintiff in the above captioned matter hereby
appeals."' 69 The Third Circuit raised jurisdiction sua sponte noting
that the notice of appeal could possibly be read as indicating that the
attorney, rather than his client, was appealing. Because the district
court's order adversely affected only the client Masquerade Novelty, the
court considered whether it, in fact, had jurisdiction over Masquerade
Novelty as an unnamed appellant. The Third Circuit held that a party
will be deemed to have complied with Rule 3(c) if it has, within the time
period provided to file an appeal, filed documents that specify the party
or parties taking the appeal. 170 At oral argument on the court's motion,
which questioned whether or not the notice of appeal was sufficient, the
appellants drew the court's attention to two other documents identifying
the appellants, both of which had been filed within the 30 day dead-
line.17 1 The court noted that it did not concern itself with the nature of
the collateral documents so long as they were filed within the time pe-
riod. 17 2 Previously, the Third Circuit in Dura Systems, Inc. v. Rothbury
Investments, Ltd. '7 3 had confronted a situation where the notice of appeal
did not name all the appellants, but a Consent Decree filed within the
time period for filing a notice of appeal had identified all the appellants.
The court held that the Consent Decree served as the "functional
equivalent" of what the rules required. The court went on to hold that
by upholding the Consent Decree as a functional equivalent it was fol-
lowing the United States Supreme Court's directive to construe the rules
"liberally" and to avoid a construction that would allow "mere techni-
calities" to bar consideration of a case on the merits.
174
In Brotherhood of Railway Carmen 175 the Fifth Circuit found that the
notice of appeal named only one of five appealing unions. Nonetheless,
within the time for filing the notice of appeal, the appellants had filed a
Memorandum in Support of a Motion for Preliminary Injunction which
named all six unions. This memorandum served as a functional
equivalent of the notice of appeal. 176 In Allen Archery, Inc. v. Precision
Shooting Equipment,17 7 the court considering the Torres functional
Ry. Carmen v Atkinson, T. & S.F. Ry., 894 F.2d 1463, 1465 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct
131 (1990).
168. 912 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1990).
169. Id. at 664.
170. Id. at 665.
171. Id. at 664-65.
172. Id. at 665.
173. 886 F.2d 551 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1046 (1990).
174. Id. at 555, citing Torres, 487 U.S. 312 (1988) and Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,
181 (1962).
175. 894 F.2d 1463 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 131 (1990).
176. See also Board of Educ. v. United States, 920 F.2d 370 (6th Cir. 1990) (107 plain-
tiffs named in plaintiffs' complaint were incorporated in the notice of appeal); Warfield v.
Fidelity and Deposit Co., 904 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1990); Page v. Delaune, 837 F.2d 233 (5th
Cir. 1988). But see Allen Archery Inc. v. Precision Shooting Equip. Inc., 857 F.2d 1176 (7th
Cir. 1988) (the appellant must be named in the notice of appeal; naming him in documents
such as a supersedeas bond filed in district court will not do).
177. 857 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1988).
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equivalent language, stated that "[it] is designed for the case where the
litigant fails to file a notice of appeal, but files another paper that is its
functional equivalent. It is not designed for the case where the litigant
has filed a notice of appeal and failed to name the appellants.
1 78
VI. APPLICATION OF TORRES UNDER FED. R. APP. P. 15 AND FED. R.
BANK. P. 8001
A petition seeking review and enforcement of orders of administra-
tive agencies, boards, commissions and officers must contain the same
specificity as the notice of appeal.1 79 The Tenth Circuit applies Torres in
bankruptcy matters. In Storage Technology, the court found "[t]hat the
requirements for filing a notice of appeal under Bankruptcy Rule
8001(a) are more strict than those of Fed. R. App. P. 3(c)." 18 0 Contrary
to the Sixth Circuit's distinction in Adkins,1 8 1 however, this was not the
basis for the Tenth Circuit's decision. The notice of appeal was ambigu-
ous and would not have sufficed even under Rule 3(c). 18 2 In Citizens
Bank & Trust Co. v. Case,a8 3 however, the Fifth Circuit found that the
specificity requirement set out in Torres is inapplicable to a notice of ap-
peal from a bankruptcy court judgment or order.18 4 The case is distin-
guishable because the appeal involved sanctions entered against the
attorney and the party.' 8 5 Because the party was also sanctioned and
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8001 requires that the notice of appeal contain the
name of the parties to the judgment the Court held that naming the
party sufficed to bring the issues before the district court.18 6
VII. CONCLUSION
No practitioner having read this article, would fail to specifically
name each and every appellant, when failure to do so jeopardizes a
party's appeal. There is, however, slim hope for those who are currently
in the position of having filed a defective notice of appeal because, as
this article demonstrates, some designations short of specifically naming
178. Id.
179. FED. R. App. P. 15, Goos v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 911 F.2d 1283, 1288
(8th Cir. 1990); Kowaleski v. Department of Labor, 879 F.2d 1173, 1176 (3d Cir. 1989)
(Rule 15(a) requires same "punctilious, literal and exact compliance" as that mandated in
Torres for Rules 3 and 4); Arnow v. United States Nuclear Reg Comm'n, 868 F.2d 223, 225
(7th Cir. 1989).
180. Id. at 247. See also Concorde Resources, Inc. v. Woosley, 855 F.2d 687, 688 (10th
Cir. 1988); Certified Class in The Chartered Securities Litigation v. The Charter Co., 92
Bankr. 510, 514 (M.D. Fla. 1988).
181. Adkins, 941 F.2d at 398.
182. See Adkins, 941 F.2d at 400 n.1 (dissenting opinion).
183. 937 F.2d 1014 (5th Cir. 1991).
184. Id. at 1020.
185. Ordinarily the sanctioned attorney is the real party in interest and must be named
in the notice of appeal. F.T.C. v. Amy Travel Service, Inc., 894 F.2d 879, 880-81 (7th Cir.
1989) (court had no jurisdiction over sanctioned attorney not named in notice of appeal);
Rogers v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 864 F.2d 557, 560 (7th Cir. 1988) (sanctioned attorney
is real party in interest and must appeal in his own name); DeLuca v. Long Island Lighting
Co., 862 F.2d 427, 429 (2d Cir. 1988).
186. Citizens Bank, 937 F.2d at 1021.
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can suffice. As Torres and its progeny come to the attention of more
practitioners, the requirement of Rule 3(c) that the notice of appeal
specify the parties appealing should cease to be an issue for the courts to
address.

PROPERTY SURRENDERED BY SURVIVING SPOUSE "FLUNKS"
THE "PASSING" REQUIREMENT: THE TENTH
CIRCUIT DENIES THE MARITAL DEDUCTION
IN SCHROEDER V. UNITED STATES
I. INTRODUCTION
Schroeder v. United States I was a case of first impression before the
Tenth Circuit. It dealt with an important feature of estate tax law2 in the
United States: the "marital deduction."'3 In Schroeder, joint tenancy
property and property acquired by a surviving spouse by statutory elec-
tion against her husband's will were later surrendered in settlement of a
controversy regarding the devolution of her husband's estate. The
question at issue was whether this property actually "passed" to the
widow4 and thereby qualified for the marital deduction even though it
was subsequently surrendered. The Tenth Circuit held in Schroeder that
this property did not pass to the widow and therefore did not qualify for
the marital deduction.
The Schroeder decision is significant because it diverges from the
precedent set in decisions by the Second and Fifth Circuits. 5 In those
1. 924 F.2d 1547 (10th Cir. 1991).
2. 26 U.S.C. § 2001(a) (1988) provides: "A tax is hereby imposed on the transfer of
the taxable estate of every decedent who is a citizen or resident of the United States."
3. 26 U.S.C. § 2056 (1988) provides in part:
(a) Allowance of marital deduction
For purposes of the tax imposed by section 2001, the value of the taxable
estate shall, except as limited by subsection (b), be determined by deducting from
the value of the gross estate an amount equal to the value of any interest in prop-
erty which passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse, but
only to the extent that such interest is included in determining the value of the
gross estate.
(b) Limitation in the case of life estate or other terminable interest
(1) General rule
Where, on the lapse of time, on the occurrence of an event or contingency,
or on the failure of an event or contingency to occur, an interest passing to the
surviving spouse will terminate or fail, no deduction shall be allowed under this
section with respect to such interest-
(A) if an interest in such property passes or has passed (for less than an ade-
quate and full consideration in money or money's worth) from the decedent to
any person other than such surviving spouse (or the estate of such spouse); and
(B) if by reason of such passing such person (or his heirs or assigns) may
possess or enjoy any part of such property after such termination or failure of the
interest so passing to the surviving spouse; and no deduction shall be allowed
with respect to such interest (even if such deduction is not disallowed under sub-
paragraphs (A) and (B))-
(C) if such interest is to be acquired for the surviving spouse; pursuant to
directions of the decedent, by his executor or by the trustee of a trust.
For purposes of this paragraph, an interest shall not be considered as an
interest which will terminate or fail merely because it is the ownership of a bond,
note, or similar contractual obligation, the discharge of which would not have the
effect of an annuity for life or for term.
4. See 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a).
5. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 451 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971); United
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circuits, the will contest regulation 6 was broadly applied to cases involv-
ing property relinquished by the surviving spouse in the settlement of a
decedent's estate. The Tenth Circuit strictly construed the will contest
regulation, refusing to apply it to the facts in Schroeder.
To establish the legal setting for Schroeder, this Comment will first
set forth the legislative development of the marital deduction. Second,
the facts of Schroeder will be discussed and an analysis of both the Tenth
Circuit and U.S. District Court decisions will be provided. The policy
reasons behind the Tenth Circuit's decision and possible future ramifi-
cations will also be examined. Ultimately, this Comment will propose
that the will contest regulation be amended.
II. LEGISLATIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE MARITAL DEDUCTION
Upon death, an estate tax is imposed on the value of the decedent's
taxable estate.7 The value of certain property that "passed" during the
decedent's life or "passes" at death to the decedent's surviving spouse
can be deducted as a "marital deduction,"'8 thereby reducing the dece-
dent's taxable estate. The marital deduction was originally enacted in
19489 and has experienced a series of legislative changes through the
years.
A. Revenue Act of 1948 - Legislative Response to Community Property
System
Prior to 1948, an estate tax disparity was created between commu-
nity property states, 10 where assets acquired during marriage were auto-
matically owned one-half by each spouse, and common law states, where
each spouse owned the assets acquired by his or her personal endeavors
or by gift or inheritance. When most of the family property was owned
by the first spouse to die, a greater estate tax burden was imposed in
States Trust Co. of N.Y. v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 937 (1964).
6. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(d) (1958), provided in pertinent part:
If as a result of a controversy involving the decedent's will, or involving any be-
quest or devise thereunder, his surviving spouse assigns or surrenders a property
interest in settlement of the controversy, the interest so assigned or surrendered
is not considered as having "passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse."
7. See 26 U.S.C. § 2001.
8. 26 U.S.C. § 2056. See aho 5 BORIS I. BrrrIrR, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ES-
TATES AND GI-rs 129.1, at 129-2 (1984) [hereinafter BrrrER]; 4 JACOB RABKIN & MARK
H. JOHNSON, FEDERAL INCOME, GIFT AND ESTATE TAXATION § 53.04 (1989) [hereinafter
RABKIN &JOHNSON] (marital deduction is allowed for property included in the gross estate
that passes to the surviving spouse).
9. The Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, 62 Stat. 117, § 361(a), added the
marital deduction provision to the 1939 Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. § 812(e); 26
U.S.C. § 2056 (Supp. V 1952).
10. Eight states currently operate under a community property system. See ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 25-211 (1991); CAL. CIv. CODE § 687 (West 1991); IDAHO CODE § 15-1-201
(1991); LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2343.1 (West 1991); NEV. REV. STAT. § 123.220 (1991);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-3-12(A) (Michie 1991); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 5.01 (West 1991);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.16.030 (West 1991).
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common law states than in community property states." The common
law states taxed all of the property owned by the decedent, whereas the
community property states taxed only half of the community property
regardless of how much the decedent owned.'
2
Congress first sought to equalize this disparity by amending the
Revenue Act of 1942 which taxed community property in full to the es-
tate of the first spouse to die.' 3 These amendments, although constitu-
tionally upheld in Fernandez v. Wiener,' 4 in effect operated to tilt the
balance against community property states.' 5 The Revenue Act of 1948
restored the pre-1942 community property system of including only
one-half of the community property in the gross estate of the first
spouse to die.' 6 Also as part of the 1948 Act, Congress enacted the
"marital deduction" in order to equalize the treatment of couples in
common law and community property states.' 7 It allowed up to fifty
percent of the value of the decedent's gross estate to be deducted from
the taxable estate if the property passed outright to the surviving
spouse.' 8 By enacting the marital deduction, Congress introduced the
11. See H.R. REP. No. 2333, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 35-37, 160 ("For the purpose of
Federal estate taxation, husband and wife living in community-property States enjoy a
preferential treatment over those living in non-community-property States.").
12. BrrXER, supra note 8, 125.10, at 125-33.
13. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, 56 Stat. 798,941, §§ 402,404 (codified
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 811(d)(5), 811(e)(2), 811(g)(4) (1946)).
14. 326 U.S. 340 (1945). The Court stated, "We find no basis for the contention that
the tax is arbitrary and capricious because it taxes transfers at death and also the shifting at
death of particular incidents of property. Congress is free to tax either or both, as it may
constitutionally do .... Id. at 358.
15. Professor Bittker stated:
If, for example, the first spouse to die was not the economic source of any of the
community property but exercised his or her power of testamentary disposition
over half of the property by leaving it to the surviving spouse, the first decedent's
estate was taxed on 50 percent of the community property, and the survivor on
100 percent; by contrast, a comparable couple in a common-law jurisdiction paid
no tax when the nonowner spouse died, and the property was taxed in full when
the survivor died.
BrrrKER, supra note 8, 129.1, at 129-4.
16. The Revenue Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-471, 62 Stat. 116, § 351, repealed the
community property amendments I.R.C. §§ 81 1(d)(5), 81 1(e)(2), 81 1(g)(4). See also Brrr-
KER, supra note 8, 129.1, at 129-6.
17. 26 U.S.C. § 2056(c)(1) (Supp. V 1952) provided: "The aggregate amount of the
deductions allowed under this section ... shall not exceed 50 percent of the value of the
adjusted gross estate ......
18. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1163, 1167, stated the legislative intent behind the repeal of the 1942 amendments and
the institution of the marital deduction:
1. The 1942 amendments to the estate and gift taxes which provided special
rules in the case of community property are repealed for persons dying and as to
gifts made after the date of the enactment of this bill. Generally, this restores the
rule by which estate and gift-tax liabilities are dependent upon the ownership of
the property under State law. Thus, in community-property States, irrespective
of which spouse dies first, only one-half of the community property is included in
the gross estate. Similarly, a gift made out of community property is taxable one-
half to the husband and one-half to the wife, since under State law each owns a
one-half interest in the property.
2. Provision is made for estate- and gift-tax "splitting" of non-community
property. This provision also will apply to persons dying after the date of the
enactment of this bill, so that community property and noncommunity property
may be placed on an equal basis at the same time. Under this provision property
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new concept of "estate-splitting." Estate-splitting permitted one spouse
to bequeath half of his or her property to the other spouse without tax.
This concept was the culmination of the following chain of legislative
reasoning: 1) income-splitting was designed to put common law resi-
dents on a par with community property residents; 2) because the 1942
estate tax amendments were unfair to community property residents, it
was desirable to restore the pre-1942 law which recognized the local law
property division between husband and wife; 3) the only method to
place common law residents in approximate equality with community
property residents for estate tax purposes was to allow estate-splitting. 19
B. 1976 Reform Act
Congress amended the marital deduction in 1976 to allow up to
$250,000 or one-half of the decedent's adjusted gross estate to be de-
ducted, whichever was greater.20 This amendment was based on the
rationale that "a decedent with a small- or medium-sized estate should
be able to leave a minimum amount of property to the surviving spouse
without the imposition of an estate tax."'2 1 The marital deduction con-
tinued to be an equalizer between community property and common law
states, but "it was now charged with a second function: to free inter-
spousal transfers from estate and gift taxation, albeit at a modest
level."
22
C. 1981 Economic Recovery Act - Current Legislative Rationale for the
•Marital Deduction
The 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act repealed the limits set by the
marital deduction provision under the 1976 Reform Act and provided
for an unlimited marital deduction. 23 It broadened the rationale of the
passing outright in a common-law State from a decedent to the surviving spouse
is deducted from the decedent's gross estate up to a limit of 50 percent of the
value of the decedent's gross estate less deductions for funeral expenses, debts,
and other claims against the estate. In a similar fashion husbands and wives, in
common-law States, may treat their gifts as being made one-half by each spouse.
Residents of community-property States may also take advantage of the estate
and gift-tax splitting provisions with respect to transfers of their separate prop-
erty. The same splitting effect is achieved for community property by the repeal
of the 1942 amendments.
See also United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 128 (1963).
19. RABKIN &JOHNSON, supra note 8, § 53.04.
20. 1976 Tax Reform Act, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1854, § 2002 (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 2056 (1976)). Section 2056(c) provided, "The aggregate amount of the deduc-
tions allowed under this section ... shall not exceed the greater of-(i) $250,000, or (ii) 50
percent of the value of the adjusted gross estate."
21. JOINT COMMrrrEE TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX REFORM AcT OF
1976, H.R. REP. No. 10612, 94th Cong., 2nd. Sess. 533 (1976), reprinted in 1976-3 C.B. 1,
545.
22. BrrrKER, supra note 8, 129.1, at 129-6.
23. The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(a)(1), 95 Stat.
172, 301 (1981) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (1988)) repealed § 2056(c) of
the 1976 Act. The Act allows for an unlimited marital deduction provided the interest
received by the surviving spouse is not a terminable interest. 26 U.S.C. § 2056. See supra
note 3.
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marital deduction well beyond the "equalization" theory of the 1948
Act. Under the 1981 Act, the legislative rationale of the marital deduc-
tion was "that an individual should be free to pass his entire estate to a
surviving spouse without the imposition of any additional tax."' 2 4 "[A]
husband and wife should be treated as one economic unit for purposes
of estate and gift taxes, as they generally are for income tax
purposes."
25
The 1981 Act remains current law with respect to the marital de-
duction. The provision allows a married couple to transfer assets freely
between themselves without estate tax ramifications regardless of which
spouse earned, inherited or acquired the property. 26 There is also a
correlating gift tax counterpart. 2 7 Consequently, under the current law,
married couples are given a great deal of flexibility in protecting assets
owned by the first spouse to die from estate tax until the survivor dies.
28
The marital deduction is allowed, however, only to the extent that prop-
erty exempted upon the death of the first spouse will be potentially sub-
ject to gift or estate tax when the property is passed on by the second
spouse, either at death or by inter vivos gift. 29 Therefore, I.R.C. § 2056
is a means of deferring, not eliminating tax liability.3 0 The Schroeder de-
cision reflects this rationale in its denial of the marital deduction to
property that would have otherwise escaped estate taxation.
III. SCHROEDER V. UNITED STATES
A. Factual Background
Schroeder v. United States3 l involved an action brought by the execu-
tor of the decedent's estate to claim a refund of certain federal estate
taxes allegedly paid in error.3 2 Thomas Woodmansee (Thomas) was
24. RABKIN AND JOHNSON, supra note 8, § 53-04, at 53-33. See S. REP. No. 144, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 127, reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 105, 228, and in 1981-2 C.B. 461.
25. S. REP. No. 144, supra note 24, at 228. The unlimited marital deduction also elim-
inates tax problems resulting from the joint ownership of property between spouses.
RABKIN &JOHNSON, supra note 8, § 53-04, at 53-33.
26. BrrrKER, supra note 8, 129.1, at 129-2 to 129-3.
27. 26 U.S.C. § 2523 (1981) provides for a broad exemption of interspousal gifts from
gift tax. See also S. REP. No. 144, supra note 24, at 228 ("[N]o tax should be imposed on
transfers between a husband and wife.").
28. BrrrKER, supra note 8, 129.1, at 129-3.
29. It is possible that all of part of the property could escape gift or estate taxation,
even upon the second spouse's death. The second spouse could give away all or part of
the marital deduction property tax-free by making use of the annual gift exclusion, the
exclusion for a transfer for the benefit of a minor, or the exclusion for transfers of qualified
educational or medical expenses. See I.R.C. § 2503. In this way, the property could pass
out of the second spouse's estate without taxation.
30. BrrIrKER, supra note 8, 129.1, at 129-3.
Deferral, therefore, does not mean that the first spouse's property will necessarily
be taxed when the surviving spouse dies-only that it will be taxed if it passes
from the husband-wife unit to other beneficiaries, after taking into account the
gift tax exclusions and the second unified credit made available to the survivor
during the deferral period.
Id.
31. 924 F.2d 1547 (10th Cir. 1991).
32. Id. at 1549.
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married to Peggy Woodmansee (Peggy) for eighteen years, and had two
adult daughters from a prior marriage, Martha Schroeder (Martha) and
Lou Ann Waters (Lou).33 On July 6, 1981, prior to his death, Thomas
set up a substantial stock account, naming himself and Peggy joint ten-
ants with a right of survivorship.3 4 On July 16, 1981, Thomas signed a
will directing that his property be placed in a trust. The income from
the trust was to go to Peggy during her life, and upon her death, the
corpus of the trust was to be divided equally between the two daughters,
or their issue.3 5 Two months later Thomas died, and his will was admit-
ted to probate. Henry Schroeder (Schroeder), Martha's husband, was
named executor.3 6 Martha and Lou learned of the joint tenancy stock
account soon after their father's death. They were told that the account
would not pass through their father's will because it was nonprobate
property owned solely by Peggy as the surviving spouse. 37 Martha and
Lou were advised by an attorney to negotiate with Peggy concerning the
stock account.
3 8
In February, 1982, in settlement of these negotiations, Peggy put
the stock account into a trust with a neutral trustee. The principal of the
trust was to be distributed to Martha and Lou, or their issue, upon
Peggy's death.3 9 During Peggy's life, quarterly income from the trust
was to be divided among the three women, one-fourth to Peggy and
three-fourths divided equally between Martha and Lou.40 In April of
1982, Peggy filed an election to take her statutory one-third spousal
share of the estate,41 which had a fair market value of $77,121. She
subsequently deposited this share into the trust account.
4 2
Schroeder filed the estate tax return, including the joint tenancy
stock account and the spousal election share in the gross estate. 4 3 He
33. Id. at 1548.
34. Id. Neither daughter was aware of the creation of the stock account.
35. Id. On the same day he signed the will, Thomas deeded the family farm over to
Martha and Lou. Both daughters signed an affidavit stating they knew the provisions of
their father's will and of his intent to keep his assets in the family. They also stated that
they intended to honor their father's wishes and that he was mentally competent at all
times during his life. Id. at 1548-49.
36. Id. at 1549.
37. Id. At the time of Thomas' death, the Fair Market Value of the stock account was
approximately $229,843. Id.
38. Id. In their affidavits, Martha and Lou stated they thought Peggy had a "moral
duty" to leave the principal of the stock account to them and their children. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 44 (West 1990).
42. Schroeder, 924 F.2d at 1549. By depositing her spousal share in the Trust Account,
Peggy submitted the money to the terms of distribution set forth in the Trust Account.
43. Id. At the time of decedent's death, 26 U.S.C. § 2033 provided that, "The value of
the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of the interest therein
of the decedent at the time of his death." Section 2040(a) provided in pertinent part,
"The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property to the extent of the
interest therein held as joint tenants with right of survivorship by the decedent and any
other person .. .in their joint names and payable to either or the survivor." 26 U.S.C.
§ 2040(a) (1988).
When Thomas died in 1981, § 2040(a) required the inclusion of the entire value ofjoint
tenancy property in the estate of the first joint tenant to die. It is because of this specific
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also claimed these assets as part of the marital deduction allowable
under 26 U.S.C. § 2056.4 4 The Internal Revenue Service (I.R.S.) issued
the estate a notice of deficiency, disallowing the marital deduction with
respect to the stock account and statutory elective share. Schroeder
paid the deficiency and then claimed a refund, which was denied by the
I.R.S.45 Schroeder then brought an action to claim a refund of the taxes
allegedly paid in error.4 6 He moved for partial summary judgment,
4 7
arguing that the stock account should be included in the marital deduc-
tion,4 8 and that the provisions of the will contest regulation did not ap-
ply. 49 The I.R.S. moved for summary judgment, arguing that the value
of both the joint stock account and the spousal election were properly
excluded from the marital deduction under the will contest regulation.
The I.R.S. based its argument on the decisions in United States Trust Co. v.
Commissioner,50 and Citizens & Southern National Bank v. United States.
5 1
B. Holding
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma disal-
lowed the marital deduction, granting summary judgment in favor of the
I.R.S.5 2 The district court applied Treasury Regulation § 20.2056(e)-
2(d)(1) to the controversy involving Thomas' estate. The court deter-
mined that the joint tenancy and statutory election share property,
which was relinquished in settlement, did not "pass" to Peggy under the
regulation, and therefore was not entitled to be included in the marital
deduction.
53
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court decision.54 The court
statutory provision that thejoint tenancy property described herein was included, in full, in
Thomas' estate.
44. Id. At the time of Schroeder's death on September 17, 1981, § 2056(c) under the
1976 Reform Act governed, limiting the deduction to the greater of $250,000 or 507 of
the value of the adjusted gross estate. See supra note 20. This section was amended in
1981, removing the limitations and providing for an unlimited marital deduction, but the
amended version took effect for persons dying in 1982 and thereafter.
Had Thomas died some four months later, the marital deduction allowable in comput-
ing the value of his taxable estate would have been unlimited and only one-half of the
aggregate value of property held by him and Peggy as joint tenants with right of survivor-
ship would have been included in the gross estate.
45. Id.
46. The refund action was founded on 26 U.S.C. § 7422 (1988).
47. Schroeder, 924 F.2d at 1549-50.
48. Id. at 1550. The marital deduction provision which applied at the time of
Thomas' death was limited under the 1976 Tax Reform Act to $250,000 or one-half the
value of the estate. See supra note 20. Schroeder based his summary judgment argument
only on his claim for the marital deduction on the stock account because the value of the
stock account together with the statutory elective share exceeded the maximum allowed
deduction.
49. Schroeder, 924 F.2d at 1550. The executor argued that "the will contest provision
only applies when the spousal property is vested after and in settlement of a controversy
specifically concerning the terms of a will." Id.
50. 321 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1963).
51. 451 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971).
52. Schroeder v. United States, 696 F. Supp. 1426, 1432 (W.D. Okla. 1988).
53. Id.
54. Schroeder, 924 F.2d 1547, 1555 (10th Cir. 1991).
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did not apply Treasury Regulation § 20.2056(e)-2(d)(1), choosing not to
broaden the application of the will contest regulation to the facts in this
case. Instead the Tenth Circuit held that "property comprising Peggy's
statutory election and the joint account did not 'pass' to her within the
meaning of the marital deduction statute [I.R.C. § 2056] because Peggy
surrendered her entitlement to this property in settlement of a bona fide
controversy concerning her rights to the property in the decedent's
gross estate for federal estate tax purposes." 55
C. Analysis
On appeal, Schroeder argued that because the Merrill Lynch stock
account was held by the decedent and his wife as joint tenants with the
right of survivorship, 56 under Oklahoma law, the surviving joint tenant
becomes the whole and complete owner at the moment of death.57 In
Clovis v. Clovis,58 the Oklahoma Supreme Court described the joint ten-
ancy interest as follows: "[The] right of survivorship does not pass any-
thing from a deceased joint tenant to the survivor since, by the very
nature ofjoint tenancy, title of the joint tenant who dies first terminates
at death and vests eo instanti in the survivor." 5 9
Schroeder argued that the joint tenancy stock account immediately
"vested" in Peggy upon Thomas' death, and under I.R.C. § 2056(a), it
was eligible to be included in the marital deduction. 60 Schroeder
pointed out that I.R.C. § 2056(d), now redesignated as § 2056(c), pur-
suant to the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, provided:
For the purposes of this section, an interest in property shall be
considered as passing from the decedent to any person if...
(5) such interest was, at the time of decedent's death, held by
such person and the decedent (or by them and any other per-
son) in joint tenancy with right of survivorship.
6 1
In sum, Schroeder argued that the three requirements of I.R.C.
§ 2056(a) were met:6 2 first, the property passed from the decedent to the
surviving spouse; second, the interest was includable in determining the
total value of the decedent's gross estate; and third, the interest was not
a terminable interest.6 3 Therefore, the joint tenancy stock account
55. Id. at 1555.
56. Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at 16, Schroeder v. United States, 924 F.2d 1547 (10th
Cir. 1991) (No. 88-2946).
57. OiA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 74 (West 1971); see also Draughon v. Wright, 191 P.2d
921, 923 (Okla. 1948).
58. 460 P.2d 878, 881 (Okla. 1969).
59. Id. at 881.
60. Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at 16, Schroeder (No. 88-2946).
61. Id. at 18 (quoting Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(a)(1)(A), 95 Stat. 172, 299 (1981))
(emphasis added).
62. See 26 U.S.C. § 2056(b).
63. See id. Appellant made the argument that the principle of the limitation provided
in § 2056(b) is to remove property interests from the marital deduction if those interests
are subject to natural extinction or expiration (i.e., life estates, terms of years) prior to the
taxation of the estate of the recipient spouse, and where there is such a "naturally" termi-
nable interest, the legislature has determined to tax the value of that interest, but the
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should be included in the marital deduction. Schroeder also relied on
the U.S. District Court of Kansas' decision in First National Bank v. United
States,6 to show that under state law, the joint tenancy property at issue
"passed" when it vested in Peggy immediately upon Thomas' death. 6 5
The court in First National Bank found that the qualification for the mari-
tal deduction must be determined at the time of death and not as of a
date established by some subsequent development.
6 6
The Tenth Circuit, in its opinion, did not deny appellant's conten-
tion that joint tenancy property "vests" in the surviving spouse upon the
date of the decedent's death. However, the court affirmed the funda-
mental rule that state law determines what property interests individuals
hold, and federal law determines how property shall be taxed.
6 7
"[Flederal law controls whether property 'passes' from the estate of a
deceased individual for the purposes of the federal estate tax."' 68 The
court pointed out that a contrary view arguably would "transgress the
Supreme Court's holding in Lyeth v. Hoey.... that federal law controls
the incidence of federal taxation of property acquired under state
law."6 9 The Tenth Circuit discounted the First National Bank decision,
which froze property rights as of the date of death. The court deter-
mined that such a ruling would preclude any consideration for federal
tax purposes of any post-mortem settlement of a controversy concern-
ing property of the decedent. The court stated that "a controversy in-
volving the surviving spouse's entitlement to the decedent's property is by
definition a post-mortem dispute. We believe that [First National's] ap-
proach is inconsistent with the purpose of the marital deduction."
'70
policy of the marital deduction is not offended when the surviving spouses's interest is
terminated by his or her own affirmative act. Appellant's Brief-in-Chief at 24, Schroeder
(No. 88-2946).
64. 233 F. Supp. 19 (D. Kan. 1964).
65. Schroeder, 924 F.2d at 1554 n.7.
66. First Natl Bank, 233 F. Supp. at 26.
67. Schroeder, 924 F.2d at 1552. See also Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 451
F.2d 221, 228 (5th Cir. 1971). Also, in United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472
U.S. 713, 722 (1985),Justice Blackmun stated in the majority opinion that "[i]n the appli-
cation of a federal revenue act, state law controls in determining the nature of the legal
interest which the taxpayer had in the property.... [Tihe federal statute creates no prop-
erty rights, but merely attaches consequences, federally defined, to rights created under
state law." (quoting Aquilino v. United States, 363 U.S. 509, 513 (1960); United States v.
Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55 (1958); Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 82 (1940)). See also
Estate of Goldstein v. Commissioner, 479 F.2d 813, 816 (10th Cir. 1973) (emphasizing
that federal law fixes tax incidences of property transfers generated by death, but state law
determines the nature of such transfers and manner by which they are affected).
68. Schroeder, 924 F.2d at 1552. See also United States Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 321
F.2d 908, 910 (2d Cir. 1963) (vesting under state law has no bearing on interpretation of
federal passing requirement).
69. 924 F.2d at 1554 (citations omitted). In Lyeth, the amount received by an heir in
settlement of a threatened will contest was acquired "by inheritance" so as to be exempt as
to him from income tax. Lyeth v. Hoey, 305 U.S. 188, 193-94 (1938). See also Helvering v.
Safe Deposit & Trust Co., 316 U.S. 56 (1942) (It is not the will, but the substituted terms
of the distribution that determine what property passes to the heir or legatee from the
decedent. Thus, an estate is not entitled to a marital deduction for property that the sur-
viving spouse relinquished in settlement of a controversy regarding the decedent's
estate.).
70. Schroeder, 924 F.2d at 1554 n.7.
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The Tenth Circuit relied on the policy that the purpose of the mari-
tal deduction was to allow a deferral of taxation when property passed to
a surviving spouse, but not to provide an escape from taxation. If post-
mortem settlements were excluded in determining a decedent's taxable
estate, a surviving spouse could feasibly pass property which had been
included in a marital deduction to other individuals in a post-mortem
settlement. This property would escape estate taxation altogether be-
cause it would no longer be part of the second spouse's estate. The
intent of the marital deduction was that it was to be "applied in situa-
tions in which the government had the potential for a two-tiered taxing
of the property."''T A portion of the estate could pass tax-free by the
marital deduction upon the death of the first spouse, but could poten-
tially be taxed upon the death of the second spouse.
The application of the "will contest" regulation 7 2 to the particular
facts of the Schroeder case was a primary issue considered by both the
Tenth Circuit and district court. This regulation provides:
If as a result of a controversy involving the decedent's will, or
involving any bequest or devise thereunder, his surviving
spouse assigns or surrenders a property interest in settlement
of the controversy, the interest so assigned or surrendered is
not considered as having passed from the decedent to his sur-
viving spouse.
73
At the trial court level, the U.S. District Court of Oklahoma applied
the will contest regulation in Schroeder v. United States74 even though the
case involved only a controversy arising from the devolution of the dece-
dent's estate, and not specifically a will contest. The court said that
"lawsuits are not determinative of the existence of a 'controversy' be-
tween the parties-all that is required is adversity."' 75 The court con-
cluded that, under the regulation, the joint tenancy and statutory
election property at issue in this case did not "pass" to Peggy Wood-
mansee from the decedent.
76
The court based its decision to apply the will contest regulation on
"a cogent body of authority in support of its view that the courts have
interpreted the regulation broadly to encompass any controversy arising
from the devolution of the decedent's estate which results in a settle-
ment."'7 7 The court especially relied on decisions by the Second 78 and
71. Id. at 1550.
72. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(d)(1) (1958).
73. Id.
74. 696 F. Supp. 1426 (W.D. Okla. 1988).
75. Id. at 1432. See also Bel v. United States, 452 F.2d 683, 694 (5th Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972). The Bel court specifically noted that "arms-length negotia-
tions are sufficient to evidence the existence of a controversy under Treas. Reg.
§ 20.2056(e)-2(d)(1)." Id. at 694.
76. Schroeder, 696 F. Supp. at 1432. The court granted defendant's motion for sum-
mary judgment and denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment. Plaintiff ap-
pealed this order to the Tenth Circuit.
77. Id. at 1429.
78. United States Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied,
376 U.S. 937 (1964).
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Fifth79 Circuits where both courts rejected a "restrictive interpretation"
of Treasury Regulation § 20.2056(e)-2(d). 80
In United States Trust Co. v. Commissioner, the decedent, a U.S. citizen
who owned property in both the United States and France, sought to
dispose of his assets by two testamentary instruments. 8 1 Under one will,
he passed all of his U.S. property to his widow and three daughters by a
former marriage.8 2 By another testamentary document, he sought to
devise his French villa and other French property solely to his widow.
83
Under French law, however, the widow's interest was limited to one-
fourth of the property unless the daughters executed certain documents
with the French government. 84 Following arms-length negotiations be-
tween the surviving spouse and the step-daughters, the widow entered
into a settlement agreement with her stepdaughters whereby she relin-
quished part of her interest in the U.S. property. In return, the step-
daughters agreed to allow the probate of the will devising the French
realty.
85
The I.R.S. disallowed the marital deduction on the relinquished
property, applying the will contest provision.8 6 Even though the appel-
lant contended that there was no actual "will controversy," the court
stated that the regulation is clear in providing that if "an agreement
resolving a controversy over the decedent's property entails the assign-
ment or surrender of property by the surviving spouse, said property is
not considered as having passed from the decedent to his surviving
spouse."
8 7
In Citizens & Southern National Bank v. United States, the surviving
spouse relinquished all her claims against her husband's estate in ex-
change for $40,000, as part of a settlement agreement with her step-
son.8 8 At the time of death, the decedent owned property in both Flor-
ida and Georgia. The Florida property passed to the surviving spouse
by her husband's will and the Georgia property descended to the widow
by intestacy. 89 The Fifth Circuit ruled that Treasury Regulation
§ 20.2056(e)-2(d) was applicable to all the property devolving to the
widow, and subsequently relinquished by her. Therefore, neither the
Georgia nor the Florida property was entitled to the marital deduction
to the extent that it was relinquished by the widow. The court held that
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue had correctly limited the marital
deduction to the $40,000.90
79. Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. United States, 451 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971).
80. Schroeder, 696 F. Supp. at 1429.





86. Id. at 910.
87. Id. at 910-11 (construing Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(d)(1)).
88. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 451 F.2d 221, 223 (5th Cir. 1971).
89. Id.
90. Id. at 228.
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The court acknowledged that the intestate property was not ad-
dressed by the literal terms of the will contest regulation. However, the
court stated its agreement with the Second Circuit holding in United
States Trust:
The medium by which the decedent's property passes, whether
it be by intestacy or by means of a testamentary instrument, is
immaterial. For purposes of the regulation, we are at a loss to
discern why a settlement of a controversy involving an estate, a
portion of which passes by intestate succession, should be
treated any differently than a settlement concerning only prop-
erty which has been disposed of by means of a testamentary
document. We think the Second Circuit's broad interpretation
of the regulation is entirely proper, and we conclude that be-
cause the settlement agreement in the instant case "resolved a
controversy over the decedent's property," the regulation re-
quires that the property surrendered by the widow not be con-
sidered as having passed to her from the decedent. 9 1
The district court, in Schroeder, also pointed out that other "federal
district courts have endorsed a broad reading of [Treasury Regulation
§ 20.2056(e)-2(d).]" 9 2 For example, in Pastor v. United States,93 the court
rejected the plaintiff's argument that because the surviving spouse's set-
tlement involved intestate property, the will controversy regulation was
inapplicable. Relying on the Second Circuit's decision in United States
Trust and the Fifth Circuit's decision in Citizens & Southern National Bank,
the Pastor court held that "these authorities make it clear that the widow
is entitled to a marital deduction only as to the value of the property
interest [actually] received [in settlement], and not to the value of the
property she might have received had she not settled her dispute."' 94 In
denying the marital deduction to the joint tenancy and statutory election
property relinquished in Schroeder, the district court followed the estab-
lished precedent of applying the will contest provision broadly. The de-
cision reflects the court's underlying purpose of protecting the
government from "circumstances in which property might pass untaxed
to the next generation by means of an agreement between the surviving
spouse and other beneficiaries."
'95
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's result.
The court ruled that the joint property and statutory elective share
property did not pass to Peggy, and accordingly the marital deduction
was properly disallowed. 96 However, the Tenth Circuit declined to
reach this result by applying a broad reading of the will contest regula-
tion. The court acknowledged that the Second and Fifth Circuits in
91. Id. at 227 (quoting United States Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d at 910-11).
92. Schroeder v. U.S., 696 F. Supp. 1426, 1430 (W.D. Okla. 1988).
93. 386 F. Supp. 106 (E.D.N.Y. 1974).
94. Id. at 107. See also Waldrup v. United States, 499 F. Supp. 820, 824 (N.D. Miss.
1980).
95. Schroeder v. United States, 924 F.2d 1547, 1550 (10th Cir. 1991); see also Schroeder,
696 F. Supp. at 1429-30.
96. Schroeder, 924 F.2d at 1548.
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United States Trust and Citizens & Southern "invoked policy to expand the
reach of [Treasury Regulation § 20.2056(e)-2(d)(1)] well beyond its
plain language." 9 7 The court noted that the will contest regulation was
not dispositive, and stated:
Unlike the district court and the courts in United States Trust and
Citizens & Southern, we believe the will contest regulation is inap-
plicable to property passing to a surviving spouse by statutory
election or under the law of survivorship because the regula-
tion speaks only in terms of a controversy involving a bequest
or devise under decedent's will.
9 8
In declining to apply the will contest regulation to property that did
not involve a bequest or devise under a will, the Tenth Circuit diverged
from the path previously blazed by the Second and Fifth Circuits. The
Tenth Circuit clearly indicated its belief that the regulation should be
strictly construed by its plain meaning and should not be applied to situ-
ations which do not involve a bequest or devise under a decedent's
will.9 9
The Tenth Circuit, in agreement with the district court, concluded
that the legislative intent of the marital deduction would be violated if it
were allowed to be applied to the property Peggy relinquished. The
purpose of the marital deduction is to protect interspousal transfers and
not transfers that ultimately end up in the hands of other beneficiaries as
a result of a settlement involving the decedent's estate. 0 0 The Tenth
Circuit stated, "The marital deduction was designed to eliminate the
'double-taxation' that would result when the same property became sub-
ject to tax upon the death of each spouse. Once property passes outside
of the interspousal unit, however, this exception no longer applies."' 0 1
The Tenth Circuit's decision was greatly influenced by its interpre-
tation of the congressional policy and intent behind the marital deduc-
tion.1 0 2 In order to accomplish the legislative goal of denying the
marital deduction to the joint tenancy and statutory election property
surrendered in Schroeder, without applying the will contest regulation, the
Tenth Circuit looked to I.R.C. § 2056.103 The court considered
whether the "rationale for the Secretary's regulatory gloss on the passing
requirement in the context of a will contest mandate[d] a similar result
based on an analysis of the term 'passes' in the marital deduction stat-
ute."10 4 In holding that it did, the Tenth Circuit found that "the rea-
97. Id. at 1553. The court in Citizens defined "the decedent's will, or... any bequest or
devise thereunder" to include transfers of property at death under intestacy statutes or
spousal election. Both Citizens and United States Trust expanded the terms "will 'contest" or
"controversy" to include arms-length negotiations conducted between parties who have
potentially adverse positions. Id.
98. Id. at 1554.
99. Id.
100. See id. at 1554 ("[Ihe transfer comprising the settlement could altogether escape
taxation applying to gratuitous transfers of wealth.").
101. Id. at 1555.
102. See id. at 1551.
103. See 26 U.S.C. § 2056 (1988).
104. Schroeder, 924 F.2d at 1553.
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sons those courts [United States Trust and Citizens & Southern] articulated
to broaden the reach of the regulation [are] persuasive in our own analy-
sis of what Congress intended by the 'passing' requirement in the mari-
tal deduction statute."' 1 5 The Tenth Circuit determined that under
United States Trust and Citizens & Southern, the courts "defined 'passing' to
mean property to which the surviving spouse retains her rights after res-
olution of all disputes concerning the decedent's property."' 10 6 Adopt-
ing this definition of "passing," the Tenth Circuit held that the joint
tenancy property and the statutory election property did not "pass" to
Peggy within the meaning of I.R.C. § 2056.107
The court pointed out that over the years, Congress has liberalized
the marital deduction, finally removing the maximum deduction limita-
tion in 1981 by enacting an unlimited marital deduction.10 8 The Tenth
Circuit noted that while the 1981 provisions did not apply to Thomas'
estate, "the legislative history of the 1981 provisions does explain in
greater detail why the code provisions applicable to Thomas' estate did
not comport with congressional intent and were changed."' 0 9 While ac-
knowledging that "[i]n creating the marital deduction, Congress envi-
sioned a scheme in which interspousal transfers of wealth would not result
in a taxable event," 1 1 0 the Tenth Circuit considered further what Con-
gress intended by the "passing" requirement in the marital deduction
statute.l 1 The court determined:
To the extent a surviving spouse surrenders her share of the
decedent's property to other beneficiaries not entitled to the marital
deduction to avoid litigation concerning her rights, it defies com-
mon sense to conclude that this property "passed" to the sur-
105. Id. at 1554.
106. Id. at 1553-54.
107. Id. at 1555.
108. Id. at 1551.
109. Id. Because Thomas died in 1981, the 1976 version of the marital deduction stat-
ute applied. See supra note 20. The legislative history to the 1981 provisions stated:
Because the maximum estate tax marital deduction generally is limited,
under present law, to one-half of a decedent's adjusted gross estate, the estate of
a decedent who bequeaths his entire estate to his surviving spouse may be subject
to estate taxes even though the property remains within the marital unit. When
the surviving spouse later transfers the property (often to their children), the en-
tire amount is subject to transfer taxes. The cumulative effect is to subject their
property to tax one and one-half times, i.e., one-half upon the death of the first
spouse and again fully upon the death of the second spouse. This effect typically
occurs in the case ofjointly held property. Because this additional tax falls most
heavily on widows, it is often referred to as the "widow's tax."
Although the committee recognizes that this additional tax can be minimized
through proper estate planning, it believes that an individual should be free to
pass his entire estate to a surviving spouse without the imposition of any addi-
tional tax. For similar reasons, the committee believes it appropriate to permit
unlimited lifetime transfers between spouses without the imposition of any trans-
fer taxes.
The committee believes ... that tax consequences should not control an individ-
ual's disposition of property.
Schroeder, 924 F.2d at 1551 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 158-164
(1981)).
110. Id. at 1554-55 (emphasis added).
111. Id.
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viving spouse. Not only is the ultimate recipient of the property a
person other than the surviving spouse, but the transfer comprising
the settlement could altogether escape taxation applying to
gratuitous transfers of wealth.'
12
The Tenth Circuit noted that Congress designed the marital deduc-
tion to eliminate the double-taxation resulting under a system where the
same property is subject to tax upon the death of each spouse, but once
the property passes outside the interspousal unit, this exception no
longer applies. 31 3 "Congress clearly did not intend to replace double-
taxation with tax avoidance." ' 1 4 Therefore, in the Schroeder case, when
Peggy Woodmansee relinquished the joint tenancy and statutory elec-
tion property to the directives of the trust fund, the property passed
outside of the interspousal unit and was not entitled to the marital
deduction.
IV. CONCLUSION
In declining to construe the will contest provision broadly, as did
the Second and Fifth Circuits," 5 the Schroeder court created a tension
between the circuits regarding its application. This tension reflects an
uncertainty and lack of predictability with respect to the application of
the will contest regulation to fact situations illustrated by Schroeder and
begs the attention of the Department of the Treasury. The Schroeder
court, in order to preserve the intent of the marital deduction, looked to
I.R.C. § 2056116 and concluded that the joint tenancy and statutory
election property relinquished by the surviving spouse "flunked" the
"passing" requirement. Although the Tenth Circuit's result was correct
(the marital deduction was denied in Schroeder), the court's application of
I.R.C. § 2056 was unsatisfactory. The statute provides no clearer solu-
tion with respect to estate tax treatment of property that has "passed" to
a surviving spouse, but is later relinquished, than does the will contest
regulation.
Consequently, to provide clear authority with respect to estate tax
treatment in such situations, the Department of the Treasury should
amend the will contest regulation. As the Tenth Circuit indicated in the
112. Id. (emphasis added). "Peggy paid no gift tax upon the transfer of the property
into the trust and did not report the transfer as a sale on her income tax returns." Id. at
n.8.
113. Id. at 1555. See also United States v. Stapf, 375 U.S. 118, 125-29 (1963) ("The
purpose [of the marital deduction] is only to permit a married couple's property to be
taxed in two stages and not to allow a tax-exempt transfer of wealth into succeeding gener-
ations.... What the statute provides is a 'marital deduction'-a deduction for gifts to the
surviving spouse-not a deduction for gifts to the children or a deduction for gifts to pri-
vately selected beneficiaries. The appropriate reference, therefore, is not to the value of
the gift moving from the deceased spouse but to the net value of the gift received by the
surviving spouse.").
114. Schroeder, 924 F.2d at 1555.
115. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank v. United States, 451 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971); United
States Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 321 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 937
(1964).
116. 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a).
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Schroeder decision, the regulation stops short of dealing with circum-
stances which do not involve a will contest. The amendment should ap-
ply the regulation, and thereby deny the marital deduction, to situations
where property which otherwise qualifies for the marital deduction is
relinquished or surrendered by the surviving spouse in a settlement of
any controversy, as a result of the devolution of a decedent's estate.
In order to ensure predictability, fairness to both the government
and the taxpayer, and clear application of the regulation, the amend-
ment should impose a time restriction. With respect to property that is
relinquished before the filing of the Estate Tax Return, 1 17 the marital
deduction should simply not be available and estate tax liability should
attach to the surrendered property. With respect to property relin-
quished after the Estate Tax Return is filed, any marital deduction previ-
ously allowed on such property should be disallowed and an estate tax
deficiency1 18 should be assessed on the relinquished property. How-
ever, once the statute of limitations period 1 19 has run, any relinquish-
ment of property to which the marital deduction was previously allowed
on the Estate Tax Return should be treated as a gift by the surviving
spouse to the transferee, and gift tax liability120 should attach.
Deborah L. Land
117. Estate Tax Returns must be filed within nine months after the date of the dece-
dent's death. 26 U.S.C. § 6075 (1988).
118. See 26 U.S.C. § 6211 (1988).
119. See 26 U.S.C. § 6501, which provides for a three year statute of limitations (after
the date of filing) on the assessment of Estate Tax.
120. See 26 U.S.C. § 2501 (1988).
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UNITED STATES V. BENCHECK: AGGREGATE PENALTIES
AND JURY ENTITLEMENT IN MULTIPLE PETTY
OFFENSE CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
For over a century, the United States Supreme Court has inter-
preted the constitutional right to jury trial' to extend only to the prose-
cution of serious criminal offenses. 2 The task of distinguishing serious
from petty offenses has, through the years, proven formidable. Today
the Court considers maximum statutory penalties the most accurate in-
dex of criminal seriousness.3 In single offense cases, crimes authorizing
incarceration exceeding six months are deemed serious, while those au-
thorizing incarceration of six months or less are presumed petty.
4
In United States v. Bencheck,5 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
faced an issue not yet addressed by the Supreme Court: jury entitle-
ment in the prosecution of multiple petty offenses. In Bencheck, the de-
fendant was tried without a jury on four petty offense charges arising
from one incident. The charges carried an-aggregate statutory incarcer-
ation period greater than eighteen months.6 Consecutive sentencing
was legislatively authorized, and consolidation of offenses was not re-
quired.7 However, due to a pretrial sentencing stipulation, the defend-
ant actually faced a maximum incarceration of only six months.8 In
assessing the seriousness of the defendant's criminality to determine
jury entitlement, the court declined to consider the aggregate statutory
penalty and instead based its assessment upon the judicially reduced
penalty the defendant actually faced. 9
This Comment will trace the history of the petty offense exception
to the constitutional right to jury trial through English common law,
United States Supreme Court interpretations, and, finally, Tenth Circuit
opinions. It will then explore and analyze the reasoning of the majority
and the dissenting opinions in Bencheck. Finally, this Comment will ar-
gue that the majority based its jury entitlement determination upon a
1. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; U.S. Const. amend VI.
2. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 552, 555, 557 (1888). Callan was the first Supreme
Court case to make this interpretation. See infra note 20 and accompanying text, and text
accompanying notes 21-22.
3. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989). The statutory
or "authorized" penalty includes the authorized period of incarceration as well as other
statutory punishment. Id. at 543 & n.8.
4. Id. at 543; see infra text accompanying note 55. Because the case central to this
Comment is primarily concerned with incarceration periods and does not involve fines,
this Comment does not discuss statutory fines.
5. 926 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1991).
6. Appellant's Reply Brief at 4 n.1, United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512 (10th
Cir. 1991) (No. 90-6072).
7. See infra note 118.
8. Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1514.
9. Id. at 1520.
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method of ascertaining criminal seriousness that facially contradicted
the Supreme Court's traditional method and that was constitutionally
inappropriate because it abandoned substantive interests that the tradi-
tional method had evolved to serve.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The History of the Petty Offense Exception
In England, in the early fourteenth century, juries decided all crimi-
nal cases.1 0 This practice became infeasible as Parliament's prolific en-
actment of penal statutes overburdened the system with prosecutions. " I
In 1362, to accommodate the increasing volume ofjury trials, England's
traveling justices began holding sessions at quarterly intervals,' 2 but in
time even the quarter session courts became overburdened with jury tri-
als.' 3 Thus, in the sixteenth century, statutes creating minor, or
"petty," offenses authorized prosecutions without juries. 14 To further
ease the burden, justices began hearing the new class of summarily tria-
ble cases out of sessions whenever necessary. 15 Penal statutes contin-
ued to multiply, and by the eighteenth century summarily triable
offenses greatly dominated England's criminal code.16 The English col-
onists brought summary proceedings to America, eventually adopting
the practice in state constitutions. 17 Yet, in America the class of offenses
excluded from the jury process was considerably smaller than that found
in England at the time.' 8 At the writing of the United States Constitu-
tion, summary proceedings for petty offenses were well-entrenched.' 9
That the framers tacitly excluded petty offenses from the ambit of the
jury clauses in Article III and the Sixth Amendment is a widely held
belief.
20
10. Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G. Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional
Guaranty of Trial byJury, 39 HARV. L. REv. 917, 923-24 (1926); see also GEOFFREY R.Y. RAD-
CLIFFE & GEOFFREY CROSS, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM, 67 (Lord Cross of Chelsea & GJ.
Hand eds., 5th ed. 1971) (Cases were decided by juries by the 1300's.). "Presenting ju-
ries," precursors to modern grand juries, were established about a century and a half ear-
lier. See 1 SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERICK W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAw 151 (2d ed. reissued 1968).
11. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, at 924-27.
12. See RADCLIFFE & CROSS, supra note 10, at 73.
13. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, at 925.
14. Id. at 924-27.
15. Id. at 925. These latter tribunals became known as "petty sessions." RADCLIFFE &
CROSS, supra note 10, at 76, 204.
16. See 10 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 159-60 (1938);
Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra, note 10 at 930-33. Today, the vast majority of English
criminal cases are still tried without a jury. See MARCUS GLEISSER, JURIES AND JUSTICE 46
(1968); LLOYD E. MOORE, THE JURY, TOOL OF KINGS, PALLADIUM OF LIBERTY 127 (1973);
GLANVILLE WILLIAMS, THE PROOF OF GUILT 302 (3d ed. 1963).
17. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, at 937.
18. Id. at 936. In fact, the colonists perceived the Crown's extensive use of summary
proceedings as oppressive. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 15 (U.S. 1776);
SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 267-70 (Richard L. Perry ed. 1959).
19. Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, at 962-69.
20. Id. at 937-69; see, e.g., Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541
(1989). Article III states: "The trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall
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In 1888, Callan v. Wilson 2 ' was the first United States Supreme
Court case to examine the constitutional limits of the right to jury trial.
The Court reversed a conspiracy conviction tried without a jury, inter-
preting the jury clauses of the Constitution in light of colonial common
law. The Court recognized a class of petty offenses the prosecutions of
which did not fall within the jury trial guarantee.2 2 Because conspiracy
was indictable at common law, it was not of this class of petty offense.
23
Therefore, the Court reasoned that prosecution of conspiracy com-
manded the right to a jury. Evaluation of the common law indictability
of the offense became the first of two common law tests employed to
distinguish petty from serious offenses.
24
Sixteen years later, the second common law test was born. In Schick
v. United States,2 5 the majority looked to the moral quality of the offense
in finding a violation of the Oleomargarine Act of 188626 petty for jury
trial purposes. 27 In making its assessment, the Court also considered
the harshness of the prescribed punishment,28 thereby presaging use of
be by Jury ...." U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. The framers originally chose the words
"trial of all criminal offenses." 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 187
(Max Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937). Prior to adoption of the constitution, the framers
amended the wording to read "all crimes." Id. at 434, 438, 576, 601. The United States
Supreme Court has interpreted the eighteenth century understanding of the word
"crimes" to mean serious offenses only. See, e.g., Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 69-
70 (1904). Hence, the Court has concluded that the change from "all criminal offenses" to
"all Crimes" expresses an intent to exclude petty offenses from the jury trial right. Id. at
70.
The Sixth Amendment states: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
That the phrasing of this clause differs from the "all Crimes" language in Article III is
immaterial. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, at 971. The Sixth Amendment was
intended to enumerate the common law features ofjury trials guaranteed in Article III, not
to expand the class of offenses to which that guarantee applied. l-; see also Johnson v.
Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 371 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S.
540, 549 (1888); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONsTrruTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 662 (Boston, Hillard, Grey & Co. 1833).
A significant minority of jurists and commentators interpret the Constitution as in-
cluding all criminal prosecutions within the scope of the jury trial guarantee. See, e.g.,
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 74-76 (1970) (Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring);
Schick, 195 U.S. at 83, 98-100 (Harlan,J., dissenting); George Kaye, Petty Offenders Have No
Peers!, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 245 passim (1959).
21. 127 U.S. 540 (1888).
22. Id. at 549, 555.
23. Id. at 555, 557.
24. But see Robert P. Connolly, Note, The Petty Offense Exception and the Right to a Jury
Trial, 48 FORDHAM L. REVIEW 205, 213-14 (1979); Kenneth C. Picton, Note,Jury Trials for
Petty Offenses: Time to Drop the Common Law Tests?, 12 STETSON L. REv. 191, 201-02 (1984).
These authors divide the common law tests into three. They distinguish the moral quality
test employed in Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65 (1904), from the malum in se test
employed in District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73 (1930). These tests (see infra
text accompanying notes 25-31) are more appropriately classed together, as malum in se
designates acts that are inherently immoral. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 959 (6th ed. 1990).
25. 195 U.S. 65 (1904).
26. Oleomargarine Act of 1886, ch. 840, § 11, 24 Stat. 209 (repealed 1950) (act taxing
oleomargarine).
27. Schick, 195 U.S. at 67. In part, the Court based its decision that the jury right
constitutionally could be waived on the pettiness of the offense. See Patton v. United
States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930) for the modem standard for jury trial waiver.
28. Schick, 195 U.S. at 67-68. The penalty was a fifty dollar fine.
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a criterion on which later decisions would rely heavily. In 1930, the
moral quality test was further developed by District of Columbia v. Colts.2 9
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Sutherland found reckless auto-
mobile driving to be a malum in se offense and an indictable offense by
common law standards. 30 These findings led the Court to conclude that
the infraction was serious enough to secure the right to jury trial. 3 '
After Colts, the Supreme Court moved away from tests that evalu-
ated the nature of criminal offenses in light of common law standards
and began judging criminal seriousness in light of current normative
standards objectively expressed by statutory penalties.3 2 In the 1937
case of District of Columbia v. Clawans,3 3 the Court took the first significant
step in this direction. Justice Stone, writing for the majority, first ap-
plied both common law tests and found that dealing in second-hand per-
sonal property without a license was not a serious crime.34 Yet the
majority, uneasy with the judicial subjectivity involved in applying the
common law tests and seeking a more objective measure of criminal se-
riousness, went on to pursue the analysis touched upon in Schick.3 5 Jus-
tice Stone looked to the legislative penalty as an objective embodiment
of social and ethical judgments attaching to the crime and found that an
authorized imprisonment of ninety days expressed a social judgment
that the crime was not serious.
36
In 1968, Duncan v. Louisiana3 7 extended the use of objective criteria
found in Clawans. The defendant was convicted of simple battery and
sentenced to sixty days' imprisonment.3 8 In assessing the seriousness of
the crime, the Court focused exclusively on the severity of the legisla-
tively authorized penalty of two years' imprisonment.3 9 To aid its evalu-
ation, the majority looked to the federal definition of petty offense40 and
to the punishment most often accompanying petty offenses at common
law.4 1 The Court, declining to establish a specific quantum of punish-
29. 282 U.S. 63 (1930).
30. Id. at 73. (When horses constituted the motive power, the offense amounted to a
public nuisance.)
31. Id. at 74.
32. That the severity of the statutory penalty expresses the crime's seriousness is sup-
ported by both retributive and utilitarian theories of punishment. Compare John Cotting-
ham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238, 238 (1979) (classical retributive theory of
repayment) with JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND
LEGISLATION ch. XIV (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970) (classical utilitarian theory).
33. 300 U.S. 617 (1937).
34. Id. at 625.
35. Id. at 625-28;see Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 n.5 (1989).
36. Id. at 625-30.
37. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
38. Id. at 146; La. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:35 (West 1950) (maximum imprisonment, two
years) (current version at LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:35 (West 1986)).
39. Id. at 159-62.
40. Id. at 161 (citing 18 U.S.C. § *1 (1964)) (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 19 (1988)).
This section defines the term "petty offense" as a Class B or Class C misdemeanor. 18
U.S.C. § 3559(a)(7) (1988) sets the maximum imprisonment for Class B misdemeanors at
six months or less.
41. At colonial common law, petty offenses generally carried no more than six
months' imprisonment. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161; see District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300
766 [Vol. 69:4
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ment distinguishing serious from petty crimes, decided only that a crime
carrying a maximum authorized penalty of two years' imprisonment was
serious by common law and contemporary standards of punishment.
42
Writing for the majority, Justice White rejected the State of Louisiana's
argument43 that under Cheffv. Schnackenberg44 the proper measure of a
crime's seriousness is the penalty actually imposed The Court empha-
sized that Chefinvolved a criminal contempt statute that did not author-
ize a maximum penalty.4 5 The opinion is clear that, where it exists, the
maximum statutory penalty, not the penalty actually imposed, is the
proper objective measure of the crime's seriousness.
4 6
In the 1970 Supreme Court case Baldwin v. New York, 4 7 the plurality
reiterated that the severity of theauthorized penalty provides the proper
and most objective standard for ascertaining society's view of criminal
seriousness.48 The defendant received the maximum sentence for vio-
lating a pickpocketing statute, which authorized a one-year imprison-
ment.4 9 The plurality concluded only that a crime carrying a maximum
sentence of more than six months was serious, but did not address
whether a crime carrying a maximum sentence of six months or less was
serious.50
The most recent Supreme Court case to address the petty offense
exception was Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas. 5 1 The issue was whether
prosecution of an offense carrying a six-month sentence required jury
trial. Justice Marshall, writing for a unanimous Court, confirmed the
Duncan-Baldwin mandate: criminal seriousness is to be ascertained by
evaluating the severity of the statutory penalty. 52 Justice Marshall ex-
plained that because the legislature is best positioned to respond to so-
ciety's ethical judgments, statutory penalties best express society's view
of criminal seriousness; therefore, jury entitlement must turn on statu-
U.S. 617, 626 nn.2-3 (1937); Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, at 934 & apps. A-D
(summary of colonial petty offenses).
42. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161-62.
43. See Brief for Appellee at 7-9, Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (No. 410).
44. 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
45. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161-62 & n.35.
46. See id. However, where the legislature has not spoken as to the seriousness of a
crime by authorizing a maximum sentence, the penalty imposed substitutes as a measure
of that seriousness. See id. at 162 n.35; Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538,
542 n.6 (1989); Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 511 (1974); Frank v. United
States, 395 U.S. 147, 149 (1969); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. i94, 211 (1968).
47. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
48. Id. at 68 (citing District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937); Frank,
395 U.S. at 148).
49. Defendant was convicted of "jostling", in violation of N.Y. PENAL LAW sec. 165.25
(McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1991). Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 67 & n.l.
50. See id. at 68-69 & n.6. Justices White, Brennan and Marshall reached this conclu-
sion. Justices Black and Douglas concurred in the result, but disagreed that the Constitu-
tion exempts petty offenses from the jury right. Id. at 74 (Black and Douglas, JJ.,
concurring).
51. 489 U.S. 538 (1989). The defendant was convicted, without a jury, of driving
under the influence of alcohol, in violation ofNEv. REv. STAT. § 484.379(1) (1990). Id. at
539.
52. Id. at 541 & n.5; see supra text accompanying notes 39-50 (discussing the Duncan-
Baldwin mandate).
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tory, not judicial, expressions of criminal seriousness. 53 Emphasizing
this point, Justice Marshall stated that, in jury entitlement determina-
tions, it is "not constitutionally determinative" that a particular defend-
ant may actually receive a sentence less than the statutory maximum.
54
The Court edged closer to establishing a lower limit for serious offenses
in holding that a crime carrying a maximum penalty of six months or
less incarceration is presumed petty for jury trial purposes and that the
presumption is rebutted only by showing that "additional statutory pen-
alties," when combined with the maximum authorized incarceration,
clearly indicate a "legislative determination" that the offense is
serious.
5 5
B. Multiple Petty Offenses in the Tenth Circuit
On four occasions since Duncan, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
has addressed an aspect of jury entitlement that the United States
Supreme Court has not faced. This issue is whether a defendant ac-
cused of multiple petty offenses resulting from one act is entitled to jury
trial when the aggregate statutory penalty exceeds the Baldwin six-month
threshold.
In 1973 United States v. Potvin56 was the first Tenth Circuit case to
address this issue. The defendants were charged with two Forest Ser-
vice violations, each carrying a maximum prison term of less than six
months, with the aggregate penalty exceeding six months. 57 Tried with-
out a jury, the defendants were sentenced to ninety days in prison and
placed on six months' probation. 5 8 On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held
that since the charged offenses arose from the same act, transaction, or
occurrence and the aggregate maximum incarceration exceeded six
months, under Baldwin the defendants were entitled to jury trial even
though their actual sentence was less than six months.5 9
In United States v. Smyer,60 the defendants were charged with eleven
counts of violating the Antiquities Act,6 1 which charges arose from their
excavation of ruins at two adjacent archaeological sites. 62 The aggre-
gate maximum statutory penalty for each defendant was 990 days' im-
prisonment, but the penalty actually imposed was eleven concurrent
ninety-day sentences.6 3 Because ajury would not have been available in
Las Cruces, New Mexico and the defendants wanted trial there, they
53. Id. at 541-42.
54. Id. at 544.
55. Id. at 543; see also infra note 133 (discussing meaning and severity of "additional
statutory penalties").
56. 481 F.2d 380 (10th Cir. 1973).
57. Id. at 381.
58. Id.
59. id. at 381,383.
60. 596 F.2d 939 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843 (1979).
61. 16 U.S.C. § 433 (1988).
62. Smyer, 596 F.2d at 940.
63. Id. at 942.
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waived their right to a jury.64 On appeal, the defendants contested the
validity of their jury waivers. Although the court found the waivers
valid,65 in dictum it addressed the defendants' argument that they were
entitled to jury trial based on the aggregated authorized sentences. Di-
rectly contradicting Potvin and without referring to that case, Judge Brei-
tenstein concluded that there is no right to jury trial where the actual
sentence for multiple petty offenses is less than six months, even where
the aggregate statutory penalty exceeds six months.
6 6
The Tenth Circuit again addressed multiple petty offenses and jury
entitlement in the 1983 case Haar v. Hanrahan.67 In a New Mexico mag-
istrate court, the defendant was convicted of simple battery and criminal
damage to property and received two consecutive ninety-day
sentences. 6 8 New Mexico law provided for de novo trial in district court
upon appeal from magistrate court, but did not allow the district court
to impose a greater sentence on appeal than that imposed below. Thus
the defendant faced maximum incarceration of 180 days upon appeal.
69
At the de novo trial, the district court denied the defendant a jury.
70
The district court affirmed the conviction, and the Tenth Circuit ac-
cepted jurisdiction on the defendant's habeas corpus petition, which
reasserted his claim that he was entitled to a jury trial in the district
court. 7 1 The State argued that even though the defendant was charged
with two offenses in the district court, each carrying a potential sentence
of six months' imprisonment, ajury trial was not required since the dis-
trict court could not have imposed a sentence exceeding six months. 7
2
Judge McKay, writing the Haar opinion for a unanimous court, ac-
knowledged that Potvin guarantees jury trial where the aggregate of the
possible penalties exceeds the Baldwin six-month limit. 73 The court rec-
oguized, however, that Potvin does not reveal whether the aggregate
statutory penalties or the aggregate penalties actually facing the defend-
ant at the commencement of the trial determine the right to jury trial.
74
Because in Potvin the sentence was not limited before trial, the Potvin
64. Id.
65. Id.; see Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 312 (1930) (articulating the constitu-
tional standard for jury waiver).
66. Id. Contra United States v. Potvin, 481 F.2d 380, 381, 383 (10th Cir. 1973). The
Smyer court found support in criminal contempt and right to counsel cases. See 596 F.2d at
942. However, criminal contempt cases have little precedential value where, as here, stat-
utory penalties exist. See supra notes 45-46 and accompanying text. Also, right to counsel
cases have been sharply distinguished from right to jury trial cases. SeeJames v. Headley,
410 F.2d 325, 331-33 & n.9 (5th Cir. 1969). For further analysis of why Smyer's conclusion
regarding aggregation of penalties is dictum, see Appellant's Reply Brief at 2-3, United
States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1215 (10th Cir. 1991) (No. 90-6072).
67. 708 F.2d 1547 (10th Cir. 1983).
68. The defendant violated N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 30-1-6(c), 30-3-4, 30-15-1 (1978).
708 F.2d at 1547-48.
69. Id. Current New Mexico law does not limit the district court to sentence imposed
by the magistrate. See State v. Sanchez, 786 P.2d 42, 45 (N.M. 1990).
70. Haar, 708 F.2d at 1548.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1551.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1552; see United States v. Potvin, 481 F.2d 380, 381-83 (10th Cir. 1973).
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court had not faced this issue. Judge McKay thus found that Potvin left
the court to choose between two measures of criminal seriousness: the
"objective" penalty provided by the aggregate statutory incarceration or
the "subjective" penalty actually facing the defendant. 75 The court
found that the objective approach would "[broaden] the concept of a
serious offense, looking beyond the particular offenses charged to the
actual criminal activity that the aggregated charges represent."' 76 Ex-
pressing its desire not to expand the serious offense concept, the Haar
court dispensed with use of objective criteria, favoring the subjective
approach.
77
III. UNITED STATES V. BENCHECK
A. Facts
On June 19, 1989, military police officers stopped defendant
Bencheck at Fort Sill, Oklahoma, for operating his motorcycle without
face protection. 78 As a result of the ensuing exchange, Bencheck was
charged with assault and battery of a police officer, malicious injury to
property, operating a motor vehicle without a valid operator's license,
failure to obey the lawful order of a police officer, and operating a mo-
torcycle without face protection.79 Each offense carried a maximum in-
carceration of six months.8 0 Consecutive sentencing was legislatively
authorized, and consolidation of offenses was not required. 8 ' Before
trial, the malicious injury to property charge was dismissed.82
On the day of the trial, over the defendant's objection, the court
announced that it would not impanel ajury, but should the defendant be
convicted, it would not impose a sentence exceeding six months.8 3
Bencheck was acquitted of operating a motor vehicle without a valid li-
cense, but was found guilty of the remaining three charges.8 4 He was
sentenced to concurrent six-month sentences on two charges, all but ten
days of which was suspended and the balance served on probation.8 5
The court imposed an additional, concurrent ten-day sentence for the
75. Haar, 708 F.2d at 1552.
76. Id. at 1553.
77. See id.
78. Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1513.
79. The defendant violated, in order, OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 649, 1760; tit. 47,
§ 6-101 (West 1988 & Supp. 1991); tit. 47 §§ 11-102, 40-105(B) (West 1988). Bencheck,
926 F.2d at 1513.
80. Id. at 1514 & n.8. All offenses were assimilated into federal law under the Assimi-
lative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 7, 13 (1988). Id. at 1513; see also United States v. Sain, 795
F.2d 888, 890 (10th Cir. 1986) ("The purpose of the Assimilative Crimes Act is to provide
a method of punishing a crime committed on [federal] government reservations in the way
and to the extent it would have been punishable if committed within the surrounding
[state] jurisdiction.").
81. See infra note 118.
82. Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1514 & n.8. The charge was dismissed for the state's viola-
tion of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1988). Appellant's Opening Brief at 3 n.2,
926 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1991) (No. 90-6072).
83. Appellant's Opening Brief at 3-4, 925 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1991) (No. 90-6072).
84. Id at 4.
85. Id.
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remaining charge.8 6
The issue on appeal was whether Bencheck was denied jury trial
unconstitutionally. Bencheck asserted that Potvin, in light of Supreme
Court precedent as reinforced by Blanton, guarantees a jury trial when
one act gives rise to potential aggregate statutory penalty exceeding six
months.8 7 Bencheck claimed that Blanton implicitly overruled Haar,
8 8
which held that jury entitlement in multiple petty offense cases exists
only when the penalty actually facing the defendant at the commence-
ment of trial exceeds six months.
B. Majority Opinion
Writing for the majority, Judge Brorby acknowledged that Blanton
affirmed maximum statutory penalties as the relevant criteria for deter-
mining whether an offense is petty. 89 He stated that the Tenth Circuit,
however, recognized that the penalty actually imposed is most important
to the accused.90 Judge Brorby found these positions consistent, fol-
lowed Tenth Circuit precedent, and denied jury trial. In its analysis, the
majority noted that Haar, like Baldwin,9 1 recognized six months as the
threshold quantum of incarceration which, when exceeded, classifies a
crime as serious. 92 The court noted that the Haar threshold, unlike the
Baldwin threshold, is not exceeded by the statutory penalty, but by the
penalty actually facing the defendant at the start of trial. The court char-
acterized the Haar threshold as "corollary" to the Supreme Court's ap-
proach in Baldwin.
93
Although the Haar court described its method of determining the
seriousness of a crime as "subjective," the Bencheck court disagreed, stat-
ing that because Haar's method asks whether a discrete quantum of in-
carceration exists, the approach was actually objective.9 4 In fact, the
court implied that the approach of Duncan, Baldwin, and Blanton was ob-
jective, not because it evaluated the authorized penalty, but because it
evaluated some penalty. That is, according to the majority, the Supreme
Court approach is objective because it is "penalty-oriented." 95 Thus,
the court found that Haar's approach, being also penalty-oriented, was
objective and fully consistent with Supreme Court precedent.9 6 Follow-
ing Haar, the majority held that only penalties actually facing the de-
fendant should be considered when assessing the criminal seriousness of
multiple petty offenses.9 7 Applying the Blanton presumption, the court
86. Id.
87. See id. at 5-7.
88. Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1514.
89. Id. at 1515.
90. Id. at 1518.
91. Baldwin is discussed supra in text accompanying notes 47-50.





97. Id. at 1518, 1520.
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concluded that since the penalty threatening Bencheck did not exceed
six months' incarceration, his criminality was presumptively petty.98
The court found the presumption was not overcome and accordingly
found no jury entitlement. 99
Buttressing the holding, the majority found its penalty-oriented ap-
proach consistent with the approach taken in criminal contempt
cases.' 0 0 It noted that in Taylor v. Hayes,' 0 1 a criminal contempt convic-
tion obtained without a jury was upheld where, absent a legislatively es-
tablished penalty, a sentence of less than six months was imposed.
10 2
For further support, Judge Brorby observed that Rule 58(a)(3) of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that adherence to the
rules is not required in petty offense cases where the judge stipulates
before trial that no sentence will be imposed.'0 3 The majority appar-
ently thought that determining jury entitlement by the severity of a pre-
trial sentencing stipulation was analogous to relaxing procedural rules
where no sentence is to be imposed. 10 4 The majority cited statistics il-
lustrating the impracticability of administering jury trials for all petty
offense prosecutions and juxtaposed these statistics with certain fair trial
interests promoted by the use ofjuries. 10 5 The court did not engage in
a balancing analysis, but impliedly found support for its holding in the
practical concerns of judicial efficiency suggested by the statistics. 10 6
C. Dissenting Opinion
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Ebel maintained that Blanton over-
ruled Haar.10 7 The dissent, echoing Haar, recognized that although
Potvin required aggregation of petty offense penalties for jury trial pur-
poses, it did not reveal which penalties to aggregate: statutory penalties
or those actually threatening the defendant. However, Judge Ebel read
Blanton as unequivocally mandating that statutory penalties be aggre-
gated. 10 8 The dissent concluded that since the aggregated statutory
penalties exceeded six months Bencheck was entitled to a jury.10 9 Ac-
98. Id. at 1516-17, 1519-20. In applying the presumption to the judicially stipulated
sentence, the court did not address the fact that the presumption in Blanton was applied to
the "maximum authorized period of incarceration." Compare Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1516-
17, 1519-20 with Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989).
99. Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1520.
100. Id. at 1519.
101. 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
102. Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1519.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. The Court stated, "Among the concerns is the time involved in administering a
jury system. For example, 83,092 petty offenses, 56,763 of which were traffic offenses,
were disposed of by the United States Magistrates in 1987." Id. at 1515 (citingAdministra-
tive Office of the United States Courts, Annual Report of Director, Tables M-IA, M-2, at 393, 397
(1987)).
106. Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1515. ("The practical necessity of limiting the number ofjury
trials ... is obvious.").
107. Id. at 1521 (Ebel, J., dissenting).
108. Id. at 1522.
109. Id.
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knowledging the majority's concern with judicial administration, Judge
Ebel argued that under present law, pretrial sentencing stipulations can-
not preclude jury trials and that the majority's administrative concerns
could be addressed either by limiting the number of offenses charged or
by changing the law to prohibit offense aggregation.'110
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Facial Conflict
The United States Supreme Court, by exclusively relying on statu-
tory penalties to gauge criminal seriousness, provided specific guidance
for determining jury entitlement."' Because it rejected evaluation of
statutory penalties, the Bencheck opinion is facially at odds with this gui-
dance and is unconvincing in its attempt to show otherwise. Construing
Haar as consistent with Blanton and its predecessors was crucial to the
court's reasoning, as the court ultimately followed Haar's approach. In
trying to reconcile these cases, the Bencheck majority stated that the
Supreme Court's objectivity mandate required only that the petty-seri-
ousness inquiry be "penalty-oriented." 1 2 Since Haar's inquiry was pen-
alty-oriented, the Bencheck majority found Haar consistent with Blanton
and its predecessors."
3
The majority's rationale does not harmonize Haar with Supreme
Court precedent. Just because a method is "penalty-oriented" does not
mean that it satisfies the Supreme Court's requirement of objectivity. 114
In single offense cases, where a maximum statutory penalty exists, the
court must ascertain criminal seriousness by evaluating the severity of
the statutory penalty. 15 Although "penalty-oriented," an evaluation of
the severity of the penalty actually imposed will not suffice." l6 There-
fore, finding the Supreme-Court method penalty-oriented does not, in
itself, justify Haar's and Bencheck's particular penalty-oriented method.
The majority's attempt to justify its penalty-oriented method on the
basis of its harmony with criminal contempt precedent is similarly
flawed. Because criminal contempt statutes do not specify maximum
penalties, the Supreme Court has specifically rejected criminal contempt
cases as precedent for evaluating criminal seriousness where statutory
penalties exist.1 17 In stating that its approach exactly followed the crim-
inal contempt cases, the majority ignored the substantial difference be-
tween criminal contempt cases and the instant case: in the former, the
110. Id.
11I. See supra text accompanying notes 33-55.
112. Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1518.
113. Id.
114. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162 n.35 (1968).
115. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541-42 & n.6 (1989); cases
cited supra note 46.
116. See, e.g., Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541-42 & n.6; Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161-62 & n.35.
117. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161-62 & n.35; cf. United States v. FMC Corp., 428 F.
Supp. 615, 620 (W.D.N.Y. 1977) (criminal contempt cases involve unique principles of
legal sanction).
19921
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
legislature has not spoken on the seriousness of the criminal act, while
in the latter, the legislature has determined statutory penalties, has au-
thorized consecutive sentencing and has not required mandatory con-
solidation of offenses.' 18 The legislature thus had expressed its view
that an incident generating the multiple offenses was, in society's eyes,
more serious than an incident generating fewer of the offenses. 119 In
such a situation, the aggregate statutory penalty provides, under
Supreme Court standards, the only acceptable measure of criminal
seriousness.120
B. Substantive Conflict
The Supreme Court has established a method for objectively deter-
mining when the stakes facing criminal defendants are too high to ex-
empt prosecutions from the jury trial guarantee.' 21 The Court has had
several opportunities to allow judicially imposed penalties to measure
criminal seriousness in non-contempt cases. 122 In each instance it has
refused to do so, favoring some other measure, the modern measure
being legislative penalties. 123 The Court has reasoned that legislative
penalties best express criminal seriousness because they are the truest
measure of the consequences at stake in criminal prosecutions. 124 The
Court believes that social and moral judgments attaching to crimes
largely define their seriousness 125 and that legislatures are far better
equipped to capture community judgments than the judiciary.' 26 The
Court has thus reasoned that community judgments represented within
statutory penalties are important components of the potential conse-
quences facing criminal defendants.
If legislatures alone can reach these judgments, measuring criminal
seriousness by judicially reduced sentences underestimates the gravity
of the consequences facing the accused. Such a method might therefore
deny jury trial when, under Supreme Court standards, conviction carries
sufficiently severe potential consequences to secure the constitutional
118. See Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1514, 1519. Also, federal sentencing guidelines,
mandatory in federal prosecutions under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (1988), are not applicable
to petty offense convictions. 28 U.S.C. § 994(w) (Supp. 1991); UNITED STATES SENTENC-
ING COMMISSION GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1BI.9 (1990). However, where the guidelines do
require offense consolidation, the charges subsumed still operate as "aggravating factors,"
thereby expressing the heightened severity of the act. See id. at § 3D 1.2 cmt. 5.
119. See United States v. O'Connor, 660 F. Supp. 955, 956 (N.D. Ga. 1987); State v.
Sanchez, 786 P.2d 42, 46 (N.M. 1990); see also Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506,
519-20 (1974) (Marshall, J., concurring in part) (applying the principle to multiple crimi-
nal contempt charges).
120. O'Connor, 660 F. Supp. at 956; Sanchez, 786 P.2d at 46.
121. See Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541-42 (1988).
122. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (judicially imposed sentence of sixty
days); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617 (1937) (sentence of ninety days);
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888) (sentence of thirty days).
123. See supra text accompanying notes 36-55.
124. See, e.g., Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160.
125. See, e.g., id. at 159-60; Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541.
126. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541-42; seealso Cheffv. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 390-
91 (1966) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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right. Therefore measuring criminal seriousness in jury entitlement de-
terminations by legislative rather than judicial penalties is constitution-
ally significant in that legislative penalties most objectively and
accurately measure the one variable-criminal seriousness-upon which
the constitutional right turns.
Furthermore, juries are intended to provide defendants accused of
serious crimes a protection of fairness commensurate with the conse-
quences at stake.' 2 7 Thus, it is appropriate that the Supreme Court,
following common law tradition, 128 has accounted for social judgments
in determining whether the protection of ajury trial is warranted. Aside
from the length of the sentence imposed, the fact of conviction itself has
far-reaching social consequences significantly impacting the wrong-
doer's life. 129 Socialjudgments attaching to conviction of petty offenses
are manifested in a plethora of collateral statutory consequences. Re-
gardless of the penalty actually imposed, conviction of crimes authoriz-
ing sentences of six months' imprisonment can collaterally result in
removal from public office,' 30 revocation of professional licenses,' 3 1 or,
upon conviction of a later offense, enhanced punishment.13 2 Possibly
Blanton's pettiness presumption would be rebutted by proof of such
sanctions. 13
3
127. See, e.g., Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156; WILLIAM FORSY'rH, HISTORY OF TRIAL BY JURY
354 (James A. Morgan, ed., 2d ed. 1875). But see, e.g., Dale W. Broeder, The Functions of the
Jury:'Facts or Fictions?, 21 U. CHI. L. REv. 386 (1954); AndrewJ. Gildea, The Right to Tial By
Jury, 26 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1507, 1536-37 & nn.164-66 (1989);J.C. McWhorter, Abolish the
Jury, 57 Am. L. REV. 42, 45-47 (1923).
There are three often-cited equitable functions of the jury. First, the jury acts as a
buffer between the defendant on one hand, and the government or a vindictive community
on the other. STORY, supra note 20, at 653. Second, group deliberation reduces error. See
generally CHARLES W.JOINER, THE JURY SYSTEM IN AMERICA 147 (RitaJ. Simon, ed., 1975);
Dean C. Barnlund, A Comparative Study of Individual, Majority, and GroupJudgment, 58J. AB-
NORMAL AND Soc. PSYCHOL. 55 (1959); Herbert Gurnee, A Comparison of Collective and Indi-
vidual Judgments of Facts, 21 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL. 106 (1937); Janet A. Sniezek &
Rebecca A. Henry, Revision, Weighting, and Commitment in Consensus Group Judgment, 45 ORGA-
NIZATIONAL BEHAV. AND HUM. DECISION PROCESS 66, 80-83 (1990). Third, juries occasion-
ally facilitate justice by refusing to enforce harsh laws. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 188 (1968)
(Harlan and Stewart, JJ., dissenting). See HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN
JURY 494-95 (1966).
128. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 10, at 980-81 (at common law, moral judg-
ments and the stigma of authorized punishment were important factors injury entitlement
determinations).
129. The stigma of conviction dominates the spectrum of social consequences. See
Anthony A. Cuomo, Mens Rea and Status Criminality, 40 S. CAL. L. REV. 463, 505, 512
(1967); George K. Gardner, Bailey v. Richardson and the Constitution of the United States, 33
B.U.L. REV. 176, 193 (1953) (the essence of punishment lies in the conviction itself); Jo-
seph Goldstein, Police Discretion Not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low Visibility Decisions in the
Administration ofJustice, 69 YALE LJ. 543 app. 1 (1960); Henry M. Hart, The Aims of Criminal
Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 401, 404-06, 436-40 (1958).
130. See, e.g., Miss. CONsT. art. VI, § 175.
131. This is particularly true of misdemeanors involving moral turpitude. See, e.g., MD.
Bus. OCC. & PROF. CODE ANN. § 16-322(24)(ii) (1989) (revocation of real estate license);
OR. REV. STAT. § 9.527(2) (1988) (attorney disbarment); S.C. CODE ANN. § 40-47-200(2)
(1986 & Supp. 1990) (revocation of physician's license).
132. See OmA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, sec. 51(A) (1983).
133. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543-45 & n.8. The Court left open the possibility that
enhanced punishment facing a repeat offender could rebut the presumption. Id. at 545
n.12. However, it is not clear whether Blanton's rebuttal standard contemplates collateral
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The mere fact of conviction has less visible consequences as well.
Individual employers often will not hire persons with criminal
records. 1 4 Several research services facilitate this practice by furnish-
ing employers with information about the criminal history of their appli-
cants. 135 Imposed sentence notwithstanding, a conviction for multiple
offenses (even if arising from one incident) will impair employment op-
portunities substantially more than a conviction for a single offense.
Also, regardless of the sentences actually imposed, a convicted person
becomes an object of moral condemnation and collective hostility.
18 6
For example, conviction of petty crimes involving moral turpitude pro-
vides fertile ground for witness impeachment.' 3 7 Multiple convictions
make an impeachment more effective by intensifying the jury's moral
condemnation of the witness.
The Supreme Court, following common law tradition, has objec-
tively accounted for social judgments when assessing jury entitle-
ment.138 It has done so by requiring courts to determine criminal
seriousness by the severity of maximum statutory penalties-those pen-
alties the Court describes as the best embodiment of social judg-
ments.1 39 In the prosecution of multiple petty offenses where the
legislature has authorized consecutive sentencing, the Bencheck method
does not accurately assess criminal seriousness under Supreme Court
standards. Because the court's assessment did not evaluate the severity
of the maximum authorized penalty, it did not account for the social
judgments attaching to conviction. The resulting underestimation of
criminal seriousness unconstitutionally deprived the defendant of jury
trial.
V. CONCLUSION
Under the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the
statutory sanctions. Nor is it clear what constitutes "serious" consequences in this arena.
The Court has decided only that a $1,000 fine and a ninety day license suspension are not
severe enough to rebut the pettiness presumption. Id. at 543-45.
134. See Goldstein, supra note 129, app. I at 590.
135. StanleyJ. Fenvessy, What Info Are Employers Entitled To, DM NEWS, Mar. 4, 1991, at
20.
136. See MANFRED S. GUTTMACHER & HENRY WEIHOFEN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE LAW 460
(1952) (Society is aggressive toward wrongdoers.);J. Morris Clark, Civil and Criminal Penal-
ties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REV. 379, 406-07
(1976) (Conviction imparts moral condemnation.); cf. Johannes Andrenaes, The Moral or
Educative Influence of Criminal Law, in LAw,JUSTICE, AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN SOCIETY 50, 51-
54 (Felice J. Levine & June L. Tapp eds., 1977) (The criminal justice system conforms
behavior through messages of social disapproval.); J.L. Mackie, Retributivism: A Test Case for
Ethical Objectivity, in PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 622, 629 (Joel Feinberg & Hyman Gross eds., 3d
ed. 1986) (Punishable acts are those which give rise to cooperative hostility toward the
wrongdoer.).
137. See, e.g., Meyers v. United States, 377 F.2d 412, 423 (5th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390
U.S. 929 (1968); FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2).
138. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160 (1968). The Court has recog-
nized the futility of subjectively evaluating the social consequences of conviction. See Blan-
ton v. City of North Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 n.8. (1989); District of Columbia v.
Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 663 (1937).
139. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541.
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Supreme Court, dispensing with jury trial in criminal cases is justified
only where prosecution presents nominal consequences. 140 Over the
past 104 years, the Supreme Court has struggled to develop a method
for objectively determining when the consequences are minor enough to
except prosecutions from the jury trial guarantee. The Court believes
these consequences are a function of the seriousness with which society
regards specific offenses and has decided that maximum statutory penal-
ties are the most reliable index of these social judgments. Hence, the
maximum statutory penalty is the most accurate and objective measure
of criminal seriousness in jury entitlement determinations. Conse-
quently, the Court has insisted that the judiciary not second-guess the
legislative determination of criminal seriousness.
1 4 1
With this history as a backdrop, the Bencheck court was faced with
applying constitutional policy to novel circumstances. In the prosecu-
tion of multiple petty offenses where consecutive sentencing was legisla-
tively authorized, the majority chose to base jury entitlement on the
severity of a judicially stipulated sentence rather than on the maximum
penalty authorized by law. This decision departs both methodologically
and substantively from Supreme Court precedent.
Stephen C. Larson
140. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160 (The consequences of petty offense convictions are
insufficient to outweigh efficiency benefits of bench trials.).
141. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 541; Landry v. Hoepfner, 840 F.2d 1201, 1210 (5th Cir.
1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1083 (1989).
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UNITED STATES V. JACKSON: UNIFORM STANDARDS FOR
DEPARTURE FROM THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES
I. INTRODUCTION
When the United States Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines)' went
into effect on November 1, 1987,2 they produced sweeping changes in
the federal sentencing system. These changes created a need for stan-
dards to govern departure from the Guidelines and a need for sentenc-
ing decisions to be explained. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed both issues in United States v. Jackson.3 In Jackson, the court
applied a limited reasonableness standard that required the trial court
judge to adhere to the structure of the Guidelines when sentencing
outside the preset ranges of the Guidelines.4 Then, to aid the appellate
courts in applying this standard, the Tenth Circuit required the trial
court to supply a detailed description of its reasons for departure and
degree of departure. 5 Other circuit courts have applied different stan-
dards governing degree of departure from the Guidelines. These varied
standards threaten the goal of uniformity announced by Congress
6
when it established the Guidelines.
Implementation of the Guidelines also affected the role of plea
agreements in sentencing decisions. In Jackson, a plea agreement was
arranged and the court set the initial sentence prior to accepting the
Guidelines. 7 One year later, the United States Supreme Court forced
adherence to the Guidelines by rendering them constitutional in Mis-
tretta v. United States.8 On appeal, in light of Mistretta, the case was re-
manded for resentencing pursuant to the Guidelines. 9 On remand, the
trial court chose to depart from the Guidelines and the defendant again
appealed, resulting in the case that is the subject of this Comment.' 0
The confusion in this case stems from the trial court's desire to give
weight to the circumstances surrounding the crime in making its sen-
tencing decision. Throughout this process, however, the court appears
1. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL (1990) [hereinafter
U.S.S.G.].
2. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at 1.1.
3. 921 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1990).
4. Id. at 993.
5. Id.
6. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at 1.2.
7. Jackson, 921 F.2d at 987. After the Guidelines were implemented, many courts
refused to adopt them on constitutional grounds. See infra notes 65-68 and accompanying
text.
8. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). This Supreme Court case held that the-Guidelines were
constitutional, which bound all federal courts to use the Guidelines in sentencing. See
infra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
9. Jackson, 921 F.2d at 987.
10. Id. at 987-88.
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to have ignored the changed role of plea bargaining under the new
system.
Part I of this Comment briefly recounts the history of federal sen-
tencing practices. Part II describes the facts, procedural history, and ra-
tionale of the Jackson case. Part III discusses the implications ofJackson
for the Tenth Circuit and the federal systems. Part IV provides conclud-
ing remarks.
II. A HISTORY OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
A. The Pre-Guideline Era
For the greater part of the twentieth century, federal sentencing
practice was unguided, 11 and sentencing judges generally enjoyed
broad discretion. 12 With a few exceptions, 13 the judge's discretion was
only limited by statutory maximum terms. 14 These maximums were not
very restrictive. For example, the federal bank robbery statute author-
ized imprisonment for anywhere from zero to twenty-five years. 15 The
judge could also grant probation for any offense not punishable by life
imprisonment or death. 16
In determining the sentence that a criminal actually would serve,
the court also considered the effect of parole and "good time" stat-
utes. 17 Under the parole system, a criminal could be released after serv-
ing one-third of the actual sentence.18 In addition, "good time" statutes
allowed a further reduction in the sentence, for good time served. 19 Pa-
role, like unguided sentencing, was based on a theory of rehabilita-
tion.20 Under this theory, both the judge and the parole officer were
required to assess the offender's amenability to rehabilitation. 2 1 Since
evaluation of the criminal's character was necessary and the trial court
"sees more and senses more than the appellate court,"' 22 the sentencing
decision was seldom disturbed on review if it was within the statutory
11. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363.
12. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1972) (a federal trial judge gener-
ally has wide discretion in determining sentence); United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371,
1379 (9th Cir. 1980) (sentencing disparity is not improper if sentences are within statutory
limits); United States v. Cardi, 519 F.2d 309, 311-12 (7th Cir. 1975) (district court's sen-
tence will not be disturbed on appeal except on a plain showing of abuse).
13. "Some crimes, however, carry with them statutorily mandated minimum terms,
and some crimes even require the imposition of a fixed term." Stanley J. Roszkowski,
Sentencing Provisions and Considerations in the Federal System, 13 Loy. U. Cm. L.J. 621, 622
(1982).
14. Id.
15. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1988) (sentencing provisions not amended after the original
1948 enactment).
16. Roszkowski, supra note 13, at 625.
17. Id. at 622.
18. 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (repealed 1984).
19. 18 U.S.C. § 4161 (repealed 1984).
20. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 363. Justice Blackmun's opinion began by summarizing the
history of federal sentencing.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 364.
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limits. 23 Thus, a three-tiered sentencing structure was created. Con-
gress defined the maximums; the judge fixed the sentences according to
statutory ranges; and the parole board determined the actual duration of
incarceration. 24 This structure created a system of checks on federal ju-
dicial sentencing power.
25
Prosecutors eventually became part of this system by virtue of their
plea bargaining power.26 Plea bargaining allowed a prosecutor to
negotiate a guilty plea with the defendant.27 This was and continues to
be a common practice. Approximately eighty-five percent of all federal
criminal convictions result from guilty pleas. 28 As part of his or her
plea bargaining power, a prosecutor could dismiss or reduce charges
against the defendant in exchange for a guilty plea.29 As a check
on this prosecutorial sentencing power, the judge could impose any sen-
tence within statutory, limits, regardless of the prosecutor's
recommendation.
30
Even though numerous checks were in place, serious disparities ex-
isted in sentencing practices. 5 ' To resolve this problem Congress at-
tempted several reforms,3 2 which culminated in the Sentencing Reform
23. United States v. Main, 598 F.2d 1086, 1094 (7th Cir.) (sentence within statutory
limits not subject to appellate review unless sentencing judge relied on inaccurate infor-
mation), cert. denied, Main v. United States, 444 U.S. 943 (1979); United States v. Cardi, 519
F.2d 309, 311-12 (7th Cir. 1975) (sentence will not be disturbed on appeal except on a
plain showing of abuse); Dorszynski v. United States, 418 U.S. 424, 431 (1974) (sentence
unreviewable if within statutory limits and no showing of discretion abuse or inaccurate
information); United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447 (1972) (a sentence within statu-
tory limits is generally not subject to review).
24. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 364-65. See United States v. Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 190
(1979) (Congress entrusted release determinations to the Parole Commission and not to
the courts); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (the ultimate termination of
an indeterminate sentence may be decided by a non-judicial agency).
25. Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 365.
26. Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutors' Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Cm. L. REV. 50
(1968).
27. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(e)(1):
(e) PLEA AGREEMENTS PROCEDURE. (1) In general. The attorney for the government
and the attorney for the defendant or the defendant when acting pro se may en-
gage in discussions with a view toward reaching an agreement that, upon the en-
tering of a plea of guilty or nolo contendere to a charged offense or to lesser or
related offense, the attorney for the government will do any of the following:
(A) move for dismissal of other charges; or
(B) make a recommendation, or agree not to oppose the defendant's re-
quest, for a particular sentence, with the understanding that such recommen-
dation or request shall not be binding upon the court; or
(C) agree that a specific sentence is the appropriate disposition of the case.
The court shall not participate in any such discussions.
28. UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL SEN-
TENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 48 (June 18, 1987).
29. Id.
30. STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND FEDERAL SENTENCING
REFORM, 10-11 (Report for the Federal Judicial Center, 1979).
31. See, e.g., United States v. Wylie, 625 F.2d 1371, 1379 (9th Cir. 1980) (two co-
conspirators with identical criminal histories received different sentences after being con-
victed of the same conspiracy).
32. In 1958 Congress attempted to establish sentencing standards by creating judicial
sentencing institutes and joint councils. 28 U.S.C. § 334 (1988). In 1976 Congress
adopted the United States Parole Board guidelines, which established sentencing ranges.
18 U.S.C. §§ 4201-4218 (repealed 1984).
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Act of 1984 (Act).33 The Act recited the Congressional goals of promot-
ing fairness and reducing sentencing disparities while maintaining flexi-
bility for individualized sentencing.5 4 To achieve these ambitious goals,
Congress established the United States Sentencing Commission (Com-
mission)3 5 and instructed it to promulgate guidelines for federal courts
to use in determining criminal sentences.3 6 The Guidelines were inau-




The Guidelines articulate the goals of "proportionality" and "uni-
formity" in sentencing.3 8 To achieve these goals, the Commission cre-
ated a grid system based on the offender's criminal history
characteristics and the offense characteristics.3 9 The criminal history
categories form the horizontal axis and the offense levels form the verti-
cal axis. This grid system creates "boxes," each of which is assigned a
narrow range of sentences. Where the Guidelines call for imprison-
ment, the maximum term of sentence does not exceed the minimum
term of sentence by more than twenty-five percent. 40 Thus, criminals
with similar criminal histories, who are charged with the same offense,
will be given sentences that differ by no more than twenty-five percent.
The Guidelines provide instructions for selecting the proper of-
fense and criminal history categories. The Commission created a point
system to apply to offense and criminal history characteristics. 4 1 For the
criminal history portion, point values are assigned to previous convic-
tions based on criteria such as length of sentence, age at sentencing,
type of crime and the similarity of the past crime to the current crime.
The points are then totaled to determine the proper criminal history
category.
For the offense levels, the Commission wrestled with the question
of whether to use the real offense or the charged offense and finally
adopted a combination of the two choices. 4 2 The Commission supplied
a list of general base offenses, which are determined by the charged of-
fense. Within each base offense it listed specific offense characteristics,
33. Pub. L. No. 98-473 tit. II §§ 211-238,98 Stat. 1987-2034 (codified as amended at
28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988) and 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586, 3601-3625, 3661-3673, 3742
(1988)).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988). These policy ideas were reworded to "uniform-
ity" and "proportionality" by the United States Sentencing Commission. U.S.S.G., supra
note 1, at 1.2.
35. 28 U.S.C. § 991 (1988).
36. Id. § 994.
37. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at 2.1.
38. Id. at 1.2.
39. Id. at 1.1.
40. Id.
41. Id. §§ 4AI.I - 4A1.3.
42. Id. at 1.5. The real offense is defined as the defendant's actual conduct, regardless
of the charges for which he or she was indicted or convicted.
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which are determined by the real offense. The specific offense charac-
teristics are used to adjust the base offense.4 3 Yet, the use of real of-
fense characteristics is limited. Under the Guidelines, a court is not
permitted to consider real conduct that is not articulated in the specific
offense characteristics. 4 4 It may, however, consider the real offense
characteristics, or "what really happened," when it is considering a de-
parture from the Guidelines.
45
The Commission created forty-three offense levels, which include
all crimes from petty offenses to first degree murder.4 6 Only six crimi-
nal history categories were created.4 7 Criminal history category VI is
open-ended, including all criminal histories with a total of thirteen or
more points.48 Under a strict reading of the Guidelines, a criminal with
fifty criminal history points would be classified in the sixth category.
2. Provisions for Departure
The sentencing statute allows a court to depart from the guidelines
only upon a showing of "an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a
kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the Sen-
tencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines that should result in
a sentence different from that described." 4 9 The Commission expected
departures to be rare, since it had taken into account the factors that
made a significant difference in pre-Guidelines sentencing practices. 50
In practice, a judge may consider departure from the Guidelines above
the sixth category.
3. Provisions for Plea Agreements
A proper sentence is determined by a combination of the prosecu-
tor's plea bargaining power and the judge's power to order the actual
duration of incarceration. Both are important and inseparable functions
in the overall sentencing process. 5 1 Congress recognized this when it
instructed the Commission to include plea bargaining in the Guide-
lines. 5 2 The Commission honored this instruction by devoting a section
43. Id.
44. Stephen G. Breyer & Kenneth R. Feinberg, The Federal Sentencing Guidelines: A Dia-
logue, 26 GRIM L. BuLL. 5, 23 (1990).
45. Id.
46. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at § 5A.
47. Id. §§ 4A1.I - 4A1.3.
48. Id.
49. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b) (1990).
50. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, at 1.6.
51. See FED. R. GRIM. P. ll(e)(1), supra note 27; Schulhofer, supra note 30; Albert W.
Alschuler, Departures and Plea Agreements Under the Sentencing Guidelines, 117 F.R.D. 459
(1988); Alschuler, supra note 26; Breyer & Feinberg, supra note 44; StephenJ. Schulhofer
& Ilene H. Nagel, Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen
Months, 27 AM. GRIM. L. REv. 231, 237-38 (1989).
52. 28 U.S.C. § 994(a)(2)(E) (1988) (Commission shall promulgate general policy
statements regarding the appropriate use of plea agreements under FED. R. GRIM. P.
1 l(e)(2)).
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of the Guidelines specifically to plea agreements. 53 It opted not to make
major changes in the pre-Guidelines plea agreement practices, but in-
stead issued general policy statements concerning the acceptance of
plea agreements. 5 4 These statements provide two significant directives
to district courts. First, they allow a court to accept the dismissal of a
charge only when the remaining charges reflect the seriousness of the
real offense. 5 5 Second, they require the court to determine whether dis-
missal of charges will undermine the statutory purposes of the Guide-
lines. 56 Two other rules mandated by Congress went into effect when
the Guidelines were implemented: the Act provided for limited appel-
late review of sentencing decisions 57 and abolished early release on
parole.
5 8
C. The Post-Guideline Era
The implementation of the Guidelines has had a significant effect
on sentencing practice. First, the use of narrow sentence ranges has lim-
ited judges' sentencing discretion.5 9 Second, the acceptance of charge
offense sentencing has reduced judges' ability to adapt an individualized
sentence to fit the actual crime. Third, the Guidelines only allow judges
to consider certain past criminal convictions when determining the
proper criminal history category. Fourth, for the purposes of judicial
review, a trial court must now provide reasons for imposing a particular
sentence when it chooses to depart from the Guidelines or when the
sentence range exceeds two years. 60 Finally, a real-time sentencing sys-
tem has been created. Since Congress abolished parole, with the excep-
tion of minimal time off for good behavior, 6 1 the sentence imposed will
be the sentence served.
62
The role of plea bargaining also has changed in the post-Guidelines
era. Before the Guidelines were accepted, a judge could accept a plea
agreement, then disregard the prosecutor's recommendation and im-
pose any sentence within the statutory limits. 6 3 In practice, many judges
accepted plea agreements in order to shorten the court's docket.64
53. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 6B.
54. Id § 6B1.2.
55. Id. § 6B1.2(a). See also United States v. Bos, 917 F.2d 1178 (9th Cir. 1990) (Guide-
lines send contradictory messages by requiring courts to accept only plea agreements that
reflect the seriousness of the conduct, while providing for departure when the crime of
conviction does not reflect the seriousness of the conduct); United States v. Henry, 893
F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1990) (defendants need not be informed of applicable sentencing guide-
line range before plea is taken).
56. U.S.S.G., supra note 1, § 6B1.2.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 3742 (1988).
58. The Act repealed 18 U.S.C. § 4205, which provided for release on parole after
one-third of the sentence had been served. Pub. L. 98-473, § 281(a)(5), 98 Stat. 2027
(1984).
59. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 367.
60. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(c) (1988).
61. 18 U.S.C. § 3624(b) (1988).
62. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 51, at 237.
63. Schulhofer, supra note 30, at 10-11.
64. Id. at 11 n.10.
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Under the old system, the judge's discretion to tailor a sentence to the
actual offense, as opposed to the charged offense, was a useful check on
prosecutorial plea bargaining power. The implementation of the Guide-
lines and the Mistretta decision created a different sentencing system
with new methods of administering sentences and accepting plea agree-
ments. Judges no longer have the discretion to select a sentence based
on circumstances that have been plea bargained away,65 and Congress
has eliminated early release on parole. Prosecutorial discretion now re-
mains virtually unfettered. 66 As a result, the prosecutor's plea bargain-
ing role has become more powerful.
These changes made judges reluctant to accept the Guidelines.
Many had doubts about the constitutionality of the Guidelines and re-
fused to apply them.67 In all, over two hundred district court judges
held the Guidelines unconstitutional, 68 while approximately 120 judges
adhered to them.69 This conflict continued untilJanuary 18, 1989 when
the United States Supreme Court, in an eight-to-one decision, declared
the Sentencing Guidelines constitutional. 70 After that date, all federal
courts were bound to follow the new sentencing rules.
III. UNITED STATES V. JACKSON
A. Facts and Procedural History
On July 5, 1988, the defendant, Leonard Brady Jackson, was ar-
rested in Oklahoma for possession of firearms by a felon, possession of
ammunition by a felon, and possession with intent to distribute approxi-
mately one gram of cocaine.7 1 He was later indicted on the same
charges. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Jackson pled guilty to posses-
sion of ammunition by a felon.72 The government dismissed the other
two charges and agreed not to seek the enhanced fifteen-year mandatory
65. See U.S.S.G., supra note 1 at 1.5 (declaring policy of using charge offense sentenc-
ing instead of real offense sentencing).
66. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 51, at 238.
67. See, e.g., United States v. Bolding, 683 F. Supp. 1003, 1005 (D. Md. 1988) (the Act
violates the separation of powers doctrine by transferring judicial power from the federal
courts to the Sentencing Commission), rev'd, 876 F.2d 21 (4th Cir. 1989); United States v.
Allen, 685 F. Supp. 827, 828 (N.D. Ala. 1988) (the Act is unconstitutional because it vio-
lates the separation ofpowers principle); United States v. Arnold, 678 F. Supp. 1463, 1469
(S.D. Cal. 1988) (the Act is unconstitutional because it designates the Commission, which
possesses executive powers and duties, as a part of the judicial branch). But see United
States v. Chambless, 680 F. Supp. 793, 795 (E.D. La. 1988) (the Act does not give the
Sentencing Commission "free rein to do as it pleases" and therefore does not unconstitu-
tionally delegate legislative authority); United States v. Ruiz-Villanueva, 680 F. Supp.
1411, 1417 (S.D. Cal. 1988) (because the Act contains "intelligible standards and state-
ments of purpose," it does not embody an unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power).
68. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 51, at 257 n.116.
69. Id.
70. Mistretta, 488 U.S. 361.
71. Appellee's Supplemental Brief at 5, United States v. Jackson, 921 F.2d 985 (1Oth
Cir. 1990) (No. 89-6118).
72. Jackson, 921 F.2d at 987.
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sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act.7 3
Prior to this arrest, Jackson had been arrested six times.74 These
arrests were for robbery and forgery in the 1960's; two counts for sale of
heroin in 1975; felon in possession of a firearm in 1978; reckless con-
duct with a firearm and carrying a loaded firearm in a motor vehicle in
1982; and three counts of shooting with intent to kill in 1983. He was
convicted of all charges except the 1978 firearm possession and two
counts of shooting with intent to kill in 1983. 7 5
The district court, believing that the Sentencing Guidelines were
unconstitutional, sentenced Jackson to the statutory maximum of five
years and applied a special assessment of fifty dollars. 76 At sentencing,
the court noted the defendant's extensive criminal history, which in-
volved both guns and drugs,77 and expressed concern about the cocaine
and firearms found in the defendant's apartment.
78
The defendant appealed the sentence 79 and the circuit court re-
manded the case for resentencing pursuant to the Mistretta decision.80
At resentencing, the judge chose to depart from the applicable Guide-
line range of four to ten months and sentenced Jackson to sixty months
confinement, two years supervised release, and a special assessment of
fifty dollars.81 The court explained the departure by noting Jackson's
extensive criminal history and the fact that his prior convictions, some of
which were excluded by the Guidelines, demonstrated a continuing
course of criminal conduct.
8 2
Jackson again appealed, stating that neither the departure nor the
degree of departure was justified.83 On appeal, a panel of three judges
upheld the trial court's sentencing decision.8 4 The defendant peti-
tioned for a rehearing en banc, which was granted.8 5
B. Holding and Rationale
The Tenth Circuit remanded the case to the sentencing court for a
more specific explanation of the departure from the Guidelines. 86 The
court stated that although the trial court had sufficiently described its
reasons for departure, it had not adequately explained the degree of
departure,8 7 and that the reviewing court needed "a base line from
73. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1) (1988).
74. Appellee's Supplemental Brief, supra note 71, at 6.
75. Id.
76. Jackson, 921 F.2d at 987.
77. Appellee's Supplemental Brief, supra note 71, at 10.
78. Jackson, 921 F.2d at 992.
79. Id. at 987.
80. Id.
81. Id at 988.
82. Id at 992.
83. Id at 988.
84. United States v.Jackson, 903 F.2d 1313 (10th Cir. 1990).
85. Jackson, 921 F.2d 985.
86. Id at 993.
87. Id at 992.
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which we can gauge the reasonableness of the degree of departure."8 8
In other words, the trial court had explained why it moved from criminal
history level III to criminal history level VI, but it had not provided a
reasonable justification for a sentence above level VI.8 9 The court rea-
soned that since category VI fits any offender with thirteen points or
more, the Commission intended cases reaching this category generally
to stay within its sentencing confines.90 ' Additionally, to uphold the
principles of proportionality and uniformity, the court held that the trial
court must rely on the Guidelines to find analogous levels and principles
to guide its degree of departure.9 1
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THEJACKSON CASE
A. Necessity of Standards
The ability to depart is a key feature of the Guidelines because it
allows a court to uphold Congress's goal of proportionality. 92 At the
same time, however, uniformity must be maintained. Therefore, the cir-
cuit courts must adopt standards governing departure. The appeals
courts have been generally consistent when determining what standard
should control departure,93 but they have diverged in their treatment of
departure above the highest criminal history category, category VI.
9 4
The most restrictive standard, which was used by the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits, requires the court to use the basic structure of the Guidelines
as a guide when determining the appropriate sentence range above
criminal history category VI.9 5 The First, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Cir-
cuits have adopted a less restrictive standard based on reasonableness. 96
Under this standard, the appeals court will determine if the sentence
88. Id at 993.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 992.
91. lId at 993.
92. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
93. Theresa W. Karle & Thomas Sager, Are the Federal Sentencing Guidelines Meeting Con-
gressional Goals? An Empirical and Case Law Analysis, 40 EMORY LJ. 393, 422 (1991).
94. Id. at 423.
95. United States v. Schmude, 901 F.2d 555, 560 (7th Cir. 1990) (courts should use
the 10-15% increases authorized by the Guidelines to derive the proper sentence when
criminal history category VI underrepresents the defendant's criminal background);
United States v. Pearson; 900 F.2d 1357, 1362 (9th Cir. 1990) (departure should be mea-
sured by analogy to the Guidelines).
96. United States v. Brown, 899 F.2d 94, 98 (1st Cir. 1990) (trial court decision to
depart above criminal history category VI from the 3-9 month range to 21 months was
reasonable because the defendant had a "demonstrated penchant for criminality" not
fairly accounted for by the Guidelines); United States v. Harvey, 897 F.2d 1300, 1306 (5th
Cir) (affirming trial court decision to depart upward from the 18-24 month range to 60
months despite failure to explain the degree of departure and indicating that explanation
is necessary only for low criminal history categories), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 568 (1990);
United States v. Christoph, 904 F.2d 1036 (6th Cir. 1990) (trial court decision to depart
upward from the 33-41 month range to 60 months was reasonable since criminal history
category VI did not adequately represent defendant's criminal history), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 713 (1991); United States v. Simmons, 924 F.2d 187, 192 (11 th Cir. 1991) (departure
above criminal history category VI was reasonable based on the defendant's prior adult
criminal conduct).
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY L4 W REVIEW
imposed is reasonable without requiring the trial judge to resort to anal-
ogy based on the structure of the Guidelines. 97 The Eighth Circuit has
implemented an even more lenient reasonableness standard, allowing
the trial court to use a great deal of discretion in determining the proper
sentence above criminal history category VI.98
In Jackson, the court significantly changed the Tenth Circuit view.
The Tenth Circuit originally adopted a reasonableness standard to con-
trol departures in United States v. White.9 9 The White opinion, however,
did not consider the issue of how a court should determine the proper
sentence range when criminal history category VI is inadequate. This
issue was deliberated in United States v. Bernhardt.100 In Bernhardt, the
Tenth Circuit adopted the reasonableness standard of the First, Fifth,
Sixth and Eleventh Circuits. Finding no guidance from the Sentencing
Commission, the Bernhardt court applied its "own judgment" to deter-
mine the reasonableness of a sentence imposed above criminal history
category VI. 10 1 In Jackson, the court abandoned this position and opted
for the more restrictive view expressed by the Seventh and Ninth Cir-
cuits. Citing the Seventh Circuit case of United States v. Schmude, 10 2 the
court stated that "the increments between the Guidelines ranges could
assist both the sentencing court and the reviewing court in gauging the
reasonableness of the degree of departure."
10 3
The Tenth Circuit should be applauded for adopting a standard
that requires close adherence to the Guidelines for departures above
criminal history category VI. Uniformity is more likely to be achieved
when the standard for departure requires judges to remain true to the
structure of the Guidelines. As demonstrated before the Guidelines
were implemented, judicial discretion leads to non-uniform sentenc-
ing. 10 4 Additionally, it has been argued that the sentencing Guidelines
will add to the already severe prison overcrowding problem.10 5 The
reasonableness standard established in Bernhardt would have exacer-
bated this problem because it would have resulted in proportionately
longer sentences. By adopting the more restrictive standard of Jackson,
the Tenth Circuit has held these problems to a minimum.
Nevertheless, the problem of non-uniformity among the circuits still
exists. Sentencing has only become uniform among the circuits that
97. Simmons, 924 F.2d at 191.
98. United States v. Hill, 911 F.2d 129, 130 (8th Cir. 1990) (trial court did not abuse
its discretion in departing above criminal history category VI based on the defendant's
extensive criminal history); United States v. Carey, 898 F.2d 642, 646 (8th Cir. 1990) (trial
court decision to depart upward from the 15-year range to 19 years was permissible be-
casue the seriousness of the defendant's criminal history and his incorrigibility were not
adequately reflected in his criminal history category).
99. 893 F.2d 276 (10th Cir. 1990).
100. 905 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1990).
101. Id. at 346.
102. 901 F.2d 555 (7th Cir. 1990).
103. Jackson, 921 F.2d at 993.
104. Supra notes 12-30 and accompanying text.
105. See generally Michael K. Block & William M. Rhodes, Forecasting the Impact of the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 7 BEHAv. Sci. & LAW 51 (1989).
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have chosen similar standards. Either the other circuits should follow
the Tenth Circuit's lead and adopt the most sensible standard, or the
Supreme Court should grant certiorari. Otherwise, the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines perhaps should be renamed the Circuit Sentencing
Guidelines.
B. Necessity of Detailed Explanations When Sentencing
The increased specificity required by the court in Jackson will
achieve three desirable results: first, it will provide reviewable material
on appeal; second, it will establish precedent; and third, it will allow the
Commission to adjust and maintain the Guidelines.
Detailed explanations of departures by trial courts are necessary for
adequate review on appeal. Congress has empowered appeals courts to
review departure sentences for reasonableness, 10 6 but the determina-
tion of reasonableness must be based on the rationale advanced by the
trial court and not the appeals court's own post hoc reasoning. 10 7 Un-
less the trial court articulates its rationale, the appeals court cannot ef-
fectively review the sentencing process.' 0 8 If courts of appeal were
unable to review the basis of a departure decision, trial courts would be
able to depart from them indiscriminately. This would render the
Guidelines useless, and sentencing would revert back to the pre-Guide-
lines system. 10 9 Such a reversion would be directly opposed to Con-
gressional intent. 110
A detailed description of departures will also provide the basis for
common law precedent. 1 11 Each time a trial court departs from the
Guidelines, it is setting common law precedent. Having a detailed rec-
ord to follow will aid future judges in determining when departure is
acceptable. Finally, a particular reason for departure that becomes per-
vasive may be included in the Guidelines. Congress empowered the
Commission to monitor the sentencing process and adjust the Guide-
lines where necessary. 1 12 Records of trial court reasoning allow the
Commission to identify common departures and consider whether that
reasoning should be incorporated in the Guidelines. By ensuring that
the sentencing process is open to study, evaluation, and review, written
opinions will help preserve good faith and rational suppport for a guide-
line system. '1 3
106. 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4) (1988).
107. United States v. Dean, 908 F.2d 1491, 1497 (10th Cir. 1990) (case remanded for
failure to explain departure sentence adequately).
108. United States v. Gardner, 905 F.2d 1432, 1436 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
202 (1990).
109. See United States v. Ferra, 900 F.2d 1057, 1062 (7th Cir. 1990) ("Unless there is
discipline in determining the amount of departure . . . sentencing disparity will
reappear.").
110. 28 U.S.C. § 991(b)(1)(B) (1988).
111. See Marc Miller, Guidelines Are Not Enough: The Needfor Written Sentencing Opinions, 7
BEHAv. Sci. & LAw 3, 20-21 (1989).
112. 28 U.S.C. § 995 (1988).
113. Miller, supra note 111, at 21.
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C. The Role of Plea Bargaining
Although the Jackson court should be applauded for adjusting the
standard governing degree of departure and for requiring more detailed
explanations for departures, it seems to have ignored the role of plea
bargaining. Because of the timing of this case, the court effectively in-
termingled the new and the old sentencing systems. A plea agreement
was reached under the pre-Guidelines system, 1 4 yet the trial court was
required to support the sentence under the standard of the post-Guide-
lines system.' 1 5 Under the old system, the trial court could consider
facts included in the charges dismissed by the plea agreement.
116
Under the new system, it could only consider aggravating circumstances
that were related to the charged offense.
1 17
By failing to recognize the effect of the Guidelines on plea agree-
ments,11 8 the Jackson court has set a precedent for the intermingling of
law in similar cases. Any subsequent cases that were plea bargained
before Mistretta, but sentenced after, will put the sentencing power in the
hands of the prosecutors. This outcome could have been avoided, had
the court allowed for reconsideration of the plea agreement on remand.
The trial court then could have exercised its power to accept or reject
the plea bargain and impose an appropriate sentence.
V. CONCLUSION
The goals of the United States Sentencing Guidelines were to in-
crease uniformity and maintain proportionality in the sentencing pro-
cess. To maintain proportionality, the Guidelines allow for departure
from the prescribed sentencing ranges. To achieve uniformity, it is es-
sential that judges write detailed sentencing opinions and that appeals
courts validate or invalidate those opinions based on strict standards.
Those standards should be uniform among the circuits. The Jackson
court acknowledged this need by applying a strict standard to sentences
that depart above criminal history category VI. It would be in the best
interest of society if the circuits not already applying this standard would
follow suit.
J. Kevin Ray
114. Jackson, 921 F.2d at 987; see supra note 7 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 86-91 and accompanying text.
116. At sentencing, the court noted the defendant's extensive criminal history involv-
ing guns and drugs and expressed concern about the cocaine and firearms involved in the
current charges. Appellee's Supplemental Brief, supra note 71, at 10. At resentencing, the
court noted that the defendant's prior convictions were not adequately taken into consid-
eration under the Guidelines. Jackson, 921 F.2d at 992.
117. U.S.S.G., supra note'l, § 5K2.0 (1989). The Guidelines no longer require that the
aggravating circumstances be related to the charged offense. U.S.S.G., supra note 1,
§ 5K2.0 (1990).




Nearly all of the federal agency decisions reviewed by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals during the last year evidenced the federal
court's tendency to give substantial defeience to administrative agency
decision-making. While favoring broad judicial review in administrative
law cases, the Tenth Circuit continued this deferential trend in 1991.
Part I of this Article discusses Tenth Circuit decisions that applied the
"substantial evidence" standard of review, the general standard for judi-
cial review of formal agency'action. Part I also discusses two cases that
applied the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of review, the highly
deferential standard for agency appeals. Part II examines the Tenth Cir-
cuit's comprehensive analysis in Franklin Savings Ass'n v. Director, Office of
Thrift Supervision,' which also reflects the continuing federal judicial
practice of giving substantial deference to administrative rulings. This
Article highlights the Franklin decision because the Tenth Circuit's in-
depth analysis illustrates the federal courts' approach to reviewing ad-
ministrative actions more comprehensively than any other case the court
decided in 1991.
I. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
The Administrative Procedure Act (APA)2 completely excludes re-
view of agency decisions when review is* prohibited by a particular
agency statute or when "committed to agency discretion by law."'3 How-
ever, in recent years, courts held "only upon a showing of 'clear and
convincing evidence' of a contrary legislative intent should courts re-
strict access to judicial review." 4 The appropriateness ofjudicial review
of agency decision-making was thus stiongly presumed.5 The APA out-
lines specific standards a reviewing court must apply in determining
whether an agency decision is valid.6 The purpose of these standards is
to ensure "the courts do not improperly usurp the prerogatives of the
legislature" to administer the activities of agencies or take away author-
ity properly entrusted in the agency. 7 The scope of judicial review is
meant to reflect the scope of authority delegated to the particular
agency, including the extent to which it was empowered by statute to
make discretionary determinations. 8 Both the substantial evidence and
arbitrary and capricious standards of review are based upon "reasona-
1. 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991).
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-706 (1988).
3. Id. § 701(a)(2).
4. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967).
5. JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS 132 (1989).
6. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
7. ARTHUR E. BONFIELD, STATE ADMINISTRATIVE RULE MAKING 580 (1986).
8. Id. at 583.
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bleness" and both require a sufficient factual basis be present in the ad-
minstrative record to support the agency's decision. 9
A. The Substantial Evidence Standard of Review
Despite the similarities in the judicial review standards, the
Supreme Court indicated the substantial evidence standard may impose
a greater burden on the reviewing court by requiring it to take a "harder
look" at the record than it would otherwise.10 In some agency statutes,
Congress has required the substantial evidence standard so courts will
engage in a more rigorous review."1 Courts use the "substantial evi-
dence" test to review agency fact finding in proceedings determined on
the basis of a formal agency record. 12 This standard "goes to the rea-
sonableness of what the agency did on the basis of the record before it,
for a decision may be supported by substantial evidence even though it
could be refuted by other evidence that was not presented to the deci-
sion-making body."' 13 The substantial evidence standard's intended
purpose is to limit an appellate court's power to overturn an agency's
fact findings. 14 The general view is that this rationality test must be
based upon the record as a whole,' 5 although originally substantial evi-
dence meant merely "more than a mere scintilla," or "such relevant evi-
dence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion."' 16 Thus, the substantial evidence standard is a more diffi-
9. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs. v. Board of Governors, Fed. Re-
serve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683-84 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (since the APA's scope of review provi-
sions are cumulative, agency action supported by required substantial evidence may be, in
another regard, arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise unlawful).
10. MICHAEL AsIMow & ARTHUR E. BONFIELD, STATE AND FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw 625 (1989); see also American Paper Inst. Inc. v. American Elec. Power Serv. Corp.,
461 U.S. 402, 412 n.7 (1983) (in the absence of a statutory requirement to employ a spe-
cific review standard, the court must review agency action under the more easily satisfied
arbitrary and capricious standard, which the APA requires for judicial review of informal
rulemaking).
11. BONFIELD, supra note 6, at 625.
12. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1988).
13. Id.
14. BONFIELD, supra note 6, at 573.
15. § 706 of the APA provides that a court shall set aside agency action "unsupported
by substantial evidence" and that "[i]n making the foregoing determinations, the court
shall review the whole record or those parts of it cited by a party." 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2) &
(2)(E) (1988).
16. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). See Universal Cam-
era Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951), which states that:
Even though the whole record may have been canvassed in order to determine
whether the evidentiary foundation of a determination by the Board was "sub-
stantial," the phrasing of this Court's process of review readily lent itself to the
notion that it was enough that the evidence supporting the Board's result was
"substantial" when considered by itself ... Protests against "shocking injus-
tices" and intimations of judicial "abdication" with which some courts granted
enforcement of the Board's orders stimulated pressures for legislative relief from
alleged administrative excesses.... [Thus,] Congress ... made it clear that a
reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot
conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial,
when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the
body of evidence opposed to the Board's view.
Id. at 477-79, 488.
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cult one for the agency to meet than the arbitrary and capricious test.
The Tenth Circuit applied the substantial evidence standard in four
cases discussed in this Article, affirming two Immigration and Naturali-
zation Services (INS) decisions supported by substantial evidence.
However, applying the same standard, the court reversed both Health
and Human Services decisions due to the lack of supportive evidence.
1. The Immigration and Naturalization Services Decisions
Both Kapcia v. INS 17 and Rivera-Zurita v. INS 18 involved claimants
charged with deportability pursuant to the Immigration and Nationality
Act (Act).1 9 The Immigration and Naturalization Services denied the
applications for asylum and suspension of deportation in both cases and
the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed. The Tenth Circuit held the
factual findings of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) were sup-
ported by substantial evidence.
Kapcia involved a claim by petitioners that they were eligible for asy-
lum because of past and future persecution arising from membership in
the Solidarity movement in Poland. The BIA found petitioners did not
show the fear of persecution required to merit relief nor did they satisfy
the more difficult eligibility standard required for withholding of depor-
tation to meet the burden of proof for asylum.20 The Tenth Circuit re-
viewed the BIA's factual findings as to whether an alien is a refugee
under the substantial evidence standard.2 1 The court placed signifi-
cance on the fact that this standard does not "weigh the evidence or
evaluate the witness' credibility."' 22 Even if the court disagreed with the
BIA's position, it should not reverse if the BIA's conclusions were "sub-
stantially reasonable."
'23
The BIA found petitioners ineligible for statutory asylum because
they did not meet their burden of establishing refugee status. An appli-
cant for asylum "'must present "specific facts" through objective evi-
dence to prove either past persecution or "good reason" to fear future
persecution.' ",24 Part of the BIA's reasoning was based on the fact that
political changes in Poland made persecution less likely. The BIA took
administrative notice of the changed political situation and inferred the
new government would not persecute members of Solidarity. It there-
fore found no specific facts to establish a well-founded fear of
17. 944 F.2d 702 (10th Cir. 1991).
18. 946 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1991).
19. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (1988).
20. Kapcia, 944 F.2d at 703.
21. Id. at 707.
22. Id. (quoting Sorenson v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 684 F.2d 683, 685 (10th Cir.
1982)).
23. Id.
24. Id. (quoting Aguilera-Cota v. INS, 914 F.2d 1375, 1378-79 (9th Cir. 1990)). See
also Carvajal-Munoz v. INS, 743 F.2d 562, 574 (7th Cir. 1984) (requiring either specific
facts showing past persecution or evidence that they will be singled out for future
persecution).
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persecution.
2 5
In reviewing the BIA's conclusions, the Tenth Circuit agreed that
petitioners did not establish the credible, direct or specific evidence nec-
essary to establish an objectively well-founded fear.2 6 Therefore, the
court did not have to examine the petitioners' subjective fears, and
given the fact the BIA's findings were "substantially reasonable, ' '2 7 the
Tenth Circuit easily found substantial evidence in the record to support
its denial of asylum.
Rivera-Zurita involved an alien charged with deportability after find-
ing him precluded from establishing good moral character. Rivera's de-
portation hearing was held before an Immigration Judge (IJ), who
denied him relief because he found petitioner had recently spent more
than 180 days in prison. Consequently, he was statutorily ineligible for
either suspension of deportation or voluntary departure. 28 The Act
mandates an alien who seeks these forms of discretionary relief must
show "good moral character" 29 for a specified period of time.
5 0
Rivera contended the IJ and the BIA erred in finding he had spent
more than 180 days injail. Rivera alleged he testified incorrecdy during
his deportation hearing regarding his incarceration period because he
lacked understanding of the law.3 1 However, based upon Rivera's testi-
mony and the documentary evidence of record, the IJ and the BIA found
he spent more than 180 days in confinement during the time relevant to
suspension of deportation and voluntary departure.3 2 In reviewing the
BIA's decision, the Tenth Circuit found Rivera failed to meet his burden
to prove he was not incarcerated for more than 180 days. Because sub-
stantial evidence existed in the record to support the BIA's conclusion,
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the BIA's decision.
3 3
2. The Health and Human Services Decisions
Both Hill v. Sullivan 34 and Pacheco v. Sullivan3 5 involved claimants
25. See Kapcia, 944 F.2d at 704-05.
26. Id. at 707.
27. Id.
28. Rivera-Zurita v. INS, 946 F.2d 118, 120 (10th Cir. 1991). For suspension of de-
portation, the alien must show he "has been physically present in the United States for a
continuous period of not less than seven years immediately preceding the date of such
application, and proves that during all of such period he was and is a person of good moral
character." 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(1) (1988). For voluntary departure, the alien must show
he can depart at his own expense and has been "a person of good moral character for at
least five years immediately preceding his application for voluntary departure." Id. at
§ 1254(e)(1).
29. The Act states that good moral character will not be found where a conviction
resulted in 180 days or more of confinement during the specific period when good charac-
ter is required. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(0)(7) (1988).
30. The Act requires good moral character for either seven or ten years depending on
the specific deportation suspension invoked. Id. at § 1254(a).
31. 946 F.2d at 121-22.
32. Id. at 120.
33. Id. at 122.
34. 924 F.2d 972 (10th Cir. 1991).
35. 931 F.2d 695 (10th Cir. 1991).
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seeking review of the Department of Health and Human Services'(HHS)
denial of benefits. The Tenth Circuit applied the substantial evidence
standard to these cases as it did in the INS cases, but here the appellate
court reversed the agency's decision in both instances.
In Hill, the claimant appealed the decision of the Secretary of HHS
denying her supplemental security income benefits.8 6 Hill claimed the
Secretary's determination that she was not disabled was not supported
by substantial evidence.3 7 Hill contended the Secretary neglected to de-
velop the record fully and fairly by failing to have her possible chronic
depression evaluated.3 8 The Secretary rendered his decision "on the
ground that her impairment did not prevent her from returning to her
past relevant work and, therefore, she was not disabled." 9 The Tenth
Circuit found the Secretary failed to follow proper procedure in evaluat-
ing the claimant's potential mental impairment and reversed.
40
An administrative determination of fact made by the Secretary is to
be considered "conclusive" on judicial review if supported by substan-
tial evidence.4 ' However, if the Secretary ignores overwhelming evi-
dence to the contrary, the substantial evidence test is not met.4 2 The
Secretary argued Hill's potential mental impairment was not related to
her claim for disability and there was no duty to inquire about it.
4 3
However, the record upon which the Secretary based his opinion con-
tained evidence of a mental impairment, which allegedly prevented Hill
from working, and the Secretary should have followed procedure for
evaluating the potential medical problem.4 4 The Tenth Circuit found
the Secretary had not carefully considered all relevant evidence since the
record contained evidence of a mental impairment. Therefore, his deci-
sion was not supported by substantial evidence.
4 5
Pacheco v. Sullivan4 6 involved the termination of disability benefits
by the Secretary after finding the claimant could perform "other work in
the national economy."' 47 Pacheco complained the Secretary's finding
was not supported by substantial evidence because evidence showed
36. Hill, 924 F.2d at 973.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 974.
39. Id. at 973. The Administrative Law Judge's decision became the final decision of
the Secretary because the Appeals Council denied claimant's request for review. The dis-
trict court affirmed the Secretary's decision and this appeal followed. Id.
40. Id.
41. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1988).
42. Knipe v. Heckler, 755 F.2d 141, 145 (10th Cir. 1985).
43. Hill, 924 F.2d at 974.
44. Id. at 975. The court invoked § 8(a) of the Reform Act, which provided that:
An initial determination... that an individual is not under a disability, in any case
where there is evidence which indicates the existence of a mental impairment,
shall be made only if the Secretary has made every reasonable effort to ensure
that a qualified psychiatrist or psychologist has completed the medical portion of
the case review and any applicable residual functional capacity assessment.
42 U.S.C. § 421(h) (1988).
45. Hill, 924 F.2d at 975.
46. 931 F.2d at 695 (10th Cir. 1991).
47. Id. at 697.
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Pacheco needed treatment to render him able to work in the future.48
Pacheco's physician evaluated his injuries and determined he required
knee surgery before he could perform any work, but the Secretary failed
to consider his determination.
4 9
The Tenth Circuit discussed four requirements that must be met
before a claimant's failure to undergo treatment may terminate his bene-
fits5 ° and determined the Secretary had not made a finding with respect
to any of them.5 1 By not applying the correct legal standards, the Secre-
tary's finding that Pacheco was not disabled could not have been based
on substantial evidence, and was therefore improper. 52 Remanding the
case to the Secretary, the court emphasized the fact it did "not mean to
preclude the Secretary from acting in his proper role as factfinder."
5 3
But the court recognized that, even without additional evidence to de-
termine whether Pacheco unjustifiably refused treatment, the physician's
report contained substantial evidence to support a finding Pacheco was
disabled.
54
B. The Arbitrary and Capricious Standard of Review
The "arbitrary and capricious" standard allows a court to set aside
an agency action only if it is "so far outside the range of action expected
from responsible decision makers that it cannot successfully be de-
fended as an exercise of reasoned judgment."5 5 The standard is highly
deferential to the agency. Thus, only if the agency acted irrationally or
illogically may the court set aside its decision.5 6 The arbitrary and capri-
cious provision is a "catch-all" standard under which administrative mis-
conduct is reviewed if it is not covered by the other more specific
standards.5 7 To find a decision arbitrary and capricious, the court must
consider whether the decision was based upon all relevant factors and
decide whether the agency made a clear error ofjudgment. 58 The ulti-
mate standard of review is a narrow one, however, and the court may
48. Id. at 696-97.
49. Id. at 697.
50. The court stated that "'(1) the treatment must be expected to restore the claim-
ant's ability to work; (2) the treatment must have been prescribed; (3) the treatment must
have been refused; (4) the refusal must have been without justifiable excuse.' "Id. at 697-
98 (quoting Teter v. Heckler, 775 F.2d 1104, 1107 (10th Cir. 1985)).




55. BONFIELD, supra note 6, at 575.
56. WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 258 (1991).
57. Association of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Board of Governors, Fed. Re-
serve Sys., 745 F.2d 677, 683 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
58. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971).
The Supreme Court has defined "substantial inquiry" as whether the Secretary acted
within his authority, whether the decision was within the range of available choices, and
whether the decision that there were no feasible alternatives was reasonable. The review-
ing court must find the agency choice was not capricious, arbitrary, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise unlawful. Id. at 413-16.
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not substitute its judgment for the agency's.5 9
1. Sierra Club v. Lujan
Sierra Club v. Lujan60 involved an action brought against the Depart-
ment of Interior to enjoin a proposed road improvement project that
passed through federal lands bordering a wilderness study area in
southern Utah.6 1 In an earlier appeal, 62 the Tenth Circuit determined
there was a "major federal action" and remanded the case to the Bureau
of Land Management (BLM) for an environmental assessment. 63 Based
on BLM's findings of no significant impact, the district court lifted its
injunction against construction on the areas bordering the wilderness
study area on the western twenty-eight miles of Burr Trail. The Sierra
Club again appealed. 64
On the second appeal, the court narrowed its focus to the factual
matters "derived from the limited scope of the BLM action." 6 5 It re-
viewed only those matters challenged in the district court regarding the
"Harper Contract," an agreement to improve the western twenty-eight
miles of Burr Trail from a one-lane dirt road to a two-lane gravel road.
66
BLM was required to consider the environmental impacts and unavoida-
ble adverse effects associated with this project, and either issue a finding
of no significant impact, or issue an environmental impact statement
(EIS).67 After careful review of the impacts of the proposed project, the
BLM determined there was no significant impact. An EIS was therefore
unnecessary.
The court applied the arbitrary and capricious test as handed down
by the Supreme Court in Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council.68 In
adopting this test and rejecting the "reasonableness" standard, Sierra
Club followed the trend set by other circuits. 6 9 After examining the rec-
ord, the Tenth Circuit was satisfied the agency took a "hard look" at the
environmental impacts the proposed contract would have on the wilder-
59. Id. at 416.
60. 949 F.2d 362 (10th Cir. 1991).
61. Id. at 364.
62. See Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1988) (although BLM's actions
regarding the county's road construction proposal neither exceeded its right-of-way
through public lands nor constituted a "major federal action" within the National Environ-
mental Policy Act, BLM's duty to prevent unnecessary degradation of adjoining wilderness
study areas under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act did constitute a "major
federal action".
63. 949 F.2d at 364.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 367.
66. Id. at 364.
67. Id.
68. 490 U.S. 360 (1989). The court invoked the arbitrary and capricious scope of
review pursuant to 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988).
69. See Goos v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 911 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir. 1990) (court
applied the arbitrary and capricious standard to an agency's decision not to prepare an
Environmental Impact Statement); see also North Buckhead Civic Ass'n v. Skinner, 903
F.2d 1533, 1538 (11th Cir. 1990) (holding that the arbitrary and capricious standard is
appropriate when appellate court reviews agency action under the National Environmental
Policy Act).
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ness study area, and thus determined the decision to forego an EIS was
not arbitrary and capricious.
70
2. Rives v. Interstate Commerce Commission
Rives7 l concerned employees of railroad subsidiaries affected by
consolidation, who sought review of an Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion (ICC) decision, which denied them labor protective conditions
under the Interstate Commerce Act. The petitioners claimed the ICC
erred in determining they were not entitled to labor protection. 72 The
Tenth Circuit held the enabling statute was silent on the issue. Thus,
since ICC's decision denying the employees labor protection was not
arbitrary and capricious, it was not subject to judicial review.
73
The ICC imposed labor protective conditions to protect those rail-
road employees affected by consolidation. 74 Petitioners who were ter-
minated after consolidation were denied benefits, because under the
ICC's interpretation of the statute, they were not railroad employees.
75
The ICC construed the statute as applying only to employees the rail
carrier directly employed, so petitioners employed by non-rail subsidiar-
ies were excluded.
76
The Tenth Circuit applied the "two-step" analysis employed by the
Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,
Inc. 7 7 Applying the first step in the analysis, the Court determined Con-
gress had not "unambiguously expressed an intent that employees of a
motor carrier subsidiary [were] entitled to the mandatory protections
afforded in § 11347. '78 Since Congress had not specifically defined
"employee," the court administered the second prong of the Chevron
70. Sierra Club, 949 F.2d at 369.
71. Rives v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n., 934 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1991).
72. Id. at 1172.
73. Id. at 1174.
74. Id. at 1173. These conditions included such benefits as dismissal or dismissal al-
lowances and continuation of benefits for a specific time period. Id. at 1173 n. 1.
75. The statute governing labor protective conditions states:
When a rail carrier is involved in a transaction for which approval is sought under
sections 11344 and 11345 or section 11346 of this title, the Interstate Commerce
Commission shall require the carrier to provide a fair arrangement at least as
protective of the interest of employees who are affected by the transaction as the
terms imposed under this section before February 5, 1976, and the terms estab-
lished under section 405 of the Rail Passenger Service Act (45 U.S.C. 565).
49 U.S.C. § 11347 (1988).
76. Rives, 934 F.2d at 1173-74.
77. Id at 1174. The court held that:
First, if Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue and its intent
is clear, 'that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must
give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.' If Congress has
not addressed directly the precise question at issue, the reviewing court 'does not
simply impose its own construction on the statute .... Rather, if the statute is
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is
whether the agency's answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.'
Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 842-43 (1984) (citations omitted)).
78. Id. at 1174.
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test to determine whether the ICC's interpretation of § 11347 was per-
missible. 79 The eourt found, despite the possibility of a more reason-
able interpretation of the statute, it must uphold the agency's
interpretation so long as it was reasonable or permissible. Bound by
this standard, the Tenth Circuit declined disturbing it on review.
80
II. SUBSTANTIAL DEFERENCE TO AGENCY ACTION: FRANKLIN SA. Ass'N
v. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF THRIFT SUPERVISION
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director, Office of
Thrift Supervision,8 1 an exhaustive analysis of the applicable law, reflects
the judicial practice of giving substantial deference to administrative
agency rulings. In Franklin, the Tenth Circuit provides a comprehensive
discussion of the standards for judicial review of administrative actions
as well as a model approach to appeals of federal agency decisions.
A. Facts
Franklin operated as a traditional savings and loan association for
approximately eighty years before it was acquired by new ownership in
1973.82 The new ownership group brought marked changes to Franklin
by expanding services to include eight branches and adopting novel
marketing strategies and pursuits. 83 Franklin's asset base changed as it
had acquired numerous forms of mortgage backed securities.8 4 Ulti-
mately, mortgage backed securities and junk bonds made up more than
thirty-five percent of Franklin's assets. 85 While Franklin's earnings and
working capital declined, it continued aggressive expansion without a
corresponding growth in capital.
8 6
The Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision had several con-
cerns about Franklin's capital structure. The Director expressed his
concerns by telling Franklin the savings association's net interest margin
had been decreasing, and was actually negative for the past three
quarters. 87 However, Franklin failed to comply with repeated agency
directives to remedy its financial situation. On February 15, 1990, the
Director determined Franklin's condition was too unsafe and unsound
to transact business and appointed the Resolution Trust Corporation as
conservator.
8 8
79. Id. at 1174-75.
80. Id. at 1175-76.
81. 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991).
82. Id. at 1133.
83. Id.
84. A mortgage backed security is a security that entitles the holder to share in the
payments (cash flow) from a fixed pool of mortgage loans. Id.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 1134.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 1135.
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B. District Court Proceedings
The district court initially established its jurisdiction by noting that
Congress specifically provided for judicial review of a regulator's ap-
pointment of a conservator in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recov-
ery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).8 9 However, the court also
noted the FIRREA provision that allows judicial review of the Office of
Thrift Supervision (OTS) neglects to define the scope or standard of
review. 90
The court outlined in detail the appropriate standard of review for
an administrative agency's action. It consulted the APA, which provides
that if the agency action was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law," it must be set aside.9 1
This standard entitles the agency's decision to a presumption of validity,
and the party challenging the agency action must show the agency deci-
sion lacked any basis in fact or law, or was arbitrary, capricious or an
abuse of discretion.
9 2
The district court then discussed the Director's contention that the
administrative agency limited its review and concluded evidence outside
the record could be properly considered. It based its finding on the
conclusion that an "on the merits" review should provide Franklin with
the opportunity to submit evidence outside the administrative record in
support of its case.9 3 The court differentiated its "hybrid standard of
review" 94 from a de novo review, and determined an examination
89. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, 12 U.s.C
§§ 1461-1470 (1988). The relevant portion of FIRREA specifically states:
The Director shall have exclusive power and jurisdiction to appoint a conservator
or receiver for a Federal savings association. If, in the opinion of the Director, a
ground for the appointment of conservator or receiver for a savings association
exists, the Director is authorized to appoint ex parte and without notice a conser-
vator or receiver for the savings association. In the event of such appointment,
the association may, within 30 days thereafter, bring action in the United States
district court for the judicial district in which the home office of such association
is located ... for an order requiring the Director to remove such conservator or
receiver, and the court shall upon the merits dismiss such action or direct the
Director to remove such conservator or receiver.
12 U.S.C.A. § 1464(d)(2)(E) (West Supp. 1991). See Franklin Say. Ass'n v. Director, Office
of Thrift Supervision, 742 F. Supp. 1089, 1094 (D. Kan. 1990), rev'd and vacated, 934 F.2d
1127 (10th Cir. 1990).
90. Franklin, 742 F. Supp. at 1095. The court mentioned that appropriate relief
should be granted "upon the merits," but also noted that such language concerns the scope
of reviewable evidence rather than the standard of review. Id. at 1095 n.3 (emphasis added).
91. Id at 1095 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988)).
92. Id. at 1096.
93. Id. at 1096-97.
94. The hybrid standard of review was first discussed in Collie v. Federal Home Loan
Bank Bd., 642 F. Supp. 1147, 1150-52 (N.D. I1. 1986). The Collie court determined that
the "upon the merits" language allowed the court to continue to apply the arbitrary and
capricious standard of review, but that the record on which such review was to be based
was expanded:
'Upon the merits' contrasts with the more usual 'on the record.' Congress must
not have intended for judicial review always to be confined to an administrative
record.... [T]he challenging association should have the opportunity to submit
evidence whether or not that evidence was considered by the Board, and to de-
velop any facts bearing on the question of whether any of the statutory grounds
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"upon the merits" allowed the court to expand the record on which its
review was based.9 5
After reviewing the administrative record and the evidence
presented to it by both Franklin and the Director, the district court ac-
cepted and considered evidence outside the administrative record.
96
The court found the regulator acted wrongly in imposing conservator-
ship and the Director lacked any factual basis to justify the appointment
of Resolution Trust.97 The court determined the Director acted "arbi-
trarily and capriciously" in making the appointment and ordered the Di-
rector to remove the conservator.9" Director appealed and the Tenth
Circuit stayed the order of removal pending appeal.
C. Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit engaged in a detailed review of the applicable
statutes, legislative history and case law concerning the review of admin-
istrative agency decisions by the federal courts. The court first defined
the proper scope of review for a reviewing court when it examined a
director's decision to appoint a conservator for a savings and loan asso-
ciation.9 9 It concluded the plain language of FIRREA, while authorizing
judicial review of the Director's decision, failed to delineate the scope of
review. 100
The court noted a reviewing court may examine information
outside of the administrative record for limited purposes only. 10 More-
over, in cases where Congress provided for judicial review without set-
ting forth the necessary standards or procedures, the Supreme Court
has ruled such review should be confined to the administrative rec-
ord. 10 2 The Tenth Circuit found the lower court erred in adopting the
reasoning set forth in Collie v. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, and rejected
the district court's application of a hybrid scope of review.10 3 Although
the Tenth Circuit did not place strict limitations on the admission of
evidence by the reviewing court, it noted the district court made exten-
sive, independent findings. The court concluded the reviewing court
existed. 'Upon the merits' means that both parties to the reviewing action have
the right to develop the judicial record.
Id. at 1151 (citations omitted).
95. See 742 F. Supp. at 1097.
96. Id. at 1099.
97. Id. at 1126-27.
98. Id. at 1126.
99. Franklin, 934 F.2d at 1136-40.
100. Id. at 1137.
101. Id. An example of such a limited purpose would be: where the administrative
record fails to disclose the factors used by the agency, a reviewing court may require addi-
tional findings or testimony from agency officials to determine if the action was justified.
See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
102. Franklin, 934 F.2d at 1137. Accord Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138 (1973); Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); United States v. Carlo Bianchi
& Co., Inc., 373 U.S. 709 (1963); Woods v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400
(5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988); Guaranty Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal
Home Loan Bank Bd., 794 F.2d 1339 (8th Cir. 1986).
103. Franklin, 934 F.2d at 1138.
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should confine its review to the information available to the Director at
the time the appointment decision was made.'
0 4
The Tenth Circuit also held the appropriate standard of review
specified in the APA should be applied in this situation. The APA pro-
vides that an appointment decision may be set aside only if found arbi-
trary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance
with the law.10 5 Although the district court articulated the correct stan-
dard, the Tenth Circuit concluded the lower court misapplied it.106 The
Tenth Circuit then noted the reviewing court must defer to the Director
where a reasonable person considering the matter, as presented to the
agency, could find a rational basis to arrive at the same judgment made
by the Director. 107 The Tenth Circuit determined the district court was
not justified in fact-finding to test the Director's decision to appoint a
conservator10s It found the Director's decision supported by substan-
tial evidence, not arbitrary, capricious, nor an abuse of discretion.10 9
The Tenth Circuit thus reversed and vacated the decision of the district
court, remanding it with instructions to dismiss the action. 110
D. Analysis
A court reviewing an agency action is sometimes compared to an
appellate court reviewing trial court findings; because the appellate
court is distanced from the entire trial process, the trial court's decision
should be given deference. Agency decisions are, however, different
from trial court decisions. The reasoning and expertise behind agency
decisions are apt to be even less familiar to a reviewing trial court than
trial court decisions are to appellate courts. "' Thus, reviewing courts
give more deference to agency decisions than to trial court decisions.
Also, agency policy choices are traditionally afforded considerable defer-
ence; they are generally approved if they have a "reasonable basis in the
law." The reasoning behind this policy is the expertise of the agency is
foreign to the courts and should therefore be afforded some
deference. "1
2
104. Id. at 1140.
105. Id. at 1142.
106. Id. The court of appeals found that the lower court had actually conducted a de
novo review. Id.
107. Id. Employing language used in Webb v. Hodel, 878 F.2d 1252 (10th Cir. 1989),
the court constructed a standard for appellate review of district court review of agency
actions. The appellate court must review the agency decision independently, based on the
same administrative record the district court utilized. The same review standard is used at
both levels. On appeal, the district court decision is afforded no particular deference. Id.
108. The Tenth Circuit felt that, by allowing Franklin's experts to testify, the lower
court both expanded the scope of review and improperly applied the standard of review.
The lower court thus overstepped its boundaries. Id. at 1150-51.
109. Id. at 1151.
110. Id.
111. See CHRISTOPHER F. EDLEY, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: RETHINKING JUDICIAL CON-
TROL OF BUREAUCRACY 32-33 (1990).
112. Id. at 33-34. See, e.g., NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 131 (1944)
(holding that an agency's initial determination of a statutory term must be accepted if it is
warranted in the record and has a reasonable basis in applicable law); Gray v. Powell, 314
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While the general consensus is agency decisions are to be afforded
considerable deference, there is still the problem of how much defer-
ence. This concerns the question of the scope of judicial review-the
evidence the reviewing court will analyze in examining the agency deci-
sion. As the Tenth Circuit discussed, in order to define the proper
scope of review in Franklin it became necessary to examine whether Con-
gress had established or defined a scope of review to be used when re-
viewing appointment decisions. 113 The court found it significant that
Congress passed FIRREA in response to the problems existing within
the savings and loan industry and, consequently, FIRREA "dictate[d]
strong and prompt supervisory oversight." 114 The Tenth Circuit ana-
lyzed the plain language of the statute that gave the director his broad
regulatory and enforcement powers. 15 The court's analysis focused on
the words "opinion" and "on the merits". The Tenth Circuit stressed
the determination of whether the director appointed a conservator was
based on the Director's opinion.' 16 Congress designed the statute so
the Director could immediately appoint a conservator. 117 The court
also noted the "upon the merits" language of the statute providing for
judicial review of the Director's decision did not authorize the lower
court to construct an entirely new record. 18 The Fifth 119 and Eighth 120
Circuits have agreed judicial review under this statute is limited to the
administrative record, not to a new one compiled by the district court.
Besides determining the scope ofjudicial review, the Tenth Circuit
also deliberated upon the correct standard of review. The court found
the district court articulated the correct standard, 121 but applied it in-
correctly. The rest of the court's analysis focused on the trial court's
mistaken application of a de novo review. 122 The district court lacked
authorization to make independent, de novo, findings of fact, and
should instead have determined whether any rational basis existed upon
which the Director could have based his decision. Because the district
court inappropriately expanded the record, the Tenth Circuit was not
subject to the usual, deferential fact standard of the factual findings of a
district court.
In reviewing the determination to appoint a conservator under the
U.S. 402, 412-13 (1941) (stating that a determination left to an agency will remain un-
touched by a reviewing court).
113. See Franklin, 934 F.2d at 1136.
114. Id.
115. For the pertinent portion of FIRREA, see supra note 87.
116. 934 F.2d at 1137. "Congress did not mandate a haring or specific findings of fact
be made; rather it required only the director be of the opinion statutory grounds for ap-
pointment of a conservator existed." Id.
117. Id.
118. See id. at 1140.
119. See, e.g., Woods v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 826 F.2d 1400 (5th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 959 (1988).
120. See, e.g., Guaranty Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Federal Home Loan Bank Bd., 794 F.2d
1339 (8th Cir. 1986).
121. The district court used the arbitrary and capricious test as specified in 5 U.S.C.
§ 706(2)(A) (1988).
122. 934 F.2d at 1142.
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arbitrary and capricious standard, a reviewing court is limited to a con-
sideration of the administrative record before the Director when the de-
cision was made. 123 A reviewing court may go outside of the
administrative record for limited purposes only. For example, evidence
may be admitted when necessary to explain the action of the agency.
124
Where the administrative record does not disclose the factors consid-
ered by the Director, a reviewing court may require the Director to pre-
pare additional findings, or, if necessary, require testimony from agency
officials to explain the decision. 12 5 Judicial review should thus remain
limited to the administrative record already in existence, "not some new
record made initially in the reviewing court."'
26
Some of the evidence introduced at trial may have been properly
admitted to explain technical terms. However, the lower court used
most of the evidence to make its own determinations about the safety of
Franklin's operations. 12 7 The inquiry of the district court went beyond
any authorized scope of review, which resulted in the court substituting
its own judgment for the Director's. The court thus violated the princi-
ples that "[t]he reviewing court is not generally empowered to conduct a
de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and to reach its own con-
clusions"' 28 and that courts are not free to substitute their views for
those of the appropriate government agency.
12 9
E. Conclusion
Congress made it clear that it vested the Director with the responsi-
bility to determine the soundness of a financial institution.13 0 The
Tenth Circuit correctly determined the Director's judgment should not
be subject to the strict scrutiny re-examination the district court applied.
The sole question determined during judicial review should have been
the question the Tenth Circuit considered-whether the Director rea-
sonably determined a ground existed for the appointment of a conserva-
tor. After reviewing only the agency record, the Tenth Circuit
concluded the Director determined a reasonable ground existed for the
conservator's appointment.
CONCLUSION
During the past year, the Tenth Circuit continued its trend to give
substantial deference to administrative agency decisions. The court
carefully scrutinized agency decision-making, but overruled agency deci-
sions only when convinced the agency definitely failed to consider all
123. See Camp v. Pitts, 411 U.S. 138, 142 (1973). See also supra note 105 and accompa-
nying text.
124. Animal Defense Council v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 1432, 1436 (9th Cir. 1988).
125. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971).
126. 411 U.S. at 142.
127. Franklin, 934 F.2d at 1142-45.
128. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985).
129. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416.
130. See Franklin, 934 F.2d at 1151.
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relevant evidence. The Franklin decision exemplifies the Tenth Circuit's
meticulous consideration of the agency record and its general tendency
to defer to agency expertise when reviewing administrative actions.
Melissa A. Dick

TENTH CIRCUIT ANTITRUST LAW: RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
AND POSSIBLE FUTURE TRENDS
WILLIAM E. MOOZ, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
The nation's principal antitrust laws were enacted over a century
ago. Since then, the sophistication of our economy has increased, re-
quiring the application of antitrust laws to a variety of circumstances that
were not contemplated by the drafters. Economic thinking has also
changed during this time, and many types of conduct that were once
automatically considered anticompetitive are now considered to be
procompetitive. In the 1970's, these combined factors led to a revolu-
tion in antitrust jurisprudence. Spearheaded by Robert Bork's The Anti-
trust Paradox,I courts began to subject antitrust claims to a heightened
level of scrutiny to foster the overriding goal of protecting consumer
welfare. This phase of the revolution produced substantial restrictions
on who had standing to sue,2 when vertical restraints would be declared
illegal per se,3 and even when horizontal collusion would be
condemned.
4
The revolution gathered momentum during the 1980's with both
the federal courts (including the Tenth Circuit) and the Department of
Justice leading the charge. Some of the areas most affected during this
decade include: (a) standing;5 (b) market and monopoly power;6 and (c)
the concerted action requirement of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.7 As we enter the 1990's, the movement is going strong and there
are indications that Congress may join the movement. This Article ex-
amines the Tenth Circuit's most recent decisions in some of the charged
areas of the past decade and discusses the course of future
developments.
II. ANTITRUST STANDING
"Antitrust standing" differs from Article III standing. Article III
* William E. Mooz, Jr., Associate, Holland & Hart, Denver, CO; B.A. 1981, Colo-
rado College; J.D. 1985, University of Colorado School of Law.
1. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A PoLIcY AT WAR wrrIH ITSELF (1978).
2. E.g., Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
3. E.g., Continental T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36 (1977).
4. E.g., Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
5. E.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104 (1986); Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983); see infra section II.
6. E.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co. 472
U.S. 284 (1985); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984); see infra
section III.
7. E.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite
Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752 (1984); see infra section IV.
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standing requires an injury in fact sufficient to satisfy the Constitution's
jurisdictional requirements. 8  Before a court can address antitrust
standing, it must first find the plaintiff has satisfied the Article III stand-
ing requirements. To demonstrate antitrust standing, the plaintiff must
subsequently show an injury within the zone of interests protected by
sections 4 and 16 of the Clayton Act. 9 These two sections respectively
provide private rights of action to seek damages and injunctive relief.10
A two-tiered process is used to show whether one falls within the zone of
interests protected by these sections. First, the plaintiff must demon-
strate an "antitrust injury," that is, an injury of the sort proscribed by
the antitrust laws. 1  Then, the plaintiff must show the action would be
brought in an efficient and effective manner. 12 This latter inquiry has
been labeled both the "standing" and the "proper plaintiff" require-
ment. The concepts of antitrust injury and proper plaintiff are closely
related and both must be satisfied.'
3
A. Antitrust Injury
Emphasis on antitrust injury began in the 1970's when the United
States Supreme Court voiced its concern that plaintiffs were using the
antitrust laws to stifle, rather than promote, competition. 14 Conse-
quently, the Court introduced the now-famous requirement that the
plaintiff demonstrate that the injury "flows from that which makes de-
fendants' acts unlawful."' 15 Under this standard, the plaintiff must show
that an activity prohibited by the antitrust laws, namely a reduction in
competition, caused the injury. Mere injury to a competitor 16 or "injury
which is merely causally linked in some way to an alleged antitrust viola-
tion" will not suffice. 17 The Tenth Circuit has applied the antitrust in-
jury requirement consistently since the late 1970's' 8 and its recent
8. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
9. 15 U.S.C. §§ 15, 26 (1988).
10. See generally Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 109-11 (1986). The Tenth
Circuit has yet to take a position on whether the absence of antitrust standing can be
waived by the parties. Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 961-62
(10th Cir.)(noting split between circuits and declining to take a position), cert. denied, 110 S.
Ct. 3241 (1990).
11. E.g., Cargill, 479 U.S. at 109-11 & n.6 (1986). This standard applies to the plaintiff
who seeks damages. A plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief only need demonstrate a threat
of antitrust injury. l
12. Id. at 122.
13. See generally Reazin, 899 F.2d at 960 ("Standing and antitrust injury are essential
elements in a private antitrust damages action brought under section 4 of the Clayton
Act."); Board of Regents v. NCAA, 707 F.2d 1147, 1151 (10th Cir. 1983) (antitrust injury
and standing issues treated as identical), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
14. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 488 (1977).
15. l at 489; accord Holly Sugar Corp. v. Goshen County Coop. Beet Growers Ass'n,
725 F.2d 564, 567-68 (10th Cir. 1984).
16. Injury to a competitor may be enough to vest the plaintiff with standing to sue
under the Robinson-Patman Act. See, e.g., Alan's, Inc. v. Minolta Corp., 903 F.2d 1414,
1418 n.6, 1427 (11 th Cir. 1990)(cataloging the debate on this point).
17. Reazin, 899 F.2d at 962 n.15; see, e.g., Brunswick, 429 U.S. at 487.
18. See Natrona Serv., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 598 F.2d 1294, 1297-98 (10th Cir.
1979)(citing Brunswick, 429 U.S. 477); Farnell v. Albuquerque Publishing Co., 589 F.2d
497, 501 (10th Cir. 1978).
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decisions show no indication of change.' 9
B. Proper Plaintiff
During the 1980's, the Court took the teachings of Brunswick Corp. v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.20 one step further by ruling that, even if the
plaintiff demonstrates antitrust injury, standing still may be denied for
reasons of efficiency.2 1 The plaintiff must demonstrate an ability to
prosecute the action in an efficient and effective manner. The Supreme
Court set out somewhat conflicting standards for making this analysis.
In Associated General Contractors, Inc. v. California State Council of
Carpenters,22 the Court formulated a laundry list of factors to consider.
These factors, as summarized by the Tenth Circuit, include the
following:
1. "the directness or indirectness of the connection between
the plaintiff's injury and the allegedly unlawful market
restraint;"
2. "the speculativeness of the plaintiff's damages;"
3. "'the 'risk of duplicative recoveries . . .or the danger of
complex apportionment of damages[;]'" and
4. "the defendant's intent[.]
' '23
The Court cautioned that, although these factors are to be applied on a
case-by-case basis, competitors and direct consumers24 will be the only
parties likely to satisfy the inquiry.
25
Just one year earlier, the Court set out a more nebulous and lenient
19. See Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Casualty and Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 639,
650 (10th Cir. 1987); Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738 F.2d 1509,
1522-23 (10th Cir. 1984), af'd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985); cf. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort, Inc., 479
U.S. 104, 113-22 (1986)(reversing Tenth Circuit for failing to require a showing of im-
pending antitrust injury in proceeding for injunctive relief).
20. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
21. The genesis of this second requirement actually occurred in 1977 when the Court
held that indirect purchasers did not have standing in all but the most exceptional cases,
even though they clearly had suffered antitrust injury. Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S.
720 (1977). This situation-specific decision did not evolve into a general principle of
standing until 1983. See generally Cargill, 479 U.S. at 110 n.5 ("A showing of antitrust injury
is necessary, but not always sufficient, to establish standing under § 4 [of the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1988)], because a party may have suffered antitrust injury but may not be a
proper plaintiff under § 4 for other reasons.")(citing William H. Page, The Scope of Liability
for Antitrust iolations, 37 STAN. L. REv. 1445, 1483-85 (1985)); Associated Gen. Contrac-
tors, Inc. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
22. 459 U.S. 519, 543-44 (1983).
23. Reazin, 899 F.2d at 962 n.15 (quoting Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 544).
This formulation of the Associated Gen. Contractors criteria differs from that of some other
circuits. Compare Reazin, 899 F.2d at 962 n.15 (listing defendant's intent as a factor) with
Adams v. Pan Am. World Airways, 828 F.2d 24, 26 & n.4 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (intent is an
element of the offense and not a factor to be considered in the standing analysis), cert.
denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
24. Indirect purchasers stand virtually no chance of being proper plaintiffs under any
analysis. See, e.g., Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 735-36 (indirect purchaser cannot bring anti-
trust claim unless it has a preexisting cost-plus contract with the direct purchaser); In re
Wyoming Tight Sands Antitrust Cases, 866 F.2d 1286, 1290 (10th Cir. 1989)(same), af'd,
110 S. Ct. 2807 (1990).
25. See Associated Gen. Contractors, 459 U.S. at 537-45.
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standard in Blue Shield v. McCready.2 6 In McCready, the Court found that
standing exists where the plaintiff's injury is inextricably intertwined
with or an integral aspect of the illegal plot.2 7 Contrary to its intima-
tions in Associated General Contractors, the Court specifically stated that
persons who are neither competitors nor consumers may be able to
make this showing.2 8 A number of courts have resolved this conflict by
eschewing McCready (at least implicidtly) in favor of the Associated General
Contractors factors.
29
The Tenth Circuit's most recent standing decision, Reazin v. Blue
Cross & Blue Shield,30 takes a contrary approach. The court indicated that
McCready, rather than Associated General Contractors, predominantly gov-
erns the determination of who is a proper plaintiff. In Reazin, the Tenth
Circuit made no attempt to reconcile the holdings of Associated General
Contractors and McCready. Rather, it unceremoniously buried the Associ-
ated General Contractors factors in a footnote without discussion or any
attempt to apply them to the facts of the case.3 1 This task left uncom-
pleted, the court turned almost exclusively to the nebulous statements
in McCready and declared that the plaintiffs had standing.
3 2
The court in Reazin may well have reached the right result, but its
analytical path is a troubling one. The plaintiffs were at least perceived
competitors of the defendant and, in all likelihood, could have satisfied
the Associated General Contractors factors had they been put to the task by
the Tenth Circuit. The court did not need to bury Associated General to
reach its result, and its failure to discuss the Associated General Contractors
factors or to explain why it was not applying them creates confusion as
to how it may act in future cases. Given the plaintiffs' apparent ability to
satisfy the Associated General Contractors factors, and the court's failure to
repudiate the factors overtly, Reazin probably should not be read as plac-
ing the Associated General Contractors analysis beyond resurrection in the
Tenth Circuit.
III. MARKET POWER
The area of antitrust law most affected by the events of the past two
decades is market power analysis. In 1977, the Court thrust the concept
of market power into the limelight when it examined challenges to non-
price vertical restraints under the rule of reason and effectively required
a market power analysis in all such cases.3 3 Then in the 1980's, the
Court took aim at a number of types of horizontal restraints, holding
them free from per se condemnation unless defendants were first shown
26. 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
27. Id. at 479, 484.
28. Id. at 472.
29. See, e.g., Adams v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 828 F.2d 24 (D.C. Cir. 1987)(rig-
orously applying Associated Gen. Contractors criteria), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
30. 899 F.2d 951 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3241 (1990).
31. Id. at 962 n.15.
32. Id. at 962-63.
33. Continental T.V. Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc., 433 U.S. 36, 59 (1977).
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to have market power.3 4 This increasing emphasis on market power
means virtually all antitrust cases now require some showing of market
power.3 5 As we enter the 1990's, all courts, including the Tenth Circuit,
are grappling with how to define and measure market power.
A. Definition of Market Power and Monopoly Power
The Tenth Circuit defines market power as "'the ability to raise
prices above those that would be charged in a competitive market.' ",36
Market power differs from monopoly power in that market power exists
where the defendant has the power to either exclude competitors or con-
trol prices, while the defendant with monopoly power is able to do
both.37 Simply put, monopoly power is substantial market power.
3 8
The Tenth Circuit's definition, though, does not reflect its actual mean-
ing or practice. Virtually every firm has some ability to raise prices with-
out losing all of its customers. When a firm has a downward sloping
demand curve, some increase in price will be accepted by customers
before they seek substitute products. Almost all firms have a downward
sloping demand curve. Similarly, virtually every firm has some ability to
exclude competitors, because, as a practical matter, the cost of entering
and exiting a market rarely is zero. Thus, when applied literally, the
Tenth Circuit's tests-similar to those used in all other circuits-are
meaningless.
3 9
The real focus of the Tenth Circuit and other circuits is the degree of
the defendant's market power.40 A defendant's market power threatens
34. See, e.g., Northwest Wholesale Stationers Inc. v. Pacific Stationery & Printing Co.,
472 U.S. 284, 294-95 (1985)(group boycott); Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde,
466 U.S. 2, 12-18 (1984)(tying arrangements); Smith Mach. Co. v. Hesston Corp., 878
F.2d 1290, 1295-98 (10th Cir. 1989)(line forcing), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1073 (1990). But cf.
Reazin v. Blue Gross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 968 n.24 (10th Cir.)(absence of market
power will not justify a naked restriction on price or output absent some competitive justi-
fication), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3241 (1990).
35. See, e.g., Bright v. Moss Ambulance Serv., Inc., 824 F.2d 819, 823 (10th Cir.
1987)(monopolization); Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1229
(10th Cir. 1986)(vertical refusal to deal), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); Shoppin' Bag of
Pueblo, Inc. v. Dillon Cos., Inc., 783 F.2d 159, 161-63 (10th Cir. 1986)(attempt to monop-
olize).
It is unclear to what extent Robinson-Patman claims have been affected by this devel-
opment. Compare Alan's, Inc. v. Minolta Corp., 903 F.2d 1414, 1418 n.6 (11th Cir.
1990)(ability to injure a single competitor is all that law requires in Robinson-Patman case)
with Boise Cascade Corp. v. FTC, 837 F.2d 1127, 1143-44 (StarrJ.) and 1149-1152 (Wil-
liams, J., concurring)(D.C. Cir. 1988)(Robinson-Patman Act requires showing of injury to
competition and market power).
36. Westman Comm'n, 796 F.2d at 1225 (quoting NCAA v. Board of Regents of Univ. of
Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 109 n.38 (1984)); see also Reazin, 899 F.2d at 966-67.
37. Reazin, 899 F.2d at 967; Key Fin. Planning Corp. v. 17T Life Ins. Corp., 828 F.2d
635, 643 (10th Cir. 1987); Bright, 824 F.2d at 824; Westman Comm'n, 796 F.2d at 1225;
Shoppin' Bag, 783 F.2d at 163-64.
38. Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 894 (10th Cir. 1991);
Reazin, 899 F.2d at 967.
39. All of the circuits' tests for market and monopoly power emanate from the Court's
holding in United States v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956), that
"[mionopoly power is the power to control prices or exclude competition."
40. See, e.g., Reazin, 899 F.2d at 966-72; PHILLIP AREEDA & DONALD F. TURNER, ANTi-
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to injure competition only when it is substantial. Unfortunately, Tenth
Circuit law currently provides little guidance as to when a firm's power is
substantial enough to be troubling. The point at which "market power"
graduates to "monopoly power" is even less clear. Hopefully, the Tenth
Circuit will act during the 1990's to provide more guidance in this area.
One possibility would be to adopt the test for market power contained
in the Department of'Justice's merger guidelines: Does the firm in ques-
tion have sufficient power that it can profitably raise its prices by 5% for
more than a transitory period of time?
4 1
B. The Relevant Market
The first step in evaluating a firm's market power is to define the
relevant market.4 2 This is a question of fact.43 The relevant market has
two elements-the relevant product market and the relevant geographic
market.4 4 Each is defined by analyzing the market from the perspective
of the buyer and not the seller.4 5 The relevant product market includes
all products that are" 'reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the
same purposes.'"46 Exactly where to draw the line between including
or excluding a product is unclear, since rarely are different products per-
fect substitutes for one another. The Tenth Circuit, quite properly, di-
rects its focus to the cross-elasticities of demand for the various
products47 but has not stated what degree of elasticity is required to
justify including a product in the market. The court may well be per-
suaded by the elasticity standard set out in the Department of Justice
Merger Guidelines: The product market includes all products that con-
sumers would turn to when faced with a non-transitory five percent in-
crease in the price of the defendant's product.4 8
TRUST LAw, 505 (1978)("The significance of market power depends not only on its de-
gree but also on its durability.")
41. Department of Justice Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,103,
§ 2.11 (June 14, 1984) [hereinafter DOJ Guidelines]. Because the Tenth Circuit's current
test for market power follows that mandated by the Supreme Court in duPont, it probably
would have to treat the merger guidelines as a mere method for applying the current test
in order to preserve the fiction that duPont still controls.
42. E.g., Bacchus, 939 F.2d at 893 ("Without a definition of the relevant market for the
product involved, there is no way to measure the defendant's ability to lessen or destroy
competition.") (citing Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S.
172 (1965)).
43. Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l Inc., 796 F.2d 1216, 1220 (10th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988); Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp. v. Aspen Skiing Co., 738
F.2d 1509, 1514 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 472 U.S. 585 (1985); Telex Corp. v. International
Bus. Machs. Corp., 510 F.2d 894, 915 (10th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 423 U.S. 802 (1975).
44. Bacchus, 939 F.2d at 893; see also Westman Comm'n, 796 F.2d at 1221-22.
45. See Westman Comm'n, 796 F.2d at 1221; Key Fin. Planning Corp. v. ITT Life Ins.
Corp., 828 F.2d 635, 643 (10th Cir. 1987).
46. Westman Comm'n, 796 F.2d at 1221 (quoting United States v. E.I. duPont de
Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 395 (1956)); accord Bacchus, 939 F.2d at 893; Telex Corp., 510
F.2d at 917; see Key Fin., 828 F.2d at 643.
47. Westman Comm'n, 796 F.2d at 1220-21.
48. DOJ Guidelines, supra note 41. See also National Association of Attorneys General
Horizontal Merger Guidelines, 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 13,405, § 3.1 (Mar. 10, 1987)
[hereinafter NAAG Guidelines] ("A comparably priced substitute will be deemed suitable
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As a second element, the relevant "geographic market is the nar-
rowest market which is wide enough so that products from adjacent ar-
eas ... cannot compete on substantial parity with those included in the
market."'49 Evidence of how far consumers are willing to travel to ob-
tain the product at a lower price will be significant.50 This approach,
similar to that employed by all other circuits, 5 1 is fact-intensive.
C. Proving Market Power and Monopoly Power
Once the market is properly defined, the parties then attempt to
prove or disprove the existence of market power. Market power is typi-
cally determined by estimating the defendant's market share. Next, the
structural characteristics of the market establish whether that market
share allows a rise in price for a nontransitory period of time without
loss of so many customers that the price increase becomes unprofitable.
In Reazin, however, the Tenth Circuit suggested a deviation from the
typical analysis in two potentially significant ways.
First, the Tenth Circuit indicated that the strength of the showing of
market power may vary with the nature of the challenged restraint.
5 2
The more naked the restraint, the less elaborate need be the analysis of
market power. Second, the court stated that detailed proof that the de-
fendant possessed market power may not be necessary if substantial evi-
dence indicates the defendant in fact exercised market power.53 In other
words, if it is clear that output has been reduced and prices raised, there
is no need to debate whether the defendant has the power to accomplish
such results.
The significance of these statements is difficult to assess, however,
because the Reazin court ultimately applied a traditional market power
analysis. These statements also apparently conflict with the Tenth Cir-
cuit's subsequent proclamation that "'[a]t the very least it must be
shown how much of the relevant market a defendant controls if market
power is to be evaluated.' "54 This latter statement appears to apply
orily to cases of monopolization or attempt to monopolize where the
plaintiff must demonstrate monopoly power or a likelihood that the de-
fendant will obtain monopoly power. Such cases face higher standards
and thereby expand the product market definition if, and only if, considered suitable by at
least 75% of [the customers who purchase the particular product in question.]")
49. Westman Comm'n, 796 F.2d at 1222 (internal quotations omitted); see also Bacchus,
939 F.2d at 893 ("geographic market consists of the area of effective competition").
50. See Westman Comm'n, 796 F.2d at 1222.
51. See, e.g., Satellite Television & Associated Resources, Inc. v. Continental Cablevi-
sion, Inc., 714 F.2d 351, 356 (4th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1027 (1984); LAWRENCE
A. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANrrrusT § 12 (1977).
52. Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 966, 968 n.24 (10th Cir.), cerl.
denied, 110 S. Ct. 3241 (1990).
53. Id at 968 n.24 (quoting FTC v. Indiana Fed'n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460-61
(1986)).
54. Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 894 (10th Cir.
1991)(quoting Shoppin' Bag of Pueblo, Inc. v. Dillon Cos., Inc., 783 F.2d 159, 161-62
(10th Cir. 1986)).
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than the mere existence of market power required in a Sherman Act
section 1 case.
In the Tenth Circuit, like all others, the traditional market power
inquiry begins with an analysis of the defendant's market share. Market
share provides important, but not conclusive, evidence of market
power.55 A low market share gives rise to a presumption that market (or
monopoly) power does not exist and a high market share creates the
opposite presumption. 5 6 In addition to market share, the Tenth Circuit
considers how the structural characteristics of the relevant market may
impact upon a firm's ability to exercise power. These factors include:
trends in the market; barriers to entry; the substitutability of other avail-
able products; the number and strength of existing and potential com-
petitors; 5 7 the cross elasticity of demand for the relevant product; and
regulatory or contractual limits on the amount or duration of the de-
fendant's power.
5 8
Under current economic thinking, barriers to entry are by far the
most important of these factors, because, in their absence, one can ex-
pect potential entrants to flood the market if the defendant restricts out-
put or raises prices. Barriers to entry can take many forms, including:
high capital costs; 59 regulatory or legal requirements such as patents or
licenses; control over an essential or superior resource; entrenched
buyer preferences; and capital market evaluations imposing higher capi-
tal costs on new entrants.60 These various structural characteristics can
enhance or diminish a firm's market power.6 1 Which effect they have, if
any, is determined by a fact-specific examination.
55. Bacchus, 939 F.2d at 894; Reazin, 899 F.2d at 967; Shoppin'Bag, 783 F.2d at 162; see
Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 885 F.2d 683, 695 n.20 (10th Cir.
1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 441 (1990).
56. Reazin, 899 F.2d at 968 ("market share percentages may give rise to presumptions,
but will rarely conclusively establish or eliminate market or monopoly power"); Colorado
Interstate Gas, 885 F.2d at 694 n.18 (monopoly power generally will not exist absent a mar-
ket share of at least 70% to 80%).
57. One factor that the Tenth Circuit has yet to consider is the impact of actual or
potential competition from abroad. The practical approach taken by the court in Reazin
indicates that the Tenth Circuit will evaluate such claims (which often carry a tinge of
xenophobia) closely and not overlook the very real difficulties that foreign competitors
may have in entering the domestic market, such as transportation costs, tariffs and other
regulatory barriers, exchange rate fluctuations, etc.
58. See, e.g., Bacchus, 939 F.2d at 894; Reazin, 899 F.2d at 968-72; Colorado Interstate Gas,
885 F.2d at 694-96 & n.21; Westman Comm'n Co. v. Hobart Int'l, Inc., 796 F.2d 1216,
1226 (10th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1005 (1988).
59. High capital costs should be considered a barrier to entry only to the extent that
they cannot be recouped if the firm decides to exit the market. For example, the need to
invest in a fleet of trucks is not likely to create a serious barrier to entry into the widget
market because trucks are readily available and can be sold or rented to persons other than
the competing widget manufacturers in the event that the new entrant does not succeed.
An investment in a custom piece of tooling machinery, by contrast, probably cannot be put
to any other use outside of the widget industry and would be a barrier to entry.
60. Reazin, 899 F.2d at 968 (quoting Colorado Interstate Gas, 885 F.2d at 695-96 n.21);
Westman Comm'n, 796 F.2d at 1225-26 n.3; SULLIVAN, supra note 51, 1 23; AREEDA & TUR-
NER, supra note 40, 409.
61. Compare Reazin, 899 F.2d at 966-68 (factors enhanced market power) with Colorado




The rigor of this examination in the Tenth Circuit has varied from
case to case. In Reazin, the court critically examined each of the factors
raised by the parties as potentially impacting the defendant's market
power. The court only gave weight to those factors proven to exist and
proven to have a significant effect on the defendart's ability to exercise
control over prices or to exclude competitors. 6 2 By contrast, the court's
examination in Colorado Interstate Gas Co. v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,63 was
cursory and purely theoretical. There, the court simply noted that con-
tractual terms limited the defendant's ability to exercise market power to
six years and held that this fact precluded any likelihood of the defend-
ant achieving monopoly power.64 The court's failure to consider the
defendant's power during that six-year period, which most authorities
consider to be more than transitory, 6 5 is highly surprising and unlikely
to be followed in other cases.
66
Reazin and Colorado Interstate Gas demonstrate that the Tenth Circuit
looks beyond market share to consider structural attributes of the mar-
ket impacting a defendant's ability to control prices or exclude competi-
tion. The degree of scrutiny placed on these purported power-
enhancing or power-reducing factors, however, is likely to vary from
case to case.
IV. CONSPIRACY-PROOF
The Supreme Court has long recognized that purely unilateral con-
duct does not violate section I of the Sherman Act.6 7 The requirement
of concerted action under sections 1 and 2, however, received unprece-
dented emphasis during the 1980's.68 As a result, plaintiffs find it much
more difficult to prove concerted action, an essential element of every
case brought under section 1 of the Sherman Act and of claims for con-
spiracy to monopolize under section 2. The Tenth Circuit has followed
the Supreme Court's lead in this area, and recent precedent indicates
that it will continue to do so-at least until Congress legislates
otherwise.
6 9
62. See Reazin, 899 F.2d at 968-72.
63. 885 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1986).
64. Id, at 695-97.
65. See, e.g., DOJ Guidelines, supra note 41, § 3.3 (potential entry won't be considered
unless it is likely to happen within two years); NAAG Guidelines, supra note 48, § 5.1 (po-
tential entry must occur within one year to be relevant).
66. The Department ofJustice has strongly criticized this aspect of the Colorado Inter-
state Gas opinion. See Amicus Curiae Brief of Department of Justice at 18-19, Colorado
Interstate Gas v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 885 F.2d 683 (10th Cir. 1989)(No. 89-1508),
cert. denied, Ill S. Ct. 441 (1990).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919).
68. See Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988); Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986); Copperweld Corp. v. Inde-
pendence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984); Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465
U.S. 752 (1984).
69. See, e.g., Bacchus Indus., Inc. v. Arvin Indus., Inc., 939 F.2d 887, 895 (10th Cir.
1991)(rejecting conspiracy to monopolize claim for failure to establish combination or
conspiracy); McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365, 367 (10th Cir. 19 88)("Solely unilat-
eral conduct, regardless of its anticompetitive effects, is not.prohibited by Section 1.");
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A. Capacity to Conspire
In 1984, the Supreme Court held a parent corporation legally inca-
pable of conspiring with its wholly-owned subsidiary because they were
under common control and, hence, merely a single actor for purposes of
antitrust analysis. 70 Its decision upheld a long line of Tenth Circuit pre-
cedent requiring a threshold demonstration that alleged conspirators
have the legal capacity to conspire for antitrust purposes. 7 1 The legal
capacity of particular parties to conspire with one another is a question
of fact hinging largely on the degree to which the parties are subject to a
common source of control. 7 2 Applying this analysis, the Tenth Circuit
has found the following parties legally incapable of conspiring with one
another: a company and its owner/president; 7 a real estate broker and
its sales agents where state law made their relationship one of superior
and subordinates; 74 economically integrated affiliated business enti-
ties;75 and an insurance company and insurance agents who were part of
the company structure.7 6 Recent Tenth Circuit precedent indicates this
line of decisions will continue to expand.
77
B. Proof Required
Recent Supreme Court decisions have also raised the showing a
plaintiff must make to establish the existence of concerted action.7 8 The
Tenth Circuit, in keeping with these developments, now employs a two-
pronged test to evaluate the plaintiff's evidence of concerted action:
(1) [I]s the plaintiff's evidence of conspiracy ambiguous, i.e., is
it as consistent with the defendants' permissible independent
interests as with an illegal conspiracy; and, if so, (2) is there any
evidence that tends to exclude the possibility that the defend-
ants were pursuing these independent interests.
79
Although this test was developed in the context of a motion for sum-
Blankenship v. Herzfeld, 661 F.2d 840, 845 (10th Cir. 1981)(rejecting claims under both
section 1 and section 2 for want of proof of concerted action).
Congress has considered legislation which would overturn much of the Court's recent
conspiracy decisions. See infra text accompanying notes 88-95.
70. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 752.
71. See, e.g., Card v. National Life Ins. Co., 603 F.2d 828, 834 (10th Cir. 1979).
72. See, e.g., Blankenship v. Herzfeld, 721 F.2d 306, 309 (10th Cir. 1983)(Blankenship
I/)(capacity of related parties to conspire is a question of fact).
73. United States v. Suntar Roofing, Inc., 897 F.2d 469, 474 (10th Cir. 1990)("the law
will not recognize a conspiracy when the only possible 'conspirators' are a company and its
employee, officer or owner")(citing Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769).
74. Holter v. Moore & Co., 702 F.2d 854, 856 (10th Cir.) (recognizing that officers
and employees of corporation are generally incapable of conspiring with the corporation
or each other), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 937 (1983).
75. Blankenship II, 721 F.2d at 309-10.
76. Card, 603 F.2d at 834.
77. See Suntar Roofing, 897 F.2d at 474 (10th Cir. 1990)(following Copperweld, 467 U.S.
at 752).
78. See, e.g., Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
79. Key Fin. Planning Corp. v. ITT Life Ins. Corp., 828 F.2d 635, 639 (10th Cir.
1987)(quoting Gibson v. Greater Park City Co., 818 F.2d 722, 724 (10th Cir. 1987)).
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mary judgment,8 0 it comes into play at the motion to dismiss stage and
at trial as well. 8 ' This test makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to prove
concerted action by way of circumstantial evidence due to its susceptib-
lity of ambiguious or differing inferences.8 2 This does not mean, how-
ever, that circumstantial evidence never can suffice to establish the
requisite concerted action.83 The plaintiff should expect to come for-
ward with at least some direct evidence, which can be supplemented by
logical inferences, in order to establish concerted action.8 4
C. Types of Concerted Action Required
In addition to tightening the quantum of proof required to establish
conspiracies, recent Supreme Court precedent further narrows the types
of conspiracy that will satisfy the concerted action requirement.8 5 The
Tenth Circuit has carried this trend even further. For example, in Mc-
Kenzie v. Mercy Hospital,8 6 a tying claim brought under section 1 was dis-
missed for lack of concerted action even though the alleged tying
arrangement constituted a contract that many circuits consider within
the ambit of section l's requirement of a "contract, combination or con-
spiracy" in restraint of trade.87 The extent to which this trend continues
80. l.
81. See Reazin v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 899 F.2d 951, 963-64 (10th Cir.)(trial),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3241 (1990); Monument Builders v. American Cemetery Ass'n, 891
F.2d 1473, 1481 n.8 (10th Cir. 1989)(motion to dismiss), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 2168
(1990).
82. See Cayman Exploration Corp. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 873 F.2d 1357, 1361
(10th Cir. 1989)(conspiracy can be established by circumstantial evidence, but parallel
business behavior alone is not enough and claim of conspiracy "will fail if there is an
independent business justification which explains the alleged conspirators' conduct");
Dreiling v. Peugeot Motors of Am., Inc., 850 F.2d 1373, 1380 (10th Cir. 1988)(evidence at
best ambiguous and consistent with defendants' permissible interests); Key Fin., 828 F.2d
at 639-40 (evidence ambiguous and equally indicative of legitimate conduct); Gibson, 818
F.2d at 724-25 (each action cited subject to plausible nonconspiratorial explanation).
Compare with the earlier cases of King & King Enters. v. Champlin Petroleum Co., 657
F.2d 1147, 1153 (10th Cir. 1981)(conspiracy may be inferred from course of conduct and
other circumstantial evidence), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1164 (1982); Cackling Acres, Inc. v.
Olson Farms, Inc., 541 F.2d 242,244-45 (10th Cir. 1976)(same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122
(1977).
83. See Reazin, 899 F.2d at 963-64 (circumstantial evidence of conspiracy sufficient to
support jury's finding of conspiracy); Monument Builders, 891 F.2d at 1481 n.8 ("The Court
did not intend to end reliance on circumstantial proof of conspiracy, but rather to avoid
reliance exclusively on evidence which is as consistent with permissible competition as
with illegal conspiracy.") (internal quotation omitted).
84. See United States v. Suntar Roofing, Inc., 897 F.2d 469, 474-77 (10th Cir.
1990)(upholding finding of conspiracy at trial based on mixture of direct and circumstan-
tial evidence); Instructional Sys. Dev. Corp. v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 817 F.2d 639,
644-46 (10th Cir. 1987)(direct evidence supported by logical inference sufficient to estab-
lish conspiracy).
85. See, e.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717 (1988)(plaintiff
must show that defendants agreed not only that plaintiff should be terminated for dis-
counting, but also that they acted jointly to set the prices or price levels that were being
enforced).
86. 854 F.2d 365 (10th Cir. 1988).
87. Id. at 367-68; see also Smith Mach. Co. v. Hesston Corp., 878 F.2d 1290, 1294-95,
1298-99 (10th Cir. 1989) (indicating that court may have been willing to dismiss tying claim
on this basis had it been raised by the defendant and later finding general dealership
agreement containing line forcing requirement to be insufficient to establish a "contract
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is likely to be determined by the Supreme Court or Congress.
V. FUTURE TRENDS
Virtually all of the recent developments in antitrust jurisprudence
stem from actions taken by the Supreme Court. In its handful of annual
antitrust opinions, the Court has steered antitrust jurisprudence down a
fairly predictable path that emphasizes economic efficiency over just
about all else. Recent appointments to the Court indicate that it will not
deviate from this course.
88
But antitrust jurisprudence can move in directions other than those
mandated by the Supreme Court. Congress, in theory at least, retains
the power to reset the course of the law. Since the 1970's, certain mem-
bers of Congress have attempted to derail the antitrust revolution, albeit
unsuccessfully. In 1991, the Senate passed just such a bill, S. 429,89
which would reverse cases like Business Electronics Corp. v. Sharp Electronics
Corp.90 and Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Service Corp.9 1 and make it easier
for plaintiffs in vertical restraint cases to establish the concerted action
element of section 1 of the Sherman Act, and reaffirm the per se invalid-
ity of resale price maintenance arrangements.
While S. 429 mirrors many of the earlier "turn back the dock" bills,
its counterpart in the House, H.R. 1470,92 indicates that Congress' ap-
proach to antitrust law may be turning in the same direction as the
Court's. Like S. 429, H.R. 1470 contains provisions directed at making
it easier to establish section l's concerted action requirement. H.R.
1470, however, limits per se condemnation of resale price maintenance
to cases where defendants possess market power. These changes, if en-
acted into law, would keep the Supreme Court's antitrust jurisprudence
headed in the same direction, 1ut with a much firmer underpinning.
For years, leading antitrust jurists have felt that per se condemna-
tion of resale price maintenance was inconsistent with the policies un-
derlying the antitrust laws. 93 Long-standing precedent 9 4 and fear of a
congressional backlash operated to keep the courts from overtly aban-
doning per se condemnation in favor of the rule of reason. Instead,
courts covertly achieved this result by pushing section l's concerted ac-
tion requirement to contorted extremes.9 5 H.R. 1470, in its current
for sale" as required by section 3 of the Clayton Act), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1073 (1990); cf.
Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 (1984)(indicating that contract im-
posing tie on the purchaser is also sufficient to satisfy Section 1).
88. See, for example, Justice Thomas's opinion in United States v. Baker Hughes,
Inc., 908 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
89. 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
90. 485 U.S. 717 (1988).
91. 465 U.S. 752 (1984).
92. 102d Cong., Ist Sess. (1991).
93. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted Distri-
bution: Per Se Legality, 48 U. CHI. L. REv. 6 (1981).
94. See, e.g., Dr. Miles Medical Co. v.John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U.S. 373 (1911).
95. See, e.g., Business Elecs. Corp. v. Sharp Elecs. Corp., 485 U.S. 717, 721-25 (1988);
McKenzie v. Mercy Hosp., 854 F.2d 365, 367-68 (10th Cir. 1988).
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form, would allow the courts to reach an economically correct result via
a superior path.
I Conference between the Senate and the House has not yet begun.
Which of the two competing bills, if either, actually gets passed and
signed into law remains to be seen. If H.R. 1470 ultimately prevails, one
can expect the antitrust revolution to continue unabated. If S.B. 429
becomes law, tension will continue to exist between the Court and Con-
gress creating additional uncertainties in antitrust law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The antitrust law of the Tenth Circuit, like that of the Supreme
Court, has changed dramatically over the past few decades. One can
expect the Court to continue its emphasis on economic efficiency and
consumer welfare for the foreseeable future. The Supreme Court shows
no inclination of diverting the Tenth Circuit from this course, and, while




In spite of the recession (perhaps because of it), the caseload of the
Tenth Circuit was not demonstrably heavier than in prior years. As will
be seen, a number of the cases involved interesting examples ofjudicial
interpretation and application of various provisions of the 1978 Bank-
ruptcy Code as amended. A number of them will be, or have been ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court. If there is any theme or trend in the
Circuit, it is continuing interpretation of that still relatively new statute.
This survey attempts to describe and analyze selected cases of the
Tenth Circuit for the 1991 calendar year. The only bankruptcy cases
ignored for this purpose have been unreported cases, cases involving
only matters of procedure and cases involving only questions of state
law unrelated to bankruptcy issues. The cases selected for treatment
cover a broad range of topics and many should be of interest to non-
specialists.
II. POWERS OF THE BANKRuPTcY COURT
In 1991, the Tenth Circuit encountered an array of diverse ques-
tions on the powers of the bankruptcy court. None of the cases involved
jurisdictional questions; a few involved routine matters and have been
omitted from this survey.
A. Application of Equal Access to Justice Act: O'Connor v. U.S. Dept. of
Energy
In the first case, O'Connor v. U.S. Department of Energy, 1 the Tenth
Circuit held that a bankruptcy court was a "court" within the meaning of
a provision of the Equal Access to Justice Act ("EAJA"). The EAJA pro-
vides that "a court shall award to a prevailing party ... fees and.., costs
... in certain cases "brought by or against the United States in any
court having jurisdiction of that action .... -"2 The Department of En-
ergy ("DOE"), as an unsecured creditor in a bankruptcy proceeding,
had filed a motion to enforce a reorganization plan and alternatively, to
convert the bankruptcy from a Chapter 11 to a Chapter 7 proceeding.
After the bankruptcy court denied the motion, the debtor requested and
the court granted costs and attorney fees under the above cited provi-
sion of EAJA. Upon appeal, the district court reversed; debtor appealed
to the Tenth Circuit.
The only circuit to have addressed the application of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412(d)(1)(a) to bankruptcy courts was the Eleventh Circuit. How-
l. 942 F.2d 771 (10th Cir. 1991).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).
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ever, the Eleventh Circuit's decision, In re Davis,3 was controlled by
Bowen v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue4 which held that the non-Article
III tax court lacked jurisdiction to award EAJA fees. In O'Connor, the
Tenth Circuit declined to let the issue turn on whether a court was an
Article III court. Applying a "plain meaning of the language" approach,
the court noted the differing terms "court" and "Court of the United
States" and concluded that the term "a court" and "any court" included
the bankruptcy court.5 A final comment noted that this result was con-
sistent with the "undisputed purpose of the EAJA to encourage individ-
uals and small businesses to challenge adverse government action
notwithstanding the high cost of civil litigation."
6
B. Right toJury Trial. In re Republic Trust & Savings Co.
In re Republic Trust & Savings Co. 7 is one chapter of a case originally
decided by the Tenth Circuit in 19908 and reviewed by the Supreme
Court in the same year.9 Inasmuch as last year's Denver University Law
Review Tenth Circuit Survey did not include bankruptcy cases, mention
of the case in this year's survey seems appropriate.
Republic Trust & Savings was an uninsured financial institution
which filed a Chapter 11 petition in 1984. A year later, the trustee
(Langenkamp or the predecessor trustee), instituted adversary proceed-
ings to recover voidable preferences against appellants who had re-
deemed thrift and passbook savings certificates totaling over $713,919
within the 547(b) ninety day look back period (preceding the filing of the
petition).1 0
After a bench trial, the bankruptcy court found that the payments
constituted voidable preferences and the appellants appealed. In the
1990 decision, the Tenth Circuit panel held that the payments were not
excepted under either 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) or (c)(2)' 1 and these con-
clusions were not appealed. An additional argument of the appellants in
3. 899 F.2d 1136 (11th Cir. 1990) cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 510 (1990). See also In re
Brickell Inv. Corp., 922 F.2d 696 (11th Cir. 1991).
4. 706 F.2d 1087 (11th Cir. 1983).
5. 942 F.2d at 773-74.
6. Id at 774.
7. 924 F.2d 997 (10th Cir. 1991).
8. In re Republic Trust & Savings Co. (Langenkamp v. Hackler), 897 F.2d 1041
(10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 245 (1990).
9. Langenkamp v. Culp, 11 S. Ct. 330 (1990).
10. 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(A) reads in pertinent part: (b) Except as provided in sub-
section (c) of this section, the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in
property-... (4) made-(A) on or within 90 days before the date of filing of the petition
11. 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1) and (2) state:
(c) The trustee may not avoid under this section a transfer-
(1) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) intended by the debtor and the creditor to or for whose benefit
such transfer was made to be a contemporaneous exchange for new
value given to the debtor, and
(B) in fact a substantially contemporaneous exchange;
(2) to the extent that such transfer was-
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the 1990 Tenth Circuit case, was that the district court had erred in de-
nying them a jury trial on the trustee's preference claims.
The Tenth Circuit, applying the complex test of the recent Supreme
Court decision, Granfinandera, S.A. v. Nordberg,12 agreed that those ap-
pellants who had not filed claims against the debtor's estate were clearly
entitled to a jury trial. Surprisingly, in an attempt to apply the law of the
Granfinandera case, the Tenth Circuit held that even those appellants
who did file claims were also entitled to a jury trial.13 Apparently, the
court felt the trustee's action against all recipients of payments should
be subject to the right to ajury trial, even though some of the recipients
filed claims, because certain of the claimants still had monies invested
with the bankrupt.
The trustee filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme
Court on this last point and in a brief per curiam opinion, the Court
stated:
In Granfinanciera we recognized that by filing a claim against the
bankruptcy estate the creditor triggers the process of "allow-
ance and disallowance of claims," thereby subjecting himself to
the bankruptcy court's equitable power .... If the creditor is
met, in turn, with a preference action from the trustee, that ac-
tion becomes part of the claims-allowance process which is tria-
ble only in equity.14
On remand, the Tenth Circuit vacated that portion of its prior opinion
granting a right of jury trial to those appellants which had filed claims
against the estate.
C. Control of Dilatoiy Debtors: In re Frieouf
In a case involving administration of estate issues, debtor Randy
Arden Frieouf filed an underlying Chapter 11 petition on September 20,
1985.15 Frieouf engaged in conduct for over three years (throughout
the bankruptcy proceedings), which evidenced a pattern of evasion. For
example, debtor failed to file a plan within the time limits, failed to com-
ply with orders to file disclosure statements, and was dilatory in filing an
amended disclosure statement and a third reorganization plan over a
period of three years. On February 14, 1989 the bankruptcy court dis-
missed the Chapter 11 petition with prejudice to the filing of any bank-
ruptcy petition for three years. The district court affirmed. Frieouf
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary
course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the transferee;
(B) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of
the debtor and the transferee; and
(C) made according to ordinary business terms
12. 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
13. "Despite these appellants' claims, the trustee's actions to avoid the transfers, con-
solidated by the bankruptcy court, were plenary rather than a part of the bankruptcy
court's summary proceedings involving the 'process of allowance and disallowance of
claims."' 897 F.2d at 1046-47.
14. Langenkamp, 111 S. Ct. at 331.
15. In re Frieouf, 938 F.2d 1099 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 117 L.Ed.2d 408 (1992).
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appealed to the Tenth Circuit, claiming, inter alia, that the bankruptcy
court had no authority to limit access to bankruptcy relief for three
years.
Section 349(a) 16 of the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a bankruptcy
court to permanently disqualify a class of debts from discharge for
cause. But the section does not on its face state that a bankruptcy court
may deny future access to bankruptcy.17 The Tenth Circuit (Judge Seth)
reasoned that the statute's language was plain and held that the bank-
ruptcy court's denial of all access to bankruptcy court for more than 180
days was beyond the authority conferred by section 349(a). 18 The
Tenth Circuit upheld the order dismissing Frieouf's bankruptcy, but re-
versed and remanded the district court's affirmance of the bankruptcy
court's judgment denying the debtor all access to court beyond 180 days
for debts unrelated to this case.19
D. Bankruptcy Court Supervision - Formal Notice to Creditors in Chapter 11
Cases: In re Unioil
A relatively routine case, In re Unioil,20 involved the bankruptcy
court's powers of supervision over the administration of a case. The
debtor was an oil and gas exploration company which filed for reorgani-
zation under Chapter 11. In spite of the filing, one of its officers made
post-petition transfers, triggering creditor objections that led to a stipu-
lation and court order that Unioil would make no transfers without court
approval. After confirmation of the plan, the creditors' committee dis-
covered transfers and assignments to parties related to the debtor in
violation of this order. The bankruptcy court granted a motion to set
aside such transfers and issued an order to that effect. After a hearing,
the court also entered an order barring the claims of the assignees inas-
much as the court found such assignees (limited partnerships related to
the debtor) were on inquiry notice of the bankruptcy proceedings.
2 1
Initially, the Tenth Circuit faced a jurisdictional question. The no-
tice of appeal had identified appellants as "Appellant Partnerships, Dal-
16. 11 U.S.C. § 349(a) reads:
(a) Unless the court, for cause, orders otherwise, the dismissal of a case under
this title does not bar the discharge, in a later case under this title, of debts that
were dischargeable in the case dismissed; nor does the dismissal of a case under
this title prejudice the debtor with regard to the filing of a subsequent petition
under this title, except as provided in section 109(f) of this tide.
17. See also, 11 U.S.C. § 109(g):
(g) Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, no individual or family
farmer may be a debtor under this title who has been a debtor in a case pending
under this title at any time in the preceding 180 days if-
(1) the case was dismissed by the court for willful failure of the debtor to
abide by orders of the court, or to appear before the court in proper prosecu-
tion of the case; or
(2) the debtor requested and obtained the voluntary dismissal of the
case following the filing of a request for relief from the automatic stay pro-
vided by section 362 of this title.
18. 938 F.2d at 1104.
19. Id. at 1105.
20. 948 F.2d 678 (10th Cir. 1991).
21. Id. at 680-81.
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ton Development Project No. 1 et al. and other partnerships. '2 2 Van
Bebber, district judge sitting by designation, applied Torres v. Oakland
Scavenger Co. 23 which held that "et al." fails to provide notice to the ap-
pellants. Thus, the Tenth Circuit had appellate jurisdiction only over
Dalton.
24
The opinion had little problem with the creditor's argument that
the order setting aside the transfers was invalid. The court held that
such an order was a valid exercise of the court's equitable power to en-
force its own orders. 25 The Tenth Circuit did, however, reverse that
part of the bankruptcy court's order barring the claims of Dalton Devel-
opment.2 6 Debtor relied on In re Green,2 7 in arguing that actual knowl-
edge of the bankruptcy proceeding amounted to constitutionally
adequate notice. However, Unioil distinguished the notice required in a
Chapter 7 case such as Green, from the actual formal notice required by
Reliable Electric Co., Inc. v. Olson Construction Co.,28 for the purposes of a
Chapter 11 proceeding.2 9 In light of the above conclusion, the court
reversed the lower court decision and remanded for appropriate action.
III. AUTOMATIC STAY
A necessary feature of any bankruptcy proceeding is the automatic
stay which prevents most creditor activity with respect to the assets of
the estate. Recurring reports in the press to "filings under the protec-
tion of bankruptcy" reflect this feature of the law. Two cases from the
Tenth Circuit 1991 caseload interpreted this important provision.
A. Tolling Effect of the Automatic Stay: Valley Transit Mix of Ruidoso,
Inc. v. Miller
In order that bankruptcy does not cause the loss of a non-bank-
ruptcy right, 11 U.S.C. § 108(c)30 provides for the tolling of any non-
22. IL at 681.
23. 487 U.S. 312 (1988).
24. 948 F.2d at 681-82.
25. Id at 682.
26. Apparently, the barring of the claims of the other unnamed partnerships are not
affected by this decision in that as ruled, supra, they were not within the jurisdiction of this
appeal.
27. 876 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1989).
28. 726 F.2d 620 (10th Cir. 1984).
29. See also N.Y. v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293 (1953) indicating that
a creditor with actual knowledge of a reorganization proceeding has no duty to inquire
about further court action.
30. 11 U.S.C. § 108(c):
(c) Except as provided in section 524 of this title, if applicable nonbankruptcy
law, an order entered in a nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes a
period for commencing or continuing a civil action in a court other than a bank-
ruptcy court on a claim against the debtor, or against an individual with respect to
which such individual is protected under section 1201 or 1301 of this title, and
such period has not expired before the date of the filing of the petition, then such
period does not expire until the later of-
(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period oc-
curring on or after the commencement of the case; or
(2) 30 days after notice of the termination or expiration of the stay
1992]
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bankruptcy statute of limitations during the period the stay is in effect.
Valley Transit Mix of Ruidoso, Inc. v. Miller31 involved an action by B.C.R.
and others to enforce mechanic's liens against land owned by the Miller
group. The land had been leased to Ruidoso Recreation, Inc. which
made the improvements on the Miller land. Shortly after B.C.R. filed its
lien, Ruidoso filed bankruptcy. The issue was the effect of the automatic
stay arising out of that bankruptcy on the enforcement of the lien
against the Miller land. Miller argued that the instant action to enforce
the B.C.R. lien was time-barred by the New Mexico statute inasmuch as
B.C.R.'s action to enforce the lien against Miller's land was not stayed by
the Ruidoso bankruptcy. The lower courts rejected this narrow reading
of the scope of the automatic stay. The Tenth Circuit affirmed, holding
that the automatic stay applied to action to enforce a debt against the
debtor-lessee, including the foreclosure of a lien against land of the les-
sor.3 2 Thus, B.C.R. was protected by the tolling of the New Mexico stat-
ute by the bankruptcy filing pursuant to section 108(c).
B. Exception for Governmental Proceedings: Eddleman v. United States
Dept. of Labor
The 1978 Bankruptcy Code specifically provides that the filing of a
petition does not operate to stay "the commencement or continuation
of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce such gov-
ernmental unit's police or regulatory power."'3 3 In Eddleman v. United
States Dept. of Labor,3 4 the debtors operated a mail-hauling business
which they continued to operate as debtors-in-possession after a Chap-
ter 11 filing. After such filing, the Department of Labor (DOL) filed an
administrative action against the debtors alleging pre-petition violations
of the Service Contract Act 35 (SCA) requiring minimum wages and ben-
efits for those obtaining certain federal contracts. As part of this action,
DOL sought to liquidate claims for back wages due the debtors' employ-
ees and to include the Eddlemans on a list of entities debarred from
contracting with the government for a three year period. The bank-
ruptcy court held that the action was subject to the automatic stay and
did not come within the section 362(b)(4) exception.3 6 The district
court affirmed noting that the exception was intended to prevent viola-
under section 362, 922, 1201, or 1301 of this title, as the case may be, with
respect to such claim.
31. 928 F.2d 354 (10th Cir. 1991).
32. Id. at 355-56.
33. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4):
(b) The filing of a petition under section 301, 302, or 303 of this title, or of
an application under section 5(a)(3) of the Securities Investor Protection Act of
1970 (15 U.S.C. 78eee(a)(3)), does not operate as a stay-
(4) under subsection (a)(1) of this section, of the commencement or
continuation of an action or proceeding by a governmental unit to enforce
such governmental unit's police or regulatory power
34. 923 F.2d 782 (10th Cir. 1991).
35. 41 U.S.C. §§ 351-58 (1988).
36. 923 F.2d at 790.
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tions of regulatory laws. It also reasoned that "regulatory laws that con-
flict directly with control of the res or property by the bankruptcy court
are not excepted by Section 362(b)(4)." 3 7 The Eddlemans appealed to
the Tenth Circuit which reversed.
Much of the Tenth Circuit opinion, authored by Judge McKay, in-
volved a jurisdictional question of appealability. Holding that a denial
of the DOL's claim of exemption from the automatic stay was an appeal-
able final order, the court turned to the issue involving the asserted ex-
emption. The court outlined two tests which have been used by the
bankruptcy courts to determine the scope of the governmental exemp-
tion.3 8 Under the "pecuniary purpose" test, the exemption does not
apply if the governmental action is primarily for the purpose of protect-
ing a pecuniary interest as opposed to protecting matters of public pol-
icy. The "public policy" test asks whether the action is aimed at
effectuating public policy or if it is aimed at adjudicating private rights.
Actions taken for the purpose of advancing private rights are not in-
cluded within the exemption.
The instant case does not admit of an easy answer. Certain mini-
mum wages and benefits are required by the SCA. The administrative
activity would determine how much the bankrupts owe their employees,
and in that regard the proceedings do adjudicate private rights. On the
other hand, the proceedings might result in an order taking the bank-
rupts off the list of approved contractors who deal with the United
States. Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit decision leaves many questions
unanswered. It reversed the lower courts without adopting either of the
above outlined tests. The court preliminarily rejected the district
court's limitation of the exemption because it interfered with the bank-
ruptcy court's control over debtor assets.
The Tenth Circuit opinion pointed out that the language of section
362(b)(4) contained no such limitation.3 9 Next, the court ruled that the
DOL's proceedings were exempt from the automatic stay under either
the "pecuniary purpose" test or the "public policy" test.40 As to the
"pecuniary purpose" test, the opinion concluded that the agency's ac-
tion with respect to wages had the purpose of preventing unfair compe-
tition.4 1 With respect to the "public policy" test, the agency request for




38. These tests are outlined in a Sixth Circuit case, NLRB v. Edward Cooper Painting,
804 F.2d 934, 942 (6th Cir. 1986).
39. 923 F.2d at 790.
40. Id at 791. There is not much difference between these tests although they are
apparently treated as two separate tests. Perhaps the courts should combine the tests and
refined the single resulting test. There is not that much authority on the issue at this time.
See id at 790, n.12.
41. Id. at 791.
42. Id.
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IV. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
Under 11 U.S.C. § 541, the bankruptcy estate is created from all of
the non-exempt property of the debtor as of the commencement of the
case. With certain limited exceptions, assets acquired by the debtor af-
ter the commencement of the case4 3 belong to the debtor and are part
of the debtor's "fresh start." One Tenth Circuit case in 1991 involved a
significant issue regarding pensions, which issue is currently being re-
viewed by the Supreme Court.
A. Pension and Profit Sharing Plan: In re Harline
An interesting and important case for attorneys generally and bank-
ruptcy attorneys particularly is In re Harline,4 4 in which the Tenth Circuit
held that a pension and profit sharing plan, one which was a qualified
plan under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"),4 5
was not part of the bankruptcy estate. There is now a significant split on
this question involving at least eight circuits. The Supreme Court has
recently granted review in one of these cases.
4 6
The debtor, a Dr. Harline, filed a petition for reorganization of his
affairs under Chapter 11 and the petition was subsequently converted
into Chapter 7 proceedings. The debtor had not listed as an asset of his
estate his beneficial interest in a profit sharing trust of the Weber Clinic,
Inc. The trust had been established as a corporate retirement plan in
1960. At the time of the bankruptcy filings, Weber Clinic was a profes-
sional corporation with the bankrupt as the sole shareholder. He was
also the sole remaining beneficiary of the trust and sole member of its
deferred compensation committee. The assets of the trust were three
insurance policies with cash values totaling over $300,000.
After learning of the existence of this asset, Gladwell, the bank-
ruptcy trustee, sued the bank trustee of the plan. Harline assumed re-
sponsibility for the defense of the action and alleged that his interest in
the plan was not an asset of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541(c) (2) which
provides: "A restriction on the transfer of a beneficial interest of the
debtor in a trust that is enforceable under applicable non-bankruptcy
law is enforceable in a case under this title." Specifically, Harline made
the argument that the trust was within this subsection either (1) because
the trust was a valid spendthrift trust under Utah law, or (2) because the
trust qualified as a pension and profit sharing plan under ERISA. The
bankruptcy court ordered the plan to turn over the asset, the district
court affirmed and Harline appealed.
The first part of the opinion written by Judge Logan discussed the
viability of Harline's argument that the plan was an effective spendthrift
trust. It is generally conceded that "nonbankruptcy law" referred to in
43. The principle does not apply in Chapter 13 proceedings. 11 U.S.C. § 1306
(1988).
44. 950 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1991).
45. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988) (amended 1991).
46. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S.Ct. 932 (1992).
828 [Vol. 69:4
BANKRUPTCY SURVEY
section 541 (c) (2) 4 7 applies at least to state law recognition of spendthrift
thrusts. After an appropriate analysis of Utah law, the Tenth Circuit
concluded that (1) Utah would probably recognize the doctrine of
spendthrift trusts, but (2) the trust in question did not qualify as a
spendthrift trust because of the bankrupt's control of the res as the only
officer, director, and shareholder of the Weber Clinic which had the
power to amend or terminate the plan.
48
The second part of the Harline opinion wrestled with a question
which has split the circuits: 4 9 Does an ERISA qualified pension come
within the § 541(c)(2) provision as effective under "nonbankruptcy
law?" A number of statutory provisions are relevant. Under ERISA,
"each pension plan shall provide that benefits provided by the plan may
not be assigned or alienated." 50 This provision suggests that a qualify-
ing plan is a restriction on alienation effective under nonbankruptcy law
and therefore is not property of the estate. On the other hand, the Code
elsewhere exempts pension payments.5 ' This provision suggests that to
completely exempt a plan under ERISA would render its purpose mean-
ingless. Judge Logan's opinion cites four circuits as limiting "nonban-
kruptcy law" to state spendthrift trust law.52 The discussion in the
legislative history does focus exclusively on state spendthrift trust law,
supporting this view.
The opinion in Harline cited three recent circuit court holdings to
the contrary.53 Judge Logan characterized these cases as "hold[ing] that
an appeal to legislative history is inappropriate here because the lan-
guage of 541(c) (2) is clear."'54 The Tenth Circuit decision found no rea-
son to narrowly read the language of the proviso. It determined that the
legislative history was not limiting and cited other examples of federal
law being included as "nonbankruptcy law." 5 5 Similarly, the opinion
discussed the purposes of ERISA and concluded, "[o]ur construction of
541 (c) (2) harmonizes the Bankruptcy Code with the dear policy and in-
tent of ERISA."'5 6 The case was remanded for a determination as to
whether the plan in question did in fact qualify under ERISA.
The issue in the Harline case is of obvious importance. The pres-
47. See supra note 11.
48. 950 F.2d at 671-72.
49. Id. at 670.
50. 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d)(1) (1988).
51. See 11 U.S.C. § 522 (d)(10)(E) (1988), which exempts payments under a pension
or profit sharing plan "to the extent reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor
and any dependent of the debtor."
52. 950 F.2d at 673. (citing Daniel v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank (In re Daniel) 771 F.2d
1352 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1016 (1986); Lichstrahl v. Bankers Trust (In re
Lichstrahl), 750 F.2d 1488, 1490 (11 th Cir. 1985); Samore v. Graham (In re Graham), 726
F.2d 1268, 1273 (8th Cir. 1984); Goffv. Taylor (In re Goff) 706 F.2d 574, 577 (5th Cir.
1983)).
53. Id, (citing Forbes v. Lucas (In re Lucas), 924 F.2d 597, 601 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
Ill S. Ct. 2275 (1991); Velis v. Kardanis, 949 F.2d 78, 83 (3rd Cir. 1991); Anderson v.
Raine (In re Moore), 907 F.2d 1476, 1477 (4th Cir. 1990)).
54. 950 F.2d at 673 (quoting In re Moore, 907 F.2d 1476, 1478 (4th Cir. 1990)).
55. Id. at 675.
56. Id.
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ence of ERISA assets in future bankruptcies can only be expected to
increase and the debtor's interest in a pension fund can constitute an
attractive asset to the trustee in a no-asset case, or to creditors generally.
Colorado lawyers should be aware of a recent amendment to the exemp-
tions law of Colorado which adds to its list of exemptions:
[p]roperty, including funds, held in or payable from any pen-
sion or retirement plan or deferred compensation plan, includ-
ing those in which the debtor has received benefits or
payments, or has the right to receive benefits or payments, or
has the right to receive benefits or payments in the future and
including pensions or plans which qualify under the federal
"Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974" as an em-
ployee benefit plan, as defined in 29 U.S.C. § 1002, any individ-
ual retirement account, as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 408, and any
plan, as defined in 26 U.S.C. § 401, and as these plans may be
amended from time to time.
57
This, of course, is of broader application than the decision in Harline,
and of interest to planning attorneys.
58
The Supreme Court has recently granted review of this question.5 9
The case on review, Shumate v. Patterson,60 is the second case from the
Fourth Circuit to hold that the ERISA provision is "nonbankruptcy law"
for the purposes of 11 U.S.C. § 541(c)(2). 6 1 Patterson, like the Harline
case, involved a debtor who allegedly had great control of the funds re-
maining in the fund. A panel of the Fourth Circuit, in an opinion writ-
ten by former Dean Phillips, held that all that was required for the
section 541 proviso to apply was that the plan be ERISA qualified. 62 An
additional chapter in this story should be in next year's survey.
63
B. Tax Refunds: In re Barowsky
Tax refunds can be an important factor in planning the timing of
the filing of a petition in bankruptcy. While In re Barowsky 64 includes no
new law, it is included as another example of this recurring matter. The
Barowskys filed a bankruptcy petition on July 24, 1987 and received a
57. Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-54-102(l)(s), 1991 Cum. Supp. (effective May 1, 1991).
58. For a recent discussion of the possibilities of the Act and certain limitations, see
Paul G. HymanJr., Prebankruptcy Planning: Conversion of Nonexemp Assets into Exempt Assets, 21
CoLo. LAW. 231 (1992).
59. Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S.Ct. 932 (1992).
60. Schumate v. Patterson, 943 F.2d 362 (4th Cir. 1991).
61. See supra note 11.
62. 943 F.2d at 365.
63. A recent decision in Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1991) held that an
Arizona statute similar to the above-cited Colorado statute is preempted by ERISA, 29
U.S.C. § 1144(a) which states:
(a) Supersedure; effective date
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III of this chapter shall supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
described in section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of
this title. This section shall take effect onJanuary 1, 1975.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988).
64. In re Barowsky, 946 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir. 1991).
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discharge on December 3, 1987, upon the trustee's stipulation that it
was a no-asset case. The trustee learned that the debtors received an
income tax refund check for $1,092.74 for the 1987 calendar year. The
trustee reopened the case to recover that part of the refund applicable
to pre-petition earnings arguing that this asset was a pre-petition asset
and thus was property of the estate. The Barowskys' motion to establish
their right to the entire refund was denied by the bankruptcy court and
the district court agreed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed on the authority of Kokoszka v. Belford.
6 5
The debtor's attempt to distinguish the Kokoszka case (because the peti-
tion in bankruptcy in that case was filed after the end of the tax year) was
rejected, as well as the argument that a change in the law was effected by
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.
V. DEBTOR'S EXEMPT PROPERTY
Only one Tenth Circuit case in 1991 dealt explicitly with the subject
of debtor exemptions. The Harline case, discussed above, involved a re-
lated topic and should be consulted by the attorney who is counseling a
debtor approaching the possibility of a bankruptcy filing. The case fea-
tured here concerned, among other issues, the question of what pre-
bankruptcy financial activity is permissible in taking advantage of a statu-
tory homestead exemption.
A. Pre-bankruptcy Planning: Converting Nonexempt Property to Exempt in
Anticipation of Bankruptcy: In re Carey
Patricia G. Carey was a stockbroker and former officer and director
of her husband's business, the Carey Lumber Company. In 1984, she
executed a number of personal guarantees to cover the business's in-
debtedness. 6 6 Late in 1985 Carey Lumber began to experience cash
flow shortages. The company filed a Chapter 11 petition on October 20,
1986 and Marine Midland, appellant, began an action for alleged fraud
against Carey's husband. Carey filed her petition on April 20, 1988.
Marine Midland filed an "Objection to Claim of Exemption" and a
"Complaint Objecting to Debtor's Discharge" alleging that her activi-
ties in liquidating her nonexempt assets in order to reduce the mortgage
on her homestead should lead to a court denial of the homestead ex-
emption and that she should be denied a discharge. 6 7 Marine Midland
also recited a number of acts as evidence of fraudulent intent. The
bankruptcy court gave judgment in favor of Carey and she ended up
with a homestead exemption under Oklahoma law on a $300,000 home
with a $30,000 mortgage. The district court affirmed and Marine Mid-
land appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court rulings. The opinion
65. Id. at 1519 (citing Kokoszka, 417 U.S. 642 (1974)).
66. In re Carey, 938 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1991).
67. Id. at 1075.
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commenced with a quote from an Eighth Circuit opinion stating: "[T]he
conversion of non-exempt to exempt property for the purpose of plac-
ing the property out of reach of creditors, without more, will not deprive
the debtor of the exemption to which he otherwise would be entitled."
'68
Furthermore, Congress had determined that a debtor should be permit-
ted to convert nonexempt property into exempt property before filing a
bankruptcy petition, that the practice was not fraudulent as to creditors,
and that it permits the debtor to make full use of the exemptions to
which it is entitled under the law.
6 9
The appellant wanted the court to deny Carey a discharge in that
the activities complained of constituted fraudulent conveyances. 70 Cit-
ing varying authorities, the court outlined certain fundamental rules
about transfers to hinder, delay or defraud. To deny a discharge under
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2), a court must find actual intent to defraud credi-
tors. The desire to convert assets into exempt forms by itself does not
constitute actual intent to defraud. Extrinsic evidence of fraudulent in-
tent is required, although fraudulent intent to conceal assets may be es-
tablished by circumstantial evidence, or by inferences drawn from a
course of conduct. Judge Logan's opinion noted that the cases are pecu-
liarly fact specific. He indicated that the bankruptcy court had found
that Carey's actions were not fraudulent and concluded that, on the
facts, the Code sections require more evidence than Marine Midland of-
fered. 7 1 The lower court decisions were affirmed.
VI. ADMINISTRATION OF THE CASE
A. Involuntary Petitions
Section 303 of the Bankruptcy Code governs petitions for involun-
tary bankruptcy. Among other provisions therein, creditors are prohib-
ited from indiscriminately filing an involuntary petition against a debtor.
When a bankruptcy court dismisses a petition for involuntary bank-
ruptcy, the debtor may recover costs under certain circumstances. In
the case of a bad faith filing, it may also recover damages from the peti-
tioning creditors. A strangely worded subsection of section 303 caused
unnecessary litigation and a thorny interpretive problem for the Tenth
Circuit in In re Peterson.
68. Id at 1076 (quoting Norwest Bank of Neb., N.A. v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871, 873-74
(8th Cir. 1988)).
69. Id (citing H.R.REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 361 (1977), reprinted in 1978
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 6317; S.Rep. No. 989, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 361
(1977), reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News at 5862).
70. Id See I 1 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2) (1988) which provides, "(a) The court shall grant the
debtor a discharge, unless - ... (2) the debtor, with intent to hinder delay, or defraud a
creditor ... has transferred .... or concealed - (A) property of the debtor within one year
before the date of the filing of the petition ......
71. Id. at 1077.
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1. Conditions for Recovery of Damages for Bad Faith Filings: In
re R. Eric Peterson Const. Co.
In September 1986, Quintek, Inc. (Quintek) petitioned to place R.
Eric Peterson Construction Co. (Peterson) in involuntary bankruptcy
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 303.72 Quintek's counsel sent letters to all of
Peterson's subcontractors informing them of the involuntary petition.
The publicity, along with the filing, allegedly had a disastrous effect on
the financial viability of the company. Peterson opposed the petition,
alleging it had paid its bills on time, that the creditor's claims were sub-
ject to bona fide disputes and that the petition had been filed without
adequate investigation of the company's financial status.
At the hearing on creditors' motion to dismiss the petition, and in
response to the court inquiry into whether Peterson would consent to
the dismissal, Peterson's counsel responded that the debtor:
[w]ould like to indicate a reservation. The debtor does not ob-
ject to the petition being dismissed, but it is the debtor's feel-
ing that this petition was filed in bad faith and it wishes to
assert a claim under 303([i]). And we would like to reserve the
right, if we would go along with the dismissal, subject to reserv-
ing in the Court's jurisdiction [sic] and the right to have the bad
faith claim adjudicated under 303([i]).
73
The court dismissed the petition but retained jurisdiction to determine
the debtor's bad faith filing claim.
Summarizing the rather complicated procedural facts, for the pur-
poses of this Article, the bankruptcy court granted the creditors sum-
mary judgment on debtor's claim of bad faith filing and the District
Court, on its own motion, determined that the debtor's consent to dis-
missal deprived the bankruptcy court of jurisdiction of the debtor's
good faith claim. 74 Thus, the issue in the debtor's appeal to the Tenth
circuit was whether the debtor consented to dismissal even though it
had specifically reserved a claim for the bad faith filing.
Without questioning why the obviously awkwardly worded statute
would so require7 5 , the Tenth Circuit opinion outlined its three require-
ments, namely: (1) dismissal of the petition, (2) something other than
consent of all petitioning creditors and the debtor and (3) non-waiver of
72. In re Eric R. Peterson Const. Co., 951 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1991).
73. Id. at 1177. See also 11 U.S.C. § 303(i) (1988):
(i) If the court dismisses a petition under this section other than on consent
of all petitioners and the debtor, and if the debtor does not waive the right to
judgment under this subsection, the court may grant judgment -
(1) against the petitioners and in favor of the debtor for -
(A) costs; or
(B) a reasonable attorney's fee; or
(2) against any petitioner that filed the petition in bad faith, for -
(A) any damages proximately caused by such filing; or
(B) punitive damages.
Id.
74. 951 F.2d. at 1177-78.
75. See supra note 73.
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the debtor of its right to recover damages for bad faith filing.76 In other
words, the statute requires both non-consent to dismissal and non-waiver
of the debtor's right to damages.
The issue in Peterson turns on whether the debtor consented to dis-
missal of the bankruptcy petition when it did not object to the creditors'
voluntary dismissal of the bankruptcy petition - even though at the
same time it specifically reserved a claim against the creditors under sec-
tion 303(i) for alleged bad faith filing of the bankruptcy petition. The
Tenth Circuit opinion attached a common sense meaning to the word
"consent." It reasoned that the debtor should not be required to ac-
tively oppose dismissal of an involuntary bankruptcy in order to pre-
serve a claim for damages under 303(i) if that petition was wrongfully
brought. 77 The court held that, as a matter of law, Peterson did not
consent to dismissal within the meaning of section 303(i). It reversed
and remanded the case to the district court for consideration of Peter-
son's appeal of the bankruptcy court's summary judgment determina-
tion on the bad faith issue.
78
B. Treatment of Secured Claims
The treatment of secured claims in bankruptcy has become one of
the topics much litigated in the shakedown following the enactment of
the 1978 Bankruptcy Code and the 1984 Amendments. Three Tenth
Circuit cases, two of which have been to the Supreme Court, are in-
cluded in this survey. These cases actually involved the so-called
"Chapter 20" filings. A number of debtors have been filing a straight
bankruptcy under Chapter 7 followed by a rehabilitative case under
Chapter 13. The extent to which a debtor may combine some advan-
tages of each chapter is presently unclear as the cases to be discussed
indicate.
1. "Lien Stripping": In re Dewsnup
The Tenth Circuit, in In re Dewsnup 79, was faced with a difficult in-
terpretive problem involving section 506. The Dewsnups borrowed
money secured by a deed of trust covering farmland. After default, fore-
closure proceedings were interrupted by the pendency of bankruptcy
proceedings. Following an aborted Chapter 11 proceeding, petitioners
sought liquidation under Chapter 7 and attempted to strip the lien
through the use of provisions of section 506. The bankruptcy court de-
termined the value of the land to be $39,000; the debt was over
$100,000.
Often, secured parties in bankruptcy are undersecured. That is, the
value of the collateral is less than the debt. Section 506(a) recognizes
this fact and provides that the creditor is a secured creditor to the extent
76. 951 F.2d at 1179.
77. Id. at 1180.
78. Id. at 1182.
79. In re Dewsnup, 908 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1990).
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of the value of the collateral and an unsecured creditor for the excess
amount of the debt.8 0 However, section 506 further provides in subsec-
tion (d) that, insofar as a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is
not an allowed secured claim, such lien is void.8 1 The Dewsnups argued
that under a literal reading of this language, the lender's lien should be
disallowed except to the extent of the present value of the land which
was $39,000. The effect of this application of the language, in the words
of Mr. Justice Blackmun in the case on appeal, was that "the creditor
would lose the benefit of any increase in the value of the property by the
time of the foreclosure sale."
8 2
After the bankruptcy court denied the petitioner's request and the
district court affirmed, the Tenth Circuit also affirmed. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's decision was based upon the questionable conclusion that because
the trustee would abandon the asset, the estate had no interest in the
asset as abandoned property. Because of a split among circuits on the
lien stripping issue, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and rendered
an opinion on January, 15, 1992.83 Over the dissent of Scalia and Sou-
ter, who would apply the clear language of section 506(d),8 4 the
Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit and remanded. The majority
opinion (Thomas,J., not participating) ruled that inasmuch as the Bank-
ruptcy Code does "embrace some ambiguities," 8 5 the section "does not
allow petitioner to 'strip down' respondents' lien."'8 6 Unfortunately, in
deciding the case on the presumed intent of Congress not to change the
law on this point in the enactment of the 1978 Code, the opinion admit-
ted that the holding is of limited application.8 7 Bankruptcy lawyers
would probably agree with the assumption that Congress did not intend
the strip down effect of section 506(d). Lawyers and jurisprudential
types will probably continue to disagree on whether the dissent's ap-
proach is a desirable one.
80. 11 U.S.C. § 506, Determination of secured status, which states in pertinent part:
(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the
estate has an interest ... is a secured claim to the extent of the value of such
creditor's interest in the estate's interest in such property.., and is an unsecured
claim to the extent that the value of such creditor's interest ... is less than the
amount of such allowed claim.
81. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d).
82. Dewsnup v. Timm, 112 S. Ct. 773, 778 (1992).
83. I; Dewsnup v. Timm, I11 S. Ct. 949 (1991).
84. 11 U.S.C. § 506(d):
(d) To the extent that a lien secures a claim against the debtor that is not an
allowed secured claim, such lien is void, unless-
(1) such claim was disallowed only under section 502(b)(5) or 502(e) of
this title; or
(2) such claim is not an allowed secured claim due only to the failure of
an entity to file a proof of such claim under section 501 of this title.
85. 112 S. Ct. 773, 777.
86. Id at 778.
87. "Hypothetical applications that come to mind and those advanced at oral argu-
ment illustrate the difficulty of interpreting the statute in a single opinion that would apply
to all possible fact situations. We therefore focus upon the case before us and allow other
facts to await their legal resolution on another day. IdL at 778.
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2. "Bifurcation" of Secured Claims: In re Hart
One important provision of 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) 8 8 permits a
Chapter 13 plan to modify a secured claim. The home mortgage indus-
try convinced Congress to make an exception to that rule in their favor8 9
and the present version provides that the plan may modify the rights of
holders of secured claims, other than a claim "secured only by a security
interest in real property that is the debtor's principal residence." 90 A
recent Tenth Circuit case, In re Hart, presented the question of whether
the bifurcation of a claim into a secured claim and an unsecured claim
under section 506(a) was permissible where a mortgage on the debtor's
residence was undersecured.9 1 The Harts attempted a bifurcation in
their Chapter 13 plan where the mortgage secured a $55,000 indebted-
ness and the fair market value of the property was stipulated to be
$30,000. Recognizing the bifurcation of the claim would mean that the
unsecured portion of the claim would not be subject to the section
1322(b) (2) limitation, the creditor objected. The district court reversed
the bankruptcy court's approval of the plan and the Harts appealed to
the Tenth Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the bankruptcy court that the plan
could bifurcate the creditor's claim. The majority opinion (a per curiam
opinion ofJJ. Moore and Tacha, even thoughJ. Brorby dissented) noted
the split of authority among the circuits.9 2 The courts differ basically on
balancing the extent of the protection afforded such creditors by Con-
gress against the effect of the clear use of the terms "secured claim" and
"unsecured claim" in section 1322. The court opinion found nothing in
the language of the section necessitating going beyond the statutory def-
inition of secured claim, "to protect the unsecured portion of an under-
88. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2):
(b) Subject to subsections (a) and (c) of this section, the plan may-
(2) modify the rights of holders of secured claims, other than a claim
secured only by a security interest in real property that is the debtor's princi-
pal residence, or of holders of unsecured claims, or leave unaffected the
rights of holders of any class of daims;
89. See discussion of the legislative history, In re Hart, 923 F.2d 1410, 1412 (10th Cir.
1991).
90. Id. (citing Gruggs v. Houston First Am. Say. Ass'n, 730 F.2d 236)( ).
91. 923 F.2d 1410 (10th Cir. 1991) and 11 U.S.C. § 506(a) which states:
(a) An allowed claim of a creditor secured by a lien on property in which the
estate has an interest, or that is subject to setoffunder section 553 of this title, is a
secured claim to the extent of the value of such creditor's interest in the estate's
interest in such property, or to the extent of the amount subject to setoff, as the
case may be, and is an unsecured claim to the extent that the value of such credi-
tor's interest or the amount so subject to setoff is less than the amount of such
allowed claim. Such value shall be determined in light of the purpose of the valu-
ation and of the proposed disposition or use of such property, and in conjunction
with any hearing on such disposition or use or on a plan affecting such creditor's
interest.
92. See cases cited in In re Hart, 923 F.2d at 1414. According to the opinion, the
Third and Ninth Circuits allow bifurcation while the Fifth, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits
treat it as inappropriate in Chapter 13 proceedings.
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secured home mortgage."' 95  The dissent, without elaboration,
concluded that this approach "renders section 1322(b)(2) essentially
meaningless."
'94
3. Secured Claims in Chapter 13: In reJohnson
One question resulting from a "Chapter 20" bankruptcy was an-
swered by the Supreme Court in a case coming from the Tenth Cir-
cuit. 95 In an attempt to increase the use of Chapter 13 by individual
debtors, section 1322(b)(2) permits a plan for adjustment of debts
under that chapter to modify the rights of holders of secured claims.
9 6
Johnson took steps after Home State Bank started to foreclose a mort-
gage on his farm property. First, he filed for a liquidation under Chap-
ter 7 and as a result of this action, he was discharged from personal
liability on the promissory notes to the bank. The bank still had a right
to proceed in ren against the real estate and re-initiated foreclosure, ob-
taining an in rem judgment. Prior to the foreclosure sale, the petitioner
completed the "Chapter 20" filing by filing under Chapter 13, staying
the foreclosure sale.
In the Chapter 13 proceeding, Johnson listed the bank's mortgage
on the farm as a claim against the estate-and, under the plan, proposed
to pay the bank in four annual installments and a final balloon payment
totalling the amount of the bank's in rem judgment. The bankruptcy
court confirmed the plan over the bank's objection. The bank appealed
to the district court arguing that (1) the debtor could not modify its
mortgage obligations under a Chapter 13 plan where the personal liabil-
ity had already been discharged in a Chapter 7 case, and (2) that the
court erred in finding that the plan was in good faith and feasible. The
district court agreed with the bank on the first point and the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The Tenth Circuit disagreed with two
other circuit courts,9 7 and held that Congress did not intend such a
claim to be treated in a Chapter 13 plan even though the definition of
"claim against the debtor" in 11 U.S.C. § 102(2) "includes claim against
property of the debtor."98 Because of the split between the circuits, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in the Johnson case, 99 and reversed the
Tenth Circuit. 0 0
Justice Marshall delivered the opinion of the unanimous Court. 10 '
After examining the Code's use of the word "claim" throughout the
Code and citing its decisions adopting "the broadest available definition
93. Id at 1415.
94. Id at 1417.
95. In reJohnson, 904 F.2d 563 (10th Cir. 1990).
96. 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2).
97. See In re Saylors, 869 F.2d 1434, 1436 (1Ith Cir. 1989); In re Metz, 820 F.2d 1495,
1498 (9th Cir. 1987).
98. 904 F.2d 563, 565.
99. 111 S. Ct. 781 (1991).
100. Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111 S. Ct. 2150 (1991).
101. The congruence between a "plain meaning" result and a perceived "intent of
Congress" result may be one explanation of the unanimous result.
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of 'claim,'- 102 the court discussed the bank's claim that "[s]erial filings
under Chapter 7 and Chapter 13 . . .evade the limits that Congress
intended to place on these remedies."' 0 3 The opinion disagreed with
this argument, reasoning that Congress had expressly prohibited certain
forms of serial filings and therefore not this one. 10 4 The Court left to a
remand the issue of whether the plan was proposed in "good faith"
under section 1325(a)(3). 10 5 One expected issue to be settled following
this case is the judicial reaction to a claim that a serial filing of Chapter 7
followed by Chapter 13 in a foreclosure setting as was true inJohnson is,
per se, a bad faith plan. 106
VII. TRUSTEE AVOIDANCE POWERS
Inasmuch as a filing of the petition in bankruptcy operates to stay
creditor activity, the bankruptcy trustee is given certain substantive pow-
ers which benefit all of the creditors. The three powers most often liti-
gated are the "strong arm" power under section 544, the power to avoid
certain preferences under section 547 and the power to set aside fraudu-
lent conveyances under section 548. This survey includes one case from
each of these areas. The reader is also reminded that the Carey case,
discussed above under the topic of Debtor's Exempt Property, included
a discussion of pre-petition transfers to improve one's exemptions and
the extent to which such transfers were fraudulent conveyances.
A. The "Strong Arm" Power
The power of the trustee to avoid pre-petition transfers under sec-
tion 544 is often called the "strong arm" power since the power of
avoidance is sometimes exercised even though no actual creditor could
have acted. The following case illustrates the operation of the section in
the context of a real estate transfer.
1. Hypothetical Bona Fide Purchaser: Watkins v. Watkins
The strong arm power of the trustee under section 544(a) is a hypo-
thetical lien creditor power under (a)(1) and (a)(2), and a hypothetical
bona fide purchaser power under (a)(3).10 7 Under the latter subsection,
102. 111 S. Ct. at 2154.
103. Id at 2156.
104. Id
105. 11 U.S.C. § 1325(a): Except as provided in subsection (b), the court shall confirm
a plan if... (3) the plan has been proposed in good faith and not by any means forbidden
by law. See also In re Johnson, 940 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1991).
106. See the opinion in the originalJohnson case in the Tenth Circuit and citation of
cases at 904 F.2d at 565. That opinion seems to treat serial filing and the listing of a
discharged claim as a bad faith plan.
107. 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(a)(1),(2) and (3):
(a) The trustee shall have, as of the commencement of the case, and without
regard to any knowledge of the trustee or of any creditor, the rights and powers
of, or may avoid any transfer of property of the debtor or any obligation incurred
by the debtor that is voidable by-
(1) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the com-
mencement of the case, and that obtains, at such time and with respect to
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applied in Watkins v. Watkins,10 8 the trustee may avoid a pre-bankruptcy
transfer of the debtor's property if such transfer under state law were
ineffective as against a bona fide purchaser "whether or not such a pur-
chaser exists."
10 9
Janet and Gregory Watkins were divorced in Oklahoma in 1986.
One of the assets, owned jointly, was a tract of commercial real property
containing Gregory's office. The divorce decree set aside this asset to
him and also imposed a lien on the property to secure his obligation to
pay alimony. Subsequently, Gregory filed a petition in bankruptcy
which prompted Janet to file a copy of the divorce judgment as a lien in
the county clerk's office. Gregory sought to avoid the lien under section
544(a) (3) on the ground that Janet had not perfected her lien at the time
of the bankruptcy petition. The bankruptcy court invalidated the lien;
the district court affirmed and Janet appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reversed on a determination that under
Oklahoma law, a bona fide purchaser would take subject to the construc-
tive notice provided by the divorce judgment.' 10 That judgment, which
was the source of the ex-husband's sole title, also contained the limita-
tion of that title, the ex-wife's lien.
B. Fraudulent Conveyances
1. Fraudulent Conveyances: In re Kaiser Steel Corp.
An interesting question involving the trustee power to recover
property which was arguably the subject of a fraudulent conveyance was
finessed in In re Kaiser Steel Corp.,II' when the court applied another sec-
tion of the Bankruptcy Code. Kaiser Steel Corporation was the subject
of a leveraged buyout ("LBO") in which its former shareholders were
the recipients of cash and new shares. Sometime after the LBO, the new
entity, Kaiser Steel Resources, Inc., went into Chapter 11 proceedings
and promptly attempted to recover as fraudulent conveyances the pay-
ments made as a result of the LBO. Various defendants made the argu-
ment that the payments were "settlements" under section 546(e)11 2 and
such credit, a judicial lien on all property on which a creditor on a simple
contract could have obtained such ajudicial lien, whether or not such a credi-
tor exists;
(2) a creditor that extends credit to the debtor at the time of the com-
mencement of the case, and obtains, at such time and with respect to such
credit, an execution against the debtor that is returned unsatisfied at such
time, whether or not such a creditor exists; or
(3) a bona fide purchaser of real property, other than fixtures, from the
debtor, against whom applicable law permits such transfer to be perfected,
that obtains the status of a bona fide purchaser and has perfected such trans-
fer at the time of the commencement of the case, whether or not such a pur-
chaser exists.
108. 922 F.2d 1513 (10th Cir. 1991).
109. 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3).
110. 922 F.2d at 1514-15.
111. 952 F.2d 1230 (10th Cir. 1991).
112. 11 U.S.c. § 546(e):
(e) Notwithstanding sections 544, 545, 547, 548(a) (2), and 548(b) of this ti-
de, the trustee may not avoid a transfer that is a margin payment, as defined in
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non-recoverable. In an earlier appeal,1 13 the court held that payments
to financial intermediaries were protected by the "settlement" excep-
tion. Thus, Kaiser involved only the issue of whether the Schwab holding
should be extended to protect payments made to the shareholders. Sec-
tion 546(e) exempts from the trustee's avoiding powers "a transfer that
is a margin payment .... or settlement payment, as defined in section
741(8) of this title, made by or to a commodity broker, forward contract
merchant, stockbroker, financial institution, or securities clearing agency
...." "Settlement payment" is defined in section 741(8) as: "a prelimi-
nary settlement payment, a partial settlement payment, an interim settle-
ment payment, a settlement payment on account, a final settlement
payment, or any other similar payment commonly used in the securities
trade .... "1114
The debtor-in-possession naturally argued that these definitions
only protected intermediaries in the process of using brokers, margin
accounts and other organizations in the securities market. The defend-
ant shareholder and the Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC")
115
argued for an all-inclusive protection of the securities markets including
shareholders. The latter argument was accepted by the Tenth Circuit
116
and unless the Supreme Court settles the question otherwise, the fasci-
nating law of LBO's as fraudulent conveyances must await another
forum.
C. Voidable Preferences
Certain transfers of property of the debtor to creditors made within
an arbitrary period of time, ninety days for most purposes, are avoidable
by the trustee under 11 U.S.C. § 547. The purpose of avoiding these
preferences (which are neither generally nor necessarily fraudulent con-
veyances or otherwise bad under state law) is at least twofold. One ac-
cepted purpose is to increase the amount of pro rata sharing that takes
place in the bankruptcy process and another is to inhibit creditors from
participating in a rush to the courthouse door which might unnecessarily
force a debtor into failure.
section 101(34), 741(5), or 761(15) of this title, or settlement payment, as defined
in section 101(35) or 741(8) of this title, made by or to a commodity broker,
forward contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution or securities clearing
agency, that is made before the commencement of the case, except under section
548(a)(1) of this title.
113. Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Charles Schwab & Co., 913 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1990).
114. 11 U.S.C. § 741(8) (1988).
115. One may wonder why the SEC would assist the shareholders in so interpreting the
definition of "settlement payment" so as to preempt a determination of whether certain
LBO's might not be fraudulent conveyances. An examination of the SEC's brief in the
instant case sheds some light on the matter. Much of the brief argues that there is no
reason in the language of the statute to exclude payments by brokers to shareholders.
Discussing policy concerns, the brief states: "Investor confidence (in the securities market)
would be undermined if investors could be forced to give up payments received years
earlier in settled transactions." SEC brief at p. 17.
116. 952 F.2d at 1241.
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1. Time of Transfer in Payment by Check: In re Antweil
Much of the complexity of voidable preference law under section
547 involves an interaction of state and federal law. A recent decision of
the Tenth Circuit, now under review by the Supreme Court, is an illus-
tration of this complexity.
The issue in In re Antweil, 117 can be simply put. In the case of pay-
ment of a debt by a check, does a transfer under section 547 occur when
the check is delivered or when the check is honored by the drawee bank?
Obviously, the beginning of the 90 day period is unknown at the time it
occurs. One cannot predict the timing of a future filing of a petition.
However, after the event it becomes important to identify whether a
debt paid by check is paid when the check is delivered to the creditor or
when it is paid by the drawee bank.
In the Antweil case, debtors delivered a check on the 91st day prior
to bankruptcy and it was honored by the drawee bank within the 90 day
period. If the transfer of property of the debtor occurred when the
check was delivered, there was no preference within the suspect period.
In reversing the district court's holding that the transfer occurred upon
delivery, the Tenth Circuit joined the Seventh and Eleventh Circuits 18
in ruling that the transfer did not occur until the check was honored or
paid by the drawee bank and therefore a transfer occurred within the
ninety day period. 1 19 The Supreme Court granted review120 and re-
cently affirmed the Tenth Circuit holding.121
2. Payments Made in the Ordinary Course of Business: Union
Bank v. Wolas (Supreme Court)
A 1991 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court is noted in this Survey
because of its significance to certain Tenth Circuit cases discussed
herein. 1
2 2
The 1978 Bankruptcy Code included an extensive rewrite of the law
of preferences. Section 547(c)123 includes a number of transactions
which are not avoidable by the trustee even though otherwise they
would meet the definition of preference set forth in section 547(c).
Congress recognized that certain payments made by a debtor in the
usual course of business were definitionally preferences, such as
monthly payments for utility services, rent, etc. Hence, section
547(c)(2) provides that the trustee may not avoid a transfer:
(2) to the extent that such transfer was-
(A) in payment of a debt incurred by the debtor in the ordinary
117. 931 F.2d 689 (10th Cir. 1991).
118. According to the court's opinion, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held other-
wise. See cites in 931 F.2d at 695.
119. 931 F.2d at 695.
120. Barnhill v.Johnson, 112 S. Ct. 48 (1991).
121. Barnhill v.Johnson, No. 91-159, 1991 U.S. LEXIS 1955 (U.S. Mar. 25, 1992).
122. Union Bank v. Wolas, 112 S. Ct. 527 (1991).
123. See supra note 11.
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course of business or financial affairs of the debtor and the
transferee;
(B) made not later than 45 days after such debt was incurred;
(C) made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs
of the debtor and the transferee; and
(D) made according to ordinary business terms.
In the 1984 amendments, Congress repealed the 45 day limitation with-
out otherwise changing the subsection.' 24 The effect of this latter
amendment was an issue in Union Bank v. Wolas. 12
5
ZZZZ Best Co. borrowed seven million dollars from Union Bank
and, during the ninety day period before ZZZZ Best filed for bankruptcy,
it made two interest payments to the bank. The bankruptcy court deter-
mined that such payments came within the ordinary course of business
exception and the district court affirmed. The Ninth Circuit reversed on
the basis of policies underlying the Code and the Supreme Court
granted certiorari 12 6 to resolve a split on the issue with the Sixth
Circuit. 1
2 7
Wolas, the trustee, argued that the exception did not apply to pay-
ments made by the debtor on long term debt. Applying a plain meaning
of the words approach to the statute as amended, Justice Stevens' opin-
ion (Justice Scalia, concurring) held that there was no reason to find
such a limitation to the exception. The Ninth Circuit decision was
reversed. 1
2 8
The importance of the decision in the Wolas case can only be as-
sessed by subsequent cases. Many routine preference questions will
need to be reexamined in the light of this case. For example, the pay-
ments made to depositors in the Republic Bank case, discussed above,
12 9
were assumed to be voidable preferences. After Wolas, transferees will
argue that such payments were made in the "ordinary course of busi-
ness" of the debtor. A cynical reader of the Wolas decision might feel
that much of the voidable preference power of the trustee disappeared
in the process.
VIII. DISCHARGE
One of the purposes and policies of the Federal Bankruptcy Code is
to afford the debtor a "fresh start." Many debtors file for bankruptcy
with the purpose of obtaining a discharge from pre-bankruptcy obliga-
tions. One continuing debate with respect to bankruptcy law issues is
the extent to which the discharge feature is abused. Section 523 of the
Code provides a number of bases for excepting certain debts from dis-
charge and section 727 outlines certain acts which will constitute
124. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-353,
§ 462(c), 98 Stat. 333, 378.
125. 60 U.S.L.W. 4043, 4044-45 (U.S. Dec. 10, 1991).
126. Union Bank v. Wolas, 111 5. Ct. 2009 (1991).
127. In re Finn, 909 F.2d 903 (6th Cir. 1990).
128. 60 U.S.L.W. at 4046.
129. See supra note 7.
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grounds for denying a discharge altogether. Several Tenth Circuit cases
involve this important topic of the discharge.
A. Collateral Estoppel and Burden of Proof. In re Tsamasfyros
In Brown v. Felsen,i30 the Supreme Court considered the extent to
which a non-bankruptcy court determination of facts, constituting
grounds for non-dischargeability of a debt in bankruptcy, could be used
in bankruptcy proceedings. The actual case involved a possible issue of
res judicata, but in a footnote, the opinion indicated that similar results
might follow from application of the principle of collateral estoppel. 131
The Tenth Circuit applied this footnote dicta in In re Tsamasfyros. 1
3 2
The bankrupt had been sued in state court and that court, after a four-
day trial, entered judgment for the plaintiff in the sum of over $150,000.
In a written order, the judge held that the bankrupt's "actions in breach-
ing his fiduciary duties were attended by circumstances of fraud and by a
wanton or reckless disregard of [plaintiff's] rights and feelings."'
8 3
Within a month after this judgment, Tsamasfyros filed a petition in
bankruptcy and the successful plaintiff filed a complaint to determine
the dischargeability. The bankruptcy judge's order of non-dis-
chargeability under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A),' 3 4 using the state court
finding, was upheld by the district court and appealed to the Tenth
Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit's affirmance of the decisions outlined a few mat-
ters of importance in applying the collateral estoppel rule. The appel-
lant's argument that a state court determination of fraud would not
equate with a bankruptcy determination because of a different standard
of proof became unmaintainable given the nearly contemporaneous de-
cision of the Supreme Court in Grogan v. Garner.'3 5 In that case, it'was
held that a "preponderance of the evidence" rather than a "clear and
convincing evidence" standard applies to all exceptions to dis-
chargeability of debts set forth in 11 U.S.C. § 523.136 The Tenth Circuit
also held that the fact that Tsamasfyros appeared pro se in the state court
proceedings on the facts, did not render collateral estoppel
irrelevant.13
7
130. 442 U.S. 127 (1979).
131. ld at 139, n.10.
132. 940 F.2d 605 (10th Cir. 1991).
133. Id. at 605.
134. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(2)(A):
(a) A discharge under section 727, 1141, 1228(a), 1228(b),or 1328(b) of this
title does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt-
(2) for money, property, services, or an extension, renewal, or refinanc-
ing of credit, to the extent obtained by-
(A) false pretenses, a false representation, or actual fraud, other
than a statement respecting the debtor's or an insider's financial
condition;
135. 111 S. Ct. 654 (1991).
136. Id at 659.
137. 940 F.2d at 607.
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B. Section 727 and Burden of Proof. In re Serafini
As just indicated, the Supreme Court decision in Grogan v. Garner
involved a ground for denial of dischargeability under section 523. An-
other 1991 Tenth Circuit case applied the reasoning of Grogan to a sec-
tion 727 case. In re Serafini13 8 began as an adversary proceeding
brought by a creditor to deny a Chapter 7 debtor of the discharge based
upon his alleged fraudulent transfer, removal, destruction, mutilation or
concealment of assets under 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2).13 9 The bankruptcy
court dismissed the complaint and the district court affirmed on the
grounds that the creditor had not met its burden of proof by the requi-
site clear and convincing evidence. 140 Subsequent to the date of the
judgment of the district court, the Supreme Court decided the Grogan
case, supra. The Tenth Circuit, McWilliams, J., held that even though
that case was a section 523 case, the same logic applied to denial of
discharge under section 727.141
One can speculate as to the general acceptability of Serafini's exten-
sion of Grogan to section 727 by analogy. The opinion by justice Stevens
in the Grogan case discussed the fact that the grounds for precluding
application of the discharge to certain debts under section 523 were re-
lated to state created causes of action which might have a different bur-
den of proof. In cases involving possible application of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel, the opinion noted, reduction of litigation would fol-
low from the same standard for burden of proof. This consideration
seems to have much less weight or relevance in the context of the
grounds from the denial of a discharge set out in section 727. This re-
viewer predicts that a split will develop among the circuits on this issue.
C. "Dischargeability of Taxes and Penalties: In re Bergstrom
Bankrupt failed to file income tax returns for certain pre-petition
tax years and following bankruptcy proceedings the IRS served delin-
quency notices on Bergstrom. 14 2 Debtor filed a motion to reopen the
case to determine the dischargeability of the tax liability and the bank-
ruptcy court denied the motion. A hearing was held in the district court
which affirmed the bankruptcy court. In the Tenth Circuit, Bergstrom
contended that, since the tax liability was determined through "substi-
138. 938 F.2d 1156 (10th Cir. 1991).
139. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(2):
(a) The court shall grant the debtor a discharge, unless-
(2) the debtor, with intent to hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor or an
officer of the estate charged with custody of property under this title, has
transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed, or has permitted
to be transferred, removed, destroyed, mutilated, or concealed-
(A) property of the debtor, within one year before the date of the
filing of the petition; or
(B) property of the estate, after the date of the filing of the petition;
140. 938 F.2d at 1156.
141. Id. at 1157.
142. In re Bergstrom, 949 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1991).
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tute filings" made by the commissioner, and since such filings were
"prima facie good and sufficient for all legal purposes" according to 26
U.S.C. § 6020(b)(2), such liabilities did not come within the exception
from discharge provided in 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B). 14 3 The Tenth Cir-
cuit (Barrett, Senior Circuit Judge) had no problem holding that a sub-
stitute form for the purpose of the Internal Revenue Code was not a
filed form for the purposes of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code.
144
D. Protection of the Discharge: In re Walker
While In re Walker,14 5 involved little new law, the application of ex-
isting principles is instructive. The Higleys filed suit against real estate
agent Ralph Walker and others in Utah state court for Walker's alleged
deceptive appropriation of funds from the Higleys during a consumer
real estate transaction. The proceeding was halted temporarily when
Walker filed a Chapter 11 petition in bankruptcy court in Utah, but re-
sumed when that petition was dismissed. Walker did not attend the re-
sumed proceedings because he intended to refile for bankruptcy.
Formal entry of judgment for the Higleys did not occur until after
Walker's Chapter 7 petition was filed. Walker received a discharge.
After learning that Walker had declared bankruptcy, the Higleys pe-
titioned the state district court for an order directing payment of their
judgment out of Utah's Real Estate Recovery Fund (Fund), a monetary
fund established by the State of Utah to satisfy judgments against real
estate licensees in actions based on fraud, misrepresentation or deceit
committed in real estate transactions. The state district court granted
the Higleys' petition and the State of Utah complied with the court's
order by paying the Higleys. Subsequently, Walker filed a motion in
Utah state court to vacate the judgment against him, alleging that the
judgment was void because it was entered after the section 362(a) auto-
matic stay had gone into effect. On November 16, 1987, Walker filed an
adversary proceeding against the Higleys and their attorney, claiming
violation of the Bankruptcy Code's automatic stay provisions and seek-
ing damages under 11 U.S.C. § 362(h).14 6
Meanwhile, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that the state court judg-
ment was void, having been entered after the filing of the petition in
bankruptcy, and the judgment was vacated. 147 Thereupon, the Utah At-
torney General requested that the state court order the Higleys to repay
143. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B), which reads in pertinent part:
(a) A discharge under section 727 ... does not discharge an individual debtor
from any debt -
(1) for a tax...
(B) with respect to which a return, if required-
(i) was not filed ....
144. Id. at 343.
145. 927 F.2d 1138 (10th Cir. 1991).
146. 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) states: An individual injured by any willful violation of a stay
provided by this section shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorney's fees,
and, in appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages.
147. 927 F.2d at 1141.
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the Fund the sum previously paid to them in satisfaction of the now-void
judgment. The Higleys responded to the recovery efforts of the Utah
Attorney General by filing various motions in the bankruptcy court in-
tended to confirm their right to the monies received from the Fund.
The bankruptcy court denied each of these motions.148 The Higleys ap-
pealed the bankruptcy court denials of their motions for relief from the
post-discharge injunction or for an extension of time in which to deter-
mine the dischargeability of their claim against Walker. The district
court affirmed the bankruptcy court' 4 9 and the Higleys appealed to the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The Tenth Circuit decision is of interest in this survey because of
the court's discussion of the effect and purposes of the post-discharge
injunction provided by 11 U.S.C. § 524 (a) (2). 150 The injunction pre-
vents the commencement or continuation of an action, the employment
of a process, or an act, to collect, recover or offset any such debt as a
personal liability of the debtor, whether or not discharge of such debt is
waived. The intent of this post-discharge injunction is to protect debt-
ors like Walker in their financial fresh start following discharge.
The court (Judge Logan) indicated that section 524 further pro-
vides that discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of
any other entity on, or the property of any other entity, for such debt. 15 1
This latter provision permits a creditor to bring or continue an action
directly against the debtor for the purpose of establishing the debtor's
liability when, as here, establishment of that liability is a prerequisite to
recovery from another entity. Since, in this case, the Higleys sought to
continue their state court action against Walker for the sole purpose of
confirming their right to the Fund monies previously paid to them, the
Court of Appeals found no basis for the lower courts' determination that
the Higleys' efforts to renew this action threatened Walker's financial
fresh start. 152
The court found no reason to reverse the denial of the Higleys' mo-
tion for an extension of time in which to challenge the dischargeability
of their claim against Walker. A complaint against discharge of a credi-
tor's claim must be filed within 60 days after the first meeting of credi-
tors,' 5 3 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) and Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c).15 4 In this case
148. ld
149. Id
150. 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2):
(a) A discharge in a case under this title-
(2) operates as an injunction against the commencement or continua-
tion of an action, the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover or
offset any such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not dis-
charge of such a debt is waived;
151. 927 F.2d at 1142. 11 U.S.C. § 524(e) states: Except as provided in subsection
(a)(3) of this section, discharge of a debt of the debtor does not affect the liability of any
other entity on, or the property of any other entity for, such debt.
152. 927 F.2d at 1143.
153. Id at 1144.
154. 11 U.S.C. § 523(c) states:
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the Higleys had actual knowledge of the bankruptcy case in time to
proceed.
IX. CONCLUSION
A number of comments follow from a study of the Tenth Circuit's
busy year with bankruptcy cases. The structure of the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code is complex. Congress was reacting to many policy issues in the
process of reforming bankruptcy law and many policy issues were in-
completely resolved, arguably, even in the 1984 Amendments. This ob-
server predicts a continued flow of cases to the Tenth Circuit asking for
clarification of these issues. There does not appear to be any discernible
"trend" in the Tenth Circuit cases.
The Tenth Circuit tends not to be a pro-debtor bankruptcy court,
but there are really no simple answers to many of these issues. There
will continue to be splits in the circuits. One might also predict continu-
ing Supreme Court activity to resolve such splits. It is unlikely that Con-
gress will act soon to simplify the judicial task of applying this mammoth
statute. A final comment - history repeats itself in the sense that the
prior Bankruptcy Act required constant judicial interpretation and one
can expect the same for the current 1978 Bankruptcy Code.
Neil 0. Littlefield,
Steve Hall*
(c) Except as provided in subsection (a)(3)(B) of this section, the debtor shall
be discharged from a debt of a kind specified in paragraph (2), (4), or (6) of sub-
section (a) of this section, unless, on request of the creditor to whom such debt is
owed, and after notice and a hearing, the court determines such debt to be ex-
cepted from discharge under paragraph (2), (4), or (6), as the case may be, of
subsection (a) of this section.
Bankruptcy Rule 4007(c), 11 U.S.C. § states:
(c) Time for Filing Complaint Under § 523(c) in Chapter 7 Liquidation,
Chapter 11 Reorganization, and Chapter 12 Family Farmer's Debt Adjustment
Cases; Notice of Time Fixed.
A complaint to determine the dischargeability of any debt pursuant to
§ 523(c) of the Code shall be filed not later than 60 days following the first date
set for the meeting of creditors held pursuant to § 341(a). The court shall give all
creditors not less than 30 days notice of the time so fixed in the manner provided
in Rule 2002. On motion of any party in interest, after hearing on notice, the
court may for cause extend the time fixed under this subdivision. The motion
shall be made before the time has expired.
* Neil 0. Littlefield, B.S., LL.B., LL.M., SJ.D., is Professor of Law at University of





In 1991, the Tenth Circuit handed down over 90 cases involving
civil procedure. While many of these cases involved routine application
of precedent in well-settled areas of the law, two areas emerged in which
the court redefined or altered existing procedural law. First, the Tenth
Circuit developed new rules concerning the applicability of sanctions
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11, in light of recent Supreme
Court decisions in this area. Second, the Tenth Circuit continued its
trend of allowing district courts increased discretion when disposing of
lawsuits brought by prison inmates pro se.
I. RULE 11 SANCTIONS
A. Introduction
Rule 11, originally promulgated in 1938, consolidated a number of
pleading practices from English procedure', the former Federal Equity
Rules2 , and existing state sanctioning practices. 3 The original Rule 11
simply required an attorney to have a subjective, good-faith belief that a
signed document contained a sound factual and legal basis.4 The rule
allowed a court, at its own discretion, to impose an appropriate sanc-
tion.5 However, by the 1980's, studies indicated that Rule 11 was se-
verely under-utilized; courts were reluctant to impose and parties
reluctant to request the imposition of Rule 11 sanctions.6
In response to the considerable confusion surrounding the circum-
stances under which sanctions should be imposed and the standard of
attorney conduct required, the committee significantly amended Rule 11
in 1983. 7 The new language8 of the rule was intended to "reduce the
1. See English Rules Under the Judicature Act, 1935,0. 19, r. 4, and Great Australian
Gold Mining Co. v. Martin, 5 ch. div. 1, 10. (L.R. 1877).
2. See Federal Equity Rules 21 and 24. The Federal Equity Rules of 1912 may be
found at Sup. Ct. R. 21, 24, 226 U.S. 654-55 (1912).
3. CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 36 (2d. ed. 1947). For a detailed history of Rule 11, see
5A CHARLES WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1331 (2d
ed. 1990).
4. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (1938).
5. Id.
6. Mansfield, Compliance with the 1983 Changes in Rules of Civil Procedure, 190 N.Y.LJ. 1,
5 (1983).
7. See Report of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, 97 F.R.D. 165, 198-99
(1983) reprinted (hereinafter Report). See also RHODES, RIPPLE & MOONEY, SANCTIONS IM-
POSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 64-65 (1981). Note
that Rule I 1 was also amended in 1987 but only to remove gender-biased language. The
substance of the 1983 amendment was not altered.
8. Rule 11, as amended in 1983, provides in relevant part:
The signature of an attorney or a party constitutes a certificate by the signer that
the signer has read the pleading, motion, or other paper; that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith argument
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reluctance of courts to impose sanctions... by emphasizing the respon-
sibilities of the attorney and reenforcing those obligations by the impo-
sition of sanctions."9 Unfortunately, the 1983 amendment did little to
reduce this confusion, as over a thousand judicial opinions concerning
the propriety of Rule 11 sanctions have been handed down since
1983.10 The amount of Rule 11 related litigation is ironic, considering
the Advisory Committee's statement that the 1983 amendment was in-
tended to "streamline the litigation process."' I There is considerable,
continuing debate in the legal and academic communities as to the effec-
tiveness of the rule as it now reads.'
2
In the past two years, the United States Supreme Court handed
down several significant decisions discussing and refining the scope of
and standard of review applicable to Rule 11 sanctions. In Cooter & Gell
v. Hartmarx Corp.,13 the Court held a plaintiff who voluntarily dismisses
an action pursuant to Rule 41(a)(1)(i) 14 may still be subject to sanc-
tions.' 5 The Court announced that the circuit courts of appeal must
apply an abuse-of-discretion standard when reviewing a district court's
imposition of sanctions. 16 In order to effectuate the goals of streamlin-
ing the litigation process, the district courts on the "frontlines of litiga-
tion" must be afforded tremendous deference to determine what
conduct violates Rule 11. 17 In Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communi-
cations Enterprises, Inc.,18 the Court held an objective standard of reasona-
bleness applies to the inquiry conducted by represented parties, as well
as attorneys, who sign papers.' 9 The scope of Rule 11 sanctions was
defined as applying to any paper filed or offered to the court as truthful,
for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and that it is not inter-
posed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay
or needless increase in the cost of litigation .... If a pleading, motion, or other
paper is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own
initiative, shall impose upon the person who signed it, a represented party, or
both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other
party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred... including a
reasonable attorney's fee.
FED. R. Cr. P. 11.
9. Report, 97 F.R.D. at 198-99.
10. Call for Comments, Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedures of the Judi-
cial Conference of the United States, 131 F.R.D. 335, 344 (1990) (hereinafter Call for
Comments).
11. Report, 97 F.R.D. at 165.
12. See e.g., Melinda G. Baum, The Seven Year Itch: Is It Time to Reamend Rule 11? 40
WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 227 (1991). For a bibliography of current articles and
comments on the post-1983 Rule 11, see Call for Comments, 131 F.R.D. at 350-51.
13. 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990).
14. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(i).
15. Cooter & Cell, 110 S. Ct. at 2457.
16. Id. at 2460.
17. Id. For a thorough discussion of this case, see Martin B. Bailey, Note, Recent Devel-
opment Federal Civil Procedure - Rule 11 - Rule 41(a) Voluntary Dismissal Does Not Bar Sanc-
tions, Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 110 S. Ct. 2447 (1990), 58 TENN. L. REv. 313
(1991).
18. 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
19. Id. at 930. For a thorough discussion of Business Guides, see Jennifer M. Moore,
Note, Sanctioning Clients Under Rule 11: Business Guides Inc. v. Chromatic Communications
Enterprises, Inc., 14 HARV.J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 913 (1991).
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including affidavits signed by parties.2
0
This past year, the Tenth Circuit considered a number of Rule 11
appeals under the Supreme Court's recent decisions. Unfortunately,
these recent Tenth Circuit decisions do little to ease the uncertainty sur-
rounding the applicability of Rule 11, and instead reflect the confused
state of Rule 11 law both in other circuits and at the Supreme Court
level. 2 1 In Dodd Insurance Services v. Royal Insurance Co.,22 the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that Rule 11 sanctions are appropriate in cases in which plead-
ings contain both frivolous and non-frivolous claims. 23 However, the
court indicated exceptions to this holding that make it unclear exactly
when a complaint containing both non-frivolous and frivolous claims
should be sanctioned. 2 4 Second, in Eisenberg v. University of New Mexico,
2 5
the court held that Federal Rule of Evidence 408 does not exclude from
Rule 11 sanctions an affidavit submitted during a settlement confer-
ence.2 6 The scope of amended Rule 11 includes any paper offered by a
litigant.2 7 Third, the Tenth Circuit upheld a district court's refitsal to
impose Rule 11 sanctions in Hughes v. City of Fort Collins,28 applying the
deferential review standard required by Cooter & Cell. However, the
court indicated that it was not pleased by the district court's refusal to
impose sanctions and indicated that the plaintiff's good-faith argument
for the extension of existing law was about as tenuous as will be toler-
ated.29 Finally, the somewhat related case of In re Byrd, Inc.30 held that
Rule 11 standards and case law apply in reviewing a district court's im-
position of sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g).
B. The Cases
1. Dodd Insurance Services v. Royal Insurance Co.
Plaintiff insurance agency (Dodd) sued an insurer (Royal) after
Royal attempted to terminate an agency-company sales agreement.
Dodd alleged ten claims, and Royal moved for summary judgment on
seven of them. The district court adopted a federal magistrate recom-
mended summary judgment on eight of the plaintiff's claims and im-
posed Rule 11 sanctions based on three of the ten claims. The three
claims adjudged frivolous were defamation, breach of fiduciary duty,
and negligence. The court granted Royal thirty percent of its litigation
20. 111 S. Ct. at 928.
21. See SAUL KASSIN, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RULE I1 SANCTIONS (1985); Charles M.
Shaffer, Jr., Rule 11: Bright Light, Dim Future, in SANcToNs: RULE 11 AND OTHER POWERS 1
(Charles M. Shaffer, Jr. & Paul M. Sandier eds. 1988).
22. 935 F.2d 1152 (10th Cir. 1991).
23. Id. at 1158.
24. Id.
25. 936 F.2d 1131 (10th Cir. 1991).
26. Id. at 1134.
27. Id. at 1133.
28. 926 F.2d 986 (10th Cir. 1991).
29. Id. at 990.
30. 927 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1991).
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costs, based on its finding that three claims out of ten were frivolous.3 '
Dodd appealed on three grounds: (1) the three claims were not suffi-
ciently meritless to be considered frivolous for Rule 11 sanction pur-
poses; (2) a complaint that contains both frivolous and non-frivolous
claims does not violate Rule 11; and (3) the court erred in applying a
mathematical percentage approach in determining the amount of sanc-
tions imposed when some claims are frivolous and some are not.
The Tenth Circuit applied the Supreme Court mandated abuse of
discretion review standard of Cooter & Cell v. Hartmarx Corp.,3 2 upholding
the district court's determination that the claims were sufficiently merit-
less. The most important issue was whether pleadings containing both
valid and frivolous claims can violate rule 11. In this regard, the circuits
are split. The Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits hold that sanctions
are improper where most of the claims within the complaint are valid.
3 3
The court declined to follow this view and instead followed the view of
the Second and Eleventh Circuits, that a pleading containing a single
frivolous claim can violate Rule 11.34 The court noted that the Supreme
Court, in Cooter & Gell, had admonished the circuits to apply extreme
deference to a district court's conclusions regarding Rule 11 sanctions.
In holding that a single frivolous claim could lead to Rule 11 sanctions,
the Tenth Circuit reasoned that a contrary conclusion would allow a liti-
gant with one or more competent claims to include in his complaint one
or more highly advantageous, yet wholly frivolous, claims, because that
party can be confident that the presence of the meritorious claims will
shield him from sanctions.3 5 The court noted in dictum that, although
the presence of a single frivolous claim may not require Rule 11 sanc-
tions, here the fact that only three of the plaintiff's ten claims survived
summary judgment strongly suggested that sanctions were in order.
The Tenth Circuit attempted to give guidance to the district courts
as to which complaints containing both nonfrivolous and frivolous
claims deserve sanctions. The court compared Burull v. First National
Bank of Minneapolis3 6 and Oliveri v. Thompson,3 7 cases in which the pres-
ence of a single frivolous claim did not warrant sanctions, with Patterson
v. Aiken 38 in which the Eleventh Circuit approved of sanctions for a sin-
31. Dodd Ins. Services, Inc. v. Royal Ins. Co. of America, 935 F.2d 1152, 1159 n.5 (10th Cir.
1991).
32. 110 S.Ct. 2447 (1990).
33. See FDIC v. Tefken Constr. and Install. Co., 847 F.2d 440, 444 n.6 (7th Cir. 1988)
(fact that one argument in an otherwise valid paper is not meritorious does not warrant
Rule 11 sanctions); Burull v. First Nat'l Bank of Minneapolis, 831 F.2d 788 (8th Cir. 1987),
cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988); Golden Eagle Distrib. Corp. v. Burroughs Corp., 801 F.2d
1531 (9th Cir. 1986); but see Frantz v. United States Powerlifting Fed'n., 836 F.2d 1063 (7th
Cir. 1987) (Rule 11 applies to all statements in papers it covers, each must have sufficient
support and be investigated and researched before filing).
34. Dodd, 935 F.2d at 1158 (citing Cross & Cross Properties v. Everett Allied Co., 886
F.2d 497 (2d Cir. 1989); Patterson v. Aiken, 841 F.2d 386 (11th Cir. 1988)).
35. Dodd, 935 F.2d at 1158 (quoting Cross & Cross Properties v. Everett Allied Co.,
886 F.2d 497, 505 (2d Cir. 1989)).
36. 831 F.2d 788, 790 (8th Cir. 1987) cert. denied, 485 U.S. 961 (1988).
37. 803 F.2d 1265, 1280 (2d Cir. 1986).
38. 841 F.2d 386, 387 (11th Cir. 1988).
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gle frivolous claim.39 The Burull and Oliveri decisions affirmed a refusal
of sanctions where the frivolous claim had little or no appreciable effect
on litigation and the legal argument was not taken seriously by the op-
posing parties.40 Conversely, in Patterson, where the effect and cost of
defending against the single violative claim could be separately proven,
sanctions were in order.
4 1
The court's comparison of these two lines of cases suggests an eco-
nomic approach to the applicability of sanctions. The implication is that
when the costs legitimately incurred in defense of a frivolous claim are
separable from those incurred defending valid claims, sanctions seem to
be in order. However, if the claim is so frivolous that a reasonable per-
son would not have been concerned with defending against it or would
have incurred minimal cost in doing so, then sanctions may not be in
order.
However, in Dodd, the court's decision regarding sanctions is not
consistent with this economic approach. In Dodd, Royal was unable to
separate the costs of defending against the three frivolous claims. The
district court noted that the Supreme Court, in Hensley v. Eckerhart4 2 ex-
pressly rejected the percentage approach, and ordered Royal to resub-
mit its claim, detailing the actual hours spent on defense of the three
frivolous claims.4 3 Royal responded it could not segregate the attor-
ney's fees and costs relating to the three claims, but the previously sub-
mitted figure of $39,050.88 was a "reasonable estimate."
'44
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit held the district court erred in impos-
ing sanctions that reflected a percentage of total costs based on the per-
centage of frivolous claims in the complaint. It reasoned that since the
purpose of Rule 11 sanctions is to deter future frivolous claims, the
amount of the sanction should not be determined mechanically.4 5 The
court agreed sanctions were in order, however the case was remanded
for a determination of the correct amount of sanctions.
Under the court's economic analysis approach to the imposition of
sanctions where the complaint contains both frivolous and non-frivolous
claims, sanctions should not be imposed in this case because Royal was
unable to separate its litigation costs incurred solely as a result of de-
fending against the three frivolous claims. Clouding the issue further,
the court relied on the magnitude of sanctions in this case as an indica-
tion the district court concluded that the three claims substantially bur-
dened Royal.4 6 Yet the court failed to notice the district court, in
39. Dodd, 935 F.2d at 1158.
40. See Burull, 831 F.2d at 790; Oliveri, 803 F.2d at 1280.
41. 841 F.2d at 387.
42. 461 U.S. 424, 435 n.11 (1983).
43. Dodd, 935 F.2d at 1159 n.5.
44. Id.
45. Dodd, 935 F.2d at 1159 (citing White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 684-
685 (10th Cir. 1990)).
46. Dodd, 935 F.2d at 1159-60.
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determining the amount of the sanctions, merely relied on Royal's esti-
mate of the costs of defending the frivolous claims.
This holding does little to clear up the confusion surrounding Rule
11 sanctions. While it indicates Rule 11 sanctions are proper if eco-
nomic loss results from even one claim in an otherwise valid complaint,
the facts of this case indicate sanctions may be imposed even where it is
impossible to separate the costs of the one claim. Further, this holding
will not discourage some frivolous litigation, in that claims that the court
finds so baseless that no reasonable attorney would have spent any time
or money defending them may not warrant sanctions. Only those claims
causing the opposing party to incur some costs will be sanctioned. This
may lead to the ironic result that utterly baseless claims run less risk of
sanctions than do those with a less tenuous legal or factual basis.
2. Eisenberg v. University of New Mexico
Torres, the attorney representing the plaintiff in an underlying case,
moved for a new trial following a verdict against her client, 47 alleging
the judge's law clerk engaged in prejudicial ex parte conduct regarding
the sending of exhibits to the jury during deliberations and stated to
several people, including Ms. Torres, that she was being represented by
a member of defense counsel's law firm.4 8 Torres filed an affidavit,
signed by herself, in support of the allegations.4 9 The motion was de-
nied, and the district court issued an order to show cause as to why
Torres should not be sanctioned under Rule 11 for failing to adequately
inquire into the truth and accuracy of her affidavit. The hearing was
conducted by Judge Parker after the original trial judge recused himself.
Ms. Torres's attorney requested a settlement conference and filed a sec-
ond affadavit by Ms. Torres. It detailed a second statement made by the
law clerk indicating that she was represented by defense counsel's law
firm.5 0 Following the hearing, Ms. Torres's first affadavit was found not
to violate Rule 11. However without a hearing, Judge Parker ordered a
fine of $250 for violation of Rule 11 on the second affidavit. Tones
challenged the sanction on three grounds: (1) the offending affidavit was
not filed with the court, but instead was part of the settlement negotia-
tions and therefore outside the scope of Rule 11, (2) she was denied due
process due to lack of a hearing, and (3) the court abused its discretion
by imposing a Rule 11 "fine" without a finding of criminal contempt that
would have afforded her the due process protections of Rule 42(b) of
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. 5 1
Torres argued on appeal that because the offending affidavit was
not formally filed, it does not fall under the scope of Rule 11. Torres
pointed to Justice Kennedy's dissent in Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic
47. Eisenberg v. University of New Mexico, 936 F.2d 1131, 1132 (10th Cir. 1991).






Communications Enterprises, Inc.,52 where he questioned the majority's
holding that any paper filed with the court could be subject to sanc-
tions. 53 The Tenth Circuit court rejected this defense, citing the major-
ity opinion in Business Guides that any paper submitted to the court for its
review, even an affidavit submitted during in camera review and not for-
mally filed, is still subject to the signing requirements of Rule 11.
5 4
Torres argued the second affidavit should be excluded from Rule
11 consideration pursuant to Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 408.
55
Reasoning the purpose of Rule 408 is to promote nonjudicial settlement
of disputes, 5 6 Judge McKay held that Rule 408 does not protect evi-
dence of unqualified factual assertions, that Torres waived any Rule 408
protection by submitting the affidavit to the court, and that the affidavit
fell under the "evidence set forth for other purposes" exception to Rule
408.
Torres further argued the district court's failure to conduct a sec-
ond hearing denied her due process. Noting that due process is a flexi-
ble concept, 5 7 the court held Torres was given adequate notice under
due process concepts. Citing Eleventh Circuit precedent,58 the court
held an attorney who files court papers cannot claim lack of notice of the
standard of conduct that Rule 11 itself provides. 59 Although Torres
stepped out of her role as an attorney at the time she submitted the
second affidavit, under Business Guides even a represented party who
signs a document bears a personal responsibility to verify its contents.
60
The show cause order also provided adequate due process, which con-
stituted notice reasonably calculated to apprise her of the pendency of
the action under Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.
6 1
The court also held the $250 sanction 6 2 was not a "fine," but rather
a "monetary sanction," applying Miranda v. Southern Pacific Transport
Co. 6 3 In Miranda the sanction was distinguished from a fine for willful
52. 111 S. Ct. 922 (1991).
53. Id. at 939.
54. Id. at 928.
55. FED. R. EVID 408 provides in relevant part:
Evidence of (1) furnishing or offering or promising to furnish, or (2) ac-
cepting or offering or promising to accept, a valuable consideration in compro-
mising or attempting to compromise a claim which was disputed as to either
validity or amount, is not admissible to prove liability for or invalidity of the claim
or its amount. Evidence of conduct or statements made in compromise negotia-
tions is likewise not admissible .... This rule also does not require exclusion
when the evidence is offered for another purpose, such as proving bias or preju-
dice of a witness.
56. Eisenberg, 936 F.2d at 1134 (citing Bradbury v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 815 F.2d
1356 (10th Cir. 1987)).
57. Ide at 1134 (citing Braley v. Campbell, 832 F.2d 1504, 1514 (10th Cir. 1987)).
58. Id at 1135 (citing Donaldson v. Clark, 819 F.2d 1551, 1560 (11th Cir. 1987)).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
62. It is more than a little ironic that a $250 sanction generated an eight-page circuit
opinion, obviously consuming valuablejudicial resources, in lighi of the Advisory Commit-
tee's statement that the amended rule was intended to cut down on "satellite litigation."
See 97 F.R.D. at 198-99.
63. 710 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1983).
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misconduct, which included denial of court access, until the fine was
paid. The sanction against Tones did not approach the magnitude of a
fine, thus the more stringent due process requirements of criminal con-
tempt as set forth in Cotner v. Hopkins64 did not apply. Cotner involved a
fine for willful disregard of a court order.65 The court agreed with the
Eleventh Circuit opinion in Donaldson v. Clark,66 holding nothing in the
text of Rule 11 indicates the due process requirement called for in crimi-
nal contempt proceedings be applied in the present case.
3. Hughes v. City of Fort Collins
In this case, the husband and children of a murder victim sued the
City of Fort Collins, its police officers and district attorneys, alleging
that the City's failure to solve a previous murder and apprehend the
perpetrator before he murdered Hughes's spouse deprived plaintiffs of
their constitutional rights.
67
The City moved for dismissal of the claim for failure to state a claim
upon which relief could be granted and requested sanctions pursuant to
Rule 11. After a hearing, the district court dismissed the complaint,6 8
but denied sanctions, believing a good faith argument for the extension
of existing law could be made.
69
Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their complaint, and defendants
cross-appealed the denial of sanctions. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the
dismissal, and reversed the trial court for "summarily refusing to con-
sider the award of sanctions." 70 On remand, the district court again de-
nied the sanctions, reiterating its belief that a good faith argument for
the extension of existing law could be made.7 1 The City again appealed,
arguing the district court based its denial of sanctions on an "improper
hybridization of the old and new standards mandated by Rule 11.
' '72
Judge Anderson, speaking for the court, upheld the district court's
refusal to award sanctions, relying heavily on the Cooter & Gell abuse of
discretion standard for all aspects of a district court's Rule 11 determi-
nation. This standard of review applies not only to factual determina-
tions, but also to determinations of matters of law.73 Judge Anderson
noted the deferential abuse of discretion standard mandated by Cooter &
64. 795 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1986).
65. Id. at 902.
66. 819 F.2d 1551 (11th Cir. 1987).
67. Hughes v. City of Fort Collins, 926 F.2d 986, 987 (10th Cir. 1991).
68. Dismissal was based on a finding that there is no constitutional protection for
members of the public against criminal attacks by third parties. Id.
69. Id. at 987-88.
70. Hughes, 926 F.2d 986 at 988.
71. This is the same reason the court gave for the original denial of sanctions. The
district court re-asserted its reasoning stating that the Tenth Circuit had apparently over-
looked it. Id. at 988.
72. Id. at 989. The City argued that the trial court had confused the old subjective
standard of the pre-1983 Rule 11, with the objective standard required by amended Rule
11. Therefore, they further alleged that the court based it ruling on an erroneous view of
the law under Cooler & Gell.
73. Cooler & Cell, 110 S. Ct. at 2460.
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Gell enhances the dual goals ofjudicial economy and integrity of the trial
courts. The court reasoned that:
[t]he Supreme Court's message is dear. It is not the role of the
circuit court to second-guess the district court's Rule 11 deter-
minations. While we are sympathetic with the burdens this liti-
gation has imposed on the City, we are not the district court,
and we cannot reverse the court simply because, had we been
the triers of fact, we might have decided the case differently. 74
The court agreed with the City that the inquiry required by Rule 11
is now an "objective assessment of 'reasonableness under the circum-
stances,' "75 and the district court confused the present standard with
the pre-1983 standard by interjecting the subjective phrase "good faith
belief" before the objective phrase "formed after reasonable inquiry."
76
Reviewing the denial of sanctions under the present objective standard,
the circuit court presumed, although there was no indication in the oral
ruling, that the district court must have concluded the attorney made an
adequate pre-filing inquiry into the factual basis for the case. Further,
the circuit court found that the trial court determined that the attorney
made a good faith argument for modification of existing law.
77
Although the Tenth Circuit upheld the refusal to impose sanctions,
it clearly indicated its strong disapproval of the district's holding and the
plaintiff's legal theories78 and sternly warned the district to keep abreast
of controlling law. The court warned that the argument for a modifica-
tion of existing law in this case came dangerously close to being "[a]
mere assertion that the controlling law is wrong [that] should, at the
very least, be viewed critically by the district court," and that "[a]n
unadorned and forlorn hope that a court may change settled law at some
future time ought not to be enough."
'79
This case highlights the way in which Cooter & Gell has muddied the
waters of Rule 11. The extreme deference to the district courts, re-
74. Hughes, 926 F.2d at 989 (citing Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564 (1985)).
75. Id. (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 11, Advisory Committee Notes).
76. Id.
77. Id. Based on the following statement, the trial court declined to impose sanctions:
I think there is no such constitutional claim; but I think probably there is room, if
one reads Martinez (referring to Martinez v. California, 444 U.S. 277 (1980)), for
inquiring whether these various progeny of Martinez which have been decided in
all these circuits really flow from the words of Martinez or whether there is a possi-
ble challenge there which needs to be further clarified ultimately by the Supreme
Court. Certainly it's established law, I think, in the Tenth, Eleventh, Ninth, Sev-
enth, Sixth Circuits; but whether there is an argument which may ultimately be
resolved by the Supreme Court in carving out an exception to Martinez, I don't
know.
Hughes, 926 F.2d at 990.
78. The court made note of plaintiff's attorney's lack of knowledge and disregard for
controlling law. When the attorney was informed of the Supreme Court's decision in
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dep't of Social Services, 489 U.S.c 189 (1989) (holding that a
state's failure to protect an individual against private violence does not constitute a viola-
tion of the due process clause) and its direct applicability to the case, he responded that
the decision was "horrendous" and that he would distinguish it in a reply brief. No reply
brief was ever filed, nor was the case ever distinguished. Hughes, 926 F.2d at 990 n.3.
79. Id. at 990.
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quired by Cooter & Gell, obviously constrained the Tenth Circuit's ability
to effectively review this case. Even though the trial court had misap-
plied Rule 11, the attorney framed extremely weak legal arguments
which disregarded existing case law, and the defendants had incurred
considerable expense in defending the suit, the circuit was unable to
reverse. It is difficult to conceive of a case in which an abuse of discre-
tion sufficient to reverse under the Cooter & Cell standard of review could
be found. Because inconsistent sanctioning practices between judges
will be upheld, attorneys may never understand the level of inquiry nec-
essary to satisfy Rule 11.
4. In re Byrd, Inc.
The debtor in a Chapter 12 bankruptcy reorganization filed a mo-
tion to assess the value of the estate's primary property. Experts' depo-
sitions were scheduled after the property valuations were submitted. A
creditor served the debtor's expert with a subpoena duces tecum timed
to coincide with the originally sceduled deposition date, although the
deposition was rescheduled for a later date. The creditor sent a second
subpoena, which for unknown reasons never reached the expert.
Although the subpoenas did not comply with procedural rules,8 0 the
debtor did not object to the subpoenas or creditor's method of service.
The subpoenas requested the expert to produce appraisals he pre-
pared for similar properties. Citing "business ethics," he refused to
produce the documents without a court order. The creditor moved for
an order to show cause for the expert's failure to comply with the sub-
poenas, and the bankruptcy court issued the order. At the hearing the
bankruptcy judge quashed the show cause order, finding the subpoenas
unenforceable due to their noncompliance with procedural rules. The
judge also awarded the expert costs and fees in the amount of $5,496.86
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g). On appeal, the dis-
trict court slightly reduced the amount, but upheld the ruling. The
creditor appealed the awards.
Before this case, the Tenth Circuit did not specifically address
either the standard for sanctioning a party under Rule 26(g) or the stan-
dard of review for such sanctions. After reviewing the decisions of other
circuits, that applied Rule 11 standards to Rule 2 6 (g),8 the circuit ex-
pressly adopted their approach. Specifically, the court looked to Cooler
& Gell v. Hartmarx Corp. ,82 and Burkhart v. Kinsley Bank 8 3 in applying an
abuse of discretion standard of review in Rule 26(g) sanction cases. Re-
garding the standards for sanctions, subjective bad faith is not required,
but rather the central issue is whether "the person who signed the
pleading conducted a reasonable inquiry into the facts and law support-
80. Specifically, FED. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(2) and D. N.M. R. 30.1.
81. See Insurance Benefit Adm'rs Inc. v. Martin, 871 F.2d 1354, 1360 (7th Cir 1989);
Apex Oil Co. v. Belcher Co., 855 F.2d 1009 (2d. Cir. 1988); see also FED. R. Civ. P. Advi-
sory Committee's Note (Rule 26(g) "parallels the [1983] amendments to Rule I 1").
82. 496 U.S. 384, 384 (1990).
83. 852 F.2d 512, 515 (10th Cir. 1988).
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ing the pleading."'8 4 Applying this standard, the circuit held the sub-
poenas were not supported by reasonable inquiries and upheld the
district court's award of costs and fees. This holding provides another
example of the scope of the Tenth Circuit's interpretation of Cooter &
Cell, which applies not only to Rule 11 sanctions but also to sanctions
imposed under other rules.
C. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit's 1991 Rule 11 decisions do little to clarify the
confusion surrounding Rule 11 sanctions. The Cooter & Gell standard of
review cemented this confusion by permitting a district court to either
run wild in sanctioning or indiscriminately refuse to sanction the attor-
ney. However, the ruling makes two things clear. First, it is unlikely the
Tenth Circuit will reverse the award of sanctions or refusal to sanction
on appeal. Second, there are, and will continue to be, glaring inconsis-
tencies in the district courts' application of Rule 11 that the Tenth Cir-
cuit cannot address due to the extreme deference given to lower court
decisions. A recurring theme in 1991 cases was the Tenth Circuit's in-
ability or refusal to take action even when the appellate court did not
agree with or approve of the district court's imposition (or denial) of
Rule 11 sanctions.
8 5
II. PRO SE LITIGANTS
A. Introduction
The Tenth Circuit dealt with a number of cases involving pro se
litigants this past year. In these cases prison inmates sued for relief from
various civil rights violations. Congress gave the federal judges who
hear these cases wide discretion in how to deal with them.8 6 For in-
stance, a judge can allow an inmate to proceed without a prepayment of
the fees and costs, 8 7 appoint counsel to represent the prisoner,88 or dis-
miss the action as frivolous or malicious.8 9 However, section 1915
presents a court with several problems. One problem the courts face is
how to differentiate a valid complaint from one factually or legally un-
supportable. In 1978, the Tenth Circuit created a mechanism to aid
judges in determining the validity of a complaint called a Martinez re-
port, named for the case creating it, Martinez v. Aaron.90
In Martinez, several prisoners in a New Mexico correctional facility
brought a section 1983 action91 alleging theft and confiscation of per-
84. See United Mo. Bank of Kansas City v. Bank of N.Y., 723 F. Supp 408, 415 (W.D.
Mo. 1989) (applying Rule 11 standards to Rule 26(g)).
85. See e.g., Hughes, 926 F.2d at 989; Eisenberg, 936 F.2d at 1137.
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988).
87. Id. § 1915(a).
88. Id. § 1915(d).
89. Id.
90. 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978).
91. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
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sonal property by the prison guards. To aid its decision regarding
whether to dismiss the case as frivolous, the trial judge ordered the
prison officials to investigate the incident.92 The Tenth Circuit ex-
pressly approved the procedure outlined in this order, finding the re-
port useful for deciding preliminary issues, including jurisdiction under
section 1915(a)9 3 and allegations as to color of state law.
94
Last year the Tenth Circuit handed down two decisions involving
Martinez reports. In Hall v. Bellmon,9 5 the Circuit decided a Martinez re-
port may be considered both as an affidavit for defendant in a summary
judgment motion, and as part of the pleadings for the purposes of a
motion to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b) (6).
This decision allowed the court to avoid the procedures established in
Reed v. Dunham,9 6 which held that when documents other than the
pleadings are considered a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is treated as a Rule 56
motion for summary judgment. 97 Since the Martinez report is treated as
part of the pleadings, Reed is inapplicable.
In Mosier v. Maynard,9 8 the circuit elaborated on another aspect of
Hall, narrowing the circumstances under which a defendant prison offi-
cial can use a Martinez report as an affidavit in a motion for summary
judgment. Hall limited the use of a Martinez report in cases where the
plaintiff presented conflicting evidence. 99 Mosier went one step further,
negating the effects of the Martinez report in a motion for summary judg-
ment by using the plaintiff's complaint as an opposing affadavit.
A civil rights suit brought by a prison inmate pro se under section
1915100 has many hurdles to pass before it is allowed to proceed to trial.
92. The court order states inter alia:
(3) Officials responsible for the operation of the New Mexico State Penitentiary
are directed to undertake a review of the subject matter of the complaint: a. to
ascertain the facts and circumstances; b. to consider whether any action can and
should be taken by the institution to resolve the subject matter of the complaint;
and c. to determine whether other like complaints ... are related to this com-
plaint and should be take up and considered together.
(4) In the conduct of the review, a written report shall be compiled and filed
with the Court. Authorization is granted to interview all witnesses including the
plaintiffs and appropriate officers of the New Mexico State Penitentiary ....
(5) All reports made in the course of the review shall be attached to and filed
with defendant's answers to the complaint.
Martinez, 570 F.2d at 319.
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) (1988).
94. Martinez, 570 F.2d at 319.
95. 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991).
96. Reed v. Dunham, 893 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1990).
97. Id. at 287 n.2. The court stated:
[flurthermore, once it is determined.., that a particular claim is not subject to
dismissal under § 1915(d), a requested disposition of that claim premised upon
materials outside the pleading should be treated as a motion for summary judg-
ment, with due regard for the requirements of notice and opportunity to respond
specified in FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
Id.
98. 937 F.2d 1521 (10th Cir. 1991).
99. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 1991). "The court is not author-
ized to accept the factual findings of the prison investigation when the plaintiff has
presented conflicting evidence." Id.
100. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1988).
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Federal judges dispose of the cases in a variety of ways, including dis-
missal as frivolous under section 1915(d), 10 1 dismissal for failure to
state a claim upon which relief can be granted 10 2 and summary judg-
ment. 10 3 Each of these has a different set of requirements applied in
different circumstances. However, the lines between the three are be-
coming blurred as the courts actively eliminate the procedural distinc-
tions in order to make it easier to dispose of a frivolous lawsuit.
The use of the Martinez report as an affidavit and as an attachment
to the pleadings contributed to the elimination of those distinctions.
Hall v. Bellmon effectively eliminated a distinction between dismissal for
failure to state a claim and summary judgement by allowing a Martinez
report to be considered an attachment to the pleadings.' 0 4 In McKinney
v. Okla. Dept. of Human Services,105 the circuit eliminated another distinc-
tion between the types of dismissal. After comparing dismissal under
section 1915(d) with dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
Rule 12(b)(6), the court announced a new rule allowing sua sponte dis-
missals of a pro se litigant's action under Rule 12(b)(6).
Section 1915(d) 10 6 allows a court to appoint counsel to represent
an indigent party. However, if the suit is frivolous or legally unsup-
ported, the court need not appoint counsel. The Tenth Circuit gives a
trial judge broad discretion to deny an indigent plaintiff's request for
the appointment of counsel. In 1985 in McCarthy v. Weinberg, the Tenth
Circuit ruled a district court decision will not be overturned unless "the
lack of counsel results in fundamental unfairness."' 0 7 The court
adopted the guidelines the Seventh Circuit set forth in Maclin v.
Freake.10 8 In deciding whether to appoint counsel, the court should con-
sider the merits of the litigant's claims, the nature of the factual issues
raised, and the complexity of the legal issues.10 9 This year the circuit
decided two cases based upon McCarthy: Long v. Shillinger I 10 and Wil-
liams v. Meese. I I' These cases do not change the holding of McCarthy but
simply follow it indirectly by explicitly following Maclin.
B. The Cases
1. Hall v. Bellmon
Plaintiff, a Native American state prisoner, brought a pro se action
alleging violation of his civil rights. Specifically, Hall alleged he was de-
nied his First Amendment right to free exercise of religion by the confis-
101. Id. § 1915(d).
102. FED. R. Cxv. P. 12(b)(6).
103. FED. R. CIv. P. 56.
104. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1112.
105. 925 F.2d 363, 365 (10th Cir. 1991).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988).
107. 753 F.2d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 1985).
108. 650 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1981).
109. Id. at 887-89.
110. 927 F.2d 525 (10th Cir. 1991).
111. 926 F.2d 994 (10th Cir. 1991).
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cation of his medicine bag and talisman, destruction of his property, and
forced compliance with the prison grooming code.
1 12
The district court considered and dismissed each of plaintiff's
claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Although
on appeal the plaintiff claimed the district dismissed his claims as frivo-
lous under section 1915(d), the Tenth Circuit concluded the only plausi-
ble reading of the district's memorandum opinion was that the case was
dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.1 13 Plaintiff argued on appeal that the court erred in consider-
ing the Martinez report in dismissing his claim under Rule 12(b)(6).'
1 4
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Typically, when the court
considers materials outside the pleadings, a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is
treated as a motion for summary judgment, requiring the plaintiff be
given notice and an opportunity to respond with affidavits or similar evi-
dence before the court considers the motion. 11 5 However, the Tenth
Circuit held a Martinez report may be treated as an attachment to the
plaintiff's complaint for purposes of Rule 12(b) dismissal "[w]hen the
plaintiff challenges a prison's policies or established procedures and the
Martinez report's description of the policies or procedures remains un-
disputed after the plaintiff has an opportunity to respond." 1' 6 In sup-
port of its holding, the court looked to precedent from the First,
1 17
Third, 1 18 Eighth, 119 Ninth 120 and Eleventh 12 1 Circuits. The court also
noted that the Third Circuit disagreed, holding in Rose v. Bartle 122 that
affidavits, in contrast to other written documents attached to the com-
plaint, 123 may not be considered in granting a dismissal under Rule
12(b)(6).124 Also noted is the contrary ruling of the Second Circuit in
Goldman v. Belden 125 that it is improper to consider documents attached
to defendant's motion to dismiss. 12 6 The Tenth Circuit reasoned it was
appropriate for the district court to consider the Martinez report because
the purpose of the report is to identify and clarify issues plaintiff raises
in his complaint, to develop a basis for determining whether the plaintiff
112. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1111-12.
113. Id. at 1112. The court noted that the district court never characterized plaintiff's
claims as frivolous. Dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) is only proper when a claim is
based on an indisputably meritless legal theory. Id. at 1109.
114. Id. at 1112.
115. See Reed, 893 F.2d at 287 n.2.
116. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1112-13.
117. Sullivan v. United States, 788 F.2d 813, 815 n.3 (1st Cir. 1986).
118. Chester County Intermediate Unit v. Penn. Blue Shield, 896 F.2d 808 (3d Cir.
1990).
119. Morton v. Becker, 793 F.2d 185, 187 (8th Cir. 1986).
120. AMFAC Corp. v. Arizona Mall, 583 F.2d 426, 429-30 (9th Cir. 1978).
121. Quiller v. Barclays-Am./Credit, Inc., 727 F.2d 1067, 1069 (1lth Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1124 (1986).
122. 871 F.2d 331, 339-40 n.3 (3d Cir. 1989).
123. See Chester County, 896 F.2d at 812.
124. Rose, 871 F.2d at 339-40 n.4.
125. 754 F.2d 1059 (2d Cir. 1985).
126. Id. at 1066.
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has a meritorious claim, 12 7 and to assist the court in the broad reading
of the pro se litigant's pleadings, which was held to a less stringent stan-
dard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers Haines v. Kerner.
128
2. Mosier v. Maynard
Mosier v. Maynard was a civil rights action brought by a prisoner
against Oklahoma prison officials alleging violation of his right to free
exercise of religion by requiring him to comply with the grooming code.
The district court ordered a Martinez report.' 29 The defendants filed a
motion to dismiss, which the district court converted to a summary judg-
ment motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. The district
court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants and plaintiff
appealed,13 0 claiming that the district court improperly granted sum-
mary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact existed concern-
ing the reasonableness of the prison grooming code. An exemption to
the grooming code can be obtained only if the prisoner supplies exter-
nal documentation concerning the sincerity of his religious belief from
reputable, non-family members. Plaintiff supplied no documentation,
although he supplied other forms of proof.'
3 '
The Tenth Circuit, applying de novo review,1 32 reversed and re-
manded the case. In Hall v. Bellmon, 133 the court held a Martinez report
can be treated as an affidavit, but the court cannot accept the factual
findings of the prison investigation when the plaintiff presents conflict-
ing evidence. 134 The court, treating plaintiff's complaint as an affidavit,
found conflicting evidence was presented.' 3 5 The court allowed plain-
tiff's complaint to be treated as an affidavit after finding the complaint
was based on personal knowledge and sworn under penalty of perjury
and thus met the procedure requirements of Rule 56.136 The court
ruled, in the face of this conflicting evidence, summary judgment was
not proper because the factual statements attributable to counsel con-
tained in defendant's brief do not constitute summary judgment evi-
dence. Therefore, the defendants had no support either by affadavit or
in their brief upon which the district court could rely in granting sum-
mary judgment.1
3 7
3. McKinney v. State of Oklahoma Department of Uuman
Services
The plaintiff brought a pro se section § 1983 civil rights complaint
127. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1112.
128. 404 U.S. 519 (1972).
129. Mosier, 937 F.2d at 1522. See Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978).
130. Mosier, 937 F.2d at 1522.
131. Id. at 1522-23.
132. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c) and (e).
133. 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991).
134. Id. at 1111-12.
135. Mosier, 937 F.2d at 1524.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 1525.
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alleging various violations arising out of his felony conviction and a ju-
venile proceeding involving his minor children.13 8 The district court
held the Eleventh Amendment barred the plaintiff from proceeding
against the Oklahoma Department of Human Services, found his allega-
tions against the other defendants "frivolous, improper, and totally de-
void of merit" 13 9 and dismissed the action pursuant to 28 U.S.C
§ 1915(d).
140
The circuit upheld the dismissal. In doing so, the Tenth Circuit
announced a new rule concerning the propriety of sua sponte dismissals
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b) (6).141 The Supreme Court
in Neitzke v. Williams 142 discussed the dismissal power of a judge under
section 1915(d) but expressly declined to rule on the propriety of sua
sponte dismissals under Rule 12(b)(6). The Tenth Circuit adopted the
holding of the District of Columbia Circuit in Baker v. Director, United
States Parole Comm.,143 that "a trial court may dismiss a claim sua sponte
without notice where the claimant cannot possibly win relief."' 14 4 Typi-
cally, a plaintiff is allowed notice and an opportunity to amend before
the court acts on a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim.' 4 5
However, following the District of Columbia Circuit's reasoning, the
Tenth Circuit announced a sua sponte dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) is
not reversible error when it is "patently obvious" the plaintiff could not
prevail on the facts alleged and allowing him an opportunity to amend
his complaint would be futile.'
4 6
4. Long v. Shillinger
A state prisoner in Wyoming brought a pro se action against the
prison warden under section 1983147 alleging civil rights violations con-
sisting of denial of due process afforded prisoners under Wyoming's ex-
tradition act. 148 The district court ordered the defendant warden to
submit an affidavit describing his version of the events leading to the
violations alleged in the complaint. "49 After the defendant filed the affi-
davit, the court ordered the plaintiff to submit a more definite statement
of damages and documentation thereof. Defendant then filed a motion
for summary judgment based on Eleventh Amendment immunity and
qualified personal immunity.' 5 0
138. McKinney v. State of Okla. Dept. of Human Serv., 925 F.2d 363, 364 (10th Cir.
1991).
139. Id. at 364.
140. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988).
141. McKinney, 925 F.2d at 364 (the underlying case was not dismissed under FED. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), but under 28 U.S.C. 1915(d)).
142. 490 U.S. 319 (1989).
143. 916 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
144. Id. at 726 (quoting Omar v. Sea-Land Serv., 813 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1987)).
145. McKinney, 925 F.2d at 365.
146. Id.
147. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
148. Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 7-3-201 to 227 (1987).
149. See Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978).
150. Long v. Shillinger, 927 F.2d 525, 526 (10th Cir. 1991).
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The district denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, en-
tered judgment against the defendant in his official capacity and
awarded nominal damages of one dollar. Plaintiff filed a motion to alter
or amend the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59,
which the district court denied.
151
The plaintiff appealed, arguing the district court abused its discre-
tion by refusing to appoint counsel. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the dis-
trict's decision. Following Maclin v. Freake,15 2 the circuit held the district
has wide discretion to appoint counsel for indigents under 28 U.S.C. §
1915(d) and decisions denying counsel will not be overturned unless so
unfair they impinge on due process rights.'
53
5. Williams v. Meese
The plaintiff filed a civil rights action alleging discrimination in as-
signing prison jobs, deprivation of personal property and retaliation for
filing grievances. After most of the defendants answered the complaint,
Williams filed a motion seeking the appointment of counsel pursuant to
section 1915(d).1 54 The district court did not specifically rule on the
motion to appoint counsel but instead dismissed the entire action for
failure to state a claim for relief' 55
The Tenth Circuit remanded the case, having found that Williams
stated two valid claims for relief. Further, the circuit ordered the district
court to consider the motion to appoint counsel "in light of the factors
set forth in Maclin."'
156
C. Conclusion
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has made it increasingly easy
for district courts to dismiss a lawsuit brought by an inmate. During the
survey period, the court continued that trend. The use of the Martinez
report was expanded into a tool for prison officials that can be used
either as a summary judgment affidavit or as part of the pleadings when
a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is appropriate. The utility of the Martinez re-
port is tempered only by rules that prevent its use when an inmate can
present conflicting evidence. Further, procedural rules that differentiate
section 1915(d) dismissals, Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals and summaryjudge-
ment from one another are being eroded, making it easier for a district
court to dispose of an inmate's claim at the pleadings stage. An attorney
could assist an inmate to avoid a dismissal or an adverse judgment at an
151. Id.
152. 650 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1981).
153. Id. at 886.
154. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1988).
155. Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1991).
156. Id. at 996-97. See Macin v. Freake, 650 F.2d 885 (7th Cir. 1981).
1992]
866 DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69:4
early stage. However, under the current Tenth Circuit standards a dis-
trict court will rarely be compelled to appoint one.
Christopher Forrest and Christopher Melton
LIMITING LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983: THE
NARROWING OF CONSTITUTIONAL "LIBERTY"
INTRODUCTION
In two recent decisions, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit limited governmental exposure to liability under section
19831 at the expense of individuals' constitutionally protected "liberty"
interests. 2 In Melton v. City of Oklahoma City,3 the court narrowed the
circumstances under which a public employee can sustain a section 1983
action for the deprivation of a liberty interest in an untarnished reputa-
tion. In Hilliard v. City and County of Denver,4 the court indicated that an
individual's liberty interest in personal security against bodily harm is
not redressed under section 1983 unless the state has physical control
over the person. Section one of this Survey discusses the history of the
liberty interest in personal security and in public employment.5 Section
1. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities se-
cured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action
at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Courts have limited the scope of state liability under § 1983 by describing the Consti-
tution as a "charter of negative liberties" which restrains state officials from interfering
with a person's protected interests. Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982).
Only in certain limited circumstances, the Court has concluded, does the Constitution im-
pose affirmative duties of care and protection on state actors. See Youngberg v. Romeo,
457 U.S. 307 (1982) (the substantive component of due process requires the state to pro-
vide involuntarily committed mental patients with services necessary to ensure their "rea-
sonable safety"); Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976) (the Eighth Amendment
requires the state to provide adequate medical care to prisoners). Additionally, in some
cases the state is immune from § 1983 liability notwithstanding its violation of a citizen's
rights. For instance, the principle of qualified immunity provides that government officials
performing discretionary functions are not liable for their conduct unless their actions
violate "clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person
would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Also, the Court has held that "merely negligent" actions by the state are not sufficient
to state a claim under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986) (the Court
expressly left open the question of whether recklessness or gross negligence was enough
to trigger due process protection). Finally, § 1983 is unavailable where the state provided
an adequate post-deprivation remedy. Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
2. Another significant decision by the Tenth Circuit in 1991, which will not be dis-
cussed in this Survey, is Trujillo v. Grand Junction Regional Center, 928 F.2d 973 (10th
Cir. 1991). The court held in Trujillo that the discriminatory discharge of an employee was
not actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Section 1981 grants "[aill persons ... the same
right ... to make and enforce contracts." The Tenth Circuit subsequently applied this
holding in Carter v. Sedgwick County, 929 F.2d 1501 (10th Cir. 1991) and Padilla v.
United Airlines, Inc., 950 F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1991). Trujillo was overruled, however, by
The Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 3, 105 Star. 1071 (1991). The 1991
Act specifically amended 42 U.S.C. § 1981 to include protection against discriminatory
termination of an employment contract. Id. § 101, 105 Stat. at 1071-72. See Patrick v.
Miller, 953 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1992).
3. 928 F.2d 920 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 296 (1991).
4. 930 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 656 (1991).
5. See discussion infra section I.
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two examines the Tenth Circuit's decisions in Melton and Hilliard.6 Sec-
tion three argues the Melton and Hilliard decisions narrowly construe lib-
erty interests in section 1983 actions and are, in effect, a ruse for simply
limiting state liability.
7
I. THE LIBERTY INTEREST IN PERSONAL SECURITY AND PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT
Liberty interests derive from the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, 8 made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment. 9 Due process has two fundamental components: proce-
dural and substantive. The procedural aspect, addressed by the Tenth
Circuit in Melton, guarantees a fair decision-making process before gov-
ernmental action impairs a person's constitutional rights.1 0 Substantive
due process, interpreted by the Tenth Circuit in Hilliard, is concerned
with the constitutionality of a rule or governmental action.11
In 1897, the Supreme Court explicitly repudiated the long standing
proposition that due process liberty included "only the right of a citizen
to be free from physical restraint."' 2 Twenty six years later, in Meyer v.
Nebraska,1 3 the Court recognized that liberty preserved by the Constitu-
tion, "denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right... generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common
law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men." 14
Although the Court continues to acknowledge its broad interpretation
in Meyer, during the last three decades it has restricted the liberty protec-
tion of the Due Process Clause in the areas of public employment and
personal security. 15
A. Public Employment
Since the 1960's, the Court has recognized that the government,
acting in its role as employer, is subject to the limitations imposed by the
6. See discussion infra section II.
7. See discussion infra section III.
8. "No person shall be... deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law .... U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 1.
9. "No State shall ... deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law .... " U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. JOHN E. NOWAK, RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONsTrrTUnONAL LAW, § 10.6 (4th ed.
1991).
11. Id.
12. Henry P. Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property, "62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 413-14
(1977) (quoting Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578, 589 (1897)).
13. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
14. Id. at 399. In a later decision, the Court stated: "[Tihe liberty safeguarded (by
due process) is liberty in a social organization which requires the protection of law against
the evils which menace the.., safety... and welfare of the people." West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937).
15. See Monaghan, supra note 12, at 420; Aviam Soifer, Moral Ambition, Formalism, and
the "'Free World" of DeShaney, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1513, 1529 (1989); Randolph J.




Constitution -when dealing with its employees.16 Consequently, the
Court aggressively applied conventional constitutional analysis to pro-
tect the rights of individual employees. 17 More recently, however, the
Court's opinions have favored deference to public employers, emphasiz-
ing the need to provide governmental services efficiently.' 8 At the core
of the Court's rationale is the notion that the state must be free to make
day-to-day decisions without interference from individual claims of dep-
rivation of constitutional rights. 19 To implement its "deference policy"
the Court has narrowly construed the liberty interests protected by the
Due Process Clause.
20
Among the broad historical interests protected by the Court are
people's interests in their reputation. More specifically, in the context of
public employment, the Court has invoked the procedural safeguards of
due process to protect an employee's liberty interest in an untarnished
reputation. In Board of Regents v. Roth,2' the Court first explicitly recog-
nized the right of a public employee to a name-clearing hearing to rebut
government allegations implicating the reputation interests. 22 Liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court acknowledged, in-
cluded the right "to enjoy those privileges . . . essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men."' 23 But the Court found "the range of
interests protected by due process is not infinite." 24 In Roth, the Court
identified two standards for evaluating due process claims that the gov-
ernment violated an employee's liberty interest in an untarnished repu-
tation. First, the government's statements must have stigmatized the
employee and damaged his standing in the community.25 Second, the
allegation must have foreclosed the person's freedom to take advantage
of other employment opportunities.
26
During the late 1970s, further requirements were added to the Roth
standards in Paul v. Davis2 7 and Codd v. Velger.28 First, the Court found
stigmatizing an employee's reputation, alone, was not sufficient to in-
voke procedural due process protection.29 In addition to stigmatization,
there must be a causal connection with termination of employment.30
16. Developments in the Law: Public Employment, 97 HAIv. L. REv. 1611, 1739 (1984)
[hereinafter Developments].
17. Id.; see, e.g., Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (government em-
ployment conditions could not include unreasonable restrictions on First Amendment ex-
pression); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (state could not terminate employment
based on public employee's religious beliefs).
18. Developments, supra note 16, at 1739.
19. Monaghan, supra note 12, at 420-21.
20. See id.; see also Haines, supra note 15, at 191.
21. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
22. Id. at 569-70.
23. Id. at 572 (quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923)).
24. Id. at 570.
25. Id. at 573.
26. Id.
27. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
28. 429 U.S. 624 (1977).
29. Paul, 424 U.S. at 701.
30. Id.
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Also, the stigmatizing statement must have been publicized 3 l and the
employee had to allege it was false.3 2 Finally, the public employer was
required to "create and disseminate" the false and defamatory impres-
sion about the employee in connection with his termination.3 3 If these
requirements were met, due process mandated that the government
provide the employee with a hearing to rebut the allegations.
3 4
In 1980, however, the Court retreated from its restrictive interpre-
tation of reputation interests in the context of public employment. In
Owen v. City of Independence,3 5 the City Council publicized an investigative
report alleging Chief of Police Owen took part in corrupt and criminal
activities.3 6 Although the investigation found no criminal activity, Owen
was discharged by the city manager who gave no reasons for the dismis-
sal. 37 The local press gave prominent coverage to a report released by
the City Council and linked Owen's dismissal to the investigation.
3 8
The Owen majority opinion was written by Justice Brennan, a dis-
senter to the Court's previous decisions curtailing public employees'
reputation interests.3 9 In Owen, Justice Brennan relied on the finding of
the federal court of appeals that whether stigmatizing charges came
from the government was immaterial.40 Of greater importance, accord-
ing to the lower court and Justice Brennan, was that the public believed
Owen was dismissed for perjury.4 1 In dissent, Justice Powell pointed
out the Owen decision was contrary to precedent. The government must
"create and disseminate" a false impression about the employee in or-
der to violate an employee's liberty interest. 42 Justice Powell concluded
the majority's reliance on "public misapprehension" as a due process
violation was irrelevant.
43
31. Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 348 (1976).
32. Codd, 429 U.S. at 627.
33. Id. at 628.
34. Id. at 627-28.
35. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
36. Id. at 627-628.
37. Id. at 629.
38. Id.
39. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976). Paul held that stigmatization, alone, did
not trigger due process protection. Id. at 701. Brennan found the Court's decision
"wholly excludes personal interest in reputation from the ambit of 'life, liberty or prop-
erty.' " Id. at 721 (Brennan, J., dissenting). He concluded with the statement: "Today's
decision must surely be a short-lived aberration." Id. at 735. In Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S.
341 (1976), Brennan found the Court's requirement that the stigmatizing statements were
publicized by the government "simply another [unwarranted] curtailment of precious con-
stitutional safeguards." Id. at 352-53 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Finally, in Codd v. Velger,
429 U.S. 624 (1977), Brennan adopted the reasoning of Justice Stevens. Id. at 629 (Bren-
nan,J., dissenting). Stevens did not agree with the majority that a person claiming to have
been stigmatized without being afforded due process was required to allege that the
charge against him was false. Id. at 635 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
40. Owen, 445 U.S. at 631.
41. Id. at 631-32.
42. Id. at 661-64 (Powell, J., dissenting) (citing Codd, 429 U.S. at 628).




The Supreme Court has long recognized a liberty interest in per-
sonal security in cases involving the Fourth Amendment right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures. 4 4 More recently, the Court
found the same liberty interest implicated in the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.4 5 In Ingraham v.
Wright,4 6 the Court concluded public school students' liberty interest in
personal security, derived from the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause, protected them from punishment that included inflic-
tion of physical pain.
4 7
Recognizing the primary purpose of due process was to prevent the
government from infringing on the rights of individuals, the Court in
Youngberg v. Romeo4 8 found, as a general rule, "a State is under no con-
stitutional duty to provide substantive services [to its citizens]."
4 9 It
held, however, the Due Process Clause required the state to provide in-
voluntarily committed mental patients with services necessary to ensure
their "reasonable safety." 50 Alternatively, courts have recognized that
the government has a constitutional duty to provide for a citizen where a
"special relationship" existed between the state and a particular individ-
ual.5 ' Finally, substantive due process has protected individuals from
conduct by governmental officials that was fundamentally offensive to a
sense ofjustice.
52
II. TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
A. Melton v. City of Oklahoma City 5
3
1. Facts
Raymond Melton was a lieutenant in the Oklahoma City Police De-
44. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
45. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
46. 430 U.S. 651 (1976).
47. Id. at 673-74. The Court in Ingraham determined the right to be free from unjusti-
fied intrusions on personal security was among the historic liberties granted at common
law and therefore was included in the definition of "liberty" set forth in Meyer v. Ne-
braska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). The Court, however, decided the case based on the
plaintiff's procedural due process claim. It held the state post-deprivation tort remedies
satisfied due process. Id.
48. 457 U.S. 307 (1982).
49. Id. at 317.
50. Id. at 319.
51. See Bowers v. DeVito, 686 F.2d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) ("If the state
puts a man in a position of danger from private persons and then fails to protect him.., it
is as much an active tortfeasor as if it had thrown him into a snake pit."); see alsoJensen v.
Conrad, 747 F.2d 185, 193-94 (4th Cir. 1984) (custodial or other relationships created or
assumed by states in respect of particular persons may give rise to a state duty to protect
those individuals), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1052 (1985). But see DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1990) (limiting "special relationships" to
situations involving state imposed "custody"). For a discussion of DeShaney see infra notes
160-66 and accompanying text.
52. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952).
53. Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 928 F.2d 920 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
296 (1991).
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partment and friend of William Page, a judge indicted on felony
charges. Melton surreptitiously recorded his conversation with a federal
prosecutor during an interview in connection with Page's trial and
turned the tape over to defense counsel. 54 Following the trial, the F.B.I.
accused Melton of improperly disclosing the details of his conversation
with the prosecutor and of perjuring himself in an affidavit and during
trial.5 5 An investigation revealed the perjury charge was unfounded.
However, pursuant to police department policy, the filed report reached
no conclusions. 56 Prior to a police department disciplinary board hear-
ing, a local newspaper reported that Melton was under investigation for
committing perjury during Page's trial. The information was attributed
to "informed sources" and to Lieutenant McBride, the police depart-
ment's public information officer.57 McBride's quoted statements in-
cluded confirmation that Melton was under investigation for perjury
charges and that "[the] investigation did not establish whether Melton
perjured himself."5 8
The police disciplinary board did not consider the perjury charge,
but found Melton's recording of the conversation with the federal prose-
cutor warranted dismissal from the force.5 9 In response to media in-
quiry, McBride confirmed that Melton was discharged for violating the
department's code of ethics. 60 No media report carried information that
Melton was cleared of the perjury charge. McBride testified, however,
that he told several radio stations the perjury charge was unfounded.
6 1
Melton filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the published
quotes of Lieutenant McBride, which revealed the F.B.I. perjury accusa-
tions, tarnished his reputation. 6 2 The procedural component of the Due
Process Clause, he argued, required the government to afford him an
opportunity to rebut the allegations reported to the media.63 A jury
found that Melton was deprived of his liberty interest when he was dis-
charged from the police department. To prevail on his liberty interest
claim, the jury was instructed that Melton must have proven his termina-
tion was accompanied by public dissemination of the charges against
him and that the reasons for dismissal stigmatized his reputation or fore-
closed him from future employment opportunities. 64
54. Id. at 922.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 924. It was the duty of the reporting officer only to state facts in the report





61. Id. at 925.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 926 (emphasis in original).
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2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
a. Majority Opinion
After reversing a portion of the district court's judgment,65 the
Tenth Circuit granted rehearing en banc to resolve issues relating to
Melton's liberty interest claim.6 6 The majority opinion was delivered by
Circuit Judge Moore. 67 The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court as
to the parameters of a liberty interest claim involving discharge of a pub-
lic employee. It determined the lower court erred because a public em-
ployee was entitled to a name-clearing hearing only if he proved
stigmatization and that he was an unlikely candidate for future employ-
ment.68 The court found "stigmatization" required proof of five fac-
tors: first, the public employer was the source of the derogatory
statements; 6 9 second, the employer took affirmative action against the
employee as part of a punitive proceeding; 70 third, the government's
accusations were publicized;7 1 fourth, the statements constituted a false
charge of dishonesty or immorality7 2 and finally, the allegations dam-
aged the employee's standing or associations in the community.
73
The Tenth Circuit concluded Lieutenant McBride's statements to
the Oklahoma City Times failed to qualify as "stigmatizing." 74 McBride
was not the sole source of the charges, nor was he responsible for their
publication.7 5 Also, the statements made by the police department were
true-Melton was accused of perjury by the F.B.I.76 Although the court
found truth was not a complete defense to every liberty interest claim of
this nature, it concluded that this case warranted exoneration of the po-
lice department.
77
Finally, the court found that since the police department never
"charged" Melton with perjury, he was not entitled to a name-clearing
hearing.78 In order to constitute a charge, "a stigmatizing statement
65. Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 879 F.2d 706 (10th Cir. 1989), reh'ggranted, 928
F.2d 920 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 296 (1991).
66. Melton v. City of Oklahoma City, 928 F.2d 920 (10th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 296 (1991).
67. Id. at 922. ChiefJudge Holloway heard oral arguments but did not participate in
the decision of the court.
68. See id. 927 (emphasis added). The court found an employee is not required to
prove actual denial ofajob opportunity but emphasized the rule must be read as conjunc-
tive. Id
69. See id. at 926 (citing Codd v. Velger, 429 U.S. 624 (1977)).
70. Id. (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976)).
71. Id. (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976)).
72. Id. (citing Codd, 429 U.S. at 627) (emphasis added)).
73. Id. at 927 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)).
74. Id. at 929-930.
75. Id. at 928 n.12. The court relied on Codd, 429 U.S. at 628, in which the Supreme
Court stated the employer must "create and disseminate" the false statement or impres-
sion in order to stigmatize an employee.
76. Mellon, 928 F.2d at 928 (emphasis in original).
77. Id. at 929 (citing Codd, 429 U.S. at 628). The court stated that past decisions indi-
cated falsity was an element of a public employee's liberty claim. Id. at 929 n.14 (citing
Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220, 1227 (10th Cir. 1984); Asbill v. Housing
Auth. of Choctaw Nation, 726 F.2d 1499, 1501 (10th Cir. 1984)).
78. Id. at 930.
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must be the basis of punitive action taken by a public entity against one
of its employees."' 79 Stigmatization without punitive action, the court
found, did not violate a protected liberty interest.80 Denying Melton's
claim, the court concluded the perjury charges were not part of the dis-
ciplinary measure taken against Melton. Furthermore, the police de-
partment did not take affirmative action against Melton. Mere reporting
of third party defamatory accusations, the majority held, did not make
the government liable for the deprivation of a liberty interest.8 1 The
court recognized, however, that Melton's liberty would be deprived if
the police department manifestly adopted the accusations as the basis
for his discharge.8 2 Nevertheless, it found the evidence completely con-




Circuit Judge Logan dissented, joined by Circuit Judges McKay and
Seymour.8 4 The dissent agreed with the majority that a public employee
must prove both stigmatization and foreclosure of future employment to
warrant due process protection.8 5 The dissent concluded, however, that
Melton satisfied the inference of stigmatization with evidence of the me-
dia reports surrounding his dismissal from the police department.
8 6
Contrary to the majority view, the source of the defamatory statements
should be irrelevant. 8 7 Additionally, the truthfulness of the charges
should not matter-a public employee need only allege the accusations
were false.8 8 Also, the dissent disagreed with the majority's finding that
the government must take affirmative action against an employee. The
dissent argued due process was violated since the government contrib-
uted to public awareness of the charges and then failed to take sufficient
action to dispel the stigma.8 9 Lastly, the dissent found the police de-
partment stigmatized Melton by impliedly adopting the media reports
that he was discharged for perjury. 90
79. Id. The court emphasized the government must take affirmative action against the
employee to trigger due process protection.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 931.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 932 (Logan, J., dissenting).
85. Id. (emphasis in original).
86. Id. at 934, 937.
87. Id.
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. Id. at 937.
90. Id. at 936.
[Vol. 69:4
CIVIL RIGHTS SURVEY
B. Hilliard v. City and County of Denver9 '
1. Facts
Kathy Hilliard was a passenger in an automobile involved in a minor
accident. The operator of the vehicle was arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol and removed from the scene. The arresting of-
ficers, after determining Hilliard was too intoxicated to drive, im-
pounded the vehicle leaving her in a high crime area.9 2 After an
unsuccessful attempt to phone for assistance, she returned to the vehicle
where she was robbed and sexually assaulted. 93 Hilliard was found the
next morning stripped naked, bleeding, and barely conscious. 9 4 She
brought suit under section 1983 claiming the police officers' failure to
take her into protective custody pursuant to the state emergency com-
mitment statute9 5 violated her constitutional right to life, liberty, travel
and personal integrity. 9 6
The district court dismissed Hilliard's allegations of general consti-
tutional deprivation under section 1983.97 The court did not dismiss
her claim that the officers' reckless disregard for the state emergency
commitment statute violated her Fourteenth Amendment liberty inter-
est in personal security.9 8 The district court denied the government's
motion for summary judgement on qualified immunity grounds, con-
cluding the officers' actions violated "clearly established" constitutional
rights of which a reasonable person would have known.9 9
2. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
Circuit Judges Tacha and Ebel, and District Judge Johnson, sitting
by designation, reversed the lower court and ordered dismissal of Hil-
liard's complaint. 0 0 Judge Tacha delivered the opinion of the court
concluding the officers were entitled to qualified immunity since their
actions did not violate a "clearly established" constitutional right.' 0 '
The court also stated "[w]hether such a liberty interest [in personal se-
curity] exists under the facts of this case is an issue we do not reach."'
0 2
Despite its disclaimer, dicta of the court indicates it did not believe
Hilliard was deprived of a constitutional right.10 3 The decision recog-
nized the existence of a liberty interest in personal security in cases in-
91. Hilliard v. City and County of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112
S. Ct. 656 (1991).
92. Id. at 1517.
93. Id. at 1517-18.
94. Id. at 1518.
95. COLO. REv. STAT. § 25-1-310 (1989).
96. Hilliard, 930 F.2d at 1518.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 1518-19.
99. Id. at 1518.
100. Id. at 1521.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1519.
103. Id. at 1521.
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volving the Fourth and Eighth Amendments.' 0 4 The court also
acknowledged the Supreme Court's holding in Ingraham v. Wright 105
that the substantive component of the Due Process Clause is the source
of a liberty interest in personal security.' 0 6 The Hilliard court con-
cluded, however, "[tihe existence of a constitutional right to personal
security as recognized in Ingraham may well depend on [the] element of
legitimate state power over the person of the plaintiff."'1 7 Distinguish-
ing the facts in Hilliard, the Tenth Circuit found the public school stu-
dents in Ingraham were in an environment where the state had lawful
control over their liberty.1 0 8 Their situation, the court stated, could be
analogized to that of arrestees, convicts, and patients involuntarily com-
mitted to state mental hospitals, whose liberty interests in personal se-
curity were protected by the Fourth and Eighth Amendments. 10 9 No
such lawful control over the personal security of Hilliard was found. Fi-
nally, the court was not persuaded by decisions of the Seventh and Ninth
Circuits, which treated the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process
Clause as the source of a right to personal security in instances where
the state had no physical control over the plaintiff. 11
III. ANALYSIS: LIMITING STATE LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 1983 AT
THE EXPENSE OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTY
The Tenth Circuit's decisions in Melton v. City of Oklahoma City 1"
and Hilliard v. City and County of Denver" 2 effectively limit the scope of
section 1983 under the guise of a restrictive interpretation of the liberty
protected by the Due Process Clause. Failing to recognize that "[i]n a
Constitution for a free people.., the meaning of liberty must be broad
indeed,"" 13 the court in both cases narrowed the circumstances in which
the government is liable under section 1983 at the expense of individu-
als' liberty.
In Melton, the court narrowly interpreted the liberty in the Four-
teenth Amendment by severely limiting the circumstances under which
procedural due process protects a public employee's reputation. Such a
result, the court leads us to believe, is mandated by precedent and nec-
104. Id. at 1519.
105. 430 U.S. 651 (1976).
106. Hilliard, 930 F.2d at 1519-20 (citing Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 672-73).
107. Id. at 1520.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1519-20. The Tenth Circuit cited Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630
(1886) (Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures) and
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 315-16 (1982). Youngberg is probably an erroneous
reference, however, since the case was fundamentally concerned with the Fourteenth
Amendment, not the Eighth Amendment, as the source of a liberty interest in personal
security. Following the lead of DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489
U.S. 189, 198-99 (1988), the appropriate cite should be Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97
(1976).
110. Hilliard, 930 F.2d at 1520; see infra notes 143-59 and accompanying text.
111. 928 F.2d 920 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 296 (1991).
112. 930 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 656 (1991).
113. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 572 (1972).
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essary to afford the state flexibility required to function as an efficient
employer. This balancing approach unjustly leaves individual liberty
subordinate to efficiency. The court thinks we cannot see its true mo-
tive-limit state liability under section 1983.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Melton reflects an unnecessarily nar-
row interpretation of the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.1 14  Its stigmatization requirements 1 5  severely limit the
circumstances under which due process liberty ensures a public em-
ployee's untarnished reputation. The circuit court's standards consti-
tute a misinterpretation of the Supreme Court decision in Board of
Regents v. Roth 116 and its progeny, 1 7 including a failure to recognize the
Court's decision in Owen v. City of Independence.1 18 Furthermore, the
Tenth Circuit departs from its previous rationale in devising the "stig-
matization test." Its disregard of indications that Melton was stigma-
tized by the police department reveals its underlying goal of limiting
state liability under section 1983.
The court cited three reasons for denying Melton's stigmatization
claim, each of which is unwarranted. First, the court rejected Melton's
liberty interest claim because statements by the Oklahoma City Police
Department were found truthful. However, as the dissent in Melton indi-
cated, the Supreme Court's holding in Codd v. Velger"' 9 requires only
that a plaintiff allege falsity of the stigmatizing charge, which Melton did
in the instant case. 120 This sentiment is mirrored in the Supreme
Court's decision in Owen. The Court found a liberty interest implicated
where the government, "released to the public an allegedly false state-
ment."' 2 1 More importantly, however, Melton is particularly difficult to
reconcile in light of the Tenth Circuit's decision in McGhee v. Draper (Mc-
Ghee I1).122 In that case the court was presented with the question of
whether a public school teacher was stigmatized when she was dismissed
amid publicity alleging immoral conduct. In determining the teacher
was stigmatized, the court stated: "The truth or falsity of any charges
made.., is not relevant to determining the existence of a due process
violation."'123 The Tenth Circuit required only that the employee chal-
114. Cf. Monaghan, supra note 12, at 420-23 (explosion of procedural due process liti-
gation encourages a judicial effort to limit the conception of "liberty" under due process
clause).
115. See supra notes 69-73 and accompanying text.
116. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
117. See supra notes 21-43 and accompanying text.
118. 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
119. 429 U.S. 624 (1977).
120. Melton, 928 F.2d at 937 (Logan, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); see Developments,
supra note 16, at 1790.
121. Owen, 445 U.S. at 633 n.13 (emphasis added); see Codd, 429 U.S. at 634 (Stevens,J.,
dissenting). Note that Justice Brennan, author of Owen, apparently agreed with Stevens
that a person need not allege the falsity of a stigmatizing charge. See Owen, 445 U.S. at 633
n.13.
122. 639 F.2d 639, 643 (10th Cir. 1981). The court in McGhee II also stated that Codd
read in context meant only that, absent a challenge to the truthfulness of the charges, no
hearing is necessary. Id. at 643 n.3 (citing Codd, 429 U.S. at 628).
123. Id. at 643.
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lenge the veracity of the charge. 12 4 Thus, the principal requirement in
Codd is not the truthfulness of the charges, rather whether the victim has
alleged that the statements were false. Lastly, the Melton court found Codd
supported a decision that the truthfulness of the police department's
statements warranted exoneration of the department since damage to
Melton's reputation was not intended.' 25 The Tenth Circuit's inquiry
into the police department's intent for reporting the statements, how-
ever, is unfounded. The Supreme Court's analysis in Codd makes no ref-
erence to a public employer's intentions-they are not a relevant factor
in considering whether an employee was stigmatized. 12 6
Second, the Tenth Circuit concluded, since the Oklahoma City Po-
lice Department was not the source of the charges, the department did
not stigmatize Melton. 127 This requirement is again unsubstantiated.
The Supreme Court in Owen determined that the source of the allega-
tions was irrelevant. 12 8 The most important factor, the Court found,
was what the public perceived to be the reason for dismissal. 12 9 Even
past decisions of the Tenth Circuit have not required that the govern-
ment be the source of stigmatizing charges.13 0 For example, in Eames v.
City of Logan,13 ' the director of parks alleged he was stigmatized by pub-
licity and rumors of criminal misconduct surrounding his termina-
tion.' 3 2 The Tenth Circuit held the circumstances were sufficient to
implicate Eames's liberty interest in a good reputation.' 3 3 Similarly, in
McGhee v. Draper (McGhee 1),134 a public school teacher claimed she was
stigmatized by rumors and gossip in the community when her contract
was not renewed.' 3 5 The court held that McGhee's allegations were ad-
equate evidence of infringement of her liberty interest to withstand a
directed verdict.'
3 6
The Melton court's final inconsistency is the finding that the liberty
interest claim was insufficient since the police department did not take
124. Id. at 643 n.3. The majority in Melton failed to recognize McGhee II, relying instead
on Rich v. Secretary of the Army, 735 F.2d 1220 (10th Cir. 1984) and Asbill v. Housing
Auth. of the Choctaw Nation, 726 F.2d 1499 (10th Cir. 1984). These decisions, however,
offer weak support for the court's "actual falsity" requirement since the employees in both
cases failed to allege the public employer's charges were false.
125. Mellon, 928 F.2d at 929.
126. Codd, 429 U.S. 624.
127. Melton, 928 F.2d at 928 & n.12.
128. Owen, 445 U.S. at 631.
129. Id.; cf. Haines, supra note 12, at 224 n.187 (a stigma must be obvious to the public
and constitute a special discrepancy between virtual and actual social identity). Similarly,
the Third, First and Fourth Circuits focus on whether the employer's actions create a stig-
matizing impression. See Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 5 v. Tucker, 868 F.2d 74 (3d
Cir. 1989); Rodriguez de Quinonez v. Perez, 596 F.2d 486 (1st Cir.) cert. denied, 444 U.S.
840 (1979); Cox v. Northern Va. Transp. Comm'n, 551 F.2d 555 (4th Cir. 1976).
130. See Melton, 928 F.2d at 935-36 (Logan, J., dissenting) (citing cases).
131. 762 F.2d 83 (10th Cir. 1985).
132. Id. at 84.
133. Id.
134. 564 F.2d 902 (10th Cir. 1977).
135. Id. at 904.
136. Id. at 910.
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action against Melton. 137 In the past, the Tenth Circuit has found that
government inaction may constitute stigmatization. In Eames the city
park service failed to dispel public sentiment that an employee's dis-
charge was related to stigmatizing rumors and accusations. The court
held procedural due process was violated since the city denied the em-
ployee a name-clearing hearing to rebut the allegations. 13 8 Similarly,
the court held in McGhee I the government could violate an employee's
liberty interest by impliedly adopting defamatory accusations asserted
against the employee.'
3 9
Circumstances in Melton are analogous to those in Eames since the
police department failed to dispel a false perception that Officer Melton
had been discharged for perjury. His fellow police officers believed the
perjury charges were the basis for Melton's dismissal. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's conclusion that the police department did not impliedly adopt the
published charges that Melton was dismissed for perjury is also tenuous
since the law enforcement community did in fact make the connec-
tion.14° In either case, the government's inaction adversely affected
Melton's reputation in the community, a protected liberty interest.
After a dose look at the case law, the Tenth Circuit's decision in
Mellon is not compelled by precedent. The court in Melton misinter-
preted the Supreme Court's decision in Owen and failed to apply past
Tenth Circuit decisions. Were these decisions properly applied in Mel-
ton, the public's perception that Officer Melton was dismissed for per-
jury would provide a reasonable basis for concluding he was stigmatized
by the government. As the dissent pointed out, the law enforcement
community believed Melton was discharged for perjury. 14 1 No great
leap of faith is required to conclude the public shared in this perception.
The Mellon "stigmatization test" circumscribes the instances in which a
public employee's liberty interest in a good reputation is protected. Its
practical effect was to fulfill the court's apparent goal of limiting the po-
tential claims against the state under section 1983.
The Tenth Circuit's underlying intent to limit the scope of section
1983 is even more apparent in Hilliard v. City and County of Denver.
14 2
The court resolved Hilliard by invoking qualified immunity to shield the
city from section 1983 liability for the conduct of its police officers, who
left Kathy Hilliard stranded and alone in a high-crime area. More signif-
icantly, the Tenth Circuit based its rejection of a liberty interest viola-
tion on the rationale that the state did not have physical control over
her. For the Tenth Circuit to hinge the existence of a liberty interest in
personal security on a threshold determination of whether the state has
137. Melton, 928 F.2d at 930.
138. Eames, 762 F.2d at 84.
139. McGhee I, 564 F.2d 902.
140. Melton, 928 F.2d at 935 (Logan, J., dissenting).
141. Id. During Melton's trial, there was testimony by a police officer that the law en-
forcement community believed Melton was discharged for perjury. Id.
142. 930 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 656 (1991).
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physical control over a person is unwarranted. Two factors support this
conclusion.
First, decisions by other appellate courts recognize an individual's
liberty interest in personal security in circumstances in which the state
has no physical control over the person. The Seventh Circuit in White v.
Rochford 143 and the Ninth Circuit in Wood v. Ostrander 144 found that a
liberty interest in personal security was violated in circumstances analo-
gous to those in Hiliard.1 4 5 These decisions undoubtedly support the
conclusion that physical control is not a condition precedent to the
existence of an individual's due process right to be free from unjustified
infliction of bodily harm by state actors.
In White, police officers arrested the driver of an automobile on the
Chicago Skyway, impounded his vehicle and left three minor children
stranded at the scene. 14 6 The children, exposed to the cold, left the car
and crossed eight lanes of traffic to telephone for help. They were finally
retrieved by a neighbor but as a result of the incident one child was
hospitalized for a week and all three suffered mental pain and
anguish. 147 The Seventh Circuit found that due process afforded a right
to some degree of bodily integrity and protected the children from un-
justified intrusions on bodily security.' 48 The right to personal security,
the court stated, included freedom from "unnecessary and unjustifiable
exposure to physical danger or injury to health."' 149 Additionally, the
court found due process restrained the government from activities
which were "fundamentally offensive to 'a sense of justice.' "150 The
Seventh Circuit concluded that abandoning children on a high-speed ex-
pressway on a cold evening was a clear violation of their liberty interest
in bodily integrity. 1 1
Following the rationale of White, the Ninth Circuit's Wood decision
recognized a liberty interest in personal security when presented with
facts again strikingly similar to those in Hilliard.'5 2 Wood was a passen-
ger in an automobile stopped by State Trooper Ostrander. After plac-
ing the driver under arrest and removing him from the scene, Ostrander
impounded the car and ordered Wood to leave the vehicle. Left
stranded in a high-crime area at 2:00 a.m., Wood accepted a ride with an
unknown man who raped her. The court found Wood protected by the
substantive component of the Due Process Clause.' 5 3 First, the court
concluded the officer acted "in callous disregard for Wood's personal
143. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
144. 851 F.2d 1212 (9th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 11 S. Ct. 341 (1990).
145. Hilliard, 930 F.2d at 1520-21.
146. White, 592 F.2d at 382.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 383 (quoting in part Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 673 (1976)).
149. Id. at 387 (Tone, J., concurring).
150. Id. at 383 (quoting Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172-73 (1952)).
151. Id. at 384. The Seventh Circuit reaffirmed White in Ellsworth v. City of Racine,
774 F.2d 182 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986).
152. Wood, 851 F.2d at 1213.
153. Id. at 1213, 1216.
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security, a liberty interest." i 4 The court also adopted the interpreta-
tion of section 1983 found in White and imposed liability where innocent
parties were unnecessarily endangered in "reckless disregard of their
safety."'
155
The courts' rulings in White and Wood stand for the proposition that
physical control by the state is unnecessary to invoke due process pro-
tection. These decisions are persuasive toward finding a violation of
Hilliard's liberty interest in personal security. Leaving Kathy Hilliard
stranded and alone in a high-crime area constitutes "unjustifiable expo-
sure to physical danger,"' 56 and callous disregard for her personal se-
curity. 15 7 In Hilliard, the Tenth Circuit's statement that it was,
"appalled by the conduct of the [officers],"' 5 8 indicates that the state's
actions were fundamentally offensive to a sense of justice. 15 9 Indeed,
rejection of the dear parallels with White and Wood exposes the Tenth
Circuit's plan to limit state liability by narrowly interpreting the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Tenth Circuit's failure to recognize Hilliard's liberty interest in
personal security is further unwarranted when based on the Supreme
Court's decision in DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Serv-
ices. 160 The Court in DeShaney specifically left open the possibility that a
liberty interest in personal security exists in circumstances similar to
those in Hilliard, indicating that physical control by the state is not a
condition precedent to the existence of a liberty interest in personal se-
curity. In DeShaney, a section 1983 claim was filed alleging that social
workers and local officials failed to remove four-year-old Joshua
DeShaney from his father's custody when they should have known the
child was being abused. Joshua was beaten so severely that he suffered
massive brain damage and was expected to spend the rest of his life in
an institution. 16 1 Rejecting DeShaney's claim that his Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest in personal security was violated, the Court
stated: "As a general matter .... a State's failure to protect an individual
154. Id. at 1216.
155. Id. at 1218 (quoting White, 592 F.2d at 388). The court in Wood held that Os-
trander was not entitled to qualified immunity. It found his conduct exceeded "mere neg-
ligence" and his actions violated a "clearly established" law. Id. Applying the standard for
qualified immunity set forth in Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982), the Ninth
Circuit concluded the "clearly established law" requirement should not allow section 1983
defendants to escape liability if their actions defy common sense. The court held a "rea-
sonable police officer" would have been aware of the potential danger facing a woman in
Wood's circumstances and therefore denied Ostrander the protection of qualified immu-
nity. Wood, 851 F.2d at 1218.
156. White, 592 F.2d at 387 (Tone, J., concurring).
157. See Wood, 851 F.2d at 1216. The court's holding in Wood also warrants the conclu-
sion that Ostrander was not entitled to qualified immunity. Id. But see Courson v. McMil-
Iian, 939 F.2d 1479 (11 th Cir. 1991) (citing Hilliard for the proposition that a government
official is entitled to qualified immunity since the right to personal security in a non-custo-
dial setting is not clearly established).
158. Hilliard v. City and County of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516, 1521 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 656 (1991).
159. See White, 592 F.2d at 383.
160. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
161. Id. at 193.
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against private violence simply does not constitute a violation of the Due
Process Clause."' 16 2 It also denied that due process imposed a duty
upon the state to act pursuant to a "special relationship" it created with
the child.16 3 No such relationship existed, the Court concluded, be-
cause the child was not under the "custody" of the state.
16 4
However, DeShaney explicitly left room for finding a liberty interest
in personal security in circumstances where the state does not have
physical control over an individual. The Court found substantive due
process would be violated "when the State by the affirmative exercise of
its power so restrains an individual's liberty that it renders him unable to
care for himself, and at the same time fails to provide for.., reasonable
safety."' 6 5 Due process protection from, bodily harm under DeShaney
does not hinge on an element of physical control by the state. 166
Rather, a liberty interest in personal security is violated where the state
fails to provide reasonably safe conditions after it has rendered an indi-
vidual incapable of helping himself or herself.16 7 This was the case in
Hilliard where the Denver Police abandoned Kathy Hilliard after depriv-
ing her of the transportation necessary to leave a high-crime area.
Moreover, the circumstances presented in Hilliard were precisely
those the Court intended to except from the rule that a liberty interest
in personal security exists only if the state has physical control over the
person.' 68 The dissent in DeShaney made reference to White v. Roch-
ford,16 9 indicating that custody need not be considered the only relevant
state action. 170 Consequently, the Supreme Court provided the Tenth
Circuit with a sufficient basis to rule that a liberty interest was violated.
Rejection of this basis again exposes the court's intentions in Hilliard to
limit governmental liability under section 1983. The Tenth Circuit's de-
cision in Hilliard, which acknowledges a person's liberty interest in per-
sonal security only where the state has physical control over the
individual, is very troubling. It seems particularly disingenuous that the
court in Hilliard was, "appalled by the conduct [of the officers],"' 1 yet
not so appalled to find Kathy Hilliard was deprived of her personal
security.
162. Id. at 197.
163. Id. at 199-200.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 200.
166. See Daniel A. Farber, Supreme Court Review: Government Liability After DeShaney,
TRIAL, May 1989, at 18. Farber argued that, after DeShaney, the government may have a
duty to protect individuals when it has helped to make them more vulnerable. Id. He cited
White as an example of circumstances under which the government may be liable. Id. For a
discussion of White, see supra notes 146-51 and accompanying text.
167. See DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 199-200.
168. Farber, supra note 166.
169. 592 F.2d 381 (7th Cir. 1979).
170. DeShaney, 489 U.S. at 205 (Brennan, J., dissenting).




The court's intention to limit state liability under section 1983 is
evident and the cost to individual liberty is high. The Tenth Circuit's
narrowing of a public employee's liberty interest in his reputation in
Melton ignores William Blackstone's conviction that without one's repu-
tation, "it is impossible to have the perfect enjoyment of any other ad-
vantage or right."'17 2 The court's decision in Hilliard, limiting the
protection of a liberty interest in personal security, jeopardizes whatJus-
tice Oliver Wendell Holmes' identified as the most important element in
any civilized society: "[Slome protection for the person."' 7 3
John M. Spesia
172. Monaghan, supra note 12, at 426 (quoting I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
ON THE LAW OF ENGLAND: OF THE RIGHTS OF PERSONS *134).




I. FIRST AMENDMENT - SPEECH CASES
There are three 1991 Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals cases of inter-
est that address First Amendment speech issues. The first, Adolf Coors
Company v. Brady,' involved commercial speech. This appeal arose out
of a suit by Coors against the Secretary of the Treasury and the Director
of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (BATF) in the Colo-
rado District Court, alleging a violation of its First Amendment rights.
Specifically, Coors argued that a federal statute prohibiting Coors from
advertising the alcohol content of its beer was a violation of its right to
free speech. BATF had denied an application by Coors which proposed
to disclose the alcohol content of Coors and Coors Light in its advertis-
ing and labeling.2 BATF based its decision on the language of 27 U.S.C.
§ 205(e) and § 205(f). 3 The district court 4 granted summary judgment
for Coors, holding that the federal statute constituted an illegal restraint
on speech. 5 The district court also enjoined BATF from enforcing the
statute.
The Treasury Department and the House 6 both appealed the dis-
trict court ruling. The court of appeals, 7 in an opinion authored by
Judge Seymour, reversed and remanded the case, holding that there ex-
isted genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment on
1. 944 F.2d 1543 (10th Cir. 1991).
2. Id.
3. 27 U.S.C. §§ 205(e) and 205(f) (1988) state in relevant part:
§ 205. Unfair competition and unlawful practices. It shall be unlawful for any
person engaged in business as a distiller, or brewer.., of distilled spirits, wine,
or malt beverages. .. directly or indirectly through an affiliate:
(e) Labeling
To sell or ship or deliver for sale or shipment, or otherwise introduce in
interstate or foreign commerce.., any distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages in
bottles, unless such products are bottled, packaged, and labeled in conformity
with such regulations, to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, with
respect to packaging .... labeling and size and fill of container ... (2) as will
provide the consumer with adequate information as to the identity and quality of
the products, the alcohol content thereof (except that statements of, or state-
ments likely to be considered as statements of, alcohol content of malt beverages
are prohibited unless required by State law ....
(f) Advertising
To publish or disseminate.., any advertisement of distilled spirits, wine or
malt beverages.., unless such advertisement is in conformity with such regula-
tions ... (2) as will provide the consumer with adequate information as to the
identity and quality of the products advertised, the alcoholic content thereof (ex-
cept the statements of, or statements likely to be considered as statements of,
alcoholic content of malt beverages and wines are prohibited) ....
4. Zita L. Weinshienk, J.
5. Coors, 944 F.2d at 1543.
6. The United States House of Representatives intervened to defend the constitu-
tionality of the statute after both the Treasury and BATF admitted that the statute was
unconstitutional. Coors 944 F.2d at 1546.
7. Before Circuit Judges McKay, McWilliams, and Seymour.
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Coors' claim that the statute was unconstitutional. 8
The court applied the following four part test from the Supreme
Court opinion in Central Hudson Gas v. Public Ser. Comm'n 9 to determine
whether the commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment: ' 0
For commercial speech to come within the First Amendment, it
at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading.
Next, it must be determined whether the asserted governmen-
tal interest . .. is substantial. If both inquiries yield positive
answers, it must be determined whether the regulation directly
advances the governmental interest asserted, and whether it is
not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest."1
Applying the first prong, the court held that Coors' proposal to ad-
vertise alcohol content was commercial speech protected by the First
Amendment.' 2 This was not at variance with the district court's
conclusion.
Under the second prong of the Central Hudson test, contrary to the
district court's holding, the court of appeals held the governmental in-
terest to be legitimate and substantial.' 3 This interest, to protect the
public against the "excesses" by the brewing industry, is supported by
the fact that Coors wanted to advertise a higher alcohol content in order
to "dispel Coors' image of being a "weak beer".'
4
To determine whether the regulation "directly advances" the gov-
ernment's interest in preventing beer strength wars, the court noted that
the "party urging the prohibition on speech has the burden ofjustifying
such a restriction." 15 The court refused to infer that the means directly
advanced the ends simply from the legislature's presumptions.' 6 The
decision points out that the district court erred by not "separately con-
sider[ing] whether the facts presented by both sides presented a genuine
issue of material fact on whether the legislative means directly advanced
the legislative ends."' 7 If, on remand, the district court does conclude
that the interest espoused by Congress is directly advanced by the regu-
lation, the fourth prong of the Central Hudson test, dealing with less in-
trusive means, will then be triggered.
8. Coors, 944 F.2d at 1554.
9. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
10. Coors v. Brady at 1547.
11. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 557.
12. Coors, 944 F.2d at 1547.
13. Coors, 944 F.2d at 1549. The district court observed that the purpose behind the
legislation is inapplicable to today's market. When the statute was enacted in 1935, Con-
gress was concerned primarily with "strength wars" among breweries. These wars came
about as a result of brewers marketing high alcohol content beers, which consumers would
purchase over the competition. There was a legitimate interest by Congress to encourage
a lower alcohol content of beer. The district court reasoned that factual circumstances had
changed, and the statute no longer serves a substantial interest. Id.
14. Id.
15. Coors, 944 F.2d at 1550 (citing Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (the
reasoning in this case and the underlying Court of Appeals opinion were relied on heavily
by this court).




Brown v. Palmer 18, presented the issue of whether an Air Force base
had, during their annual open house, intended to create a "public fo-
rum" for speech purposes. During 1985 and 1986 Peterson Air Force
Base celebrated Armed Forces Day by hosting an open house at the
base. The public was invited to the base and various groups distributed
informational materials. 19 Appellee Brown and others sought to dis-
tribute anti-war leaflets, which resulted in bar letters issued by the Air
Force Base. Appellees objected to these letters as restrictions on their
First Amendment right to free speech.20 After appellees received a
judgment in their favor at the district court level, the court of appeals
reversed.21
The court of appeals affirmed its prior decision,2 2 which reversed
the district court.23 The en banc decision held that the Air Force in-
tended to limit political and ideological debate, thereby not creating a
"public forum". 2 4 The bar letters issued to plaintiffs were therefore not
violative of the First Amendment.
25
Appellees presented three arguments on rehearing: (1) that the
"objective" evidence illustrated that Peterson Air Force Base intended
to create a "public forum"; (2) that the court of appeals panel had given
the Air Force Base special status in their determination of whether there
had been a public forum; and (3) that the panel improperly substituted
its judgment for the district court's in holding that the restrictions in
question were viewpoint neutral.
26
The court responded to the first contention, stating that there had
been an objective analysis involved in the determination that Peterson
had not intended to open up their base as a public forum.2 7 The court
examined prior denials by the base of political and ideological re-
quests, 28 and despite the fact that the base had allowed certain religious
activities during the open house, held there was no intent to create a
public forum.
2 9
The court next responded to the argument that the panel had been
operating under the assumption that a military base can never be a pub-
lic forum.3 0 After citing case law holding military bases not to be public
forums, the court stated, "the test is simply whether the government has
intended to open up the facility to public debate on the particular sub-
18. 944 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1991).
19. Id. at 737.
20. Id. at 733.
21. Id. at 732.
22. A panel of the court previously held that Peterson Air Force Base was not a public
forum during the open houses held in 1985 and 1986. Brown v. Palmer, 915 F.2d 1435
(10th Cir. 1990).
23. Brown 944 F.2d at 732.
24. Id. at 733.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 736-37.
28. Id. at 736.
29. Id. at 737.
30. Id. at 738.
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ject matter sought to be addressed by the person seeking access to that
government facility. '"3 1 The court was careful to point out that the evi-
dence must unequivocally support that the Air Force Base intended to
abandon control over conduct or speech in order for it to be perceived
as a public forum.3 2 This stringent test has rarely led a court to deter-
mine that a military base is an open forum. Although the court vehe-
mently denied giving the military base special status, it did acknowledge
the special needs of the military to maintain security and avoid political
and ideological debate.33 The court did not address the contention that
the panel improperly substituted its judgment for that of the district
court.
The majority was met by a strong dissent authored by John P.
Moore, CircuitJudge, joined by Holloway, ChiefJudge, and McKay and
Seymour, Circuit Judges.3 4 Criticizing how the majority viewed the evi-
dence, the dissent argued that what the Air Force did allow on the base,
as opposed to what they prohibited, is a better indicator of whether
there was intent to create a public forum.3 5 Because the base had been
opened for certain activities, it should be considered a public forum for
all activities.
The court of appeals in Miles v. Denver Public SchoolS, 3 6 addressed the
question of whether a teacher's in-class statements are constitutionally
protected. Appellant sought damages and injunctive relief pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the district court, which in turn granted summary
judgment in favor of the defendant school system.3 7 Statements made
by Miles during a ninth grade government class resulted in a four day
paid administrative leave and a letter of reprimand which stated, "you
will need to refrain from commenting on any items which might reflect
negatively on individual members of our student body." 3 8 Appellant
Miles asserted that his in-class statements3 9 were constitutionally pro-
tected, and that the school's letter of reprimand "chilled" and violated
his First Amendment right to free speech and expression. 40
The court of appeals applied the test from Mount Healthy City School
31. Id. at 739.
32. Id. (citing Flower v. United States, 407 U.S. 197 (1972)).
33. Id. [T]he court voiced concerns regarding the policy ramifications of accepting the
appellee's position, "T]he flow of information to the public from Peterson Air Force Base
would likely be restricted. The military, most likely, could not risk the possibility that
Peterson AFB would be labeled as a public forum .... [hence] the public would lose the
opportunity to come onto military bases; to learn about the weapon systems .... and then
to take that information back out to the public fora that are available and there to debate, if
they wish, the proper role of the military." Id. at 739-40.
34. Id. at 740.
35. Id.
36. 944 F.2d 773 (10th Cir. 1991).
37. Id. at 744.
38. Id.
39. Miles had commented to his ninth grade government class on the declining qual-
ity of the school, citing as an example an unfounded rumor that two students had been
seen on the school grounds having sexual intercourse. Id. at 773-74.
40. Id. at 775.
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District Board of Education v.Doyle4 l in order to determine whether a pub-
lic employee's First Amendment rights have been violated by an adverse
employment decision.4 2 First, the employee must show that "the speech
for which he was disciplined was constitutionally protected and [sec-
ondly], the protected speech motivated the adverse employment deci-
sion."'43 Once the employee has met this burden, the employer must
show by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have made the
same decision absent the protected speech.
44
As in Brown v. Palmer, the court initially examined whether the
school was a public forum.4 5 The court concluded that there was no
evidence that the school had intended to open up the school grounds as
a public forum, and hence the speech was not protected. 4 6 The court
found that the school had put forth legitimate pedagogical interests and
its actions were legitimately related to those interests.4 7 Because the
appellant neither showed that his in-class comments were constitution-
ally protected nor raised any evidence to dispute that the school's inter-
ests were legitimate and related to the ends, judgment for the school
was affirmed.
4 8
This case is remarkable due to the court's choice of standards. It
chose to apply the test set forth in Hazelwood as opposed to the standard
set forth in Pickering v. Board of Education.4 9 The Pickering decision bal-
ances the interests of the state (employer) in preventing certain expres-
sion in the workplace against the employee's interest in making the
statements. 50 The court reasoned that this test is not applicable where
the state is an educator.51 In such an instance the more stringent test
from Hazelwood better serves the purposes of reviewing speech in the
classroom context.52 The court also noted, in response to Miles' argu-
ment, that a secondary teacher does not enjoy the academic freedom
accorded by the Supreme Court to those in a University setting.5 3
II. FIRST AMENDMENT - RELIGION
In 1991, the Tenth Circuit addressed a number of cases involving
First Amendment religion clause claims by prisoners. The court consist-
ently applied the test set forth in Turner v. Safely, 5 4 which provides four
41. 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
42. Miles, 944 F.2d at 775.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 776.
46. The court relied heavily on the analysis set forth in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
47. Miles, 944 F.2d at 778.
48. Id. at 779.
49. 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
50. Miles, 944 F.2d at 777; see also Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987); Connick
v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
51. 944 F.2d at 777.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 779.
54. 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
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factors to assist in determining whether a prison regulation has imper-
missibly impinged upon an inmate's Constitutional rights.
First, there must be a valid, rational connection between the
prison regulation and the legitimate governmental interest put
forward to justify it .... A second factor ... is whether there
are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open
to prison inmates .... A third consideration is the impact ac-
commodation of the asserted constitutional right will have on
guards and other inmates, and on the allocation of prison re-
sources generally .... Finally, the absence of ready alternatives
is evidence of the reasonableness of a prison regulation.5 5
The Tenth Circuit, in Clifton v. Craig5 6 and Hall v. Bellmon 5 7 applied
these standards in holding for prison facilities. Clifton affirmed the dis-
trict court's grant of summary judgment for Leavenworth Federal Peni-
tentiary. 58 Clifton, a pro se appellant, brought an action against a
chaplain for the Federal Bureau of Prisons, objecting to the restrictions
imposed upon the members of the Church of Christ. 59 Specifically, Clif-
ton was not permitted to hold Sunday services for his denomination
apart from other groups of worshippers. 60 The court applied the four
part Turner inquiry to conclude that the restriction on Clifton's religious
practice was a reasonable one.6 1 Similarly, in Hall v. Bellmon, the court
recited the four Turner factors in holding that the cutting of Appellant's
hair and confiscation of his medicine bag and talisman were reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests. Thus, the court affirmed the
district court's 12(b)(6) dismissal of plaintiff's claims. 62 Both of these
opinions give a great deal of deference to prison officials. 63 The only
allowances the court of appeals appeared to make for inmates is in situa-
tions in which the district court fails to apply the Turner factors at all.
Mosier v. Maynard" is such a case. Mosier involved the denial of an
exception to the prison grooming standards. Plaintiff was seeking an
exception based on his Native American religion. The Oklahoma insti-
tution had a policy in effect that would deny such an application unless
the prisoner could prove through outside sources that he sincerely ad-
55. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1113 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoted in Turner v.
Safely, 482 U.S.-78, 89-90 (1987)(citations omitted)).
56. 924 F.2d 182 (10th Cir.1991)(before Anderson, Tacha, and Brorby, Circuit
Judges).
57. 935 F.2d 1106 (10th Cir. 1991)(before Logan, Moore and Baldock, Circuit
Judges).
58. Clifton, 924 F.2d at 183.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 184.
62. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1114. (It should be noted that the court primarily focused on the
question of whether a Martinez report is proper to develop the record and to consider for
the purposes of a 12(b)(6) motion, which it answered in the affirmative).
63. Citon, 924 F.2d at 184. ("This standard gives corrections officials the necessary
leeway to effectively confront the intractable difficulties of administering prison systems
while, at the same time, it keeps the intrusion of the judiciary into such matters at a mini-
mum." Id. (citing O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1987))).
64. 937 F.2d 1521 (10th Cir. 1991)(before Logan, Moore, and Baldock, Circuit
Judges).
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heres to such religion. 6 5 Because the Plaintiff refused to supply the
prison official with supporting evidence,66 the official refused to grant
the exception.
67
The district court granted summary judgment for the institution,
holding the grooming regulation valid and Plaintiff unqualified for an
exception without referring to the Turner factors.68 The Tenth Circuit,
in an opinion written by Judge Baldock, reversed and remanded, articu-
lating the necessity of applying the four Turner factors. The court stated
that the question of whether religious beliefs are sincerely held is a ques-
tion of fact,6 9 which the district court should resolve after further in-
quiry and application of the Turner factors.
7 0
The Tenth Circuit in McKinney v. Maynard,7 1 reiterated the impor-
tance of the Turner factors. The district court dismissed McKinney's
complaint as frivolous,7 2 which alleged a violation of his First Amend-
ment right to practice his Native American religion by the state (prison
officials)7 3 . The Tenth Circuit stated that plaintiff's complaint did con-
tain " 'an arguable basis either in law or in fact,' 74 and therefore va-
cated the dismissal and remanded the case to the district court for
consideration in light of the Turner factors.7 5 The court added, "[w]hile
legitimate penological objectives remain in the balance, those interests
do not categorically negate the mettle of Mr. McKinney's First Amend-
ment claim."
76
65. The prison required the inmate to establish that: "(1) the religion is recognized;
(2) he is an adherent to the religion; (3) the practice of his religion is inhibited by a partic-
ular provision in the grooming code; and (4) the facility's interest in security does not
outweigh his need to practice the religion." Id. at 1522.
66. The Plaintiff refused to identify non family members who would vouch for the
sincerity of his beliefs. Mosier, 937 F.2d at 1526.
67. Id. at 1523.
68. The district court relied on Sixth Circuit law holding that a prison could enforce a
blanket restriction on hair length even if it conflicted with sincere Native American beliefs.
See Pollack v. Marshall, 845 F.2d 656, 657, 659-60 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 987
(1988).
69. The court noted that the plaintiff had presented probative evidence of his reli-
gious beliefs in his compliant, which can be treated as an affidavit. Mosier, 937 F.2d at 1524
(citing Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1111 (10th Cir. 1991)).
70. Mosier, 937 F.2d at 1527.
71. 952 F.2d 350 (before Moore and Tacha, CircuitJudges, and Kane, DistrictJudge,
sitting by designation).
72. Id. at 351. The district court dismissed the complaint as frivolous under 28 U.S.C.
sec 1915(d).
73. Specifically, plaintiff sought damages and injunctive relief to prohibit prison au-
thorities from enforcing the grooming code against him, to have his medicine bag re-
turned,and to permit the construction of a sweat lodge at the facility. McKinney, 352 F.2d
at 351-52.
74. Id. (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)).
75. Id. at 353.
76. Id. at 354.
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III. PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. Employment
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held in Russillo v. Scarborough 77
that an "at will" employee has no property interest in the manner of
their termination. 78 Plaintiff appealed the district court ruling that he
did not have a constitutionally protected property interest in his job79
on the novel theory that he had a property interest in the expectation
that he could only be terminated by his immediate employer. 80 Plain-
tiff's suit for wrongful termination followed his dismissal from the posi-
tion of court administrator as a result of "lax procedures" and the theft
of $29,000.00.81 The court stated that a property interest cannot be had
in the methods by which it is deprived.
8 2
The court cited Campbell v. Mercer,8 3 which held that a property in-
terest is defined by substantive restrictions,8 4 not procedural protec-
tions.8 5 Employees cannot have a property interest in the procedures
involved in their termination, because" 'such a right attaches only when
there are substantive restrictions on the employer's discretion.' "86
B. Fifth Amendment - Takings
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution provides
that private property shall not be taken for public use without just com-
pensation. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in Sangre de Cristo Devel-
opment Co.,Inc. v. United States8 7 held that the Department of Interior's
(DOI) recision of its approval of a lease of Indian land did not constitute
a taking.8 8 Appellant, Sangre de Cristo Development Co., had their
lease of 5,000 acres of Indian land approved by the U.S. Department of
77. 935 F.2d 1167 (10th Cir. 1991)(before Moore and Brorby, Circuit Judges, and
Van Bebber, District Judge, United States District Court for District of Kansas, sitting by
designation).
78. New Mexico law provides that a public employee has a protected property interest
if they have an implied or express right to continued employment. This is distinguishable
from "at will" status, which does not give the employee a legitimate expectation of contin-
ued employment. Id. at 1170 (citing Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976)).
79. Id. at 1170.
80. Russillo was employed by the metropolitan court, but was terminated by the New
Mexico Supreme Court. Id. at 1170.
81. Id. at 1169-70. According to defendant Justice Scarborough, plaintiffwas not ac-
cused of stealing the money.
82. Id. at 1170 (relying on Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532
(1985)).
83. 926 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1991)(before Holloway, Chief Judge, Baldock, Circuit
Judge, and Greene, DistrictJudge, United States District Court for District of Utah, sitting
by designation).
84. State law defines what substantive property rights employees have in their em-
ployment. Campbell, 926 F.2d at 992 (citing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564
(1972)).
85. Campbell, 926 F.2d at 993.
86. Id. at 993 (quoting Asbill v. Housing Authority of Choctaw Nation, 726 F.2d 1499,
1502 (10th Cir. 1984)(emphasis added)).
87. 932 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1991)(before Logan, Anderson, and Ebel, CircuitJudges).
88. Id. at 895.
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the Interior. Their hopes of developing the area into a residential com-
munity and golf course were dashed by DOI's subsequent recission of
their prior approval.8 9 In order to prevail on a takings claim, a plaintiff
must first prove there is a vested interest protected by the Fifth Amend-
ment that was present at the time the taking occurred, and second, that
the government's action was a taking under the Fifth Amendment. 90
Affirming the district court's dismissal of the Fifth Amendment tak-
ings claim, the court of appeals did not address the second prong as they
found there was not a protected interest in the lease at the time of the
recision.9 1 The court reasoned that the lease of the Indian land is only
valid if approved by the Department of the Interior.92 The recision by
the Department was subsequent to a finding by this court that the prior
approval was invalid.9 3 Because the approval was invalid, plaintiff's in-
terest had never vested, making a taking impossible.
The Tenth Circuit also affirmed the dismissal of a Fifth Amendment
takings claim in Miller v. Campbell County9 4 as not ripe for review.9 5
Plaintiffs claimed an excavation order given by the County Commission-
ers due to the discovery of methane and hydrogen gases seeping up
through the ground constituted a "taking" of their homes for which ade-
quate compensation should be given.96 Because the plaintiffs had a re-
verse condemnation action pending in state court to recover
compensation for their loss, an action for taking without just compensa-
tion was unwarranted.9 7 The court also addressed the plaintiff's Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process claim by refusing to impose additional
due process obligations upon parties when the Fifth Amendment takings
clause adequately addresses the issue.98
Kimberley A. Elting
89. Id. at 893.
90. Id. at 894.
91. Id.
92. Id. (citing 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) (1970)).
93. Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1972)(The court of appeals held
that the approval of the lease required an Environmental Impact Statement under NEPA
sec. 4332(2)(C), which the Department had failed to complete).
94. 945 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1991).
95. Id. at 350.
96. Id. at 352.
97. Id. at 351.





The decisions of the Tenth Circuit have covered a wide variety of
contract issues with no concentration in any particular area.' Holdings
ranged from the necessity of explanatory language in a full recourse as-
signment in order to constitute an unconditional guarantee 2 to the lack
of a fiduciary relationship between a manufacturer and a dealer because
of their relatively equal bargaining positions.3 The Tenth Circuit con-
tinues to validate the promises made by parties to a contract and to be
reluctant to find a fiduciary relationship where parties are in relatively
equal bargaining positions.
II. FULL RECOURSE ASSIGNMENT OF NONNEGOTIABLE DOCUMENTS,
ABSENT EXPLANATORY LANGUAGE, IS ONLY A CONDITIONAL
GUARANTEE: MERCANTILE BANK V. FARMERS &
MERCHANTS STATE BANK
4
Under Kansas law, the full recourse assignment of a nonnegotiable
instrument without any other explanatory language is only a conditional
guarantee. Kansas courts have defined two types of guarantees: condi-
tional and unconditional. 5 If the guarantee is conditional, the creditor
must attempt collection from the principal obligor before pursuing the
guarantor.
6
Mercantile State Bank (Mercantile) was assigned promissory notes
and related equipment leases by Farmers & Merchants State Bank
(F&M). The endorsement language on the notes assigning them to Mer-
cantile contained the words "without recourse" but the language on the
leases assigned was "with full recourse." When the lessees defaulted,
Mercantile sued F&M claiming F&M, as assignor of the notes, was re-
1. This survey Article discusses contract cases decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals between December 1990 and December 1991. For more specific areas of con-
tracts combined with other areas of law see the following: for a dual decision in the area of
contracts and antitrust see COMCOA, Inc. v. NEC Telephones, Inc., 931 F.2d 655 (10th
Cir. 1991) (evidence in antitrust case supported use of the changing conditions defense);
for a discussion of contracts in an Intellectual Property setting see Harris Market Research
v. Marshall Marketing and Comm., Inc., 948 F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1991) (inconsistent ver-
dicts sustained allowing development costs as damages in copyright infringement claim).
2. Mercantile Bank v. Farmers & Merchants State Bank, 920 F.2d 1539 (10th Cir.
1990).
3. Devery Implement Co. v.J.I. Case Co., 944 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1991).
4. 920 F.2d 1539 (10th Cir. 1990).
5. Kansas State Bank & Trust Co. v. DeLorean, 640 P.2d 343, 350 (Kan. Ct. App.
1982).
6. Id.; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-3-416 (1983) (guarantees distinguished by "collec-
tion guaranteed" or "payment guaranteed" added to signature; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 3-419(d) (if signautre is accompanied by words guaranteeing collection, the signor
is obligated to pay only if creditor has pursued collection from debtor).
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quired to honor the full recourse assignments of the leases.
7
The United States District Court in Kansas concluded that F&M's
assignment with "full recourse" was a unilateral mistake on F&M's part
and that F&M must bear the responsibility. However, the district court
found that F&M was only secondarily liable. This secondary liability re-
quired Mercantile to make collection efforts against the lessees before it
could recover from F&M. The district court then ruled in favor of F&M
on the grounds that Mercantile failed to attempt collection from the les-
sees prior to pursuing F&M as assignor of the notes.8 Mercantile
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in
part. While noting that an assignor is not normally liable to the assignee
for breaches by the debtor, the Tenth Circuit stated that an assignment
"with full recourse" typically acts as a guarantee by the assignor in case
of breach.9 The next question was whether such a guarantee is uncondi-
tional. The Tenth Circuit accepted the district court's analogy to Article
3 of the Uniform Commercial Code and held that "'full recourse' as-
signment of nonnegotiable documents without any other explanatory lan-
guage is only a conditional guarantee."' 0
Although the Tenth Circuit agreed with the application of Article 3,
it found that the district court erred in applying those principles to four
of the five leases in question." 1 As the district court noted, secondary
liability of an endorser of a negotiable instrument is based on three con-
ditions: presentment, dishonor and notice of dishonor.' 2 In this case,
four out of five lessees signed guarantees that waived presentment.
Under Kansas law, a document which contains a waiver of presentment
by the assignor, is binding on all parties.' 3 Therefore, F&M was liable
on the four leases but not on the fifth lease which did not contain the
waiver. 14
III. PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTRACT: HAMILTON
STORES, INC. v. HODEL 
1 5
Preferential rights arising out of a government contract can only be
asserted when the clear conditions of the rights have not been honored.
This case represents the first time a federal circuit court has addressed
these distinctions in preferential rights arising out of government
contracts.
Hamilton Stores, Inc. (Hamilton) was a concession contractor at
7. Mercantile Bank, 920 F.2d at 1541.
8. Id at 1543.
9. Id at 1544.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1545.
12. Id.
13. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-3-511(6) (1983). "Where a waiver of presentment or notice
or protest is embodied in the instrument itself it is binding upon all parties. ...
14. Mercantile Bank, 920 F.2d at 1545.
15. 925 F.2d 1272 (10th Cir. 1991).
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Yellowstone National Park. Under the terms of its long-term contract,
Hamilton had a preferential right of first refusal for new or additional
services or accommodations. The Park Service had a similar contract
with another concessionaire, Yellowstone Park Co. but was dissatisfied
with its service. The Park Service therefore sought a new concessionaire
and invited bids, including one from Hamilton. When the Park Service
awarded the contract to another bidder, Hamilton sued claiming both
that the Park Service did not correctly follow statutory procedure, 16 and
that it failed to honor Hamilton's contractual rights. The district court
granted summary judgment to the Park Service.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment. While Hamilton had a right to bid for the contract replacing
Yellowstone Park Co., the Park Service had no obligation to award the
contract to Hamilton. 17 The decision found that Hamilton's preferen-
tial rights to contract for new services were not jeopardized because the
awarded contract was not for new services or accomodations but for ex-
isting services. 18 The Park Service applied the proper regulation when
denying Hamilton's bid. 19
IV. EQUrrABLE RELIEF TO ALLOW LATE NOTICE OF LEASE RENEWAL:
CAR-X SERVICE SYSTEMS, INc. v. KIDD-HELLER
2 0
Equitable relief is appropriate, under Kansas law, even in the face of
a clear unambiguous lease when the lessee would suffer relatively great
harm compared with the harm imposed on the lessor. This approach to
equitable relief follows the tradition of Kansas law.2 1 This decision rep-
resents the first time the Tenth Circuit has analyzed the issue of equita-
ble relief where an unambiguous contract exists.
Kidd-Heller, a subtenant, leased real property to Car-X Services
Systems, Inc. (Car-X). The lease provided for a ten-year term with an
option to extend the lease for five years if six-months notice was pro-
vided. If the option was exercised, the lease payments were to increase.
Car-X then subleased to Mufflers of Kansas City, Inc. (Mufflers) which
opened an automobile repair shop on the premises. The sublease
agreement made Mufflers subject to the terms and conditions of the
lease agreement between Car-X and Kidd-Heller. A dispute arose over
Mufflers' failure to obtain permission for certain improvements to the
property and Kidd-Heller threatened suit. The situation was resolved
16. 36 C.F.R. § 51.6 (1980).
17. Hamilton Stores, 925 F.2d at 1281-82. Hamilton argued that the Park Service had
applied the wrong regulation in denying Hamilton's contract bid. Hamilton asserted that
the regulation applicable to additional services applied. 36 C.F.R. § 51.6 (1989).
18. Id. at 1281.
19. Id at 1282. See 36 C.F.R. § 51.4 (1989).
20. 927 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1991).
21. In a situatin where a contract must be forfeited because existing conditions make
strict performance unjust and inquitable, it is proper for the court to order equitable relief.
Id. at 515 (quoting Nelson v. Robinson, 336 P.2d 415, 420 (Kan. 1959)).
1992] 897
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
when Mufflers agreed to pay additional monthly sums and Kidd-Heller
agreed not to file suit.
Car-X gave notice to renew the lease when the ten-year term ex-
pired, but this notice was not given six months prior to expiration as
required in the lease. Kidd-Heller then terminated the lease. Car-X
sought a district court action for equitable and other relief. The district
court found that equitable relief was available to allow acceptance of the
untimely renewal notice. The court also found that Kidd-Heller was un-
justly enriched by Mufflers' payment on the agreement to forbear suit
and ordered the return of $7,300.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of equitable relief22 but re-
versed the unjust enrichment award.23 Since Kansas law provided no
guidance, the district court looked to the trends in other jurisdictions
2 4
in ruling that equitable relief applied. Although the lease was clear and
unambiguous in its terms, Car-X would suffer relatively great harm if
forfeiture occurred. Car-X had operated a successful business on the
leased premises for ten years,2 5 and termination of its lease, which
would disrupt it operations would cause severe economic loss. The
court then balanced this with the incidental harm Kidd-Heller would
suffer since Kidd-Heller would continue to receive lease payments at an
increased rate and had taken no substantial steps to find another
lessor.
2 6
The Tenth Circuit reversed the award for unjust enrichment, find-
ing that forbearance to sue constitutes adequate consideration for a con-
tract.27 The Kansas Supreme Court has ruled that relinquishment of a
legal right is sufficient consideration for a promise, notwithstanding
whether the party would have prevailed in the threatened suit.28 How-
ever, forbearance as adequate consideration carries the requirement
that the claim be non-frivolous. 2 9 The Tenth Circuit then concluded
that Kidd-Heller had a reasonable and sincere belief in the validity of
22. Car-X, 927 F.2d at 517. Kansas law provided no direct authority on the fact situa-
tion in the present case, but the court of appeals agreed with the district judge's applica-
tion of the dominant views in other jurisdictions.
In using its "discretion to anticipate the rule state courts in similar circumstances
likely would make[,]" Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv. Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1332 (10th
Cir. 1983), federal courts "may consider all resources, including... the general weight
and trend of authority." Hartford v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 617 F.2d 567, 569 (10th Cir.
1980).
23. Car-X, 927 F.2d at 517.
24. See Gardner v. HKT Realty Corp., 744 S.W.2d 735, 737-38 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988);
Linn Corp. v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 424 N.E.2d 676, 678-79 (Ill. Ct. App. 1981); Wharf
Restaurant, Inc. v. Port of Seattle, 605 P.2d 334, 340-41 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979); Sosanie v.
Pernetti Holding Corp., 279 A.2d 904, 907-08 (NJ. Super. 1971).
25. Car-X, 927 F.2d at 516.
26. Id. at 517.
27. Id
28. EVCO Distfib., Inc. v. Brandau, 626 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981). See
also Frets v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 712 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Kan. 1986) (legal right
is sufficient consideration for a promise); Snuffer v. Westbrook, 795 P.2d 950, 951 (Kan.
1932) (forebearance is usually sufficient consideration for a contract).
29. EVCO, 626 P.2d at 1196-97. "Forbearance to sue can be good consideration ... if




V. No BREACH OF IMPLIED DuTY OF GOOD FArrH UNDER JOINT
OPERATING AGREEMENT ABSENT BREACH OF SPECIFIC
CONTRACT PROVISIONS: DAVIS v. TXO PRODUCTION
CORP. 
3 1
Based on Oklahoma law, the Tenth Circuit found no breach of im-
plied duty of good faith to perform under an operating agreement ab-
sent breach of specific contractual provisions. This decision conforms
to Tenth Circuit precedent concerning the existence of a joint venture
between parties to an operating agreement.
3 2
As operator under a joint operating agreement, William Davis (Da-
vis) brought suit against the owner of a nonoperating interest, TXO Pro-
duction Corp. (TXO). Davis asserted that TXO had breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by making false and ma-
licious statements concerning Davis's operation of oil and gas units.
The district court dismissed Davis's claim for failure to state a cause of
action for which relief could be granted. On appeal, the judgment was
affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit applied the district court's analysis that Davis's
claim arose out of a recognized fiduciary duty between co-tenants of an
oil and gas lease.3 3 Here, no breach existed because TXO had per-
formed on its obligations under the express covenants of the contract.
There was no evidence, therefore, to indicate that TXO breached its
implied duty to perform.
3 4
The court also rejected Davis's argument that an implied duty of
good faith exists independent of a fiduciary duty. Davis based its argu-
ment on the concept that neither party may do anything to impede the
other party's right to the "fruits of the contract,"3 5 but the facts of this
case did not present a such a situation. Davis did not adequately allege
he was deprived of any fruits of the contract or that TXO's actions
harmed the joint estate.3 6 The joint operating agreement did not spec-
ify a plan for unitization or require TXO's cooperation with such a
plan,3 7 and the agreement did not prohibit TXO from voicing its opin-
ion of the operators.3 8
30. Car-X, 927 F.2d at 518.
31. 929 F.2d 1515 (10th Cir. 1991).
32. Frankfort Oil Co. v. Snakard, 279 F.2d 436, 443 (10th Cir. 1960).
33. See Teel v. Public Serv. Co, 767 P.2d 391, 396 (Okla. 1985).
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VI. EXPECTATION DAMAGES APPLY IN BREACH OF CONTRACT FROM
CANCELLED ORDERS: ORAL-X CORPORATION v. FARNAM
COMPANIES, INC 3 9
A product supplier is entitled to damages for royalties on cancelled
orders. Through this decision, the Tenth Circuit maintains the tradition
of awarding damages so that the non-breaching party is placed in the
position he or she would have been in had the breach not occurred.40
Oral-X Corp. (Oral) is a manufacturer of nutritional paste for hor-
ses. Famam Companies, Inc. (Famam) is a large nation-wide seller of
horse care products. These parties entered into a contract that required
Oral to manufacture and sell its product to Farnam for a specified price
plus a ten percent royalty on the ultimate sale price. Farnam cancelled
several orders and terminated the contract after discovering that a small
amount of Oral's product was improperly manufactured. Oral sued
Farnam for the purchase price and royalties for products received and
sold by Farnam as well as the royalties on orders cancelled by Famam.
Famam counterclaimed on the basis of breach of express and implied
warranties of merchantability.
The district court concluded that the product did not breach any
warranties and awarded damages to Oral-X for the unpaid production
costs and royalites on the products actually shipped.4 1 However, it did
not award royalites on orders placed and cancelled by Famam4 2 because
the price and uncertainty of an actual sale were too "speculative." ' 43
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment that no
warranties of merchantibility were breached. Although Oral-X shipped
a small amount of defective product to Famam, "[t]his slight variation
did not constitute a material breach of contract excusing Farnam's
performance."
'44
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court decision not to award
damages for royalties on cancelled orders based on uncertainty about
the sale and price of the product.4 5 Oral-X was entitled to recover roy-
alty payments it would have received had Farnam performed. This de-
termination was based on the established proposition that damages are
awarded to place the non-breaching party in the same position as if the
contract been performed. 46 Had Famam performed and sold the prod-
uct, Oral-X would have received royalties on the product sold. Further,
the contract itself established Oral-X's expectation that it would receive
39. 931 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1991).
40. Id. at 670 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1981); J.
CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 14-4 (3d ed. 1987) (citing U.C.C. § 1-106; 5 ARTHUR
LINTON CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 992 (1964); CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 137
(1934); 11 SAMUEL WILUSTON, CONTRACTS § 1338 (1968)).
41. Oral-X, 931 F.2d at 668.
42. Id
43. Id at 671.
44. Id at 670. SeeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10-2 (3d
ed. 1988).
45. Oral-X, 931 F.2d at 671.
46. See A.R.A. Mfg. Co. v. Pierce, 341 P.2d 928, 932 (Ariz. 1959).
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royalties after the product was sold.47 The district court's distinction
between the orders Oral-X shipped and those Farnam cancelled was er-
roneous in both cases because although the amount of royalties due
would be difficult to determine, recovery for lost profits should not be
denied.4 8 The court then remanded for determination of damages
based on the orders Farnam cancelled.
VIi. NONOCCURRENCE OF CONDITION PRECEDENT DIscHARGEs DuTY
TO PERFORM: B-B COMPANY V. PIPER JAFFRAY &
HOPWOOD, INC.
4 9
When a contract is based on the occurrence of some future event,
such as obtaining approval for a special improvement district, nonoccur-
rence of such a condition precedent discharges the other party's duty to
perform. The following case illustrates the established principle that
failure of a condition precedent invalidates the contract. 50
B-B Co. (BB) planned to use proceeds from special improvement
district bonds to purchase and develop resort property. BB was to ar-
range for industrial revenue bonds from the municipal government
while Piper Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc. (Piper) would underwrite the
bonds. BB was was unable to get approval'for the special improvement
districts and Piper refused to underwrite the project. BB sued Piper for
breach of promise to underwrite the bonds. After hearing arguments,
the district court granted Piper's motion for summary judgment holding
that B-B had failed to meet an essential condition precedent. 5 1
The Tenth Circuit affirmed after giving BB's argument closer scru-
tiny.52 BB asserted that the original agreement with Piper was based on
Piper's promise to underwrite about $2,000,000 in bonds for the pro-
ject. BB claimed that Piper's failure to underwrite the bonds forced it to
abandon the project at considerable time and expense. However, the
Tenth Circuit found that since BB was unable to arrange for the special
improvement districts there was nothing for Piper to underwrite. 5 A
condition precedent existed for BB to establish the special improvement
districts. 54 When this condition was not satisfied, Piper's duty of per-
formance under the contract was discharged.
55
47. Oral-X, 931 F.2d at 670.
48. Id
49. 931 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1991).
50. Absent case precedent, the Tenth Circuit based its decision on secondary author-
ity. "Non-occurrence of a condition precedent discharges the other party's duty of per-
formance." Id at 678. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 275(1) & (2)
(1981).
51. B-B Co., 931 F.2d at 676.
52. Id
53. I at 678.
54. Id "A condition precedent is defined as an act or event, other than a lapse of
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VIII. STANDARD FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP OF JOINT VENTURERS MAY
BE CONTRACTED AWAY: DIME Box PETROLEUM CORP. v.
LOUISIANA LAND AND EXPLORATION Co.
5 6
The Tenth Circuit found that the parties in ajoint venture may con-
tract for a different relationship than the standard fiduciary relationship
usually found in ajoint venture agreement. Absent an agreement to the
contrary, Tenth Circuit cases have held that a fiduciary relationship ex-
ists in a joint venture.
5 7
Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. (LL&E) and Dime Box Petro-
leum (Dime Box) entered into certain agreements, including one "farm-
out" agreement, 58 to acquire and develop oil and gas leases. Subse-
quently, the parties entered into an operating agreement which desig-
nated LL&E as operator. The agreement gave LL&E the duty to drill,
complete and produce wells, and Dime Box had a duty to pay its propor-
tionate share of the costs and expenses. Dime Box brought suit claiming
LL&E breached its fiduciary duty under the operating agreement based
on overcharges and fraud. LL&E counterclaimed that Dime Box had
breached its agreement to pay for its share of the acquisition of oil and
gas leases.
The district court held in favor of LL&E since the operating agree-
ment was not ajoint venture agreement and concluded that no fiduciary
relationship had been created. 59
While the Tenth Circuit affirmed, it disagreed with the lower court's
analysis that no joint venture was created by the operating agreement.
The facts at trial established a joint venture:60 the parties had a joint
interest in the leases; they had an express agreement to share in the
profits or losses; and their conduct showed cooperation in the ven-
ture.6 ' The court further found that the nature of this joint venture cre-
ated a fiduciary relationship based on LL&E's control over the
operation 62 but the parties had contracted for a different standard than
that which is traditionally applied to fiduciaries. The operating agree-
ment provided that "operator has no liability to nonoperator for negli-
gence or unintentional misconduct." 63 While such a standard is not the
traditional measure of a fiduciary relationship, the trial court did not err
in concluding the parties contracted for a standard that modified the
56. 938 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1991).
57. See Rajara v. Allied Corp., 919 F.2d 610, 623 (10th Cir. 1990); Cascade Energy
and Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1570 (10th Cir. 1990).
58. A "farm-out" agreement occurs when an oil and gas lessee agrees to assign its
lease to another party who earns its interest in the leased minerals by drilling a well.
59. 717 F. Supp. 717 (D. Colo. 1989).
60. In Colorado, three elements are required to establish a joint venture: a joint in-
terest in property; an express or implied agreement to share in the profits or losses and
conduct showing cooperation in the venture. Dime Box, at 1147. See Agland, Inc. v. Koch
Truck Line, Inc., 757 P.2d 1138 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Fullenwider v. Writer Corp., 544
P.2d 408, 410 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975).
61. Dime Box, 938 F.2d at 1147.
62. Id.




IX. ABSENT EVIDENCE OF No ARMS-LENGTH BARGAIN, FIDUCIARY
RELATIONSHIP DOES NOT EXIST: DEVERY IMPLEMENT Co. v.
J.L CASE CO.
65
Based on Oklahoma law, the Tenth Circuit held that a farm equip-
ment manufacturer did not have a fiduciary relationship with a dealer
under a dealership agreement because there was no evidence that the
parties were not bargaining at arms length at the time of the agreement.
This decision is based on the Oklahoma practice of looking for lack of an
arms-length transaction before finding a fiduciary duty.
66
Devery Implement Co. (Devery), a farm equipment dealer, sold
parts and service for Steiger tractors. 67 Devery brought an action
against J.I. Case Co. (Case)68 after Case terminated the dealership
agreement for lack of sales. Devery claimed that the termination consti-
tuted a breach of fiduciary duty by Case.
Ajury returned a verdict for Devery finding that a fiduciary relation-
ship existed between Devery and Case.69 The Tenth Circuit reversed
the jury verdict finding no evidence to indicate that the parties had not
bargained at arms length.70 The decision stated that the district court's
ruling on the existence of a fiduciary relationship was "inherently con-
tradictory"71 because it found the agreement could be terminated at
will, which indicates an arms-length bargain, but also that a fiduciary
relationship could exist in the contract which implicates lack of an arms-
length transaction.
72
The Tenth Circuit also looked to other Oklahoma precedent to de-
termine whether a fiduciary relationship existed in this case. In
Oklahoma, a fiduciary relationship can arise when confidence or trust
from one party establishes the dominance or control of another.73 The
facts in this case, however, were not indicative of a fiduciary relationship,
particularly because Devery did not sell Steiger products as its primary
line. Devery sold several other lines, indicating that Devery was not in a
weak position relative to Case, therefore it could not be concluded that
Devery was forced to substitute Case's will for its own.74 The court con-
cluded that a fiduciary duty could arise out of a dealership agreement if
64. Id at 1148.
65. 944 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1991).
66. Id at 730 (citing Appleman v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 217 F.2d 843,
848-49 (10th Cir. 1955).
67. Steiger Tractors Inc. was also a defendant named in this action.
68. Tenneco, Inc. acquired Stieger Tractors, Inc. and subsequently assigned Steiger
to J.I. Case Company, one of Tenneco, Inc's subsidiaries.
69. Devery, 944 F.2d at 725.
70. Id. at 732.
71. Id at 731.
72. Id
73. Id at 729.
74. Id. at 731.
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the facts showed an imposition of trust and confidence. 75
X. WAIVER OF REFUND BY VOLUNTARILY PAYING PRICES IN EXCESS OF
CONTRACT: PRENALTA CORP. V COLORADO INTERSTATE GAS Co.
7 6
The Tenth Circuit found that sufficient evidence existed to remand
the case on the issue of whether Colorado Interstate Gas Co. (CIG)
waived its right to pay the escalated base price of a gas purchase contract
by paying a higher price during settlement negotiations. This decision
applies the "voluntary payment" rule, recognized under Wyoming law,
which holds that a party may not later recover damages for payments
made voluntarily.
77
Prenalta Corp. (Prenalta) and other parties named in the action,
owned working interests in several natural gas wells in Wyoming. CIG
is a company that purchases and transports gas. Prenalta and CIG en-
tered into long-term contracts whereby CIG would purchase the gas
produced from Prenalta's wells. At the time the contracts were exe-
cuted, the price of gas was regulated by the federal government.
78
However, Prenalta, anticipating deregulation and a resulting decrease in
gas prices negotiated as part of the agreement with CIG for "take-or-
pay" clauses,79 and a clause permitting it to seek a redetermination of
the price for gas under the contract. If Prenalta failed to seek redetermi-
nation of prices within six months after deregulation, the price-escalat-
ing provisions of the contract would take effect. When deregulation
occurred, CIG refused to make payments to Prenalta based on the
"take-or-pay" provision. After negotiations failed, Prenalta brought
suit.
The district court granted summary judgment to CIG, finding that
the contract provision was clear and unambiguous.8 0 Further, Prenalta
was entitled to a refund of any prices paid over the amount set forth in
the escalated-price base.
8 1
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded finding there was suffi-
cient evidence to present a factual question as to whether CIG waived its
right to a refund.8 2 "Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right manifested in an unequivocal manner."8 3 CIG's retroactive
75. Id. at 730.
76. 944 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1991).
77. Fulton v. DesJardins, 227 P.2d 240, 245 (Wyo. 1951).
78. Interstate transport and sale of gas under these contracts was regulated by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (F.E.R.C.) until January 1, 1985, when the prices
under two of the contracts were deregulated by the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15
U.S.C. § 3331 (1978). Id. at 679.
79. A take-or-pay clause requires the purchaser to take a minimum quantity of gas
annually from a well or pay for a specified quantity whether actually taken from the well-
site or not. Id. at 680.
80. Id. at 684.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 685.
83. Id. (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Albany County School Dist. No. 1,
763 P.2d 1255, 1262 (Wyo. 1988).
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and continuous payments presented a question of fact of whether it had
intentionally relinquished its claim to the refund. Wyoming law regard-
ing voluntary payments precluded GIG from asserting entitlement to a




The cases analyzed follow the well-established principle of holding
parties to the promises made, especially when changing circumstances
such as deregulated gas prices make the contract less than an ideal bar-
gain. The Tenth Circuit continues to be reluctant to find a fiduciary
relationship where the contracting parties are in relatively equal
positions.
In sum, this year's Tenth Circuit decisions have been consistent
with those of past years. Given current economic trends, decisions in
contract law will probably continue to hold parties to the conditions of
their contracts and not hold one party more responsible than another
unless there is clear evidence of dominance or control.
Eileen A. Bonnet
84. ld "[M]oney voluntarily paid under a claim of right to the payment, and with
knowledge of the facts by the person making the payment, cannot be recovered back on
the ground that... there was no liability to pay in the first instance." (quoting Fulton v.
DesJardins, 227 P.2d 240, 245 (Wyo. 1951).
1992]

CORPORATE AND COMMERCIAL LAW SURVEY
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1991 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided twelve cases of
interest dealing with Commercial and Corporate Law. Four of the cases
involve banking, four address corporations or contracts issues, three are
trade regulations cases and the last is a joint venture case.
The four banking cases represent the more important develop-
ments in 1991, reflecting the continued deference and broad construc-
tion the Tenth Circuit affords banking legislation in the face of
continuing economic difficulties. The remaining eight cases evidence a
more straightforward approach toward the application of existing law.
This Article addresses each of these twelve cases and highlights the judi-
cial restraint and conservative approach exhibited by the court.
II. BANKING CASES
Historical Background
The savings and loan crisis of the past decade generated much at-
tention, spurring federal regulation designed to strengthen the entire
banking system.1 In 1989, Congress passed the Financial Institutions
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA)2 in response
to financial industry failures. This law created the Resolution Trust Cor-
poration (RTC) and gave it authority to override state branch banking
laws, which precluded banks obtaining failing or failed thrifts through
emergency acquisitions from operating these thrifts as branches.3 On
June 1, 1990, pursuant to the provisions of FIRREA, the RTC issued a
regulation known as the "Override Regulation." '4 This regulation en-
ables the RTC to sell a branch of a failed savings and loan to a bank,
which may then operate the facility as its own branch, notwithstanding
state prohibitions on branching within the state.5
JUDICIAL DEFERENCE UNDER FIRREA AND OTHER ACTS
A. The Validity of the Override Regulation: State of Colorado v.
Resolution Trust Corp.
6
In 1991 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with the
issue of the validity of the Override Regulation. The case was combined
1. Ronald R. Glancz, Thrift Industry Restructured- An Overview of FIRREA, 36 FED. BAR
NEWS &J. 472, 472 (1989).
2. Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L.
101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (Aug. 9, 1989).
3. Id at § 501.
4. 12 C.F.R. § 1611.1 (1990).
5. Id.
6. 926 F.2d 931 (10th Cir. 1991).
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from a New Mexico case in which the federal district court upheld the
regulation, 7 and a Colorado case in which the federal district court de-
termined the regulation to be void and contrary to the provisions of
FIRREA.8 The Tenth Circuit held that the RTC's interpretation of FIR-
REA rests on a permissible construction of the statute and that Congress
had properly granted broad rulemaking authority to the RTC.9 Thus,
the court upheld the Override Regulation and ruled that FIRREA can
serve as a source of federal branching authority.' 0 Additionally, the
court held that the RTC regulation violates neither the McFadden Act
nor the Regulatory Flexibility Act. "1
The court first narrowly framed the issue as whether an override of
anti-branch banking law is a valid exercise of the RTC's rulemaking
power under FIRREA.12 Answering affirmatively, the court relied on
Chevron, Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council 13 for the proposition that
where Congress has spoken unambiguously to the power of an agency
courts are required to give effect to that intent.1 4 The court found clear,
unambiguous language indicating that the Emergency Acquisitions pro-
visions of FIRREA provide the RTC authority to issue a regulation over-
riding state branching laws that preclude nationally chartered banks
from converting acquired failed thrifts into branches.15 Employing a
sweeping standard of deference, the court held that RTC's interpreta-
tion that FIRREA authorized its actions was proper, given the back-
ground and language of FIRREA and legislative intent giving the RTC
broad authority in implementing FIRREA. The court found especially
persuasive the fact that the statute explicitly applied "notwithstanding
any provision of state law."' 6 Next, the court considered the states' ar-
gument that the RTC regulation directly conflicted with the McFadden
Act, which both Colorado and New Mexico contended was the exclusive
source of national bank branch approval.17 The court gave great defer-
ence to the Comptroller's interpretation of the National Banking Act,
and by doing so, implicitly held that FIRREA exists as an independent
source of federal branching authority.
Although much of the majority opinion is devoted to the statutory
construction of FIRREA and the RTC's authority to override state
branch banking laws, the decision has other significance. One practical
7. Independent Community Bankers Ass'n v. Resolution Trust Corp., No. Civ.- 90-
0532SG, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18584 (D. N.M. June 15, 1990).
8. State of Colorado v. Resolution Trust Corp., No. 90-Z-190, 1990WL51191, (D.
Colo. Feb. 14, 1991).
9. 926 F.2d at 936-37.
10. Id. at 944-45.
11. Id at 945-48.
12. it at 936.
13. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
14. 926 F.2d at 936.
15. Id at 936-37.
16. Id at 937 (relying on this language, the court stated that it grants the Resolution
Trust Corporation broad authority to override state law that interferes with enumerated
emergency acquisitions).
17. Id. at 945.
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result of the decision is that it enlarges the class of potential purchasers
of failed thrifts. Pursuant to the RTC regulation, bank holding compa-
nies no longer possess exclusive authority to purchase a thrift with facili-
ties in multiple counties because now single unit commercial banks may
also enter the bidding process. This invites hightened competitive bid-
ding, which may result in lower costs to the American public.
Additionally, although the RTC regulation in question only
preempts state laws barring intrastate branching, FIRREA may be inter-
preted as providing a source of authority for intrastate branching. This
is because the RTC may rely upon this precedent and upon the override
powers to supplant other ,limitations. Also, given the continuing na-
tional trend in the banking industry toward consolidation and centraliza-
tion and the RTC's apparent preference for selling thrifts in their
entirety rather than in a piecemeal fashion to presumably larger banks
or holding companies, these larger institutions may gain a significant
advantage due to the broad lender authority that results from a network
of branches. These suppositions, when compounded with the fact that
many larger institutions are nationally chartered banks, make it clear
that the decision could, in effect, promote the erosion of the competitive
equality doctrine. Finally, despite the fact that many states are gradually
legislatively authorizing branch banking anyway, this precedent of defer-
ential review may be read to extend to other, non-branching-related
state banking laws.
B. The Standard and Scope of review of Banking Insolvency Decisions:
Franklin Savings Ass'n v. Director, Office of Thrift
Supervision' 8
Franklin Savings addressed the appropriate scope and standard of
review to be used by a court when a bank challenges the Director of the
Office of Thrift Supervision (Director) in his decision to appoint the
RTC as conservator. The Tenth Circuit held that review is limited to the
administrative record, and that the appointment may be set aside only if
the decision is arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise
not in accordance with law. 19 The decision shows that the court gives
great deference to the regulator as an expert decision maker, and that
judicial review of evidence outside of the administrative record will be
upheld only in very limited circumstances.
20
In Franklin Savings, a state-chartered savings and loan association
and its parent company brought suit challenging the Director's decision
to appoint a conservator for the thrift. The Director had determined the
thrift to be unsafe and unsound to transact business due to its aggressive
and financially risky operative strategies. The thrift's management chal-
lenged the Director's decision and conclusions.
18. 934 F.2d 1127 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 60 U.S.L.W. 3652 (U.S. Mar. 23, 1992)
(No. 91-1139).
19. Id. at 1142.
20. Id. at 1139-40.
19921
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The district court had conducted a hybrid, de novo review allowing
counsel for the the thrift to cross-examine witnesses, depose expert wit-
nesses and submit other evidence outside of the three-volume adminis-
trative record. The district court found that the Director lacked any
factual basis for appointing a conservator and that the appointment was
arbitrary and capricious. The court then ordered the removal of the
conservator.
2 1
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court.
22
The court first framed the issue as whether a district court can base its
decision on evidence outside of the administrative record, and what de-
gree of deference is due a Director's decision to appoint a conservator.
After finding no guidance in the organic law, the court found that the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) confined the scope of review of a
challenged appointment of a conservator under FIRREA to the informa-
tion before the Director at the time of the decision. Thus, the adminis-
trative record provided the limits of review. 23 After reviewing the
statutory scheme, the legislative history, the APA and the applicable
state law the Tenth Circuit made it clear that the reviewing court should
be particularly deferential when judging an agency's predictive judg-
ment, and that in cases like Franklin Savings, the decisions regarding in-
solvency remain particularly within the agency's field of discretion and
expertise.2 4 While the court reaffirmed the arbitrariness, capricious-
ness, and abuse of discretion standard, it seems to have applied a nar-
row, seemingly erroneous standard.
Franklin Savings demonstrates that the court will give broad defer-
ence to challenged decisions made by regulators of financial institutions
regarding future financial stability. The Tenth Circuit's rather broad in-
terpretation of the APA implicitly presumes that the Director's decision
is correct, thereby making challenges difficult. In view of well-settled
administrative law in this area, the Franklin Savings decision appears de-
fensible. The decision further demonstrates the great deference the
Tenth Circuit gives to regulators in this area. While the trial court ap-
parently viewed its role quite broadly, the appellate court narrowed the
permissible examination, crafting a standard of review that in practice
inhibits successful regulatory challenges.
C. Decision to Close Bank for Insolvency is Unreviewable in a Pre-closure
Proceeding: American Bank, N.A. v. Clarke
2 5
In American Bank, N.A. v. Clarke, the Tenth Circuit held that the
Comptroller's decision to close a bank determined to be insolvent is un-
reviewable in pre-closure proceedings. 2 6 American Bank had been
21. Id. at 1135-36.
22. Id. at 1151.
23. Id. at 1137.
24. Id. at 1145-46.
25. 933 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1991).
26. Id at 901.
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purchased by a group of investors who were informed, pre-sale, that the
bank required an infusion of $2.4 million to raise its equity capital to the
minimum regulatory level. The investors made this cash infusion and
bought the bank. Yet after examining the financial state of the bank
again and determining that additional losses necessitated further capital
influx, the Comptroller threatened to declare the bank insolvent and
place it into FDIC receivership. After notice of a pending closure, the
bank obtained an injunction on the grounds that the Comptroller
should not be able to make a demand for new capital so soon after a
purchase, and the new owners should be given more time to make the
bank profitable.
27
The district court found the bank's arguments persuasive and tem-
porarily enjoined the Comptroller from closing the bank. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court, relying on Adams v.
Nagle,28 a 1938 U. S. Supreme Court decision holding that the Comp-
troller's decision to close a bank determined to be insolvent is unreview-
able in a pre-closure proceeding. 29 The court rejected the bank's
argument that the APA overruled Adams and noted that the APA pre-
cludes judicial review of agency action when agencies are given discre-
tionary decision-making powers or when review is precluded by another
statute.3 0 The court concluded there was neither a relevant statutory
grant of discretion nor a preclusion of review in this instance. Nonethe-
less, after looking at express language in the enabling statute, the statu-
tory scheme, the statutory objectives, the legislative history and the
nature of the administrative action involved, the court found no clear
evidence of legislative intent that pre-closure decisions are unreview-
able.3 1 The court found that the language of the statute authorizing the
Comptroller to appoint a receiver for insolvent banks gave the Comp-
troller great discretion. Furthermore, the court determined that while a
subsequent revision of the National Bank Act provides for review of
such decisions, the review here was explicitly post-closure. Finally, the
court recognized that judicial intervention preventing or postponing
bank closures would reduce the Comptroller's ability to respond to rap-
idly changing circumstances of banking activity, thus defeating the pur-
pose of the banking laws.3 2 Once again this case demonstrates the
Tenth Circuit's unwillingness to second-guess regulators' determina-
tions of bank insolvency-an area where regulator expertise is pre-
sumed. In doing so, the court broadens the scope of non-reviewability
under the APA.
27. IdL at 900-01.
28. 303 U.S. 532 (1938).
29. 933 F.2d at 901.
30. Id. at 902.
31. Id. at 903-04.
32. Id. at 903.
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D. Setoff Based on Two Separate and Unrelated Commercial Transactions
During Receivership is Impermissible: Grady Properties Co. v.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corp.
33
Under the National Bank Act, when a bank is declared insolvent and
it goes into receivership, the debts of the institution are prioritized for
repayment and the general creditors stand in line for repayment with
other creditors.3 4 Often, however, there are several transactions be-
tween the institution and its creditors, which, if offset, reduce the
amount of loss suffered by the creditor. Conceivably, such a setoff can
increase the potential liability of the federal insuring agencies.
In Grady Properties, a bank, later declared insolvent, owed fees to a
law firm. The law firm owned land encumbered by mortgage liens held
by the bank. Following the bank's insolvency and reorganization, the
law firm transferred its interest in the encumbered land and assigned its
accounts receivable in the fees owed by the bank to Grady Properties.
Grady Properties notified the bank that it had offset the mortgages on
the land against the debts of the insolvent bank. The reorganized bank,
however, refused to accept Grady's offset. Grady Properties brought a
quiet title action on the properties encumbered by the mortgages, claim-
ing that the mortgages should be canceled due to the refusal of Grady's
attempted setoff. The reorganized bank itself was deemed insolvent and
FSLIC became its receiver. FSLIC removed the action to federal court.
The district court determined that the setoff was based on two sepa-
rate, unrelated commercial transactions completed without the agree-
ment of the reorganized savings and loan.3 5 The district court stated
that since the reorganized bank had rejected the setoff, Grady Properties
had to stand in line with the bank's other general creditors. The Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision, stating
that the case of Scott v. Armstrong3 6 provides the correct rule for setoffs
under the National Banking Act. The Scott decision stated that setoff is
not prohibited by the national banking laws when the agreements un-
derlying the setoff demonstrate the contemplation of a mutual transac-
tion.3 7 Furthermore, setoff agreements may be implied from the nature
of the transactions. 3 8 The Tenth Circuit held, however, that the Grady
Properties transactions were separate and unrelated commercial transac-
tions which did not comport with mutuality of obligation as defined in
Scott.3 9
33. 927 F.2d 528 (10th Cir. 1991).
34. Kevin J. Foley, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation v. Wood: The FDIC, the Failed
Bank, and the Seemingly Insurmountable Presumption, 17 U. TOL. L. REv. 693, 712 (1986).
35. 927 F.2d at 530.
36. 146 U.S. 499 (1892).
37. 927 F.2d at 531.
38. Id




In the area ofjoint ventures the Tenth Circuit in Sullivan v. Scoular
Grain Co.40 returns again to a hands-off approach to the interpretation of
a federal statute. Sullivan dealt with the Federal Employer Liability Act
(FELA),4 1 which governs the liability of federal employers when they are
sued in tort for injuries to employees. The trend in this area has re-
cently been toward interpretary deregulation. In the face of financial
instability, regulators have merely redefined organizations falling within
their regulatory authority. In this context, FELA has been interpreted to
exclude companies owning railroad track and cars from the definition of
"common carrier" unless they carry the public for hire.4 2
In Sullivan, Scoular Grain Company and Freeport, a commercial
warehouse lessor, entered into a joint venture to provide commercial
grain storage at a railroad yard. Scoular paid for workers compensation
insurance and ran the daily operations. An employee of the joint ven-
ture lost his left arm and leg while unloading grain at the railroad yard.
After collecting $200,000 in worker's compensation benefits, the em-
ployee sued the joint venture, the two businesses and the railroad for
negligence under FELA. One of the venturers paid workers compensa-
tion premiums and both companies claimed immunity under the state's
worker compensation statute. In addition, both companies asserted that
they were not "common carriers" within the meaning of the term in
FELA. The district court exercized pendant jurisdiction over the state
law claims, granted summary judgment for the joint venture on both
issues and found that there was no genuine issue of material fact regard-
ing either the status of the companies as common carriers, or their im-
munity under the Utah workers compensation statute.
43
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court, holding that although
the two companies received grain shipped by railroad companies and
stored grain adjacent to the tracks owned by railroad companies, their
operations were not sufficient to bring them within the statutory defini-
tion of common carrier under FELA. 44 Additionally, the court found
that the immunity granted under state law to immediate employers who
pay compensation extends to all members of a joint venture even when
the compensation is paid only by one of the venturers. 45 Framing the
issue as whether every operator who uses the railroad and its operations
falls under FELA's jurisdiction,4 6 the court adopted the Supreme
Court's analysis in Edwards v. Pacific Fruit Express.4 7 That case held that a
refrigerator car company that owned its own refrigerator cars was not a
40. 930 F.2d 798 (10th Cir. 1991).
41. FELA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51, 57 (1988).
42. 930 F.2d at 800.
43. Id. at 799.
44. Id at 800-01.
45. Id at 800-02.
46. Id at 800.
47. 390 U.S. 538 (1968).
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common carrier because it did not carry the public for profit.48 The
Tenth Circuit declined to follow the Fifth Circuit's four-part test to de-
termine common carrier status,4 9 adopting instead the practice in the
Sixth and Eighth Circuits of using that test as a discretionary
"consideration." 5 0
IV. TRADE REGULATIONS
During this survey period the Tenth Circuit considered three very
different cases in the areas of trademark infringement and unfair compe-
tition, price discrimination and the application of the Petroleum Market-
ing Practices Act to a breach of contract claim. In none of these cases
did the court establish new law.
A. Incontestable Trademark Infringement Requires Showing of Likelihood of
Confusion: Coherent Incorporated v. Coherent Technologies,
Incorporated
51
In Coherent the Tenth Circuit stated that even plaintiffs with incon-
testable trademarks must show the likelihood of confusion to make a
prima facie case of statutory trademark infringement.5 2 The court reaf-
firmed the principle that incontestability, while giving the plaintiff the
right to use a trademark, does not, as a matter of law, establish auto-
matic infringement by another user.5 3 While the court affirmed the dis-
trict court's conclusion, it explicitly set out the appropriate method of
analysis. Coherent involved a California laser manufacturer with incon-
testable rights to the trademark "Coherent, Inc." The manufacturer
sued a Colorado laser radar systems distributor for federal trademark
infringement and false designation of origin for its use of the word "co-
herent" in its name and for unfair competition under Colorado common
law. Though both were involved in laser technology, the two firms were
not direct competitors because they operated in different markets, made
different end-products and marketed through different channels. Their
buyers were sophisticated engineers, project managers or corporate offi-
cials who bought products built to exact specifications. Following a
bench trial, the district court held that no infringement existed.5 4
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision, holding
that a plaintiff with an incontestable trademark must show the likelihood
48. 930 F.2d at 800.
49. Lone Star Steel Co. v. McGee, 380 F.2d 640, 647 (5th Cir. 1967). In Lone Star,
The Fifth Circuit used the following four elements to determine if the defendant was a
"common carrier" under FELA: First, whether there was actual performance of rail serv-
ices; second, whether service being performed was contracted by the public; third, whether
the defendant was engaged in interstate commerce by virtue of a contractual relationship
with a railroad; and, fourth, whether defendant received remuneration from a railroad.
50. 930 F.2d at 801.
51. 935 F.2d 1122 (10th Cir. 1991).
52. Id. at 1124.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 1123-24.
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of confusuion as an element in an infringement case.5 5 The court found
that interpretation of federal trademark law5 6 requires the giving of
some meaning to the 1988 amendment that states "such conclusive evi-
dence of the right to use the mark shall be subject to proof of infringe-
ment. .... -57 The court interpreted this statement as evidence of the
legislative intent to require a plaintiff to prove likelihood of confusion
between two trademarks. 58 The court determined the likelihood of con-
fusion to be a question of fact, and outlined four factors persuasive in
holding that the differences between the two companies outweighed
their similarities. Those factors are: (1) the name "coherent" was
adopted by the Colorado company in good faith; (2) the companies were
not competitors; (3) the companies marketed different products in dif-
ferent markets through different channels; and (4) the buyers of the
companies' products were sophisticated individuals who demanded
items built to exact specifications. 59 Despite survey evidence introduced
by the plaintiff showing likely confusion, the court upheld the district
court's holding of no likelihood of confusion. The court stated that,
contrary to the plaintiff's submission, such surveys must demonstrate
actual market conditions or simulate marketplace decision-making to be
valid.6
0
B. Technical Obsolescence or Introduction of New Products as a Valid
"Changing Conditions" Defense to Claims of Price Discrimination:
Comcoa, Inc. v. NEC Telephones, Inc.
6 1
Section 2(a) of the Robinson-Patman Act prohibits discriminatory
pricing in goods of like quality, which might substantially lessen compe-
tition or create a monopoly.6 2 Courts, however, do allow price differen-
tials occasionally where they are "in response to changing conditions
affecting the market for or the marketability of the goods concerned,
such as, but not limited to, actual or imminent deterioration of perisha-
ble goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods ... or sales in good faith in
discontinuance of business in the goods concerned."'6 3 Thus, if the
seller can show that it was operating under a variation in the usual mar-
ket circumstances, that these changes were outside of his or her compet-
itor's control and that the market change resembles one enumerated in
the Act, then the seller's pricing behavior is not actionable under the
"changing conditions" defense. The defense is usually narrow in scope
and limited in application, thereby providing for little judicial analysis.
55. Ide at 1124.
56. Lanham Trade-Mark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 through 1127 (1988).
57. 935 F.2d at 1125.
58. Id
59. Id
60. It at 1126.
61. 931 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1991).
62. FREDERICK M. ROWE, PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT,
328 (1962). See aI/SJULIAN 0. VON KALINOWSKI, 5 ANTITRUST LAws & TRADE REGULATIONS,
§ 32.04 (1969).
63. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (emphasis added).
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The Tenth Circuit's treatment of the defense in Comcoa, although some-
what broader than usual, was a typical summary treatment of the law.
There, the court held that technical obsolescence or the introduction of
a new product model satisfies the changing conditions defense when the
facts are at least similar to those established in Section 2(a) of the Robin-
son-Patman Act.6
In Comcoa, a defendant phone manufacturer produced two types of
business telephones and offered a volume discount to some of its cus-
tomers. Plaintiffs were phone equipment distributors who, despite their
requests, were denied the same discounts for similar purchases. The
distributors sued the manufacturer, alleging lost sales, lost assets, per-
manent business injury as a result of price discrimination, interference
with prospective business relations and a breach of the implied duty of
good faith and fair dealing. The district court granted the defendant
summary judgment on the issue of the implied duty of good faith and
fair dealing, but submitted the remaining issues to the jury, which ren-
dered a verdict in favor of the defendant on the remaining claims.
6 5
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict regarding price discrim-
ination and intentional interference with prospective business relations,
but reversed the district court's summary judgment for the defendant on
the issue of breach of an implied duty of good faith and fair dealing.
6 6
The court rejected the plaintiff's allegation that the trial court's failure
to submit jury instructions containing the statutory examples of chang-
ing conditions was error. Reading Robinson-Patman's explicit language
to extend the changing conditions defense beyond those substantially
similar to those enumerated in the statute, the court found that pricing
modifications due to technical obsolescence and the introduction of a
new product are sufficiently similar to the statute's given excuses to con-
stitute a valid defense. 67 The court concluded that the purpose of the
changing conditions exception to liability under the Robinson-Patman
Act is to facilitate the ready disposition of goods. To find "obsolescence
of some goods" to be a valid changing condition under the Act, the
court took a substance-over-form approach to the legislation, which was
largely enacted to protect small businesses. The court apparently recog-
nized that fluid market conditions would be enhanced if fact finders con-
sider not only conditions affecting sellers of particular goods, but also
temporary and special conditions affecting industry in general.
This slightly more expansive reading of the provision may, as in
Comcoa, deny the ready disposition of goods-exactly opposite of the in-
tent of Congress when passing the law. 6 8 The court's decision, how-
ever, is defensible as an implicit recognition that technical
"perishability" is indistinguishable from changing conditions as enu-
64. 931 F.2d at 661.
65. Id. at 658-59.
66. lId at 667.
67. Id. at 661.
68. Id at 662 n.8.
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merated in the Act. Such conditions may alter market conditions be-
yond the seller's control, thereby justifying differential pricing.
C. Applicability of Petroleum Marketing Practices Act to Termination of
Distributors Agreement: Metro Oil Co., Inc. v. Sun Refining
and Marketing Co.
69
The case of Metro Oil explores whether a change in credit terms
under a distributors agreement constitutes a termination of the agree-
ment and, thus, bringing it within the Petroleum Marketing Practices Act
(PMPA). 70 The Tenth Circuit held that the changed terms terminated
the franchise agreement in violation of the PMPA, but that the plaintiff's
suit for breach of contract and tortious interference with business rela-
tionships was barred by the PMPA's one-year statute of limitations.
7 1
In Metro Oil, a wholesale distributor of motor fuel entered into a
series of distributor agreements with a manufacturer of such fuel. The
agreements provided in pertinent part that the manufacturer could es-
tablish the terms under which the distributor would pay for the product
and that the agreements were subject to and governed by the PMPA.
Subsequently, the distributor failed to pay certain invoices or to provide
the requested proof of its ability to pay. The manufacturer changed the
terms and conditions of payment to cash on delivery. From that point,
the distributor alleged that the defendant had wrongfully terminated the
contract, causing distributor to lose dealers. In a letter to the defendant,
the distributor threatened to initiate suit under the PMPA after which
the parties ceased doing business with each other. Two years later the
distributor sued the manufacturer. The district court found the contract
was governed by the PMPA, but that the PMPA's one-year statute of
limitations barred the action. The court also held the plaintiff's claim
for tortious interference was time-barred by Oklahoma's two-year stat-
ute of limitations for torts. 72 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower
court's decision, holding that the suit was governed by the PMPA and,
therefore, it was time-barred. The court concluded that summary judg-
ment for defendants was proper because no genuine issue of material
fact existed on the question of the PMPA's applicability and that the dis-
trict court correctly applied the substantive law.73 Framing the issue as
whether the action was based upon a termination as contemplated under
the PMPA, the court took a common sense approach that a suit, litigat-
ing a defendant's noncompliance with an agreement subject to the
PMPA, required an interpretation that the defendants were actually cov-
ered by the statute. The court found that the only remaining issue for
trial was which party terminated the agreement and that in either case
the plaintiff could not prevail.74 Upon review of the Oklahoma statute,
69. 936 F.2d 501 (10th Cir. 1991).
70. Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2801 through 2824.
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the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion that the limita-
tion accrues upon the date of the tortious act or breach, and not upon




In 1991, the Tenth Circuit decided four Corporate Law cases.
None of these cases represents a significant departure in the law and are,
thus, only briefly discussed below.
A. Liability of Successor Corporation Under State Products Liability Laws:
Williams v. Bowman Livestock Equipment Corp.
76
In Williams, the court addressed the requirements that must be met
under Oklahoma law before a successor corporation to a defunct prede-
cessor can be held liable for injuries caused by products manufactured
by the predecessor. Williams, the plaintiff, was injured while operating
equipment manufactured by Bowman Hydro-Vat, Inc. Following liqui-
dation of Bowman Hydro-Vat, Jim Bowman, the owner, formed a new
corporation, Bowman Livestock Equipment Corporation. Williams
brought suit against the new company alleging that as a successor corpo-
ration, Bowman Livestock was liable for the injuries caused by Bowman
Hydro-Vat's product.
The district court dismissed the action finding no in personamjuris-
diction over Bowman Livestock. 77 The Tenth Circuit determined that
Bowman Hydro-Vat's contacts with the forum could be imputed to Bow-
man Livestock if the forum's law would hold Bowman Livestock liable
for the actions of its alleged predecessor, Bowman Hydro-Vat. The
court then addressed the law regarding successor liability in Oklahoma.
Oklahoma law requires either a defacto merger, a fraudulent transaction
or a new corporation that is a mere continuation of a former corporation
before a court will find that a new company is a successor to a former
one.7 8 In addition, there must be some evidence of an agreement to
assume liabilities and a sale or transfer of all, or substantially all, assets
from a former to a latter corporation must be made.79 The court deter-
mined that in this instance, none of the requirements of Oklahoma law
was met. Since Bowman Livestock was determined not to be a successor
to Bowman Hydro-Vat, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court.
B. Excuse of Duty to Pay After Receipt of Defective Goods: Oral-X Corp. v.
Farnam Cos., Inc.
8 0
In Oral-X, a manufacturer of horse products, Oral-X, shipped a
75. Id.
76. 927 F.2d 1128 (10th Cir. 1991).
77. Id at 1130.
78. Id. at 1132 n.8.
79. Id at 1132.
80. 931 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1991).
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small quantity of defective product to its buyer, Farnam. Thereafter,
Farnam canceled its remaining orders. Oral-X sued Farnam for breach
of the marketing agreement, and Farnam sued Oral-X for breach of im-
plied and express warranties. The district court entered judgment for
Oral-X for unpaid production costs and royalties on product received,
but denied Oral-X's request for royalties on Famam's canceled orders.
The Tenth Circuit found that there was no material breach under
Arizona law when Oral-X shipped a small amount of the product that
did not contain an essential ingredient, nor were any warranties
breached by Oral-X.8 1 Furthermore, the court agreed with the district
court that Oral-X was entitled to royalties from product already shipped,
but stated that the district court erred in refusing to award Oral-X royal-
ties for the orders that were canceled. The court determined that the
royalties on the canceled orders were not too speculative in this case and
that Oral-X was entitled to them.
8 2
C. Non-Occurrence of Condition Precedent and Non-Performance Under a B-B
Company v. PiperJaffray & Hopwood, Inc. 83
In B-B Co., B-B, a corporation planning to purchase and develop
resort property, sued Piper Jaffray, a bond underwriter that had prom-
ised to underwrite special improvement district bonds for B-B. The dis-
trict court issued summary judgment in favor of Piper Jaffray.84 On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit stated that creation of a special improvement
district was a condition precedent to PiperJaffray's obligation to under-
write bonds. The court determined that, since Piper Jaffray had prom-
ised only to underwrite special improvement district bonds and no other
bonds, failure of the creation of a special improvement district was also a
failure of a condition precedent. Therefore, PiperJaffray was under no
obligation to B-B, and it did not breach its promise.85
D. Summary Judgment in a Case for Specific Performance of a Contract:
Deepwater Investments, Ltd. v. Jackson Hole Ski Corp.
8 6
In Deepwater Investments, Deepwater entered into bargaining with
Jackson Hole Ski Corporation to purchase part of a ski resort's opera-
tion. After lengthy and involved negotiations, the parties developed an
"interim agreement" and soon disagreements emerged between them.
Eventually, Deepwater sued Jackson Hole Ski Corporation for specific
performance, and upon a motion for summary judgment, the district
court awarded Deepwater summary judgment for specific perform-
ance. 87 The Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court, stating that the
81. Id. at 670.
82. Id. at 671.
83. 931 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1991).
84. Id. at 676.
85. Id. at 678.
86. 938 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1991).
87. Id. at 1109.
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existence of genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judg-
ment for Deepwater and that the issue of whether a contract had been
entered into was a question of fact for the fact finder to determine.
8 8
VI. CONCLUSION
The survey period covered by this Article brought decisions from
the Tenth Circuit that show either great deference to, or broad con-
struction of, various legislation - as with the banking cases - or conform-
ity with established law - as with the remaining cases. The court
exhibited a willingness to yield to the decisions of financial institution
regulators, while applying accepted principles of law in the areas of
trade regulation and corporate law in general.
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88. Id. at 1111-12.
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During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit gave continuing consti-
tutional definition to the area of criminal procedure. While these
changes were not drastic, the court offered further insight in the areas of
excessive force, competency to stand trial, delay in appeal, search and
seizure, and double jeopardy. Each of these changes is analyzed to pro-
vide the practitioner with an update on the developments in the circuit,
and the impact of these changes on earlier case precedent.
I. EXCESSIVE FORCE
In 1991, the Tenth Circuit decided several cases on the issue of ex-
cessive force, most of which affirmed existing principles of constitutional
law and criminal procedure. Prior to this year, there was no standard
applicable to all excessive force claims' and defenses of qualified immu-
nity. During the survey period, however, the Tenth Circuit set forth the
standard applicable at each point while the defendant is in police
custody.
2
In Austin v. Hamilton,3 plaintiffs brought a Bivens action4 against fed-
eral agents claiming use of excessive force during their arrest and subse-
quent detention and lack of probable cause. Defendants urged qualified
immunity. The district court, however, rejected the defense and denied
defendants' motion for summary judgment. This case is significant to
the Tenth Circuit because it explicitly identifies the constitutional stan-
1. Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990).
2. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
3. 945 F.2d 1155 (10th Cir. 1991).
4. Bivens actions involve individual plaintiffs alleging that federal agents used unnec-
essary or excessive force to accomplish an unwarranted arrest or subsequent detention.
This type of action was given impetus by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal
Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), in which the Court awarded damages to plaintiff
for a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. In 1974, Congress responded to the Biv-
ens decision by extending the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1988), to
claims arising out of acts or omissions of law enforcement officers of the United States,
including claims of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest and malicious prosecu-
tion. However, in 1980, the Supreme Court held that Congress did not intend to extin-
guish Bivens actions, which are based on constitutional violations. Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14 (1980). In Carlson, the Court held that Congress intended the FTCA and Bivens to
provide "parallel, complementary causes of action." Id. at 20. The Court concluded:
After the date of the enactment of [the FTCA], innocent individuals who are sub-
jected to raids [like that in Bivens] will have a cause of action against the individual
federal agents and the Federal Government. Furthermore, this provision should
be viewed as a counterpart to the Bivens case and its progenty [sic], in that it
waives the defense of sovereign immunity so as to make the government indepen-
dently liable in damages for the same type of conduct that is allegedly to have
occurred in Bivens.
Id. (quoting S. Rep. No. 700, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2789, 2791).
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dards to be used in evaluating a qualified immunity defense.5 Before
Austin, the court "simply affirmed a district court's ruling on qualified
immunity without explicitly identifying the constitutional standard by
which the federal agent's actions should be measured."6
In connection with defendants' motion for summary judgment,
both parties submitted affidavits containing widely differing accounts of
defendants' search, seizure and detention of plaintiffs at a port of entry
into the United States from Mexico.7 Plaintiffs' affidavit told of a twelve-
hour ordeal of unnecessary physical violence and inhumane treatment,
ending in their release without charge. Plaintiffs alleged that after a
small amount of marijuana was seized from their automobile, they were
taken to the port of entry office, handcuffed despite their cooperation,
and repeatedly assaulted without provocation; and, that on three occa-
sions at least one of the plaintiffs was beaten and knocked to the floor
unconscious. Plaintiffs also alleged that their handcuffs were tightened
beyond the point of feeling and that they were denied the use of rest-
room facilities. 8 Defendants, on the other hand, stated that all measures
were taken in response to "two unruly and abusive detainees." 9 Plain-
tiffs alleged two distinct claims pursuant to Bivens:l0 use of excessive
force during arrest and subsequent detention and detention following a
warrantless arrest for an unreasonable duration without a probable
cause determination by a judicial officer. The district court disallowed
defendants' qualified immunity defense, holding that such a defense
would not lie considering the type of conduct alleged.
Reviewing the district court's denial of summary judgment de
novo I 1 and construing the affidavits in the light most favorable to the
plaintiffs,1 2 the court of appeals held that defendants' alleged conduct
might have violated plaintiffs' substantive due process and Fourth
Amendment rights.' 3 Moreover, the court held, granting qualified im-
munity on summary judgment would be inappropriate because the fac-
tual conflicts were sufficiently material to require resolution at trial.
1 4
While concluding that the denial of qualified immunity on summary
5. Austin, 945 F.2d at 1158.
6. Id. at 1158 n.2. The court has rarely entertained a case which required a specific
identification of the applicable constitutional standard. See, e.g., Martin v. County Board of
Commissioners, 909 F.2d 402, 407 n.5 (10th Cir. 1990) (qualified immunity rejected
though controlling constitutional standard not specified because questioned conduct vio-
lated potentially applicable standard); Griess v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 1047 (10th Cir.
1988) (deciding the immunity question without setting forth the constitutional standard
because of the "special nature of the violations asserted.").
7. Austin, 945 F.2d at 1158.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1157.
10. Id.
11. The denial of qualified immunity was reviewed de novo as a final decision under
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1988). See, e.g., Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 675 (10th Cir. 1990);
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985); McEvoy v. Shoemaker, 882 F.2d 463, 465
(10th Cir. 1989).
12. See, e.g., Ewing v. Amoco Oil Co., 823 F.2d 1432, 1437 (10th Cir. 1987).
13. Austin, 945 F.2d at 1155.
14. Id (citing Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 701-02 (10th Cir. 1990)).
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judgment was not enigmatic, the court noted an "analytical snarl" re-
garding whether the Fourth Amendment standard15 or the substantive
due process standard was the operative standard to apply in claims in-
volving post-arrest excessive force and regarding which constitutional
standard should govern qualified immunity under the circumstances of
the Austin case.
The controlling constitutional standard for evaluating the defend-
ants' conduct must be determined whenever qualified immunity is as-
serted.' 6 Since there is no generic standard applicable to all excessive
force claims,' 7 a court must first place defendant's objectionable con-
duct somewhere along the custodial continuum to determine the appli-
cable standard. The "custodial continuum" runs from initial arrest or
seizure ("stage 1") to post-arrest but pre-charge or pre-hearing custody
to pre-trial detention ("stage 2") to post conviction incarceration
("stage 3").18 The court summarily dismissed the defendants' argument
that all questioned conduct took place prior to arrest,' 9 stating that it
would be doubtful that the arrest took twelve hours to accomplish, "as
for example might be the case in an extended chase of the sort encoun-
tered in cinema ... ."20 The court then concluded that at least some of
defendants' conduct took place at the second stage on the custodial con-
tinuum and should be evaluated by the constitutional standard applica-
ble at that point. The court also discussed whether the Fourth
Amendment continues to protect individuals against the deliberate use
of excessive force after the arrest and pretrial detention begin. The
court of appeals observed the Supreme Court's purposeful avoidance of
a direct ruling2 ' on this same issue in Graham v. Connor,22 but also noted
the Court's recognition of the "broad applicability of fourth amendment
standards ... applicable to post-arrest police conduct." 23 Before the
Supreme Court's decision in Graham, the lower federal courts had drasti-
cally divergent views with regard to the applicability of the Fourth
Amendment after an initial arrest. 24 While the question is still open for
15. The Tenth Circuit stated that "[a]s a general matter, claims based on the use of
excessive force during arrest are now governed by the objective reasonableness standard
of the fourth amendment." Id. at 1158.
16. Id. at 1158 n.2 (citing Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1377, 1385 (10th Cir.
1989)).
17. See, e.g., Titran v. Ackman, 893 F.2d 145, 147 (7th Cir. 1990) ("[d]uring arrest
force must be reasonable, between arrest and conviction government may not punish with-
out due process of law, and after conviction government may not inflict cruel and unusual
punishment"). See also infra note 24.
18. See Gonzales v. City of Espanola, 946 F.2d 901 (10th Cir. 1991); Austin, 945 F.2d
1155, 1158 (10th Cir. 1991).
19. Austin, 945 F.2d at 1159.
20. Il
21. Id.
22. 490 U.S. 386, 395 n.10 (1989).
23. Austin, 945 F.2d at 1159.
24. See, e.g., Wilkins v. May, 872 F.2d 190, 192-95 (7th Cir. 1989) (fourth amendment
protection ends and substantive due process protection starts once the initial arrest or
seizure has been completed); Justice v. Dennis, 834 F.2d 380, 382-83 and n.4 (4th Cir.
1987) (substantive due process standard is applicable to excessive force claims where the
conduct is alleged to have occurred post-arrest), vacated, 490 U.S. 1087 (1989); Robin v.
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debate, 25 many of the lower courts have applied the Fourth Amendment
standard to claims of post-arrest use of force in consideration of Gra-
ham. 26 The Austin court recognized the Fourth Amendment's limitations
on both duration of detention and judicial determination of probable
cause 2 7 and concluded that the Fourth Amendment also protects the
arrestee detained without a warrant.
The court also discussed whether the Fourth Amendment standard
was "clearly established at the time of the alleged conduct" 28 and
whether it should be used to assess defendants' qualified immunity de-
fense. The court noted that before Graham, the Supreme Court an-
nounced the applicable standard for governing the situation that
developed in this case: law enforcement officers must be objectively rea-
sonable in their searches and seizures. 2 9 The court concluded that in
post-Graham cases involving conduct that took place before the Graham
decision was announced, the Fourth Amendment should be applied to
assess qualified immunity only when the plaintiff's claim is based on the
Fourth Amendment.30 However, when Fourth Amendment claims have
not been specifically asserted, the substantive due process standard will
determine the viability of a qualified immunity defense. In Austin, the
court's holding that Fourth Amendment protections continue post-
arrest did not reflect law clearly established at the time of the alleged
conduct. 3 ' As a result, the court held that the substantive due process
standard was the "appropriate yardstick" for evaluating a qualified im-
munity claim for post-arrest conduct.3 2 Before Austin, there were two
distinct standards applied at various points along the custodial contin-
uum to determine the existence of qualified immunity. The Austin case
is significant because it clearly establishes that the constitutionality of
any law enforcement agent's entire course of conduct, regardless of
Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1009-10 (9th Cir. 1985) (notion of "continuing custody" makes
Fourth Amendment standard applicable throughout the custodial continuum); McDowell
v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302, 1303-04, 1306 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying Fourth Amendment
standard to facts similar to those in Austin).
25. Compare Henson v. Thezan, 717 F. Supp. 1330, 1336-36 (N.D. Il. 1989) (holding
that Fourth Amendment applies to all stages of the custodial continuum prior to probable
cause hearing) with Powell v. Gardner, 891 F.2d 1039, 1044 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that
Fourth Amendment standard applies until formal charge or arraignment).
The Ninth Circuit is in accord with the Second Circuit, and applies the Fourth Amend-
ment standard to all claims of post-arrest use of excessive force. See, e.g., Hammer v. Gross,
884 F.2d 1200, 1204 (9th Cir. 1989), vacated en banc on other grounds, 932 F.2d 842, 845 n.1
and 850-51 (1991).
26. Id.
27. The court concluded:
j]ust as the fourth amendment's strictures continue in effect to set the applicable
constitutional limitations regarding both duration (reasonable period under the
circumstances of arrest) and legal justification (judicial determination of prob-
able cause), its protections also persist to impose restrictions on the treatment of
the arrestee detained without a warrant.




31. See supra notes 22 and 23 and accompanying text.
32. Austin, 945 F.2d at 1162.
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where along the custodial continuum the conduct occurs, is to be evalu-
ated under the Fourth Amendment objective standard.
II. DELAY IN APPEAL
Several Tenth Circuit decisions in 1991 strongly invited the
Oklahoma Attorney General, Oklahoma Public Defenders Office, and
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals to work together to solve the "sys-
tematic delays" encountered by indigent clients appealing lower court
decisions through the Oklahoma Public Defender's Office.33 The
lengthy delay appellants face when enlisting the aid of the public de-
fender's office was the subject of five separate actions in 1991, the most
significant being Harris v. Champion.3 4 In the Harris decision, the Tenth
Circuit remanded three similar cases on the same issue for reconsidera-
tion in light of its decision and subsequently remanded another case ap-
pealed after the Harris decision.
In Harris, petitioner was sentenced to serve consecutively one fif-
teen-year term and one five-year term for assault and battery. Upon be-
ing sentenced on September 29, 1988, he invoked his right of appeal
and requested that counsel be appointed. On May 18, 1989 the
Oklahoma Public Defender's Office filed an Application for Late Appeal,
which was granted. On April 16, 1990, over one year later, petitioner
received a letter from the Defender's Office setting forth the approxi-
mate time frame for filing a brief in support of his appeal. 35 On May 22,
1990, while his state appeal was still pending, petitioner filed a habeas
corpus petition in the United States District Court for the Northern Dis-
trict of Oklahoma alleging both constitutional deficiencies in his trial
and violations of due process, equal protection and right to counsel re-
lated to the delays in getting the Public Defender's Office to prepare his
appellate brief.3 6 The State moved to dismiss the petition for failure to
exhaust available state remedies.3 7 The federal district court adopted
the magistrate's recommendation and dismissed the petition without
prejudice.
Before discussing the merits of petitioner's argument, the court first
33. Id. at 1071.
34. 938 F.2d 1062 (10th Cir. 1991).
35. The letter read in pertinent part:
You will receive a copy of anything this office files in the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals in your behalf. So far there has been a petition and an extension filed.
There will be nothing else filed except extensions until we are able to prepare
your brief or the court issues a final extension.... It will be at least three years
before we are able to file your brief with the court.
Id. at 1064.
36. Id.
37. Before filing a habeas corpus action, a petitioner must exhaust all viable state rem-
edies. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) sets forth the circumstances under which a court may grant a
habeas corpus petition:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus... shall not be granted unless it ap-
pears that the applicant has exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the
State, or that there is either an absence of available State corrective process, or the
existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the prisoner.
28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1988) (emphasis added).
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addressed the exhaustion requirement and the established exceptions,
noting the well-recognized view that a prisoner has no obligation to ex-
haust his state remedies wherever there has been an excessive and un-
justified delay in his appeal or post-conviction proceeding.
3 8
Respondent asserted that the petitioner should not be excused from ex-
hausting his state remedies because the delay was caused by "peti-
tioner's counsel's present request for extensions which have been
granted."3 9 The court rejected respondent's syllogistic argument, and
held that the inability of the public defender to handle Harris' case in a
timely fashion could not be attributed to the indigent petitioner.40 As
the Supreme Court held in Barker v. Wingo,4 1 "the ultimate responsibility
... must rest with the government rather than the defendant."' 42 While
the court sympathized with the heavy demands on the Public Defender's
Office,4 3 it held that there was insufficient justification to withhold fed-
eral relief until the petitioner has exhausted his "inordinately-delayed
state remedies."
'4 4
The exhaustion of state remedies requirement, set forth in 28
U.S.C. § 2254(b), is a matter of comity-not an absolute limitation on
federal courts' jurisdiction. 4 5 The Harris court went further to say that
even if the Public Defender's Office were now to accelerate the projected
time-table for filing the brief, the pre-existing delay might, by itself, be
sufficient to abate the exhaustion requirement. However, the court re-
mained sensitive to the comity issue and expressed its desire to maintain
38. DONALD E. WILKES, FEDERAL AND STATE POSTCONVlCTION REMEDIES AND RELIEF,
§§ 8-19 (1987). The court also cited cases from seven circuits that are in full accord on
this issue: Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d 528, 531 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[A] prisoner need not
fully exhaust his state remedies if the root of his complaint is his inability to do so.");
Elcock v. Henderson, 902 F.2d 219, 220 (2d Cir. 1990); Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d
1208, 1221 (3rd Cir. 1987); Okot v. Callahan, 788 F.2d 631, 633 (9th Cir. 1986) (If de-
fendant receives inadequate redress in state court proceeding, he may file a habeas corpus
action in federal court.); Cook v. Florida Parole and Probation Commission, 749 F.2d 678,
680 (11 th Cir. 1985) ("State remedies will be found ineffective and a federal habeas corpus
petitioner will be excused from exhausting them in the case of unreasonable, unexplained
state delays in acting on the petitioner's motion for state relief."); Pool v. Wyrick, 703 F.2d
1064, 1066 (8th Cir. 1983); Shelton v. Heard, 696 F.2d 1127, 1128-29 (5th Cir. 1983);
Dozie v. Cady, 430 F.2d 637, 638 (7th Cir. 1970).
39. Harris, 938 F.2d at 1065.
40. Id.
41. 407 U.S. 514, 531 (1972). Although the Barker case dealt with delay of an initial
hearing, it has been applied uniformly to cases involving delays in sentencing and delays in
appeals with facts similar to those in the Harris case.
42. Id.
43. Harris, 938 F.2d at 1066.
44. Id.
45. In Shelton v. Heard, 696 F.2d 1127 (5th Cir. 1983), the court held:
[T]he requirement to exhaust state remedies is not a jurisdictional limitation on
the federal courts. Rather it is a matter of comity between the federal and state
courts. The forbearance of the federal courts is based upon the assumption that
the state remedies available to the petitioner are adequate and effective to vindi-
cate federal constitutional rights. When those state procedures become ineffec-
tive or inadequate, the foundation of the exhaustion requirement is undercut and
the federal courts may take action.
Shelton, 696 F.2d at 1128 (citing Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 516 n.7 (1982) and Fay v.
Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 433-34 (1963)).
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an incentive for states to remedy unreasonable delays.4 6
The Harris court, without deciding the merits of petitioner's
claims,4 7 enumerated several constitutional concerns to guide the dis-
trict court in determining whether a petitioner should be required to
exhaust all available state remedies. First, the court should look at the
absolute length of time required to complete the direct appeal process.
In the Harris case, the court determined that it would take four and one-
half years from the time Harris' appeal was docketed plus an indetermi-
nate amount of time before his case would be set for argument.48 Sec-
ond, the court should look to the length of the appellate process relative
to the length of the sentence in determining whether the habeas corpus
petition should be granted.4 9 This factor is not determinative since a
prisoner serving a shorter sentence, subjected to even reasonable delay,
might have completed his sentence by the time the appeal can be heard.
This approach balances the potential conflict caused by a bypass of com-
ity with the reduced effectiveness of habeas corpus actions caused by
requiring petitioners to exhaust all state remedies. 50 Third, the court
should address any equal protection ramifications of forcing indigent
prisoners to suffer extraordinary delays solely because of their financial
status: "There can be no equal justice where the kind of appeal a man
enjoys 'depends on the amount of money he has.'-51 While absolute
equality is not required, the fact that an appeal is being delayed for the
indigent and for no one else may implicate an equal protection issue.
52
Fourth, in considering whether to accept a habeas corpus request from a
petitioner who has not yet fully exhausted state remedies, the court
should look to the due process implications of an alleged delay. The
Harris court noted that many courts analyze state appellate delay due
process terms, 53 and have recognized that delay of the post-conviction
process may be a denial of due process. 54 Fifth, the court turned to the
effect a delay in appellate process might have on'the right to effective
counsel. 5 5 Again, this concern, balances petitioner's constitutional
46. Harris, 938 F.2d at 1067 (citing Layne v. Gunter, 559 F.2d 850, 851-52 (Ist Cir.
1977)) ("In this delicate area of comity, bright line rules are not the answer. The objective
is not for one judicial system to score points against the other, but to assure expeditious
justice to individuals and to retain all incentives for both the state and federal systems to
labor toward that end.").
47. Id. at n.5.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. The State argued that "in all likelihood the appeal will be decided during the time
which petitioner is incarcerated," and that "the fact that petitioner may have finished serv-
ing his sentence when his appeal is denied does not render the appeal moot." Id. at n.4.
The court rejected these arguments primarily because one of petitioner's claims was that
he was sentenced under the wrong statute, and thus should have received a lesser
sentence.
51. Id. at 1067 (quoting Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956)).
52. Id at 1068. ("[A]n insistence upon further exhaustion of state remedies would
inappropriately subjugate petitioner's constitutional rights to the concerns of comity.").
53. Id.
54. Id. (citing Kelly v. Crouse, 352 F.2d 506 (10th Cir. 1965)); Smith v. Kansas, 356
F.2d 654 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 871 (1967)).
55. The right to effective counsel and the equal protection concerns expressed by the
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rights5 6 with comity concerns.
After suggesting these constitutional guideposts, the court of ap-
peals turned to the matter of relief for independent claims stemming
from the delay in process. When, as in Harris, the petitioner alleges trial
error as well as an independent basis for relief, such as denial of due
process, the federal district court should hear the independent claim
without requiring an exhaustion of state remedies, because "[i]t would
be meaningless to insist that petitioner exhaust his state remedies when
the essence of his due process claim arises directly out of his inability to
do so."'5 7 On the other hand, when a petitioner only alleges federal con-
stitutional errors at his state trial, comity requires the petitioner to ex-
haust state court remedies unless he can show inordinate, excessive and
unexcusable delay." 5 8 If such circumstances exist, a federal court may
hear the merits of the constitutional trial error claim and any independ-
ent claim stemming from the delay.
When a federal court hears a habeas corpus action, either after ex-
haustion of state remedies or by waiving the requirement, the court may
order a wide range of remedies. The court may order the prisoner's
immediate release,5 9 release if an appeal is not heard within a relatively
short time, 60 or release on bail until the state appeal is heard.
61
Although in Harris the court of appeals left the selection of an appropri-
ate remedy to the district court, the survey of available relief was no
doubt aimed at convincing all involved state departments to cooperate
with the court's determination.
The Harris court made five orders. First, it reversed the district
court's dismissal of petitioner's habeas corpus action for failure to ex-
haust state court remedies. 62 Second, it ordered that two other cases,
Bunton v. Cowley 63 and Hacker v. Saffle,64 along with any other pending
court are interwoven. See, e.g., Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), in whichJustice
Douglas held that indigent defendants were denied equal protection where plaintiff's ap-
peals were decided without the benefit of counsel.
56. In Douglas, the Supreme Court held that when there is a denial of effective
counsel:
[Tihere is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth Amendment where
the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the benefit of counsel's examination
into the record, research of the law, and marshalling of arguments on his behalf,
while the indigent, already burdened by a preliminary determination that his case
is without merit, is forced to shift for himself. The indigent, where the record is
unclear or the errors ares only the right to a meaningless ritual, while the rich
man has a meaningful appeal.
Id at 358-59.
57. Harris, 938 F.2d 1062, 1069 (10th Cir. 1991). See also Coe v. Thurman, 922 F.2d
528 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that excessive delay in obtaining an appeal may constitute a
due process violation and that a prisoner need not exhaust state court remedies before
seeking redress for the independent due process claim).
58. Harris, 938 F.2d at 1069.
59. See, e.g., Burkett v. Cunningham, 826 F.2d 1208 (3rd Cir. 1987).
60. See Coe, 922 F.2d at 533.
61. See Rivera v. Concepcion, 469 F.2d 17, 20 (1st Cir. 1972).
62. Harris, 938 F.2d at 1071.
63. 936 F.2d 582 (10th Cir. 1991).
64. 936 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1991).
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habeas corpus actions, be consolidated for reconsideration in light of
the Harris opinion. 65 Third, the court ordered that the district court
conduct a full hearing into possible systematic delays of the Oklahoma
Public Defender's Office in the preparation and filing of appeals for the
indigent, 66 stating that all parties should work together to suggest solu-
tions to correct any constitutional deficiencies caused by the appellate
delay.67 Fourth, the court ordered the district court to make detailed
findings of fact and conclusions of law and to issue appropriate remedies
for all constitutional violations.68 Fifth, the court ordered that exper-
ienced counsel be appointed to represent the petitioners in the collec-
tively remanded cases. 69
The Harris case was recently extended to cover claims for declara-
tory and injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Richards v. Bellmon.
70
While a habeas corpus action, challenging the fact of conviction or the
conditions or duration of the confinement, requires an exhaustion of
state remedies, a § 1983 action has no such requirement. 71 The court
emphasized that relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is available to challenge
the conditions of confinement or to seek declaratory judgment as a
predicate to an award of monetary damages or injunctive relief.
72
Although the court refused to interfere with the petitioner's tactical
choice to proceed under § 1983 as opposed to habeas corpus, the court
instructed the district court to "be mindful of the statements contained
in our order on rehearing in Harris," 73 implying that the petitioner, if
successful, could recover damages to compensate for the backlog in the
Public Defender's Office that delayed his appeal.
III. COMPETENCY TO STAND TRIAL
In Lafferty v. Cook,74 the Tenth Circuit applied the Supreme Court's
decision in Dusky v. United States75 to determine a defendant's compe-
tence to stand trial. While the Lafferty case does not represent a new
approach to competency determinations in the Tenth Circuit, the case is
significant in that it represents the first time the court has addressed the
constitutional implications of a defendant's refusal to raise the insanity
defense despite strong evidence of insanity.
65. Due to venue considerations, this order was later vacated and the cases were con-
solidated and remanded to the correct district within Oklahoma. Harris, 938 F.2d at 1072-
73.
66. Id. at 1071.
67. Although the Attorney General objected to this order because of her status as a
party in the action, the court issued a sharply worded denial: "One would think that the
Attorney General's Office would want to be represented at a hearing where such matters
are under review." Id. at 1072.
68. Id. at 1071.
69. l.
70. 941 F.2d 1015 (10th Cir. 1991).
71. Id. at 1018 (citing Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499-500 (1973)).
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1019.
74. 949 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991).
75. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
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Before committing the acts for which he was convicted, Ronald Laf-
ferty was excommunicated from the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-
Day Saints because of his unorthodox religious views, 76 which eventu-
ally led to marital difficulties and a divorce from his wife.7 7 Lafferty's
sister-in-law, Brenda, apparently encouraged Lafferty's wife to take their
infant daughter and leave Lafferty.
Lafferty, his brother, and two other men who shared Lafferty's reli-
gious views participated in prayer meetings, at which they discussed the
"removal" of Brenda and her infant daughter.78 While under the influ-
ence of a religious revelation, Lafferty, his brother and the two other
men drove to Brenda's house, and Lafferty and his brother went inside
and killed both Brenda and her infant daughter, while the other two
men waited in the car.
After the state court initially determined that Lafferty was compe-
tent to stand trial, defendant's counsel filed notice that he planned to
present an insanity defense.7 9 Under Utah state law, a defendant must
cooperate in a pre-trial mental evaluation to avail himself of the insanity
defense.8 0 Lafferty refused to cooperate because he did not consider
himself insane and did not understand that he would not be allowed to
use expert testimony at trial from an expert who had examined him dur-
ing the initial competency proceeding.8 ' Defendant's failure to cooper-
ate with the requisite mental examination led the court to disallow the
presentation of the insanity defense at trial. The court reserved ruling
on whether the expert testimony would be admissible during trial on the
defense of manslaughter due to diminished mental capacity.8 2 Although
the trial court eventually allowed the expert testimony for the man-
slaughter defense, defendant refused to let his counsel present the evi-
dence because he contended that his mental capacity was not diminished
when he committed the homicides.8 3 Lafferty was convicted of capital
76. Lafferty, 949 F.2d at 1548.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 2. According to UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-3 (1) (1991):
When a defendant proposes to offer evidence that he is not guilty as a result of
insanity or that he had diminished mental capacity or any other testimony of
mental health expert to establish mental state, he shall, at the time of arraignment
or as soon afterward as practicable, but not fewer than 30 days before trial, file
and serve the prosecuting attorney with written notice of his intention to claim
the defense.
80. UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-14-4 (2) (1991) sets forth in relevant part:
The defendant shall make himself available and fully cooperate in the examina-
tion by the department and any other independent examiners for the defense and
the prosecuting attorney. If the defendant fails to make himself available and
fully cooperate, and that failure is established to the satisfaction of the court at a
hearing prior to trial, the defendant is barred from presenting expert testimony
relating to his defense of mental illness at the trial of the case ....
81. Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d 1546, 1549 (10th Cir. 1991).
82. Id.
83. Id. At this point in the trial, defense counsel attempted to file a motion to with-
draw; however, defendant advised the court that if he represented himself, he would argue
that the court had no jurisdiction because he had been commanded by God to commit the
homicides. Id. at n.5.
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murder and sentenced to death.8 4
After his conviction and sentencing were affirmed on direct ap-
peal,85 defendant filed a petition for habeas corpus in federal district
court. During the habeas corpus action, the federal district court discov-
ered that several of the transcripts of the state court proceedings were
omitted from the record on appeal and suggested filing a petition for
rehearing in state court.8 6 The Utah Supreme Court held that the tran-
scripts did not warrant a change in its prior ruling.8 7 The federal district
court subsequently denied Lafferty's habeas corpus petition, and Laf-
ferty appealed.
When a federal court hears a habeas corpus action challenging a
state court's determination, the federal court must presume the state
court's factual findings correct, unless the federal court concludes that
the fact determination is not supported by the record.88 The court of
appeals determined that competency is an issue of fact89 and set out to
determine whether the state court applied the correct legal standard,
and if so, whether its determination was supported by the record.90
The court of appeals concluded that since competence to stand trial
is an aspect of due process,9 1 the Constitution requires one gauge
against which to measure, because of his mental condition, a defendant's
due process rights are violated by requiring him to stand trial."' 92 The
court of appeals observed that the correct standard to use in making a
competency determination was set forth by the Supreme Court in Dusky
v. United States:
9 3
[I]t is not enough for the district judge to find that 'the defend-
ant [is] oriented to time and place and [has] some recollection
of events,' but that the 'test must be whether he has sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable de-
gree of rational understanding-and whether he has a rational as
well as factual understanding of the proceedings against
him.' 94
After Dusky, the Tenth Circuit has used this "sufficient contact with real-
ity test" as "the touchstone for ascertaining the existence of rational un-
84. Id.
85. State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239 (Utah 1988).
86. Lafferty v. Cook, 949 F.2d-1546, 1548 (10th Cir. 1991).
87. State v. Lafferty, 776 P.2d 631 (Utah 1989).
88. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(8) (1988).
89. In Demosthenes v. Baal, 110 S. Ct. 2223, 2225 (1990), the Supreme Court held,
"a state court's determination on the merits of a factual issue are entitled to a presumption
of correctness on habeas corpus review. We have held that a state court's conclusion re-
garding a defendant's competency is entitled to such a presumption."
90. Lafferty, 949 F.2d at 1548.
91. Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 378 (1966); Coleman v. Saffle, 912 F.2d 1217,
1224 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 22 (1990).
92. Lafferty, 949 F.2d at 1550.
93. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam).
94. Id. at 402. While Dusky was a federal prosecution, this test is equally applicable to
habeas corpus determinations. See, e.g., Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162 (1975); Coleman
v. Saffle, 912 F.2d 1217, 1224 & n.8 (10th Cir. 1990).
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derstanding." 9 5  The state court rejected the mental examiners'
conclusion that Lafferty was incompetent to stand trial because their
conclusions "rested almost entirely on the 1960 case of Dusky v. United
States, and that they have misapplied the law enunciated in that case."
'9 6
The state court went on to say that "Dusky is a very short per curiam
opinion with no underlying facts stated therein, and it is not possible to
ascertain from the opinion the context in which the words relied upon
by the examiners were used." 97 The court of appeals commented that
the state court's findings "reveal unambiguously that the state trial
court's evaluation of Lafferty's competency was infected by a mispercep-
tion of the legal requirements set out in Dusky .... ,,98 The court of
appeals concluded that the state court had failed to use the Dusky test,
and thus that the state court's determination of competence was not
supported by the record and that the presumption of correctness of the
state court's factual findings set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) did not
apply.9 9
After rejecting the presumption of correctness, the court of appeals
noted that all of the expert testimony and evidence presented at the pre-
trial competence proceedings were consistent in showing Lafferty "un-
able to make decisions on the basis of a realistic evaluation of his own
best interests." 10 0 While a defendant operating under a paranoid delu-
sional system may contend that he is not mentally ill and refuse to pres-
ent an appropriate defense, "this result cannot be reconciled with the
requirements of due process."10 1 Accordingly, Lafferty's writ for
habeas corpus was granted and his sentence and conviction were
vacated.
The holding in Lafferty is significant to the Tenth Circuit because it
requires a defendant to assert an insanity defense despite the defend-
ant's persistent objections. The case holds that the Constitution re-
quires the court to instruct the jury on the insanity defense independent
of the defendant's wishes if evidence supports a finding that the defend-
ant is insane.
IV. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
In 1991, the Tenth Circuit decided one case that impacted the law
95. Lafferty, 949 F.2d at 1551. While the majority in Lafferty cited several Tenth Circuit
cases to establish the proposition that the defendant must have a sufficient contact with
reality, the dissent contended that the cited cases were factually distinguishable, and did




99. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1977) provides that in a federal habeas corpus proceeding,
the state court's determinations of factual issues should, under most circumstances, be
presumed correct if the findings were made by a court of competent jurisdiction after a
full, fair and adequate hearing, and where the facts at issue were fully developed.
100. Lafferty, 949 F.2d at 1555.
101. Id. at 9.
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of double jeopardy within the circuit. 10 2 This decision, discussed below,
reflects the court's willingness to follow the United States Supreme
Court in granting criminal defendants greater protection under the law.
As this cases demonstrates, it is now more difficult for the state to prose-
cute a defendant twice when the alleged crimes stem from the same
conduct.
In United States v. Koonce,10 3 the Tenth Circuit addressed two signifi-
cant double jeopardy issues: first, whether the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits the conviction and sentencing for possession of an illegal sub-
stance where the same possession was used in an earlier proceeding to
increase the sentence; and second, whether the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits the conviction and sentencing of a felon in possession of a fire-
arm, where the same possession was used in an earlier proceeding to
increase the sentence.
Koonce distributed methamphetamine from his home in Monti-
cello, Utah. In late 1987, one of Koonce's customers pled guilty to dis-
tribution charges and named Koonce as his supplier. Koonce was
eventually charged in the United States District Court for the District of
South Dakota with one count of distributing methamphetamine.10 4 A
jury found Koonce guilty of distributing 443 grams of
methamphetamine within South Dakota.' 0 5 At the sentencing proceed-
ing, the prosecution introduced evidence of the methamphetamine and
firearms found at Koonce's home in Utah.' 0 6 Koonce's ultimate sen-
tence was not based solely upon the 443 grams he mailed into South
Dakota, but upon a total of 7,869 grams of methamphetamine he
owned. 10 7 Koonce received a twenty-year sentence in a maximum se-
102. In another case, the Tenth Circuit held that felony counts listed in a second indict-
ment stemmed from the same conduct that triggered a single-count conviction one year
earlier, thereby violating the law of doublejeopardy. See United States v. Felix, 926 F.2d
1522, 1524 (10th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 112,S.Ct. 1377 (1991); see also U.S. v. Felix, 867 F.2d
1068 (8th Cir. 1989). The Tenth Circuit showed a willingness to increase the protections
afforded to criminal defendants in the area of double jeopardy by following Grady v. Corbin,
495 U.S. 508 (1990). Under the Grady analysis, a court asks whether the government must
prove conduct in the second case that constitutes an offense for which the defendant was
already tried. Grady, 495 U.S. at 511; see also Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410 (1980) (distin-
guishing same conduct from actual evidence). The focus is upon the defendant's conduct,
not the evidence used by the state to prove the defendant's conduct. Many of the circuit
courts that have addressed Grady limited the case to its facts. See, eg. United States v.
Calderone and Catalano, 917 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1990) (holding that "same conduct" test
applies to double jeopardy claims occurring within successive prosecutions); cf. United
States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that the Grady decision does not
apply in the RICO context). Accordingly, the United States Supreme Court recently re-
versed the Tenth Circuit's decision in the Felix case, further limiting the Grady precedent to
certain factual contexts. See United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992) on remand to
United States v. Felix, - F.2d _, 1992 WL 105467 (10th Cir., May 21, 1992) (No. 89-
7058).
103. 945 F.2d 1145 (10th Cir. 1991).
104. Id at 1146. Koonce was charged pursuant to 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (1988).
He was tried in South Dakota after mailing a quantity of methamphetamine into the state.
105. ld
106. Ide
107. It The conviction was enhanced by two levels, reflecting the firearms Koonce
possessed and his history as a criminal.
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curity prison, five years of supervised release, and a fine of $50,000.108
Following the conviction in South Dakota, the United States
charged Koonce in the United States District Court for the District of
Utah with intent to distribute the methamphetamine found in Koonce's
Utah residence and possession of a firearm by a felon.' 0 9 The district
court refused to dismiss the indictment on double jeopardy grounds,
and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. 1 0
Koonce was ultimately found guilty of all charges and appealed his con-
viction to the Tenth Circuit. By the time his appeal was heard in the
Tenth Circuit, the United States Supreme Court had decided United
States v. Grady."1 1
The Tenth Circuit ultimately held that the Double Jeopardy Clause
prohibits a subsequent prosecution, even when the earlier use of posses-
sion evidence was used only in a sentencing proceeding." 2 In reaching
its decision, the court employed a three-step analysis. First, the court
found that Koonce was punished for the first possession conviction,
1 3
and that both the Utah and South Dakota proceedings punished Koonce
for the same conduct. Absent specific congressional design, this
presents significant double jeopardy implications under Grady. 114 Sec-
ond, the court determined that there was no congressional intent that a
defendant like Koonce receive cumulative punishment for the same con-
duct and that Congress intended to have illicit drug charges combined
into a single punishment, not broken into separate offenses. 1 5 Third,
the court looked at whether the punishment imposed by the Utah dis-
trict court constituted double punishment under the Double Jeopardy
Clause, given the concurrent punishments. 1 16 Citing Ball v. United
States,117 the court held that concurrent punishment does not make
double punishment constitutional under the Double Jeopardy
Clause. 118
The second issue, whether the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits
the conviction for possession of a firearm when the possession was used
108. Koonce's sentence was the maximum allowed under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (1988).
109. Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1147-48.
110. See United States v. Koonce, 885 F.2d 720, 722 (10th Cir. 1989). The Tenth Cir-
cuit remanded the case back to the district court for trial.
111. 495 U.2. 508 (1990).
112. Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1155.
113. Id at 1149.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1151. See also U.S.S.G. ch.1, pt. A, 4(a) (showing that the sentencing guide-
lines were constructed in an effort to eliminate charge/count manipulation). The sentenc-
ing and punishment components of the Double Jeopardy Clause are backed by legislative
intent. The Constitution does not prohibit Congress from punishing each step leading to
the full crime, where Congress possesses the authority to set punishment for the full
crime. See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 779 (1985).
116. Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1151.
117. 470 U.S. 856, 861 (1985).
118. Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1153 (defining punishment under Ball to include all conse-
quences of a conviction, not just incarceration times or fines and holding the absence of an




to increase an earlier sentence, received only cursory treatment from the
court. Applying the traditional Blockburger 119 test, the court found that
in this case the firearm sentencing enhancement charge and possession
charge each required proof of different elements.' 20 The firearm sen-
tencing enhancement requires that the accused be in possession of the
firearm and that possession occur during the commission of the narcot-
ics offense. The "possession by a felon" charge, in Utah, requires that
the accused possessed a firearm and was a felon during possession. Ac-
cordingly, the court rejected the second contention of double jeopardy
without further analysis.
This opinion establishes that there is no legitimate reason to bring a
separate proceeding against a defendant when an enhanced punishment
was given in an earlier proceeding.' 2 1 Even though there is no direct
ban against the prosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause, there is
such a ban against additional punishment in the second proceeding.
V. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
The Tenth Circuit heard several cases on the issue of search and
seizure during 1991, most of which either affirmed the existing law or
rejected search and seizure appeals on other grounds. 122 One decision,
United States v. Walker,12 is significant for its strong denunciation of ran-
dom automobile stops by the police and for defining the appropriate
standard of review in such cases.
Walker was stopped for speeding and asked to produce a valid
driver's license and vehicle registration. Although his hands shook
slightly when removing the license from his wallet, there was no reason
for the police officer to believe that Walker had committed a crime.
1 24
Rather than issue a speeding citation, the officer questioned Walker
about various crimes unrelated to the traffic stop and asked whether
there were any controlled substances, weapons, open containers of alco-
hol, or large amounts of cash in the vehicle. Walker admitted only that
he was carrying $1750 in cash. Upon the officer's request, Walker gave
permission to search the vehicle. In the trunk, the officer found kilo-
gram packages of cocaine.' 25 After the defendant's arrest, the police
obtained a search warrant and discovered 86 kilogram packages of co-
119. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). The Blockburger test examines
the statutory elements of the charged offenses. If the elements of the offenses are the
same, or if one is a lessor included offense of the other, the charges must be brought in
one prosecution. A subsequent prosecution for an offense not charged in the first prose-
cution will result in a finding of double jeopardy under the Blockburger analysis.
120. Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1154.
121. Id at 1154 n.10.
122. See, e.g., United States v. Dodds, 946 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1991) (affirming defend-
ant's conviction and holding that he had no standing to challenge the police officer's ac-
tions on search and seizure grounds).
123. 941 F.2d 1086 (10th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Walker 1].
124. United States v. Walker, 933 F.2d 812, 813 (10th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Walker
Ill.
125. Id. at 814.
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caine in the automobile. 126 The United States District Court for the
District of Utah suppressed all of the evidence of cocaine in accordance
with the Tenth Circuit's 1988 decision in United States v. Guzman.12 7 Guz-
man held that the defendant's apparent anxiety did not raise sufficient
suspicion to justify the lengthy detention. 128 On appeal, the Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed the district court's analysis but vacated and remanded the
case to allow the district court to decide whether the search was justified
by the "totality of the circumstances." 1 29 The district court found no
justification for the search, and the State petitioned the Tenth Circuit
for rehearing. The petition was denied. The denial of rehearing is sig-
nificant, as it affirms the importance of the Guzman decision in analyzing
when a stop of an automobile shifts from a simple Terry 10 stop to a
formal seizure.
Guzman involved an automobile stop for failure to wear a seat
belt.13 1 Although the police officer had no reason to suspect further
criminal activity, he continued to ask the defendants intrusive questions
unrelated to the traffic stop. The Tenth Circuit held that the detention
of the driver and passenger of the automobile was unreasonable, espe-
cially when the driver produced a valid driver's license and had valid
registration for the vehicle.13 2 United States v. Walker is almost factually
identical to the Guzman case, and thus it does not present a change in
search and seizure law within the Tenth Circuit. The Walker decision
demonstrates the court's resolve to denounce random stops by police
officers where the intrusiveness of the stop moves beyond the "ordi-
nary.' 3 3 The court held that when the intrusiveness of a police officer's
questioning moves beyond "mere inconvenience," there is almost no
justification for the seizure absent an objective reasonable suspicion.'
3 4
The limited circumstances where seizure is permitted absent such rea-
sonable suspicion were not present in Walker.'
3 5
The petition for rehearing contended that an individual driving a
car on public roads or highways has less of an expectation of privacy
126. Id.
127. 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Walker, 751 F. Supp. 199
(D. Utah 1990) [hereinafter Walker III].
128. Walker III, 751 F. Supp. at 204.
129. Walker II, 933 F.2d at 817.
130. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (scope of a search subsequent to the stop of an
automobile limited to what was minimally necessary to determine whether the defendants
were armed.).
131. Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1519.
132. Id
133. Walker 1, 941 F.2d at 1089. The court acknowledged that more leeway is allowed
when the stop is a systematic checkpoint stop. The instant case focuses upon random
stops or individual stops, which the Supreme Court denounced in United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
134. Walker 1, 941 F.2d at 1089. The objective and reasonable suspicion standard was
set forth by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
135. For examples of where such exceptions arise, see Treasury Employees v. Von
Rabb, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976);




than does an individual in a private residence.' 3 6 The Tenth Circuit,
while recognizing the general validity of the argument, rejected its appli-
cation in the instant case, citing Delaware v. Prouse.13 7 Prouse held that
motorists do not lose their reasonable expectations of privacy solely be-
cause they are in an automobile subject to heightened regulation.
13 8
The court reasoned that moving from a stop for a speeding violation to
intrusive questioning about drug trafficking and large amounts of cash
clearly implicates Fourth Amendment privacy interests.'
3 9
Finally, United States v. Walker is notable for defining the appropriate
standard of review when an officer's reasonable suspicions are ques-
tioned. The reviewing court must accept the trial court's determination
as to whether a reasonable and objective suspicion existed, unless
"clearly erroneous." 14 0 The court found nothing erroneous in the dis-
trict court's determination, and thus denied appellant's petition for
rehearing. 141
VI. CONCLUSION
During the survey period, the Tenth Circuit did not drastically
change the law of criminal procedure. However, several cases decided
during 1991 gave further insight into areas of criminal procedure that
were previously unclear or undefined. While these cases did not seem
to support any definitive trend in the circuit, it is certain that future deci-
sions will continue to conservatively explore and clarify the constitu-
tional limitations on the law of criminal procedure.
David B. Lee
Todd A. Noteboom
136. Walker I, 941 F.2d at 1089.
137. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
138. Walker I, 941 F.2d at 1089.
139. Ia at 1090.
140. Ia The court also noted that there is a split among the circuits on this issue. See,
e.g., United States v. Peoples, 925 F.2d 1082, 1085 (8th Cir. 1991) (clearly erroneous stan-
dard applied); United States v. Rose, 889 F.2d 1490, 1496 (6th Cir. 1989) (clearly errone-
ous standard applied); United States v. Mondello, 927 F.2d 1463, 1470 (9th Cir. 1991) (A
police officer's reasonable suspicion, as a mixed question of law and fact, must be subject
to de novo review by the appellate court.).
141. Walker 1, 941 F.2d at 1090. The court also noted that given its recent decision in
United States v. Turner, 928 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1991), establishing the clearly erroneous
standard, it could not deviate from this precedent with only a three-judge panel.
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EMPLOYMENT LAW AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
OVERVIEW
A two-year legislative struggle to reform civil rights legislation
ended last November 21st when President Bush signed the Civil Rights
Act of 19911 (the Act) into law. Unfortunately, the Act's unanswered
questions have moved the struggle from Congress to the federal judici-
ary. The next few years are likely to be highly charged in the area of
employment discrimination law. Prior to the Act the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit relied on a number of Supreme
Court decisions that afforded increasingly cold treatment to plaintiffs al-
leging employment discrimination. Congress responded to these deci-
sions with an omnibus act amending nearly every civil rights law,
including the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1964,,the Age Discrimina-
tion in Employment Act of 1976, and the Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of
1976. The Act's key sections greatly expand legal options and remedies
available to plaintiffs facing intentional discrimination by providing
compensatory and punitive damages, and particularly, jury trials. 2 This
Survey begins with a discussion of the issue of retroactive application of
the Act, a growing point of division among federal courts, and then fo-
cuses on recent Tenth Circuit decisions applying Supreme Court case
law recently overturned by the Act.3 This Survey then analyzes the ef-
fect of the Act's amendments on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 4 which was instead to alter standards in both disparate treatment
and disparate impact cases. In addition, the Survey reviews amend-
ments to section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 (section 1981).5
I. RETROACTIVITY OF THE ACT
While an early decision of the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado, Hansel v. Public Service Co.,6 matched the Bush ad-
ministration's opposition to retroactive application, a growing split
among federal courts suggests that the Supreme Court may ultimately
1. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
2. See Ambiguities in Civil Rights Law Still Must Be Resolved By Courts, Daily Lab. Rep.
(BNA) No. 238, at C-1 (Dec. 11, 1991) [Hereinafter Daily Lab. Rep. No. 238].
3. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989); Ward's Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
6. 778 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Colo. 1991)(refusing to consider compensatory and puni-
tive damages as allowed under § 102 of the Act). Upon signing the Act, President Bush
called for federal agencies to follow the interpretative guidance of senate minority leader
Dole (R-Kan.). President Bush's Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 226 at D-1 (Nov. 22, 1991). Senator Dole's statements show concern with
retrospective application of the Act and specifically show a belief that the Act is limited to a
prospective application. Justice Dep't Brief on Issue of Retroactivity of 1991 Civil Rights Act in
Case of Van Meter v. Barr, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 233, at F-3 (Dec. 4, 199 1)(citing 137
CONG. REC. S15,483 (daily ed. Oct. 30, 199 1)(statement of Sen. Dole)).
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be required to resolve this issue. As of this writing (Jan. 30, 1992), at
least three courts have applied the Act's new standards and remedies to
cases pending on November 21st, 7 while two other courts agreed with
the Colorado district court and rejected retroactive application.8 Courts
disagree over whether the Act is to be retroactively or prospectively ap-
plied in the absence of clear congressional intent. Section 402(a) of the
Act states that "[e]xcept as otherwise specifically provided, this Act and
the amendments made by the Act shall take effect upon enactment." 9
The Act is silent, however, as to its retroactive application to cases pend-
ing at the time of enactment. Inquiry into legislative history reveals little
more than a split on the issue between republican and democratic
senators.
0
The Supreme Court fueled the controversy over retroactive applica-
tion by inconsistently handling the retroactivity issue. Just two years
ago, in Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corp. v. Bonjorno," the Supreme Court
acknowledged its inconsistent precedent regarding a statute that is am-
biguous as to retroactive application. 12 One line of cases suggests the
judiciary disfavors retroactive application and that a statute will not be
retroactively applied unless statutory language requires otherwise.'
5
Another line of cases applies a statute to pending cases unless there is a
clear congressional intent to the contrary, or unless application of the
7. Mojica v. Gannett Co., 779 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1991)(applying §§ 101 & 105 of
the Act to disparate impact and § 1981 claims); see Stender v. Lucky Stores Inc., 780 F.
Supp. 1302 (N.D. Cal. 1992); Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distributions Inc., 1991 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 19380 (E.D. Ark. Dec. 30, 1991) (applying § 113 of the Act authorizing award of
expert fees); Courts in Arkansas and California Apply Civil Rights Act to Pending Cases, Daily Lab.
Rep. (BNA) No. 250, at A-6 (Dec. 30, 1991) [hereinafter Daily Lab. Rep. No. 250] (citing
Davis v. Tri-State Mack Distributions Inc., No. LR-C-89-912, (E.D. Ark. Dec. 16, 1991);
Stender v. Lucky Stores Inc., No. C-88-1467, (N.D. Cal. Dec. 19, 1991)).
8. Van Meter v. Barr, 778 F. Supp. 83 (D.D.C. 1991) (refusing to apply damages and
jury trial found in § 102 of the Act); see New Civil Rights Law Does Not Apply to Pending Cases,
DJ Brief Maintains, 29 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1443, at 1580 (Dec. 9, 1991) (citing
James v. American Int'l Recovery Inc., 37 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1226 (N.D. Ga. Dec.
3, 1991) (stating, without analysis, the Act does not apply to cases arising before the effec-
tive date of the Act)).
[Author's Note: Since January 1992, numerous federal district courts and courts of
appeals have wrestled with the retroactivity issue. Of the courts of appeals deciding the
question, both the Sixth and Eighth Circuit have held that the Act does not apply retroac-
tively. Vogel v. City of Cincinnati, 959 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1992); Fray v. Omaha World
Herald Co., 960 F.2d 1370 (8th Cir. 1992). For a more timely discussion of the retroactiv-
ity issue in the Tenth Circuit, see John M. Husband & Jude Biggs, The Civil Rights Act of
1991: Expanding Remedies in Employment Discrimination, 21 CoLo. LAw. 881, 886-89 (1992).].
9. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1099 (1991). Sec-
tion 402(b) adds: Notwithstanding any other provisions of this Act, nothing in this Act
shall apply to any disparate impact case for which a complaint was filed before March 1,
1975, and for which an initial decision was rendered after October 30, 1983. Id. The Sten-
der court supported its retrospective application of the Act by arguing § 402(b) would be
meaningless surplusage if the entire Act were applied only prospectively. Stender, 780 F.
Supp. at 1304.
10. Hansel, 778 F. Supp. at 1136-37 (citing 137 CONG. REc. S15485 (Oct. 30, 1991));
Mojica, 779 F. Supp. at 96.
11. 494 U.S. 827 (1990).
12. Id. at 836-37.
13. See, e.g., Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).
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law would result in manifest injustice to one of the parties. 14 The
United States District Court for the District of Northern Illinois followed
this latter view in Mojica v. Gannet Co. 15 The court reviewed factors laid
out by the Supreme Court in Bradley v. School Board of City of Richmond 16
and found that application of the Act to plaintiff's Title VII and section
1981 claims did not work a manifest injustice. In particular, the court
disregarded defendant's alleged lack of notice that intentional discrimi-
nation carried potentially severe damages.
17
In contrast, Judge Babcock, writing the decision in Hansel, denied
plaintiff an award of compensatory or punitive damages available under
the Act despite finding an hostile work environment. 18 The court based
its rejection of retrospective application on DeVargas v. Mason & Hanger-
Silas Mason Co.,19 a case in which the Tenth Circuit adopted the Supreme
Court presumption against retroactive application. The district court
appeared to limit the holding to disparate treatment cases, leaving open
the possibility of later attempts to secure retroactive application by dis-
parate impact plaintiffs.20 But as in Mojica, the court turned to prece-
dent from its own circuit when faced with legal ambiguity from both
Congress and the Supreme Court.2 1 Hence, despite conflict among fed-
14. See Bradley v. School Bd. of City of Richmond, 416 U.S. 696, 711-16 (1974);
Thorpe v. Durham Hous. Auth., 393 U.S. 268, 281 (1969).
15. Mojica v. Gannett Co., 779 F. Supp. 94, 98-99 (N.D. Ill. 1991). The plaintiff, a
Hispanic female, alleged discrimination in salary and work assignments as a disk jockey as
well as a sexual harassment by several station employees. The court granted her motion to
amend her complaint demanding a jury trial and praying for compensatory and punitive
damages consistent with the Act. Id. at 95.
16. 416 U.S. 696 (1974). The factors listed by the Bradley Court include: (1) the na-
ture and identity of the parties; (2) the nature of the rights affected; and (3) the impact of
the change in law on pre-existing rights. Id. at 717.
17. Mojica, 779 F. Supp. at 98-99.
18. Hansel, 778 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Colo. 1991). Victoria Hansel, an auxiliary tenderer
in plant operations of the Comanche Power Plant in Pueblo, Colorado, was subjected to
numerous physical and verbal assaults during her eight-years of employment. In 1983
Hansel filed sexual harassment charges which led to no formal disciplinary actions against
the charged employees. Judge Babcock found the level of hostility escalated after 1983
although the physical harassment ended. Id. at 1130. Hansel suffered a nervous break-
down in 1983 and was then diagnosed as suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.
Although Hansel no longer attended work and did not receive a salary, she continued to
receive employment benefits as an employee on no-time status. Since Hansel remained an
employee, the traditional remedies of Title VII-back pay and reinstatement-were denied,
and with the court's rejection of retroactive application of the Act, so were expanded rem-
edies of compensatory and punitive damages. The court awarded front pay, however, to
avoid the obvious inequitable result. Id. at 1135.
19. 911 F.2d 1377, 1390 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 799 (1991) (adopting
Bowen as the law of the Tenth Circuit).
20. Hansel, 778 F. Supp. at 1136. The court expressed concern that § 402(b) would
be meaningless if the entire Act were read to reject retroactive application, but did not
pursue this vein. With analytical sleight of hand, the court first stressed the importance of
the Act's language. But finding the language of Act disagreeable, the court then looked to
legislative history and, finding silence there, concluded from thin air that a presumption
against retroactivity controls. Id at 1136-37. This finding went directly against the court's
earlier concern about retroactive application.
21. The Mojica court relied on the Seventh Circuit's recent decision in Federal De-
posit Ins. Corp. v. Wright, 942 F.2d 1089 (7th Cir. 1991); see also Van Meter, 778 F. Supp. at
85 (relying on the recent holding of Alpo Pet Foods, Inc. v. Ralston Purina Co., 913 F.2d
958 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Thomas, J.)).
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eral courts, plaintiffs in the Tenth Circuit will again face the DeVargas
precedent in future attempts to gain retroactive application.
II. TrrLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196422 forbids employment dis-
crimination on racial and other invidious grounds. A violation of Title
VII can be proven in two ways. 23 The first, termed "disparate treat-
ment," requires proof of intentional discrimination directed against an
individual or group. The second, termed "disparate impact," is usually
established by proof that a neutral policy has a discriminatory effect on
an individual or group. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 alters both ap-
proaches. Within the disparate treatment context, the Act allows plain-
tiffs who prove an impermissible motive in an employment decision to
obtain an injunction and recover attorney's fees even though the em-
ployer proves the same decision would have been made absent a dis-
criminatory motive. 24 Additionally, the Act greatly expands remedies
for victims of intentional discrimination in employment, including sex-
ual harassment. 25 As to disparate impact, the Act overturns controver-
sial aspects of the Supreme Court's decision in Ward's Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio. 26 Returning to Court precedent before Ward's Cove, the Act
places the burden of proving a business necessity on the employer and
not the plaintiff, once the plaintiff demonstrates a prima facie case.
2 7
The Tenth Circuit has only partially considered the Supreme
Court's recent inroads into Title VII doctrine. While referencing those
cases in a number of decisions last year, Tenth Circuit decisions have
tended not to rest solely on the controversial aspects of Supreme Court
holdings. As a result, the Act does not dramatically challenge circuit
opinion. The circuit's jurisprudence, however, has taken the Supreme
Court's hint that employment claims are to be closely reviewed. While
the Act is likely to inspire new approaches to disparate treatment and
disparate impact claims, plaintiffs may still face barriers premised on a
generally restrictive Tenth Circuit view of discrimination claims that re-
main untouched by the Act.
22. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
23. See 2 CHARLES A. SuLuivAN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 2.2 (2d ed.
1988).
24. The Act, § 107, 105 Stat. at 1075-76. This section modifies the holding in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion).
25. The Act, § 102, 105 Stat. at 1072-74. Discussion of these remedies is postponed
until review of section 1981 since the new remedies closely parallel remedies formerly
found only in section 1981 claims. See infra text accompanying notes 131-47. Notice, how-
ever, that remedies in the Title VII context are limited to intentional discrimination and
hence do not arise in disparate impact cases. The Act, § 107, 105 Stat. at 1075-76.
26. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). The decision is overturned by § 105 of the Act. 105 Stat. at
1074-75. In § 2(2) of the Act, Congress finds the decision of the Supreme Court in Ward's
Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) has weakened the scope and effectiveness
of Federal civil rights protections .... Id. at 1071.
27. The Act, § 105, 105 Stat. at 1074. In § 3 of the Act, outlining its purposes, Con-
gress specifically mentions its intent to codify concepts of business necessity and "job re-
lated" found in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and decisions prior to
Ward's Cove. Id. at 1071.
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A. Disparate Treatment: Effect of Proving Mixed Motive
There is a tendency to view cases of disparate treatment as gov-
erned by single motives-either illegitimate (for example, race) or legiti-
mate (for example, ability to do a job). The classic evidentiary
framework for disparate treatment works well in such a context. The
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case; then the defendant articulates a
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employment decision; and
finally, the plaintiff has a chance to prove the defendant's proffered rea-
son is mere pretext2 8 for hidden discrimination. 2 9 Within this frame-
work, the burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff and the
sequence of proof is just a useful means of organizing the presentation
of evidence.30 In contrast, where evidence establishes that an employ-
ment decision results from a mixture of legitimate and illegitimate mo-
tives, another line of cases-mixed motive cases-has developed which
departs from the classic framework. In such cases, the plaintiff must first
come forward with direct evidence of discriminatory motive.3 1 By satis-
fying a higher initial evidentiary threshold than in the classic prima facie
showing, the plaintiff in a mixed motive case is advantaged by a shift of
the burden of persuasion to the defendant.3 2 The employer may sustain
this burden by showing that the same decision would have been made
absent the impermissible motive.
3 3
The Act resolves two issues made uncertain by the plurality opinion
in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,3 4 although other issues are left still in dis-
28. Pretext cases differ from mixed motive cases in that the issue in pretext cases is
whether either illegal or legal motives, but not both, are the true motives behind the em-
ployment decision. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 260 (White, J., concuring).
29. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973). This framework is
also applicable to claims of age discrimination arising under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act (ADEA). 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988). Messina v. Kroblin Transp. Sys.,
Inc., 903 F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Pitre v. Western Elec. Co., 843 F.2d
1262, 1266 (10th Cir. 1988). Last term, the court continued developing the evidentiary
requirements ADEA claims in Fallis v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 944 F.2d 743, 746 (10th Cir.
1991) (finding insufficient statistical evidence to support a prima facie case) and in Mac-
Donald v. Eastern Wyo. Mental Health Ctr., 941 F.2d 1115, 1121 (10th Cir. 1991) (An
employee can use objective evidence, her own testimony, or evidence that she held the
position for a long period of time to satisfy the prima fade requirement of job
qualification.)
30. Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
31. Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) (suit filed under
ADEA); see Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 271-72 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
32. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 245-46 (plurality opinion). Specifically, the plurality
called the employer's burden an "affirmative defense," and further ruled that an employer
must prove its "defense" by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 253.
33. Id. at 244-45. In Price Waterhouse Ann Hopkins was denied partnership in a large
accounting firm despite a far superior record of securing major contracts when compared
with the accepted partnership candidates. While there was evidence of complaints about
her interpersonal skills, other evidence established that gender-stereotyping also affected
the partnership selection process. Id at 234-35 (citing Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 618
F. Supp. 1109 (D.D.C. 1985)). On remand, District Judge Gesell found that Price
Waterhouse did not sustain its burden showing that partnership would have been denied
absent consideration of Hopkins' gender. The court ordered $ 371,175 in back pay, attor-
neys' fees and promotion to partnership. Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 737 F. Supp. 1202,
1217 (D.D.C), aft'd, 920 F.2d 967 (D.C.Cir. 1990).
34. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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pute. First, circuits disagreed on the threshold showing to be required
of a plaintiff in a mixed motive case. While some courts required a
showing that discrimination was at least a significant factor in an em-
ployment practice,3 5 others required much less.36 Under section 107(a)
of the Act, when the plaintiff establishes that an impermissible reason
was a "motivating" factor in an employment practice, it is an unlawful
employment practice regardless of the existence of other factors. 37 Sec-
ond, courts differed on whether an employer could merely limit liability
or escape liability entirely by proving that the same decision would have
been made without the discriminatory motive.3 8 Section 107(b) of the
Act allows courts to grant declaratory or injunctive relief and attorneys
fees once a plaintiff establishes an impermissible motivating factor, but
prohibits an award of other damages once a defendant demonstrates the
same decision would have been made absent the impermissible factor.3 9
The Tenth Circuit's decision in EEOC v. General Lines, Inc. is likely to
continue as precedent after the Act, as it represents a similar view.
40
35. See, e.g., FadhI v. City and County of S.F., 741 F.2d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 1984)
(Kennedy, J.) (significant factor); EEOC v. General Lines, Inc., 865 F.2d 1555, 1559-60
(10th Cir. 1989) (determining factor).
36. See, e.g., Bibbs v. Block, 778 F.2d 1318, 1320-24 (8th Cir. 1985) (en banc) (discerni-
ble factor).
37. The Act provides in full: Except as otherwise provided in this Title, an unlawful
employment practice is established when the complaining party demonstrates that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice,
even though other factors also motivated the practice. § 107(a), 105 Stat. at 1075 (amend-
ing § 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2)(emphasis added). This
change resolved one point of contention among the Price Waterhouse plurality. Compare Price
Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 258 (Brennan,J.) (motivating part) with id. at 259 (WhiteJ., concur-
ring) (substantial factor); id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same) and id. at 287-88
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (determinative factor).
38. In Bibbs, the Eighth Circuit held that once a plaintiff establishes that discrimina-
tion played any part in the employment decision, the plaintiff is entitled to some relief, if
only attorneys fees. The defendant, however, may avoid an award of reinstatement or
promotion, and backpay, by satisfying the same decision test. Bibbs, 778 F.2d at 1323-24;
see General Lines, 865 F.2d at 1559. In contrast, the Price Waterhouse Court rejected this latter
view and provided that the defendant may escape all liability by satisfying the same deci-
sion defense. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-45 & n.10.
39. The Act provides:
On a claim in which an individual proves a violation under section 703(m)
[§ 107(a) of the Act] and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would
have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating factor,
the court-(i) may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief (except as provided
in clause (ii)), and attorneys' fees and costs demonstrated to be directly attributa-
ble only to the pursuit of a claim under section 703(m); and (ii) shall not award
damages or issue an order requiring any admission, reinstatement, hiring, pro-
motion, or payment, described in subparagraph (A).
§ 107(b), 105 Stat. at 1075 (amending section 7 06(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. 2000e-5(g)).
40. 865 F.2d 1555 (10th Cir. 1989); see Cunico v. Pueblo Sch. Dist. No. 60, 917 F.2d
431, 443 n.13 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting this aspect of General Lines was rejected by Price
Waterhouse but refusing to decide Cunico on those grounds). In General Lines, plaintiffs
were discharged in retaliation for their good faith, but incorrect, objection to apparent
discriminatory employment practices. General Lines, 865 F.2d at 1557. The district court
agreed with the EEOC recommendation of back pay, but denied plaintiffs additional front
pay and reinstatement. In affirming this limited liability, the court of appeals provided
vague insight into the mixed motive framework. While the court believed the employer
had a mixed motive in terminating the plaintiffs, it did not mention direct evidence. IL at
1559. Nor did the defendants expressly establish that a same decision would have been
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The Act leaves unresolved how the plaintiff is to show a "motivating
factor," and leaves undefined the procedural differences between the
mixed motive and single motive disparate treatment frameworks.4 1
Mixed motive cases are triggered by direct evidence apparently unlike the
prima facie or pretext evidence required in regular single-motive dispa-
rate treatment claims. Lower courts differ on whether direct evidence
can be solely circumstantial evidence such as an employer's general dis-
criminatory comments.4 2 Past Tenth Circuit decisions have examined
direct evidence in cases where plaintiffs established discrimination as a
"determining factor." Considering an ADEA claim, the court in EEOC
v. Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Ass'n 4 3 found determinative evi-
dence based on firing statistics and on general discriminatory statements
made by the employer's president and other management personnel.
When a plaintiff establishes significant evidence of discrimination early
in the sequence of proof, however, the Tenth Circuit has tended to view
these as pretext cases and only recently has enunciated the "determin-
ing factor" threshold for mixed motive cases.
4 4
Ambiguity in the distinction between pretext cases and mixed mo-
tive cases is not surprising. The Price Waterhouse plurality recognized
that plaintiffs will likely allege both cases in the alternative and imposed
upon district courts the unpleasant duty of selecting one of the two the-
ories at some point in the proceedings. 45 In contrast, the Price
Waterhouse dissent argued that mixed motive cases should be treated no
differently than pretext cases and that the same burden should be placed
on the plaintiff in all disparate treatment cases.4 6 The dissent's argu-
ment, though, was based on its recommendation of a determining factor
standard and effectively sidestepped the issue of two equally influential
permissible and impermissible factors. Since the Act requires less proof
("motivating factor" rather than "determining factor"), the dissent's
made absent the discrimination. In addition, the decision limited some equitably-imposed
liability but retained the award of backpay. Id. at 1560. In contrast, where the defendant
satisfies the same decision burden under the Act, any award of monetary damages would
be denied. § 107(b)(3), 105 Stat. at 1075-76; see supra note 38 for full text of § 107(b)(3).
41. Another issue left open is the Price Waterhouse plurality's disagreement on the evi-
dentiary requirement of the defendant's same decision showing. The plurality vaguely
suggested that proof of objective criteria was necessary, stating [a]s to the employers'
proof, in most cases, the employer should be able to present some objective evidence to its
probable decision in the absence of an impermissible motive. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at
252 (footnote omitted). But a concurring opinion suggested an employer's testimony that
the decision would have taken place on legitimate grounds would be sufficient by itself. lId
at 261 (White, J., concurring).
42. Compare, e.g., Rollins v. TechSouth, Inc., 833 F.2d 1525, 1529-30 (1 1th Cir. 1987)
(A supervisor's comments about plaintiff's age in an ADEA claim did not shift the burden
of proof to employer.) with EEOC v. Alton Packaging Corp., 901 F.2d 920, 923-24 (11 th
Cir. 1990) (A decision-maker's general comment that he would not hire black people if he
were the owner was direct evidence warranting the burden-shift.); see also Price Waterhouse,
490 U.S. at 251 (general comments based on sex stereotypes do not inevitably prove that
gender played a part in the decision, but can be evidence that gender played a part.)
43. 763 F.2d 1166, 1171 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 474 U.S. 946 (1985).
44. See General Lines, 865 F.2d at 1559-60.
45. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 n.12.
46. Id. at 287-88 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
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single model view of disparate treatment should be disregarded. The
Act separates liability and remedy. While employers will be found liable
for discriminatory intent upon proof of a "motivating factor," they may
avoid severe damages by proving the "same decision" defense. As to
alternative disparate treatment claims, then, the Act also requires sepa-
ration of another element-causation. A court must recognize or reject
plaintiff's proof of a "motivating factor" before it can proceed to the
issue of liability.
1. Cunico v. Pueblo School District No. 60:47 Facts and Holding
Connie Cunico, a white woman formerly employed as a social
worker with School District 60 (District), was fired in February 1982 af-
ter working three years for the District. During this period, the District
experienced financial difficulties and instituted a reduction-in-force pol-
icy to cut its staff of social workers down to the state minimum. 48 The
policy required two measures. First, staff contracts were to be cancelled
according to seniority, and second, the percentage of minority staff em-
ployed within the District was to be maintained if possible.4 9 The Dis-
trict also followed long-term affirmative action goals. 50 After the
minimum number of state social worker positions were filled by the most
senior workers, an additional position was added specifically to retain an
African-American administrator.5 1 Plaintiff, senior to the retained Afri-
can-American employee, alleged that the District impermissibly failed to
consider her for the new position due to discriminatory motives. The
trial court found in plaintiff's favor.
5 2
On appeal, the District made two pertinent statements. It first
stated that the plaintiff could not prove a prima facie case under a dispa-
rate impact framework since she could not demonstrate that a position
was available at the time of the alleged discrimination. 53 But for the
District's racially motivated decision to create a new position for a single
employee, there would have been no open position for which plaintiff
would have been considered. Second, the defendant argued that under
a General Lines mixed-motive framework it should be able to limit its lia-
bility by showing that it had a legitimate business reason and that it
would have made the same decision in the absence of the improper pur-
pose.54 The District then alleged that its financial hardship and concern
47. 917 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1990).
48. Id. at 435.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 438-39.
51. Id. at 435.
52. Id. at 434.
53. Ic. at 440-41. The elements of a disparate treatment firing claim require the
plaintiff to show: (1) that the affected employee belongs to a protected group; (2) that she
applied and was qualifed for a job for which the employer was seeking applicants; (3) that despite
these qualifications, she was rejected; and (4) that after this rejection, the position re-
mained open and the employer continued to seek applicants of similar qualification. Mc-
Donnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802 (emphasis added).
54. Cunico, 917 F.2d at 442-43.
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for affirmative action policies were sufficient legitimate reasons.
To escape the prima facie requirements of a disparate treatment
framework, Judge Theis, sitting by designation for the Tenth Circuit,
first recognized that plaintiff had established direct evidence of discrimi-
natory motive and therefore was not bound to the common McDonnell
Douglas approach. 5 5 Yet the court was unwilling to return to the General
Lines mixed motive test because of the recent Price Waterhouse decision.5 6
Instead, the court characterized the case as a "pretext" case and found
that plaintiff had proved that "an impermissible consideration induced
the relevant employment decision." 5 7 Apparently, the court implied the
prima facie requirement of an available position in the District's decision
to consider a single candidate. 58 Second, plaintiff presumably rebutted
defendant's legitimate business necessity even though plaintiff's proof
did not extend past an initial presentation of evidence. The circuit af-
firmed the lower court's decision for the plaintiff, awarding back pay and
attorneys' fees and costs.
5 9
2. Cunico v. Pueblo School Distrist No. 60: An Analysis
By selecting a "motivating factor" standard for mixed motive cases,
the Act reinforces a central policy concern of Title VII in eliminating
discrimination in employment decisions even when other factors play a
role.60 By allowing limited recovery, the Act requires employers to reas-
sess whether a mixed motive decision is truly as harmless as the "same
decision" absent discriminatory motive. Yet, this protection of disparate
treatment plaintiffs hinges on the evidentiary burden of the "motivating
factor" (i.e., direct evidence test). Under its pre-Act "determining factor"
standard, the Tenth Circuit found a combination of statistical evidence
and evidence of general discriminatory statements by supervisors to be
sufficient direct evidence. 6 1 Certainly, evidence of an employer's express
discriminatory intent in policy statements, as found in Cunico, should sat-
isfy the direct evidence requirement. Whether lesser evidentiary show-
ings are sufficient is likely to be disputed in the court's next term.
Given the Act's greater protection of plaintiffs who prove an imper-
missible motivating factor, there is little doubt plaintiffs will try to trig-
ger a mixed motive analysis by alleging direct evidence of discrimination
whenever feasible. Tenth Circuit decisions have not fully embraced the
mixed motive methodology, however. As Cunico reflects, the circuit ap-
pears to prefer the pretext or single motive analysis of McDonnell Doug-
55. Id. at 441.
56. Id. at 443 n.13.
57. Id. at 443.
58. Id. at 442 (When the District made the decision to retain any social worker for a
third position, it was necessarily obligated [sic] [to] fill this position by considering only
permissible factors. (emphasis in original)).
59. Id. at 436 & 444.
60. See Mark S. Broudin, The Standard of Causation in the Mixed-Motive Title VII Action: A
Social Policy Perspective, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 292, 316-20 (1982).
61. E.g., EEOC v. Prudential Fed Sav. and Loan Ass'n, 763 F.2d 1166, 1171 (10th Cir.
1985).
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las-Burdine. Given the circuit's prior requirement of proof of a
"determining factor," a preference for the analytical approach taken by
the Price Waterhouse dissenters is not surprising. The court's ambiguous
framework for direct evidence cases is troubling, however. 62 Rejecting
both the common and mixed motive approaches at different points in its
opinion, the court leaves the reader of Cunico with a series of unresolved
ambiguities.
To clarify the distinction between mixed motive and pretext cases,
causation should be specifically addressed in the disparate treatment
framework. The sequence of proof advocated by Justice O'Connor in
Price Waterhouse is a strong proposal.63 A plaintiff alleging both mixed
motive and pretext would first come forward with proof of a prima facie
case normally associated with disparate treatment as well as any direct
evidence of discrimination. The defendant would then present evidence
of legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for the action taken. The dis-
trict court, in view of the received evidence, would then determine
whether a Burdine or Price Waterhouse framework applied. If plaintiff fails
to prove the employer was "motivated" by a prohibited reason, the bur-
den of persuasion stays with the plaintiff, who still may attempt to show
the employer's stated reason for acting is a mere pretext. If plaintiff
establishes liability by showing a "motivating factor," the burden of per-
suading the court of a "same decision" defense resides with the defend-
ant, not to escape liability, but to limit liability to attorneys' fees.
B. Disparate Impact: Changes to the Business Necessity Doctrine
Unlike disparate treatment cases, disparate impact cases under Title
VII do not rely on proof of discriminatory intent or motive. Liability
may be established when an employer's selection process, neutral on its
face and in terms of intent, adversely affects the employment opportuni-
ties of a class protected by Title VII.64 The sequencing of proof in a
disparate impact case first requires plaintiff to demonstrate a selection
process which adversely affects a protected class; then defendant must
prove a "business necessity" for the challenged process; and, finally,
plaintiff may succeed despite the "business necessity" argument by dem-
onstrating an alternative selection process with a less discriminatory ef-
fect.6 5 Prior to the 1989 Supreme Court decision in Ward's Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio,6 6 most circuits assumed that the employer held the burden
of persuasion on the "business necessity" element. 6 7 While courts dis-
agreed on the severity of that burden, it was generally held that "neces-
62. This ambiguity is equally apparent in General Lines. See supra note 39.
63. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 278-79 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
64. E.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 425-26 (1971).
65. See SULLIVAN et al., supra note 23, at § 4.1 (quoting Albermarle Paper Co., v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)).
66. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
67. E.g., Liberles v. County of Cook, 709 F.2d 1122, 1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983); Con-
treras v. Los Angeles, 656 F.2d 1267, 1275-80 (9th Cir. 1981) cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1021
(1982); Williams v. Colorado Springs Sch. Dist., 641 F.2d 835, 842 (10th Cir. 1981).
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sity" involved a greater showing than mere articulation of a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason-the employer defense in disparate treatment
cases.
6 8
Drawing from the disparate treatment model, however, the Ward's
Cove Court explained that plaintiffs retained the burden of persuading
the court that "business necessity" did not exist. 69 Employers merely
had the burden of producing evidence of a business necessity. Further,
the Court significantly lessened the urgency of "business necessity" lan-
guage in prior opinions and found dispositive proof that "a challenged
practice serves, in a significant way, the legitimate employment goals of
the employer." 70 The Court's controversial re-interpretation of the dis-
parate impact framework in Ward's Cove was a keen source of motivation
for passage of the Act.7 1 In response, the Act rejects the Ward's Cove
scheme primarily by returning the burden of persuasion to the employer
on whether the practice at issue is justified by business necessity. The
Act finds an unlawful employment practice if a plaintiff demonstrates an
employment practice has a disparate impact and the employer "fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position
in question and consistent with business necessity."17 2 The Act also ex-
pressly rejects Ward's Cove as a source of definition for "job related" and
"business necessity" and codifies those terms to be more consistent with
Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 73 and its progeny. 74 As a result, earlier Tenth
68. For example, in Williams, the court found [t]he term 'necessity' connotes that the
exclusionary practice must be shown to be of great importance to job performance to
rebut a prima facie case.... Nor is it sufficient that 'legitimate management functions' are
served by the employment practice. Williams, 641 F.2d at 840-41 (citations omitted).
69. Ward's Cove, 490 U.S. at 659.
70. Id. (citations omitted). The Court went on to state [alt the same time, though,
there is no requirement that the challenged practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the
employer's business for it to pass muster .... Id. One subsequent court rightly admitted
the business necessity defense had become a misnomer, since the defense no longer re-
quired a showing of necessity and, without the burden of persuasion, was no longer an
affirmative defense. Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375, 377 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J.).
71. See supra note 25. This particular focus on the Ward's Cove decision may disserve
courts attempting to interpret the Act, however. The Act asks courts to turn back the clock
to Supreme Court decisions prior to Ward's Cove. Section 3, 105 Stat. at 1071. Yet the
Court has had occasion to reconsider the disparate impact framework in other cases. For
example, in Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988), a plurality first
attempted a "fresh" articulation of the "business necessity" defense, finding a showing of
"legitimate business reasons" sufficient to satisfy the defense. Id. at 998 (O'ConnorJ.). It
is uncertain whether Watson, and other potentially restrictive opinions, remain authorita-
tive after the Act. See Daily Lab. Rep. No. 238, supra note 3, at C-1.
72. § 105(a), 105 Stat. at 1074. The term "demonstrates" is specifically defined as
"meets the burdens of production and persuasion." § 104, 105 Stat. at 1074.
73. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
74. The Act § 3, 105 Stat. at 1071. But see supra note 62. The disparate impact
section of the Act also contains an interpretative memorandum purporting to be the only
acceptable legislative history for the purpose of construing provisions dealing with the
concepts of business necessity, cumulation, and alternative business practice. The memo,
in its entirety, states:
The terms "business necessity" and "job related" are intended to reflect the
concepts enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424 (1971), and in the other Supreme Court decisions prior to Ward's Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989). When a decision-making process
includes particular, functionally-integrated practices which are components of the
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Circuit decisions, such as Williams v. Colorado Springs,75 are likely to be
revived as closer interpretations of the Griggs business necessity
standard.
Despite these far-reaching steps by Congress, the Act fails to ad-
dress other key aspects of the Ward's Cove decision. Most disparate im-
pact plaintiffs succeed because the employer fails to bring forward any
evidence of a legitimate explanation for the challenged practice.
76
Therefore, shifting the "business necessity" burden to defendants does
not necessarily assist most plaintiffs. Ward's Cove has far greater effects
in increasing the threshold requirements for disparate impact and in les-
sening the role of alternative non-discriminatory practices as a secon-
dary route to recovery. Ward's Cove was a class action suit, in which
former salmon cannery workers of Ward's Cove Packing Company al-
leged a variety of hiring and promotion practices for racial stratification
between cannery positions, filled by nonwhites, and the more stable and
higher paying noncannery positions, filled predominantly by whites.
The Court increased plaintiffs' statistical proof burden in two ways.
First, a disparate impact plaintiff must identify the specific employment
practice that is challenged. 77 Second, again drawing from disparate
treatment methodology, the Court based its analysis on representation
statistics that suggest a discriminatory intent if the percentage of a pro-
tected group in an "at-issue" job is less than the percentage of the pro-
tected group in the relevant labor market.78 Since the plaintiff bears the
burden of proof at this stage, the employer may prevail merely by rais-
ing defects in the plaintiff's data.
79
Commentators argue that comparisons of the effect of an employ-
same criterion, standard, method of administration, or test, such as the height
and weight requirements designed to measure strength in Dothard v. Rawlinson,
433 U.S. 321 (1977), the particular, functionally-integrated practices may be ana-
lyzed as one employment practice.
137 CONG. REC. S15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991).
75. 641 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1981); see also Thomas v. Metroflight, 814 F.2d 1506, 1509
(10th Cir. 1987) (The practice must be essential, the purpose compelling.)
76. See generally Mack A. Player, Is Griggs Dead? Reflecting (Fearfully) on Ward's Cove
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 17 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1989).
77. Ward's Cove, 490 U.S. at 656-57.
78. Plaintiffs rested their statistical case on the overall high percentage of non-white
workers in cannery jobs (52%) and the low percentage of such workers in non-cannery
jobs (15-17%). Id. at 652. The Court found fault with this data in three respects in particu-
lar. First, the effect of a specific employment practice was not shown. Second, drawing
from Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299, 307-08 (1977), the Court held
that plaintiffs failed to make the proper comparison between the racial composition of the
at-issue jobs (non-cannery jobs) and the racial composition of the qualified population in
the relevant labor market. Id. at 650-52. The Tenth Circuit and other circuits have gone
further to restrict the comparison not only to qualified potential applicants, but also to
interested applicants. See EEOC v.J.C. Penny Co., 843 F.2d 249 (6th Cir. 1988). Third, the
Ward's Cove Court required plaintiffs to draw the relevant population from the general area
population, not just from the cannery work force. Ward's Cove, 490 U.S. at 653-54; see gener-
ally Player, supra note 75, at 15 n.63.
79. Ward's Cove, 490 U.S. at 650. The Act appears to reinforce this requirement in
§ 105(a) which states: If the respondent demonstrates that a specific employment practice
does not cause the disparate impact, the respondent shall not be required to demonstrate
that such practice is required by business necessity. The Act, 105 Stat. at 1074.
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ment practice on a protected group with its effect on the majority group
better reveals causation.80 Because comparative statistics pinpoint an
employment practice and display its adverse consequences on protected
and majority groups, the evidence links the employment practice with
group status. This view was readily held in prior disparate impact cases.
For example, in Connecticut v. Teal,81 plaintiffs demonstrated the dispa-
rate impact of a written test on African-American applicants by showing
that fifty-four percent of African-Americans passed the test compared to
eighty percent of whites.82 In Hawkins v. Bounds,8 3 the Tenth Circuit
examined how an informal business practice, a temporary detail assign-
ment in a higher-level position, affected promotion decisions.84 Before
promotion, white employees were usually first recommended for a detail
assignment which was then accorded great weight by supervisors. The
plaintiff established a prima fade case on comparative proof that no Af-
rican-Americans were offered advance detail assignments and conse-
quently none were promoted to upper level positions.
85
Conversely, the Ward's Cove two-part requirement for causation
opened pitfalls for disparate impact plaintiffs, particularly those who
faced informal or ambiguous employment practices. Faced with a re-
quirement of identifying a specific employment practice to challenge,
plaintiffs will have difficulty isolating any one practice from informal cri-
teria used in interviews or performance reviews. Even where a single
practice is identified, the Ward's Cove focus on under-representation in a
relevant labor market obscures the causal link between employment
practice and group status. The comparison is based on the composition
of the protected group in the at-issue job and the composition of the
protected group in the relevant labor market. Like qualifications be-
tween the two groups, not the differing effects of an employment prac-
tice, become the basis of the comparison. The Court infers that because
individuals in the internal labor market and the external labor market
are similarly qualified, the only explanation for adverse impact is the
effect of the employment practice. This inference is more distant, and
more subject to dispute, than the simple use of comparison of the pro-
tected and majority groups. In the Ward's Cove scheme, plaintiffs facing
informal and ambiguous criteria will also have difficulty establishing the
relevant labor market, since determining qualifications are unclear.
Finally, the Ward's Cove decision may have a continuing effect in dis-
couraging use of the "alternative employment practices" element.
Given the stiff requirements placed on statistical proof of disparate im-
pact, some plaintiffs may be tempted to argue that the Act allows a sec-
80. See Julia Lamber, Discretionary Decisionmaking: The Application of Title VI's Disparate
Impact Theory, 1985 U. ILu. L. REv. 869, 898; Elaine W. Shoben, Probing the Discriminatory
Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate Impact Analysis Under Title VII, 56 TEx. L.
REv. 1, 32-36 (1977).
81. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
82. Id at 443 N.4.
83. 752 F.2d 500 (1985).
84. Hawkins, 752 F.2d at 502.
85. Id. at 503.
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ondary route through nonstatistical evidence of alternative business
practices.8 6 The 1991 Act, however, adopts the Ward's Cove requirement
that the employer actually knew of and refused the alternative employ-
ment practice before the plaintiff can use the alternative employment
practice to belie the employer's claim of nondiscriminatory reasons.
8 7
Hence, this requirement rejects proof of alternatives the employer could
not have known. Additionally, plaintiffs will be discouraged from using
this alternative employment practices element because a savvy employer
can simply adopt the proposed alternative to avoid liability. The Court
further cautioned courts generally not to impose their own views on
structuring business practices.8 8 The message remaining from Ward's
Cove is that employers retain a potentially broad range of discretion to
determine the feasibility of alternative employment practices. This view
at least partially remains with the Act.
1. Ortega v. Safeway Stores, Inc.:8 9 Facts and Holding
Plaintiffs were long-term female employees at a Safeway vegetable
packing plant who were laid off when the plant closed in June 1984.90
The dispute centered on the formal and informal practices of Safeway's
rehiring practices. Plaintiffs, each with considerable seniority, were of-
fered an opportunity to retain that seniority for purposes of sick leave
and vacation benefits if they were able to be rehired within 30 days of
plant closure. 9 1 In rehire applications, plaintiffs indicated that they
86. Such a view is not so far-fetched. The structure of § 105(a) places the disparate
impact-business necessity elements in one subsection and the alternative employment
practices in another. 105 Stat. at 1074. The Act could be read as establishing an unlawful
practice if a plaintiff demonstrates disparate impact and the defendant fails to show busi-
ness necessity; or if the plaintiff shows the employer's refusal of an alternative employment
practice. For a proposal on the use of alternative employment practice in a variety of
factual contexts, see Julia Lamber, Alternatives to Challenged Employee Selection Criteria: The
Significance of Nonstatistical Evidence in Disparate Impact Cases Under Title VII, 1985 Wis. L. REv.
1.
87. See Ward's Cove, 490 U.S. at 660-61. Section 105(a) establishes an unlawful em-
ployment practice if:
[T]he complaining party makes the demonstration described in subparagraph (C)
with respect to an alternative employment practice and the respondent refuses to
adopt such alternative practice.... (C) The demonstration referred to... [above]
shall be in accordance with the law as it existed onJune 4, 1989 [one day prior to
Ward's Cove] with respect to the concept of "alternative employment practice."
The Act, 105 Stat. at 1074. The Act is unclear on this point since while it purports to turn
back the clock on Ward's Cove, the employer-refusal requirement was not apparent prior to
that decision. It is likely that the legislature intended to erase the Court's additional re-
quirement that such alternatives be equally effective'yet cost efficient. Ward's Cove, 490
U.S. at 661; see Daily Lab. Rep. No. 238, supra note 2, at C-1.
88. Ward's Cove, 490 U.S. at 661 (citing Furco Construction Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S.
567, 578 (1978)). Again, the Act's primary focus on Ward's Cove does not prevent courts
from deriving the same principles from cases not expressly overturned by the Act. See supra
note 70.
89. 943 F.2d 1230 (10th Cir. 1991).
90. Id. at 1231. Plaintiffs were eight of fifteen female packers who, along with eight-
een male workers employed as warehousepersons, composed the plant's workforce. Id.
91. Id. at 1232. Safeway operates three divisions (supply plants, retail stores, and a
distribution center). The plant dosed in Denver was formerly part of the supply division.
Most plaintiffs indicated in rehire applications that they sought positions in the deli or
bakery departments of retail stores. Id. at 1232-33.
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sought full-time work and could not do heavy lifting. During the period
for rehire, however, the only available jobs either required heavy lifting
or were part-time positions, although some part-time positions would
become full-time within three to five years. 92 Of eight male plant em-
ployees seeking rehire, seven were placed in jobs. Five of those rehired
were assisted informally by the plant manager. Of thirteen female em-
ployees seeking rehire, two were placed in new jobs during the required
period. Only one of those was assisted informally by the plant man-
ager.93 Plaintiffs alleged a violation of Title VII based on both disparate
treatment and disparate impact theories.
The district court found no disparate treatment.94 Although plain-
tiffs established a prima facie case, the court accepted Safeway's legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reasons for failing to afford greater assistance
to relocate its former female employees, and plaintiffs failed to show
those reasons were pretextual. On the claim of disparate impact, how-
ever, the lower court found for plaintiffs stating that "a causal relation-
ship existed between the practice of inadequate counseling and the
discriminatory result." 95 Essentially, the court was persuaded by com-
parative statistics that, unlike female employees seeking rehire, male em-
ployees had received informal assistance increasing the chance of
matching their qualifications to available jobs. Since Safeway failed to
articulate a business necessity for inadequately counseling female em-
ployees, the district court ordered reinstatement, attorneys' fees, and
recovery of seniority for benefits purposes.
96
In reversing the lower court on the disparate impact claim, Judge
Anderson of the Tenth Circuit adopted various principles of Ward's Cove.
First, the court of appeals accepted that the burden of persuasion re-
mains with plaintiffs after they establish a prima fade case, although the
burden of production shifts to the employer.97 Second, following the
Supreme Court definition, the court held that business necessity no
longer required an "essential" relation to the business but was satisfied
by showing the challenged practice served "in a significant way, the le-
gitimate employment goals of the employer." 98 Finally, although a
showing of less discriminatory alternative practices might rebut an em-
ployer's business necessity showing, the court echoed the caution of
Ward's Cove against interfering with employer discretion and agreed that
this showing would be difficult. 99
92. Id. at 1234. Safeway also provided evidence that, during the rehire period, 66%
of all hired employees were women, 97% of employees hired in the deli department were
women, and 67% of employees hired in the bakery department were women. Id. All were
part-time positions.
93. Id at 1234. At trial, the plant manager testified that he assisted every employee
who approached him. Id. at 1234 n.13.
94. Id. at 1235.
95. Id. at 1236.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 1243.
98. Id. at 1244 (quoting Ward's Cove).
99. Id.
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Rather than hold for the employer on the controversial issue of bur-
den-shifting, the court reversed on grounds of plaintiffs' inability to es-
tablish a prima facie case. Plaintiffs' statistical analysis failed to make the
appropriate comparisons and failed to exceed a "threshold of reliabil-
ity." 10 0 Under direction of Ward's Cove, the court compared the gender
composition of "at-issue" jobs with the gender composition of the
"qualified" population of the labor market. In other words, it used rep-
resentation statistics. 10 1 Assuming Safeway's contention that "at issue"
jobs were retail jobs sought by plaintiffs, the court found that plaintiffs
were accorded the same opportunity to gain retail jobs as new hires.
Since Safeway hired a majority of women in those jobs, a disparate im-
pact based on gender could not be established. Alternatively, assuming
plaintiffs' contention that "at issue" jobs were openings which could be
filled by laid-off plant workers, the court stated that a greater male re-
hire rate was not dispositive. Examining the qualifications of the two
groups, the court found that plaintiffs had excluded themselves from
positions secured by males by expressing preferences for no heavy lift-
ing. Since males were not disproportionately hired in retail positions
for which plaintiffs were "qualified," no disparate impact was proved.
10 2
2. Ortega v. Safeway Stores, Inc.: An Analysis
Much of the Tenth Circuit's incorporation of Ward's Cove principles
in Ortega is reversed by the Act. Once plaintiffs satisfy the prima facie
demands of the court, the employer receives the burden of proving
"business necessity" under the stricter standard of Griggs and Williams
that the employment practice need be more than just legitimate-it must
be a "necessity." As is apparent in Ortega, however, the threshold prima
facie evidentiary showing presents the greater barrier to disparate im-
pact claimants. By requiring proof that female plaintiffs were more dis-
advantaged by employer practices than female applicants in general, the
Ortega court required that plaintiffs show a systematic mistreatment of all
female employees, not merely a disparate impact on a particular group.
This standard is too high for a prima facie showing in disparate impact
cases. Even during the Ward's Cove period, courts disagreed whether
disparate impact cases required the use of representative statistics
l) 0 3
The extent of the prima facie burden remains uncertain after the Act.
If the Act is interpreted as a return to the relatively less precise
framework for disparate impact under Griggs, plaintiffs in Ortega would
have established their prima facie case. The district court found a le-
100. Id. at 1243 (quoting Allen v. Seidman, 881 F.2d 375, 378 (7th Cir. 1989)); see also
Shutt v. Sandoz Crop Protection Corp., 934 F.2d 186, 188 (9th Cir. 1991)(disparate im-
pact claim under ADEA).
101. Id. at 1244-45 (quoting Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299,
308 (1977)).
102. Id. at 1245.
103. Allen, 881 F.2d at 380 (Posner, J.) (where the group challenging the employment
practice is largely homogeneous in qualifications and the disparity in results is large, a
simple statistical comparison is sufficient to support a showing of disparate impact).
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gally significant difference between the impact of rehire counseling on
female employees and the impact on male employees. ° 4 In contrast, if
courts interpret the Act to retain a vestige of Ward's Cove, a hybrid model
could result in a strict "business necessity" requirement only after proof
of a relatively high level of impact.' 0 5 In light of the Act's censure of
Ward's Cove, this latter view is objectionable. A high threshold for a
prima facie case allows a host of discriminatory employment practices
with lesser discriminatory results to go uncorrected. Given the Act's
proscription of partial discriminatory motives in disparate treatment and
a return to Griggs's concern with eliminating "built-in headwinds"
against protected groups, 106 the hybrid interpretation would be incon-
sistent with the general purposes of the Act.
III. SECTION 1981
Since the 1976 Supreme Court decision to apply section 1981 to
private contracts in Runyon v. McCrary,10 7 this obscure Reconstruction
statute has evolved into one of the most litigated areas of civil rights.'
0 8
The section, originally intended to oppose Black Codes enacted by
Southern States after the Civil War, makes it unlawful to deny nonwhites
an equal right "to make and enforce contracts."' 0 9 Although employ-
ment contracts are commonly implicated, a variety of public and private
contracts are also litigated under the section, including school admis-
sions, housing, and commercial contracts. Prior the the Act of 1991,
given a choice between Title VII and section 1981, plaintiffs would inva-
104. Ortega, 943 F.2d at 1235. Arguably, defendants may have still prevailed on the
issue of causation since the court of appeals found that plaintiffs'job preferences, not the
selection procedure, to be the cause of that impact. Id. at 1245-46. The court's position
that disparate impact cannot be established when a majority of female applicants are hired
for an at-issue position is questionable, though. [Ain employer's treatment of other mem-
bers of the plaintiffs' groups can be of little comfort to the victims of... discrimination.
Teal, 457 U.S. at 455 (citations omitted); see Pitre v. Western Elec. Co., 843 F.2d 1262,
1272-73 (10th Cir. 1988) (Evidence that most promotions during a relevant period were
given to women does not establish that decisions were not made on a discriminatory
basis.)
105. Regardless of congressional intent, some would argue the resulting hybrid is a
more accurate balance between the objectives of Title VII and the need for employer dis-
cretion. The original Griggs framework created a low prima facie burden and a much
stricter business necessity requirement. A hybrid between Ward's Cove and the 1991 Act
suggests at least a logical parallel between a greater prima facie burden coupled with a
strict business necessity requirement. See Player, supra note 76, at 36-41.
106. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
107. 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
108. In a 1980-81 survey of non-prisoner civil rights claims in federal districts in Los
Angeles, Philadelphia and Atlanta, § 1981 claims finished a close third behind Title VII
and § 1983 claims. Theodore Eisenberg & Stewart Schwab, Comment, The Importance of
Section 1981, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 596, 599 (1988).
109. Section 1981 provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United Sates shall have the same
right in every State and territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the
security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be sub-
ject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exaction of every
kind, and to no other.
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1988).
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riably prefer section 1981 since the section required no initial exhaus-
tion of administrative remedies, 110 granted jury trials,"II and provided
both compensatory and punitive damages. 112 This preference was par-
ticularly strong in claims of racial harassment. Since a hostile work envi-
ronment need not create an economic injury-such as demotion,
discharge, or lost work time-courts were constrained from compensat-
ing harassment victims for medical and related costs because of the lim-
ited remedies available under Title VII. Litigation under section 1981,
then, became the sole route to compensatory and punitive damages for
some plaintiffs,"13 although victims of purely sexual harassment were
still denied a full remedy. 114
A. Discrimination in Terms and Conditions of Employment
Concern that expansion of section 1981 might undermine the pro-
cedural and policy objectives of Title VII led the Court to limit the sec-
tion's scope in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union. 1 5 Ironically, the Court
relied on the availability of remedies under Title VII to deny section
1981 coverage for racial harassment. 61 In Patterson, the Court restric-
tively read the language of section 1981 to govern only conduct involv-
ing the rights to "make" or "enforce" contracts, not postformation
conduct relating to terms and conditions of continuing employment. 1
7
The Court therefore concluded that racial harassment in the course of
employment was not actionable under section 1981.118 Similarly, the
Court reasoned, claims of discriminatory denial of promotion would not
be actionable unless the promotion offered an opportunity to enter into
110. Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 108, at 602 n.38.
111. Ward v. Texas Employment Comm'n, 823 F.2d 907, 908 (5th Cir. 1987). Even
where Title VII and § 1981 claims were validly combined, bifurcation of the trial was nec-
essary to try the § 1981 claim before a jury and the Title VII claim before the court. See
Riggs v. Scrivner, Inc., 927 F.2d 1146, 1147-48 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 196
(1991); Skinner v. Total Petroleum, Inc., 859 F.2d 1439, 1443 (10th Cir. 1988).
112. See Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 108, at 601-02 n.34.
113. See, e.g., Hunter v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 797 F.2d 1417, 1430 (7th Cir. 1986) (up-
holding award of $ 25,000 compensatory damages and $ 25,000 punitive damages for
racial harassment under § 1981); Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Products Corp., 772 F.2d 1250,
1260 (6th Cir. 1985) (upholding award of $ 30,000 punitive damages under § 1981 for
racial harassment), cer. denied, 475 U.S. 1015 (1986).
114. Recall the case of Victoria Hansel, supra note 18. Plaintiffs have also attempted to
circumvent the remedy limitations of Title VII with state tort claims. See Baker v. Weyer-
haeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342 (10th Cir. 1990) (affirming judgment of $1.00 damages for
Title VII claim of hostile work environment plus $ 45,000 in actual damages, $ 45,000
punitive damages on claim of outrageous conduct).
115. 491 U.S. 164, 181-82 & n.4 (1989).
116. Id. at 181.
117. Id. at 176-77.
118. Id. at 179; see Daemi v. Church's Fried Chicken, Inc., 931 F.2d 1379, 1386-87
(10th Cir. 1991). More precisely, the Court found that evidence of racial harassment alone
could not establish a § 1981 claim. The Court later agreed with the Fourth Circuit's find-
ing below that postformation harassment may be used as additional evidence of discrimi-
natory intent at the time of the formation of the contract. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 184 n.5.
Additionally, evidence of harassment could be used to show the employer's purported
legitimate intent in forming a contract was pretextual. Id. at 188.
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a new contract with the employer.' 1 9 By focusing on concern with the
integrity of Title VII mechanisms, the Court intimated that overlap be-
tween the two protections should be minimized. 120 By contrast, overlap
of the two approaches to claims of intentional racial discrimination is
maximized under the 1991 Act. The Act defines the phrase "make and
enforce contracts" to include terms and conditions of the contractual
relationship. Hence, claims of harassment and failure to promote now
fall within the scope of section 1981.121 Despite the apparent simplicity
of this definitional change, the Act potentially overturns hundreds of
federal court decisions over the past three years.
The Act additionally expands the scope of section 1981 to cover
claims of discriminatory discharge. The Patterson decision did not dis-
cuss discriminatory discharge, although nearly every circuit after Patter-
son extended its holding to negate such claims under section 1981.122
In so doing, the Tenth Circuit turned a rapid about-face from its ap-
proval of the claim just a few years earlier.' 23 Plaintiffs alleging discrim-
inatory discharge were channelled into Tide VII, which offered an
identical analytical framework under disparate treatment but circum-
scribed remedies. 124 With passage of the 1991 Act, though, courts are
likely to return to the Eighth Circuit's decision in Hicks v. Brown Group 12
5
119. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 185-86 (The promotion must rise to the level of a new and
distinct relation between employee and employer). Brenda Patterson was hired in 1972 as
a bank teller and laid offin 1982. During that period, she sought and was denied a promo-
tion to the position of intermediate accounting clerk, a job which would raise her hourly
wage by 89 cents. In her complaint, Patterson alleged that harassment, failure to promote,
and discharge by her employer were due to her race. On remand, the only remaining issue
involved the discriminatory failure to promote. The district court found promotion from
one hourly wage to another did not constitute a new and distinct relation and dismissed
plaintiff's claim entirely. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 729 F. Supp. 35, 36
(M.D.N.C. 1990).
120. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 181-82. Some post-Patterson courts tested their recognition
of § 1981 claims on whether such recognition would subvert the integrity of Title VII. See
Hicks v. Brown Group, Inc., 902 F.2d 630, 640-41 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated, - U.S. -, 111
S. Ct. 1299 (1991); Prather v. Dayton Power & Light Co., 918 F.2d 1255, 1258 (6th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2889 (1991).
121. § 101(2), 105 Stat. at 1071-72 (amending 42 U.S.C. 1981), states: For purposes of
this section, the term 'make and enforce contracts' includes the making, performance,
modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges,
terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.
122. See, e.g., Williams v. First Union Nat'l Bank, 920 F.2d 232, 234 (4th Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 111 S. Ct. 2259 (1991). But see Brown Group, 902 F.2d at 640.
123. See, e.g., McAlester v. United Air Lines, Inc., 851 F.2d 1249, 1255 (10th Cir. 1988);
accord Estes v. Dick Smith Ford, Inc., 856 F.2d 1097 (8th Cir. 1988); Connor v. Fort
Gordon Bus Co., 761 F.2d 1495 (11 th Cir. 1985). Moreover, this turn occurred in the face
of two district court decisions continuing to award discriminatory discharge claims under
§ 1981 despite Patterson. Mayhue v. St. Francis Hosp., 748 F. Supp. 1484 (D. Kan. 1990);
Padilla v. United Air Lines, 716 F. Supp. 485 (D. Colo. 1989), rev'd, 950 F.2d 654 (10th
Cir. 1991). The Padilla court argued discriminatory termination did not involve the terms
and conditions of a contract, as precluded by Patterson, but affected the right to make a
contract. Padilla, 716 F. Supp. at 490. Although Padilla was reversed on appeal to the
Tenth Circuit, Judge Seymour recognized in a Nov. 26, 1991 opinion that Patterson would
soon be mooted by the 1991 Act. Padilla, 950 F.2d at 655 n.2.
124. See, e.g., Patterson, 491 U.S. at 186-88; Drake v. City of Fort Collins, 927 F.2d 1156,
1162 (10th Cir. 1991); McAlester, 851 F.2d at 1260.
125. 902 F.2d 630 (8th Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991).
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as a bridge from pre-Patterson cases to the Act. Unlike other circuits after
Patterson, the Eighth Circuit in Brown Group found that "[i]n order to give
meaning to the right to make contracts free from discrimination, the
right to be free from discriminatory discharge must be implied."' 26 Re-
sponding to the Patterson Court's concern with the integrity of Title VII,
the Brown Group court found that recovery under section 1981 does not
subvert Title VII's procedural preference for informal conciliation. The
Patterson Court accepted overlap between Title VII and section 1981 in
discriminatory hiring cases because Title VII's informal procedures are
unworkable when the parties have yet to develop a contractual relation-
ship. 12 7 Similarly, the Brown Group court stated, discharged employees
could not benefit from conciliation because no employment relationship
remained to salvage.
12 8
In Trujillo v. Grand Junction Regional Center, the Tenth Circuit adopted
a per se denial of section 1981 claims predicated on postformation con-
duct. 129 Supported by Patterson and by agreement from nearly every ap-
pellate court, the Trujillo court found that section 1981 "does not apply
to conduct which occurs after the formation of a contract and which
does not interfere with the right to enforce established contractual obli-
gations."' 3 0 In rejecting plaintiff's claim of discriminatory discharge,
the court cautioned against a tortuous construction of section 1981 to
provide a remedy for alleged discrimination already covered by Title
VII.13 1 But while the Brown Group court argued that such distortion was
not required prior to the 1991 Act,13 2 the Act's expansion and redefini-
tion of the section facilitates arguing a discriminatory discharge under
section 1981. In so doing, Congress reaffirmed a multifaceted attack on
discriminatory imposition of low wages and intolerable working condi-
tions prevalent after the Civil War and still not eliminated.'
33
B. Section 1981 and Title VII: New Remedies for Intentional Discrimination
As mentioned earlier, prior to the 1991 Act, plaintiffs were en-
126. Id. at 639 (Discriminatory discharge deprives the employee of his or her employ-
ment, the very essence of the the right to make employment contracts.)
127. Patterson, 491 U.S. at 181-82.
128. Brown Group, 902 F.2d at 640-41.
129. 928 F.2d 973, 975-76 (10th Cir. 1991) (recognized as superceded by statute in
Patrick v. Miller, 953 F.2d 1240 (10th Cir. 1992)). Also last term, the Tenth Circuit re-
jected, on similar grounds, a § 1981 claim that plaintiffwas subjected to intolerable work-
ing conditions for discriminatory reasons. Washington v. Board of Pub. Utils., 939 F.2d
901, 904 n.4 (10th Cir. 1991). For a view that per se rejection of postformation conduct
claim is untenable even in light of Patterson, see Caroline R. Fredrickson, Note, The Misread-
ing ofPatterson v. McLean Credit Union: The Diminishing Scope of Section 1981, 91 COLUM. L.
REV. 891, 906-08 (1991).
130. Trujillo, 973 F.2d at 975 (quoting Patterson) (emphasis added by Trujillo court).
131. Id. at 976.
132. In interpreting the 1866 Act, the Brown Group court held freedom from discrimina-
tory discharge could be found within the broad right to hold and enjoy the rewards of
labor, a historically protected right in section 1981. Brown Group, 902 F.2d at 647.
133. See Washington v. Board of Public Utilities, 939 F.2d 901, 902 (A black woman alleged




couraged to seek recovery under section 1981 due to the section's
greater range of compensatory and punitive recovery. Conversely, Title
VII recovery was limited to back and front pay and certain forms of equi-
table relief, such as reinstatement. The Act raises damages for inten-
tional discrimination under disparate treatment (but not disparate
impact) Title VII claims to levels similar to section 1981. However, pre-
sumably in line with the Patterson Court's concern for the integrity of
Title VII, where the complaining party is eligible to recover under sec-
tion 1981, the party cannot seek damages under Title VII.13 4 Punitive
damages may be sought against non-government employers, although a
cap is imposed on the total amount of combined compensatory and pu-
nitive damages recoverable.13 5 Finally, plaintiffs alleging intentional
discrimination may also request jury trials. 136 With the increased public
attention to harassment in the workplace, this provision may be the sin-
gle most important change in the Act.
Despite the Patterson Court's concern for integrity of administrative
remedies in Title VII, many commentators have argued that Title VII's
inadequate remedies are a primary source of inequity in that cause of
action.13 7 Prior to the Act, a particular class of plaintiffs-women of
color-suffered unequal treatment by courts faced with divergent reme-
dial powers. An African-American woman alleging racial and sexual
harassment, for example, might attempt to bring claims under both Ti-
tle VII and section 1981. Since Patterson, the section 1981 claim would
be dismissed as post-formation conduct not covered by the scope of the
134. § 102, 105 Stat. at 1072, (amending 42 U.S.C. § 1981) states:
(a) Right of Recovery. (1) Civil Rights.In an action brought by a complaining
party under section 706 or 717 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000e-
5) against a respondent who engaged in unlawful intentional discrimination (not
an employment practice that is unlawful because of its disparate impact) prohib-
ited under section 703, 704, or 717 or the Act (42 U.S.C 2000e-2 or 2000e-3),
and provided that the complaining party cannot recover under section 1977 of the Revised
Statutes (42 U.S.C. 1981), the complaining party may recover compensatory and
punitive damages as allowed in subsection (b), in addition to any relief authorized
by section 706(g) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, from the respondent....
(emphasis added).
135. The caps are: $50,000 for employers having between 15 and 100 employees;
$100,000 for employers having between 101 and 200 employees; $200,000 for employers
having between 201 and 500 employees; and $300,000 for larger employers. The standard
for awarding punitives is demonstration that the employer engaged in a discriminatory
practice with malice or with reckless indifference to the federally protected rights of an
aggrieved individual. Id. at 1073. Limitations on total recovery are applied to damages
awarded under this section. Id. at 1073. Hence, it is likely plaintiffs will attempt to argue
that no such limitation is applied to pendent state law claims. See Daily Lab. Rep. No. 238,
supra note 2, at C-I.
136. § 102, 105 Stat. at 1073. Amendment of Title VII may also expand the availability
of ajury trial under state statutes against discrimination which are generally interpreted to
track Title VII. See Best v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir.
1991) (denying a jury trial under the Kansas Acts Against Discrimination, KAN STAT. ANN.
§ 44-1001 to -1044 (1986), as a Title VII analogue).
137. See Judith A. Winston, Mirror, Mirror on the Wal" Title VII, Section 1981, and the
Intersection of Race and Gender Rights in the Civil Rights Act of 1990, 79 CAL. L. REV. 775 (1991)
(discussing similar language in the 1990 bill); Sharon T. Bradford, Note, Relieffor Hostile
Work Environment Discrimination: Restoring Title VII's Remedial Powers, 99 YALE LJ. 1611
(1990).
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section. Hence, plaintiff would first lose a chance to gain compensatory
damages for medical bills or for psychological counseling. 13 8 Second,
under Title VII, courts had difficulty linking racial harassment with sex-
ual harassment. Since section 1981 covers racially motivated decisions,
some courts would limit analysis of the Title VII claim to evidence of
sexual discrimination.13 9 Black women, who are subject to compound
discrimination as minorities and as women, thus would be penalized if
evidence were insufficient for either racial discrimination or sexual dis-
crimination as independent claims. 140 The split of remedies created a
legal analysis unsuited to the problem of compound discrimination.
1. Carter v. Sedgwick County:14 1 Facts and Holding
Jean Carter, an African-American female, complained under various
provisions including Title VII and section 1981. The plaintiff alleged
she was subjected to racial slurs and sexual harassment from her super-
visors and was later discriminatorily discharged from her position as of-
fice assistant in the Sedgwick County Community Corrections
Department. 14 2 The district court found in favor of plaintiff awarding
$100,000 in compensatory damages, $10,000 in punitives, $10,748.05 in
backpay and other equitable remedies for a violation of section 1981.
The district court denied recovery for gender-based discrimination
under Title VII since plaintiff had failed to exhaust her administrative
remedies.
143
Following Patterson and Trujillo, Judge Ebel of the Tenth Circuit re-
versed the determination of liability under section 1981.144 The court
reiterated that postformation conduct, such as harassment and dis-
charge, was no longer actionable under section 1981. Since the district
court's order was issued prior to Patterson, the court of appeals re-
manded the issue of whether Title VII could sustain damages for dis-
criminatory discharge. Providing guidance, the circuit appeared to
accept plaintiff's contention that a factual finding of racial discrimina-
tion under section 1981 applied to racial discrimination claims under
Title VII. 14 5 The court concluded that, in the event the district court
established liability under Title VII, the award of back pay and attor-
ney's fees was affirmed.
14 6
138. See supra note 110 and accompanying text; see also Bradford, supra note 138, at
1615-17.
139. See Winston, supra note 137, at 796-98 (citations omitted).
140. Id. at 797.
141. 929 F.2d 1501 (10th Cir. 1991).
142. Id. at 1503.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 1503-04. The court acknowledged Patterson was applied retroactively in the
case, but curiously noted that injustice was not done, despite vacating $110,000 of plain-
tiff's award, because Title VII still enabled plaintiffto be made whole for her injuries. Id. at
1504 n.2.
145. Id. at 1504.
146. Id. at 1507.
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2. Carter v. Sedgwick County: An Analysis
Carter demonstrates many of the unfortunate procedural hurdles
slowing courts from reaching the question of compound discrimination.
Having first determined that gender discrimination was precluded by
the administrative exhaustion requirements of Title VII, the Carter court
foreclosed the potential interaction of sexual harassment and racial har-
assment. Under this view, plaintiff had to satisfy the requirements of a
hostile environment claim to warrant a finding of gender discrimination
independently of evidence of racial harassment. Next, within the limited
context of race-based discriminatory discharge, the divergent remedies
of Title VII and section 1981 further disadvantaged plaintiff. In a case
where both courts seemed to agree that impermissible racial discrimina-
tion was present, there was no compelling rationale to award a success-
ful section 1981 plaintiff $110,000 and the Title VII plaintiff only
$11,000. Under the 1991 Act, no such division would have occured.
By equalizing damages between Title VII and section 1981, the Act
allows courts to reassess fundamental models of the interaction of race
and gender discrimination. Some consider the Tenth Circuit's decision
in Hicks v. Gates Rubber CO. 14 7 a thoughtful starting point for a new
model. The Hicks court permitted evidence of race discrimination to be
considered as additional evidence of a hostile environment giving rise to
a sexual harassment claim. 148 Whether the reverse would apply is un-
clear-for example, in Carter, whether evidence of sexual harassment
could have bolstered a claim of racial discrimination. The Hicks court
stressed that racial discrimination evidence was allowed to be intro-
duced because examination of surrounding circumstances was required
in a hostile environment claim. 14 9 The Hicks court did not use evidence
of sexual harassment to reverse the lower court finding of insufficient
evidence of a racially hostile environment. Nonetheless, this sex-plus
framework' 50 is a useful first step to the more fully developed com-
pound discrimination standard encouraged by the 1991 Act.
CONCLUSION
In a series of cases last term, the Tenth Circuit drifted further from
earlier precedent in employment law led by a blowing cold front from
the Supreme Court. A few of the circuit's decisions, such as Ortega and
Trujillo, follow the Court so closely that their reversal is soon likely in
147. 833 F.2d 1406 (10th Cir. 1986); see Winston, supra note 137, at 799-800 n.129
(discussing Hicks).
148. Hicks, 833 F.2d at 1416-17.
149. Id.
150. The origin of this framework is generally attributed to the Court in Phillips v.
Martin Marietta Corp, 400 U.S. 542 (1971). Under this model, the Court will find discrim-
inatory treatment if an employer treats groups of males and females differently because of
an additional immutable factor. In Martin Marietta, women who were parents with school
aged children were treated differently from similarly situated men. Race is just as immuta-
ble as parentage.
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light of the 1991 Act.15 1 But the circuit's decisions, for the most part,
did not fall squarely on overturned Supreme Court cases. Moreover,
the 1991 Act is ambiguous in many areas, allowing much of the strict
review suggested by the Supreme Court to linger. In particular, the
threshold showing of disparate treatment plaintiffs seeking the advan-
tage of a mixed motive determination and the statistical threshold show-
ing of disparate impact plaintiffs remain unclear. The Act's disregard
for the Court's approach in a variety of areas suggests that lower courts
need not sharply curtail plaintiffs' access in employment cases, however.
Indeed, the Act allows courts to reconsider the employment law analyti-
cal framework in a variety of areas, such as consideration of mixed mo-
tives rather than a unidimensional approach and consideration of the
links between multiple sources of discrimination. Hopefully, courts will
accept this new project by sharing the remedial concerns central to the
Act's passage and broaden protection against unlawful discrimination in
employment.
Christopher Payne
151. While Judge Brorby of the Tenth Circuit declined to comment on the potential
scope of the new civil rights act, Trujillo was not recognized as the law in Patrick v. Miller,
953 F.2d 1240, 1251 n.6 (10th Cir. 1992).
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Although codification of the law of evidence brought a desirable
measure of certainty and predictability, many of the Federal Rules of
Evidence were designed to provide flexibility by vesting considerable
discretion in the trial judge. Rule 103 always contemplated that only
harmful errors in the admission or exclusion of evidence are of any im-
portance.' Moreover, the operation of other principles, such as the con-
temporaneous objection rule2 and the giving of limiting instructions,
5
provide additional justifications for diminished appellate scrutiny of evi-
dentiary matters. These principles sometimes operate to exempt evi-
dentiary rulings from appellate review altogether. The misapplication
of evidentiary rules rarely causes the reversal of a case,4 and the rules
often appear to operate more like suggestions than rules.
In reviewing the cases of the Tenth Circuit dealing with evidentiary
matters, one finds a great deal ofjudicial energy expended to justify the
affirmance of cases in which the trial court has significant discretion.
The scope of appellate review is to identify only those trial court deci-
sions that constitute abuses of discretion. However, even an abuse of
discretion can be characterized as harmless error, so the strength of the
case on the merits supersedes enforcement of the rules. Lost in the pro-
cess are appellate interpretations and explications of the law of evi-
dence,5 and the atmosphere is one in which even prosecutorial
misconduct involving the violation of evidentiary rulings has no opera-
tional consequence.
6
* Sheila K. Hyatt, B.A., J.D., is a Professor of Law at University of Denver College
of Law.
1. FED. R. EVID. 103(a) provides: "Efect of erroneous riding. Error may not be predi-
cated upon a ruling which admits or excluded evidence unless a substantial right of the
party is affected." The Tenth Circuit stated in United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462,
1469 (10th Cir. 1990), "[a] non-constitutional error is harmless unless it had a 'substantial
influence' on the outcome or leaves one in 'grave doubt' as to whether it had such effect"
(quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)).
2. FED. R. EvID. 103(a)(1) provides that error must be harmful and a timely objection
or motion to strike must appear in the record, with a specific ground stated.
3. FED. R. EVID. 105 provides that the court shall give limiting instructions restricting
the evidence to its proper scope when requested.
4. Of over 2000 cases decided in the federal courts from July 1, 1988 to June 30,
1990, only 30 cases were found in which a court of appeals stated in an officially reported
opinion that its reversal was due to an evidentiary error at trial. Marget A. Berger, When, If
Ever, Does Evidentiary Error Constitute Reversible Error?, 25 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 893, 894 (1992).
5. See, e.g., United States v. Sanders, 928 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1991); McEwen v. City
of Norman, Okl., 926 F.2d 1539 (10th Cir. 1991).
6. See, e.g., United States v. Short, 947 F.2d 1445 (10th Cir. 1991); United States v.
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The Tenth Circuit cases involving evidentiary matters are, as might
be expected, concentrated in those areas where the trial court retains
the most discretion, and the evidence has the most impact. Cases about
extrinsic acts7 and expert witnesses are the most frequently litigated.
Part I of this article examines the relevance rules with particular empha-
sis on extrinsic acts under Rule 404(b). Part II focuses on Rules 608 and
609, which also deal with extrinsic acts. Part III deals with issues involv-
ing expert witnesses and part IV reviews the Tenth Circuit's hearsay
cases.
I. RELEVENCE AND RuLE 404(B)
Trial judges in criminal cases rarely exclude significant evidence
proffered by the defense solely on Rule 403 grounds. 8 The Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed the trial judge who did so in United States v. Willie9 , but over
a dissent. In this case, the United States prosecuted a Native American
"tax protester" for failure to file income tax returns. The defendant as-
serted a sincere, good faith belief that he need not file a tax return,
which is relevant to the willfulness of his violation. In support of his
defense, the defendant, Willie, sought to introduce (1) a copy of the
United States Constitution, (2) a History of Congress from 1792, (3)
pages of the session laws, (4) a Navajo Treaty, (5) the Coinage Act of
1965, and (6) letters from Willie to the Departments of Justice and the
Treasury setting forth his contention that the tax laws do not apply to
him as an Indian. The trial court excluded all the exhibits on the
grounds that they would confuse the jury and would be subject to mis-
use; the court wanted to avoid the presentation of "law" to the jury that
was different from what the judge would later instruct. The Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed the trial court,10 differentiating between the material's rel-
evancy to the sincerity of defendant's belief that he need not file a
return, and the sincerity of his belief that he should not need to file a
return. Since only the former would be a proper purpose, the Court
Lonedog, 929 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1991). See also Viligia Bilaisis, Note, Harmess Error: Abet-
tor of Courtroom Misconduct, 74J. CalM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY, 457, 475 (1983).
7. The term "extrinsic acts" encompasses evidence of similar happenings under FED.
R. EvID. 401 and 403; prior acts under FED. R. EVID. 404(b); prior acts relevant to credibil-
ity under FED. R. EVID. 608 and prior crimes to impeach a witness under FED. R. EVID. 609.
8. FED. R. EVID. 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of
the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence." When there is no prejudice involved, the
exclusion of defendant's evidence for trial management concerns implicates the due pro-
cess clause. "The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the
right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations." Chambers v. Missis-
sippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973).
9. 941 F.2d 1384 (10th Cir. 1991).
10. The discussion on the merits of the admissibility of this evidence was actually an
alternative holding. Id. at 1391. The majority also found that the exclusion of the evi-
dence was proper due to Willie's inadequate offer of proof under FED. R. EVID. 103(a)(2),
the absence of plain error under FED. R. EVID. 103(d) and because the error, if any, was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
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ruled that the danger of jury confusion" outweighed the probative
value.
The dissenting opinion by Judge Ebel straightforwardly asserted
that evidence of statutory provisions, legislative history and similar offi-
cial documents supported the reasonableness of the defendant's beliefs
and were evidence that such beliefs were sincerely held. 12 Despite the
compelling directness of the dissenting opinion, the majority was con-
cerned about tax protesters and the burdens they might place on the
courts. The majority feared the "slippery slope" and the prospect that a
defendant might attempt to present the "accumulated weight of material
presented at a two-week ['tax education'] seminar.. . ."13 It is worth
noting, however, that there was no such problem in this case, but none of
defendant's documents were admitted. Concern about voluminousness
or cumulativeness evidence may be addressed under Rule 403. Exclud-
ing all of the material that corroborated the sincerity of the defendant's
views was neither necessary nor fair.
Much more common than Rule 403 cases14 are cases decided under
Rule 404(b). That rule is designed to control the admission of a special
type of character evidence by excluding prior "bad acts" of a person
unless such evidence has probative value with respect to some issue
other than the person's character. 15 Trial court decisions under this
rule generate the most litigated evidentiary issue on appeal, which is not
surprising given the profound impact such evidence has on juries.'
6
11. Id. at 1398.
12. Id. at 1401-2.
13. Id. at 1397.
14. The Tenth Circuit decided a few other cases on FED. R. EvID. 403 grounds. See
generally United States v. Martinez, 938 F.2d 1078 (10th Cir. 1991) (one-half pound of
cocaine, cash, a gun, and a scale recovered from house at which defendant stopped min-
utes before defendant sold cocaine to an undercover agent was admitted as "tools of the
trade" evidence not outweighed by danger of unfair prejudice in cocaine distribution and
conspiracy charge); Bingman v. Natkin & Co., 937 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1991) (allowing
admission of evidence that two 60-year-old workers were laid off one year after the dis-
charged employee, plaintiff in action, pursuant to the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act); United States v. Haar, 931 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding the probative value of
admitting evidence of a chemical catalog found in a storage locker rented by defendant
convicted of methamphetamine production is not outweighed by risk of unfair prejudice).
15. FED. R. EVID. 404(b) provides:
(b) OTHER CRIMES, WRONGS, OR ACTS. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show action in
conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as
proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or
absence of mistake or accident.
16. In a National Science Foundation project, the researchers studied the impact of
certain kinds of evidence on groups of lawyers and laypersons. While these groups' re-
sponses were surprisingly divergent, the greatest agreement was found in connection with
evidence suggesting other immoral conduct by the defendant. Such evidence was consist-
ently rated as prejudicial. See Lee E. Teitelbaun, et. al., Evaluating the Preudicial Effect of
Evidence: Can Judges Identify the Impact of Improper Evidence onJuries?, 1983 Wis. L. REv. 1147.
See also James E. Beaver & Steven L. Marques, A Proposal to Modify the Rule on Criminal
Conviction Impeachment, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 585 (1985). In this study, the authors cite primary
research demonstrating that jurors nearly universally use the defendant's prior criminal
record to conclude that the defendant was immoral and was therefore likely guilty of the
crime charged. Additionally, the authors point to clinical research showing that jurors are
unable to follow limiting instructions and that evidence of a prior criminal record nega-
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While the admission of extrinsic acts under Rule 404(b) is discretionary
in the trial court, a very specific methodology for exercising discretion
was established by the higher courts. The United States Supreme Court
decision in Huddleston v. United States 1 7 and the Tenth Circuit's opinion
in United States v. Record 1 8 reflect the current standards for decision mak-
ing under Rule 404(b).1 9
As with other evidentiary rules, the necessity for procedural requi-
sites, the plain and harmless error rules20 and the giving of limiting in-
structions 2 1 all serve to insulate the trial courts' decisions from appellate
interference. In United States v. Sanders,2 2 a RICO prosecution, the Tenth
Circuit assumed, arguendo, that evidence of five different extrinsic bad
acts of the defendant was erroneously admitted, but found either the
defendant failed to object to the testimony offered, which operates as a
waiver, or the court gave a limiting instruction, which "presumptively
cur[es] any prejudicial impact on defendant." 28 With respect to the one
instance where uncharged misconduct was admitted over defendant's
objection and without the court giving a requested limiting instruc-
tion, 24 the Tenth Circuit found no reversible error and found the cumu-
lative effect of all of the assumed errors did not affect the defendant's
substantial rights.
25
Similarly, although United States v. Cardal126 requires the trial court
to articulate precisely the basis for admission of extrinsic bad act evi-
dence in a criminal trial, the failure to adhere to this requirement is
harmless error if the decision to admit the evidence is deemed correct
on appeal. Thus, in United States v. Morgan,27 the admission of extrinsic
tively affects even those jurors who attempt to avoid any prejudicial impact of the evi-
dence. For another study reaching essentially the same conclusions, see Roselle L. Wissler
& Michael J. Saks, On the Inefficacy of Limiting Instructions, 9 LAw & HuM. BEHAVIOR, 37
(1985).
17. 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
18. 873 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1989).
19. According to Huddeton, protection against unfair prejudice from extrinsic act evi-
dence emanates from four sources:
[F]irst, from the requirement of Rule 404(b) that the evidence be offered for a
proper purpose; second, from the relevancy requirement of Rule 402- as en-
forced through Rule 104(b); third, from the assessment the trial court must make
under Rule 403 to determine whether the probative value of the similar acts evi-
dence is substantially outweighed by its potential for unfair prejudice .... and
fourth, from Federal Rule of Evidence 105, which provides that the trial court
shall, upon request, instruct thejury that the similar acts evidence is to be consid-
ered only for the proper purpose for which it was admitted.
485 U.S. at 691-92.
20. FED. R. EVID. 103(a) & (d).
21. FED. R. EvID. 105.
22. 928 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1991).
23. Id. at 942 (citing United States v. Peveto, 881 F.2d 844, 859 (10th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, Hines v. United States, 110 S.Ct. 348 (1989)).
24. The court noted that the defendant did not request a limiting instruction, nor did
he formally move to strike the testimony. Id. at 942 n.1.
25. Id. at 943.
26. 885 F.2d 656, 671 (10th Cir. 1989) (quoting United States v. Kendall, 766 F.2d
1426, 1436 (10th Cir. 1985), cert. denied 474 U.S. 1081 (1986)).
27. 936 F.2d 1561 (10th Cir. 1991).
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act evidence was affirmed, although there was no precise articulation of
the proper purpose for which the evidence was offered.
Morgan provides an interesting illustration of the difficulties en-
countered in the search for a "proper purpose" under Rule 404(b). In
Morgan, the defendant was on trial for bank robbery. A witness was per-
mitted to testify that the defendant participated in another (uncharged)
bank robbery several weeks earlier. The Court stated, "The two robber-
ies involved many similarities: both times a stolen car was used to drive
to the banks; both involved robbers who wore masks made out of sweat
pants; weapons were used in both; and the maroon-colored El Camino,
which Mr. Morgan was in just prior to his arrest, was seen in the Bixby
area following the robbery." 28 Noting that prior uncharged acts have
probative value particularly when the act is "close in time and similar in
method to the charged scheme," 29 the Tenth Circuit concluded that the
evidence was offered for a proper purpose. Absent from the court's rea-
soning was an explanation of how the defendant's participation in the
prior bank robbery made it more probable that he participated in the
charged bank robbery - besides showing defendant's "propensity" to
rob banks, which is precisely the purpose forbidden by Rule 404. The
admission of the prior bank robbery proved one thing: the defendant
was a bank robber and, therefore, probably robbed the bank. The trial
court's limiting instruction demonstrated the illogic of finding a proper
purpose for admitting this testimony: the jury was told to consider the
evidence of the similar act "in determining the state of mind or the in-
tent with which the Defendant, Mr. Morgan, did the acts that are
charged here in the indictment."'30 The instruction told the jury that the
prior bank robbery demonstrated a bank-robbing state of mind or in-
tent. Larcenous intent was not an issue in the case, therefore the jury
would be likely to use the similar act as evidence of the defendant's
character.
A proper purpose for admitting extrinsic act evidence was found in
United States v. Esparsen,31 where a witness was permitted to testify that
one of the defendants threatened harm to the witness's children if she
was the one "ratting" on him. Although this evidence constituted an-
other crime, wrong or act under Rule 404(b), the court upheld its admis-
sibility to show the defendant's guilty knowledge or consciousness of
guilt. However, the trial court denied defendant's request that the jury
be instructed to consider the defendant's threats as proof of knowledge,
not as evidence of a violent person likely to commit illegal acts. The
Tenth Circuit ruled that the defendant was entitled to such an instruc-
tion, but the failure was harmless error because other evidence of de-
fendant's guilt was substantial and because the prosecutiofi did not
argue to the jury that they should consider the threat as evidence of the
28. Id. at 1572 (emphasis added).
29. Id. (quoting United States v. Record, 873 F.2d 1363, 1375 (10th Cir. 1989)).
30. Id. at 1573 n.5.
31. 930 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1991).
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defendant's propensity to commit crimes.3 2
Drug cases present many problems under Rule 404(b), but are fer-
tile ground for the appropriate admission of extrinsic act evidence be-
cause knowledge and intent are often at issue. In United States v.
Jefferson,33 the defendant was a passenger in a car found to contain
drugs. The defendant denied knowledge of the drugs. The driver, who
had turned state's evidence, was permitted to testify about other trips
with the defendant to purchase drugs in California for distribution in
Denver. The prior acts were probative of the defendant's knowledge
under Rule 404(b), particularly since the defendant denied such knowl-
edge. Similarly, in United States v. Poole,34 a large quantity of crack co-
caine was found hidden in the defendant's restaurant. The defendant
denied his possession of the drugs and any intent to distribute the
drugs. Federal agents were permitted to testify to prior undercover
drug deals they made with the defendant or observed him making. The
Court analyzed the appropriate factors under Huddleston,3 5 noting an ap-
propriate limiting instruction, and affirmed the admission of the evi-
dence on the issues of knowledge and intent.
Sometimes, of course, prior acts are not really extrinsic to the crime
charged. In United States v. Treff,36 the defendant was on trial for throw-
ing a molotov cocktail at the house of his former supervisor at the Inter-
nal Revenue Service. The prior act admitted by the trial court had
occurred two and one-half hours earlier on the same night-the defend-
ant had shot and killed his wife. The court determined that although it
was a close question, the act of killing his wife was not extrinsic to the
charged crime, and Rule 404(b) did not apply to an act so inextricably
intertwined with the crime charged that testimony concerning the
charged crime would be confusing and incomplete without mention of
the prior act.
3 7
The trial judge in United States v. Zimmerman3 8 failed to delineate
between extrinsic acts under Rule 404(b) and direct (but inadmissible)
evidence of the crime charged. In that case, the defendant lawyer was
convicted of conspiring to defraud the creditors of a bankruptcy client
by helping to hide assets. The government introduced out-of-court
statements of one bankruptcy judge who, in the course of adjudicating
the bankruptcy proceedings, opined that the law firm appeared either to
be acting unethically or participating in an illegal conspiracy. A second
bankruptcy judge referred the matter to the U.S. Attorney's office for
possible prosecution, and the government introduced that letter as well.
The trial judge admitted the evidence to show the defendant's "knowl-
edge and intent" under Rule 404(b) and instructed the jury accordingly.
32. Id. at 1476.
33. 925 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1991).
34. 929 F.2d 1476 (10th Cir. 1991).
35. See United States, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
36. 924 F.2d 975 (10th Cir. 1991).
37. Id. at 981.
38. 943 F.2d 1204 (10th Cir. 1991).
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The Tenth Circuit noted that the documents were not Rule 404(b) evi-
dence at all, since they were not evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts;
rather, they were hearsay opinions of two judges who believed the de-
fendant, or his law firm, was guilty of the crimes for which he was on
trial.3 9 The conviction was reversed because of the highly prejudicial
character of the evidence.
Although the erroneous admission of evidence under Rule 404(b) is
the ground most often asserted for reversal, the erroneous exclusion of
such evidence may be grounds for reversal as well. In Turley v. State Farm
Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. ,40 the plaintiff sued his insurer for failure
to pay for the theft of his car. The insurer sought to introduce testimony
of the plaintiff's ex-wife, which would reveal numerous fraudulent in-
surance claims the plaintiff previously filed, including a false slip and fall
claim orchestrated by the plaintiff and one Brigman, who was also con-
nected to the instant case as lessee of the claimed stolen car. The trial
court excluded the evidence because the insurer had not sufficiently ar-
ticulated a proper purpose under Rule 404(b), but the Tenth Circuit
reversed, holding that the "articulation" requirement was not indispen-
sable and that the prior insurance scam bore on the defense theory of
fraud, on Brigman's knowledge, on Brigman's intent and absence of an
accident or mistake in his dealings with State Farm, and on plaintiff's
knowledge of the same. 4 1 Quoting the revisionist interpretation of Rule
404(b) found in Huddleston, the court declared that the thrust of Rule
404(b) was that evidence of other acts was admissible and that "Con-
gress [in enacting 404(b)] was not nearly so concerned with the prejudi-
cial effect of Rule 404(b) evidence as it was with ensuring that
restrictions would not be placed on the admission of such evidence."
'4 2
The attitude favoring admissibility of extrinsic act evidence was ap-
parent in United States v. Lonedog.4 3 In that rape prosecution case, the
defendant asserted that the complaining witness consented to inter-
course. Through various witnesses, the following prior acts of the de-
fendant were either established or were the subject of a question put by
the prosecution: Defendant hit his former wife with a flashlight; his for-
mer wife filed a complaint of rape against him; his former wife wrote a
letter to the social services department complaining about him; defend-
ant served time in prison; defendant pointed a gun at a person unrelated
to the instant case, and that defendant had "a reputation" on the Indian
reservation. Some of this matter came in without objection, some over
sustained objections with curative instructions given. After analysis for
abuse of discretion and review for plain and cumulative error, the court
ultimately concluded that despite the often unprofessional behavior of
the prosecution, "the errors were effectively cured and that the jury pos-
39. Id. at 1211-12.
40. 944 F.2d 669 (10th Cir. 1991).
41. Id. at 675.
42. Id. at 675 (quoting United States v. Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681, 688-89 (1988)).
43. 929 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S.Ct. 164 (1991).
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sessed ample evidence to convict. ' '
4 4
Extrinsic acts are also governed by Rule 412 in the context of sexual
assault. This highly specific rule was designed to prohibit the admission
of the victim's prior sexual conduct to avoid potential jury prejudice
against her. By excluding such matter generally, the rule dissociates the
prior sexual behavior of the victim from the existence vel non of consent
in cases where the defendant asserts consent as a defense. Rule 412
contains exceptions, one of which states that previous sexual acts are
admissible when "offered by the accused upon the issue of whether the
accused was or was not... the source of... injury .... -45 This excep-
tion was aptly illustrated in a sad case involving the rape of an eight-
year-old child. In United States v. Begay, 46 the prosecution relied heavily
on medical testimony indicating the child was penetrated, but the trial
court refused to allow evidence that the child had been abused by an-
other man three months earlier. If permitted, the doctor would have
testified that the indicia of penetration exhibited during the examination
could be explained either by the current or the past abuse. The Tenth
Circuit held that the failure to allow inquiry into the previous assault was
not only evidentiary error, but constitutional error, since the confronta-
tion clause was implicated. The court must find such constitutional er-
rors are harmless beyond a reasonable doubt to affirm the conviction.
The conviction in this case was reversed and remanded for a new trial
because the court was not convinced the error was harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.
II. EXTRINSIC AcTS AND CREDIBILITY
The admission of prior crimes and other extrinsic conduct for the
purpose of demonstrating a witness's lack of credibility is governed by
Rules 608 and 609. These rules generate nearly as much litigation as
Rule 404. The tension lies between the probative impact of felonious
character and wishful thinking that each accused person should stand in
the dock on equal footing, subjected only to evidence about the immedi-
ate charges and unhaunted by a wayward past.4 7 If a criminal defendant
does not testify, her prior convictions are generally inadmissible. If the
defendant does testify, her credibility is at issue, as is some prior con-
duct which bears on that credibility.
In some circuits, the courts have attempted to mediate these ten-
sions by requiring the trial court to make explicit findings in which the
probative value of prior crimes for impeachment is weighed against prej-
44. Id. at 575.
45. FED. R. EVID. 412.
46. 937 F.2d 515 (10th Cir. 1991).
47. Historically, convicted felons were deemed incompetent to testify at all. The use
of prior convictions to impeach is more rooted in this historic disability than in a rational
relationship between crime and truth-telling. When felons became competent to testify,
the vestiges of the disability appeared in statutes and rules allowing prior felonies to be
shown for the purpose of affecting the witness's credibility. See 2 JOHN H. WIGMORE, Evi-
DENCE § 488 (Chadborne rev. 1979).
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udicial impact.48 This balancing is required by Rule 609(a),4 9 but the
Tenth Circuit has held that a trial court's failure to make explicit find-
ings in determining the admissibility of prior convictions is not a revers-
ible error.50 Indeed, a review of the Tenth Circuit cases involving a
challenge to the admission of prior crimes evidence reveals no reversals.
Defense counsel often confront a tactical difficulty when their cli-
ents with prior convictions intend to testify. First, counsel must deter-
mine which, if any, of the defendant's acts will be admitted,
accomplished by a motion in limine. If some or all of the evidence is
ruled admissible, defense counsel must decide whether to raise these
matters on direct examination to avoid the appearance of hiding the de-
fendant's criminal record when the prosecution cross-examines. Most
defense counsel believe that coming forward with the defendant's prior
crimes is better, but doing so limits their ability to challenge the trial
court's admissibility ruling on appeal. In United States v. Davis,5 1 the de-
fendant moved in limine to exclude a guilty plea entered in a prior drug
case. His motion was denied, so defendant raised the conviction him-
self, apparently to demonstrate that he was the type to plead guilty when
he was guilty, but would go to trial where, as now, he was not guilty.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the admission of the prior conviction was
not reversible error when the defendant raised the issue as evidence of
his own innocence.
5 2
Similarly, in United States v. Galloway,5" the defense counsel in a rape
prosecution decided to use defendant's prior convictions as a way of il-
lustrating that the defendant and the victim were "from two different
worlds" and that they misunderstood each other's intentions. Even if
some of the prior convictions were inadmissible, the court ruled that this
argument was a legitimate tactical move that the court would not sec-
ond-guess.
54
In United States v. Sides,55 the defendant, on trial for murder commit-
ted in the course of a robbery, made a motion in limine to exclude his
prior convictions for robbery and aggravated battery. The trial judge
reserved ruling on the motion, and when it came time for defendant to
testify, defense counsel brought out the prior convictions on direct. The
48. See United States v. Rosales, 680 F.2d 1304, 1306 (10th Cir. 1981).
49. FED. R. EvID. 609(a) provides:
(a) GENERAL RULE. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime
shall be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or
imprisonment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was
convicted, and evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall
be admitted if the court determines that the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
50. Rosales, 680 F.2d at 1304.
51. 929 F.2d 554 (10th Cir. 1991).
52. Id. at 558.
53. 937 F.2d 542 (10th Cir. 1991).
54. Id. at 545.
55. 944 F.2d 1554 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S.Ct. 604 (1991).
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Tenth Circuit ruled that in the absence of a contemporaneous objection,
the admission of the prior convictions would be reviewed only for plain
error, and the court concluded any error in the admission of the prior
convictions was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, given the over-
whelming evidence of defendant's guilt.5 6
While the catch-22 illustrated by the three preceding cases is not
new, it remains a grim reminder that the policies surrounding the admis-
sibility of prior convictions are more hortatory than consequential. The
rules of evidence operate more as guidelines honored only if a party's
case is not strong enough to overcome their violation. Even the direct
violation of a court order prohibiting the introduction of prior crimes
evidence may not constitute reversible error. In United States v. Short,5 7 a
drug prosecution, the trial judge ruled in limine that if the defendant tes-
tified, the prosecution could cross-examine with respect to the defend-
ant's prior felony conviction, but would not be allowed to reveal that the
conviction was drug-related. When the prosecutor began cross exami-
nation he immediately asked:
"Q. Mr. Short, you're a convicted felon, aren't you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And that was a drug-related felony, wasn't it?
A. Yes, sir.
s5 8
At the next break, defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's violation
of the judge's earlier ruling and asked for a mistrial. The trial judge
reconsidered the earlier ruling in light of the direct testimony and de-
cided the questioning about the prior drug conviction was proper. The
motion for mistrial was denied. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the scenario
by first assuming that the admission of the prior conviction was an abuse
of discretion and prejudicial to the defendant, then by concluding that
its admission was harmless given the overwhelming evidence against the
defendant. The result: Neither the trial court nor the court of appeals
ever engaged in the actual balancing of probative value and prejudicial
effect required by Rule 609(a).59 No appellate decision addressed
whether admission of the prior crime was erroneous, and although the
prosecutor's conduct was "not condone[d]," 6 ° there were absolutely no
operational consequences attendant to the prosecutor's violation of the
court's order.
Not only are prior crimes admissible to impeach a testifying defend-
ant, inquiry is also permitted, if the court allows, into any extrinsic act
probative of the witness's credibility. Under Rule 608(b),6 1 the cross-
56. Id. at 1560.
57. 947 F.2d 1445 (10th Cir. 1991).
58. Id. at 1453.
59. It has been argued that deference to the trial court's discretion should not render
the trial court's ruling virtually unreviewable. "This distends the notion of discretion....
The fact that the established standards may be vague or difficult to apply does not mean
the courts have discretion to ignore those standards." VictorJ. Gold, Do the Federal Rules of
Evidence Matter?, 25 Loy. L.A. REV. 909, 917-18 (1992).
60. Id. at 1455.
61. FED. R. EvID. 608(b) provides:
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examiner may ask questions about such acts, but he is bound by the
witness' answer and may not use extrinsic evidence to prove the conduct
if the witness denies it. In United States v. Drake,62 the defendant was
charged with mail fraud in the course of his direct testimony and cross-
examination, the defendant made reference to his educational back-
ground and college degrees. By the time the cross-examination was fin-
ished, the defendant had been asked whether the "records" would
reflect that he was kicked out of the University of Illinois for falsifying
facts in a disciplinary investigation. The Tenth Circuit correctly ruled
that inquiry into these matters was proper under Rule 608(b). The only
real issue was whether the prosecutor should have been allowed to make
the inquiry by referring to matters appearing in the defendant's
"records" that were (appropriately) not admitted into evidence. The
Court ruled that this style of questioning was improper, but harmless
error. In other words, a good faith basis must exist before the cross-
examiner may ask questions about extrinsic conduct, so it was entirely
proper for the prosecution to have consulted the defendant's college
records. The cross-examination itself, however, should not have been
conducted with reference to the extrinsic evidence, but only through in-
quiry into the conduct itself.
6 3
Rule 608 applies to all witnesses who testify, and the prohibition
against extrinsic evidence about extrinsic conduct under that rule pre-
vents courts from becoming embroiled in truly tangential matters. In
United States v. Young,64 the defendant was charged with stealing from
her employer by opening a bank account in the employer's name and
depositing his funds therein. She later withdrew funds for her personal
use. The defendant wanted to demonstrate that the employer who testi-
fied against her had accused another employee of embezzlement and,
therefore, was not credible in this case. When the employer denied he
had done so, the defendant was "stuck with the answer" and was pre-
cluded from introducing the former employee to contradict the em-
ployer. This result would be the same whether the original question to
the employer was considered an extrinsic act under Rule 608 or under
404(b). If the latter, Rule 611 has generally been interpreted to prevent
extrinsic evidence where the impeachment matter is collateral. 65
Similarly, a defendant who sought to use prior crimes evidence
(b) SPECIFIC INSTANCES OF CONDUCT. Specific instances of the conduct of a wit-
ness, for the purpose of attacking or supporting the witness' credibility, other
than conviction of crime as provided in rule 609, may not be proved by extrinsic
evidence. They may, however, in the discretion of the court, if probative of truth-
fulness or untruthfulness, be inquired into on cross-examination of the witness
(I) concerning the witness' character for truthfulness or untruthfulness, or
(2) concerning the character for truthfulness or untruthfulness of another wit-
ness as to which character the witness being cross-examined has testified.
The giving of testimony, whether by an accused or by any other witness, does not
operate as a waiver of the accused's, or the witness' privilege against self-incrimi-
nation when examined with respect to matters which relate only to credibility.
62. 932 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1991).
63. Id. at 867.
64. 952 F.2d 1252 (10th Cir. 1991).
65. Id. at 1259.
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against a prosecution witness was limited in how he might do so. In
United States v. Thomas,6 6 one of the prosecution witnesses testifying
against the defendant admitted to one prior conviction and when the
defendant wanted to prove that the witness had a second conviction by
offering the court records through a court clerk, the government offered
to so stipulate. The record was admitted, but the clerk was not permit-
ted to testify. The Tenth Circuit ruled that this procedure fully com-
plied with Rule 609(a).
6 7
III. EXPERT TESTIMONY
The use of expert testimony has greatly increased despite its ex-
pense, at least partly in response to the broad and easily met require-
ments of Rule 702.68 Among the issues that continue to confront the
courts are the overuse of expert testimony where it is not warranted and
the reliability of expert testimony.
The Tenth Circuit has taken a liberal approach to the admission of
expert testimony, and in the three cases decided in 1991, which arguably
represent the overuse 69 of expert testimony, none of the instances war-
ranted reversal, nor did the Court express serious reservations. In
McEwen v. City of Norman, Okla.,70 a motorcyclist's estate brought a
§ 1983 action against the police and the city claiming excessive force
was used during the chase and in the arrest of the motorcyclist after he
collided with a police car. The defendants presented Samuel Chapman,
a professor of political science and the director of the Law Enforcement
Administration degree program at the University of Oklahoma, who tes-
tified that he did not believe that the officers "intended" to establish a
roadblock. Chapman did not believe that one of the police officers had
"rolled" McEwen back and forth with his foot or used excessive force as
testified by others. Chapman agreed that the police officer should not
have been subjected to any disciplinary action arising out of his encoun-
ter with McEwen, and that this latter opinion was based in part on Chap-
man's assessment of the credibility of the witnesses he heard testify
during the trial.
7 1
The plaintiff filed a motion in limine to prevent the testimony of this
66. 945 F.2d 328 (10th Cir. 1991).
67. Id. at 330.
68. FED. R. EVID. 702 provides: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
69. There is some overlap between FED. R. EVID. 702 and FED. R. EVID. 704(a). The
latter states: "Except as provided in subdivision (b), testimony in the form of an opinion
or inference otherwise admissible is not objectionable because it embraces an ultimate
issue to be decided by the trier of fact." While testimony on the "ultimate issue" is thus
not proscribed, the Advisory Committee's notes to Rule 704 caution that Rules 701 and
702 provide "ample assurances against the admission of opinions which would merely tell
the jury what results to reach, somewhat in the manner of the oath-helpers in an earlier
day." FED. R. EVID. 704 advisory committee's note.
70. 926 F.2d 1539 (10th Cir. 1991).
71. Id. at 1546.
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witness, but it was denied. Plaintiff's counsel made no contemporane-
ous objections to any of the testimony. The trial court gave a cautionary
instruction to the jury, noting that Chapman had been permitted to tes-
tify to some matters "within [his] common knowledge," and telling the
jury that they were not to surrender their "complete independence in
finding the facts as you believe they exist from the evidence .... -72
The Tenth Circuit held first that the lack of objection made the ad-
mission reviewable only under the plain error rule, and concluded no
plain error existed. The court stated that Chapman "did render opin-
ions ... which indicated to the jury the precise result the jurors should
reach based on the evidence."'7 3 But the court also stated, "Arguably,
his testimony was proper under Rules 702 and 704 .... ,74 Thus, the
court never decided whether the testimony was correctly admitted or
not. The question was avoided because of the lack of a contemporane-
ous objection.
The utility of expert testimony was also an issue in United States v.
McDonald,7 5 a criminal prosecution for possession of crack cocaine with
intent to distribute. A supervisor for the Denver Metro Crack Task
Force with extensive training concerning cocaine and cocaine trafficking
was permitted to testify over objections about the significance of the
quantity of the cocaine involved, its street value, how crack was cut and
packaged, and that crack dealers commonly possess beepers, single-
edged razor blades, and large quantities of cash and food stamps.
The Tenth Circuit examined this testimony asking whether, under
Rule 702, the officer's specialized knowledge would assist the trier of
fact in understanding the evidence, stating it was a common sense in-
quiry into whether a juror would be able to understand the evidence
without specialized knowledge concerning the subject. 76 The court had
no difficulty concluding that information about the quantity of the drugs
and the use of pagers, beepers, razors and weapons would help the ju-
rors understand the evidence. Somewhat less convincing was the court's
allowance of expert testimony concerning the cash and food stamps.
The court asked, "Why would someone have such a large quantity of
money and food stamps upon his person? Without understanding the
drug trade is a cash-and-carry business, and that both cash and food
stamps are the medium of exchange in a drug transaction, the basic evi-
dence would leave a juror puzzled."'7 7 It is certainly unlikely that the
admission of expert testimony on these matters was reversible error, but
it appears the court gave jurors little credit for being able to draw an
obvious inference that any prosecutor could argue without the support
of expert testimony.
72. Id. at 1543-44.
73. Id. at 1546. See supra note 68, the Advisory Committee comment on the impropri-
ety of such opinions.
74. Id.
75. 933 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S.Ct. 270 (1991).
76. Id. at 1522.
77. Id.
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The third case requiring the court to distinguish between admissi-
ble expert testimony that assists the jury, even on the ultimate issue, and
inadmissible expert testimony, which merely tells the jury how to decide
the case, was Wheeler v. John Deere Co..78 In that case, a mechanical engi-
neer with special expertise in the safe design of farm equipment was
allowed to testify that a combine was "dangerous beyond the expecta-
tion of the ordinary user,"7 9 a phrase reflecting a legal standard gov-
erning the case. The Tenth Circuit held this testimony was within the
engineer's expertise and, given the technical nature of the case, "could
have assisted the jury."8 0
It will be interesting to see whether or not the proposed amend-
ments to Rule 702 will affect these holdings. The new language permits
the expert opinion testimony only if the "information is reasonably reli-
able and will substantially assist the trier of fact to understand the evi-
dence or to determine a fact in issue .... ,"81 The Advisory Committee
Notes to the proposal indicate more concern with the reliability of opin-
ions based on questionable science than with the overuse of opinion tes-
timony where it merely tells the jury how to decide the case.
8 2
The Wheeler case raises the second commonly litigated issue arising
in connection with the use of expert testimony: The sufficiency of the
qualifications of experts to render opinions on certain topics. In
Wheeler, for example, the court allowed the plaintiff's psychiatrist to tes-
tify that "momentary forgetfulness" was a human factor that should
have been considered in designing the combine that injured the plain-
tiff. The court noted the doctor might not have been the "optimal" wit-
ness to speak on factors governing product design, but his lack of
specialization only affected the weight of his testimony and not its
admissibility."3
Quinton v. Farmland Industries, Inc.84 illustrated the Tenth Circuit's
liberal approach on the specialization issue. In that case a doctor of vet-
erinary medicine was allowed to testify about the effect of substances on
dairy cows, although he was not a specialist in the field of toxicology.
The one case reversed by the Tenth Circuit for an error in the treat-
ment of expert testimony was Werth v. Makita Electric Works, Ltd..85 In
that case, the judge excluded the opinions of two of the plaintiff's ex-
perts, effectively precluding the presentation of the plaintiff's theory of
how the accident (involving the severing of plaintiff's fingers by a circu-
lar saw) occurred. The experts went to the plaintiff's home, set up the
tables and other physical conditions existing at the time of the injury,
and examined evidence, such as the location of blood spatters and the
78. 935 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1991).
79. Id. at 1100.
80. Id. at 1100-01.
81. FED. R. EVID. 702 (Proposed Amendments 1991)(emphasis added).
82. Id. (Advisory committee's note).
83. Wheeler v.John Deere Co., 935 F.2d 1090, 1101 (10th Cir. 1991).
84. 928 F.2d 335 (10th Cir. 1991).
85. 950 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1991).
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defendant's severed fingers, to testify about the action of the saw and its
location at the time of the injury. The trial court seemed troubled that
neither expert simply turned on the saw to see how it operated, and
excluded their testimony for lack of an adequate factual basis for the
opinion. The court of appeals reversed, holding that there was certainly
no per se rule requiring an accident reconstructionist to actually test the
instrumentalities involved. The court also held that technical kinetic
principles formed a sufficient scientific basis to support the experts'
opinions and would have been helpful to the jury.
86
One area in which expert testimony probably would assist the trier
of fact is a criminal defendant's state of mind, but Rule 704(b) expressly
excludes this type of testimony for policy reasons.8 7 Because of this
proscription, a defendant charged with aggravated sexual abuse, assault
with a deadly weapon with intent to do bodily harm, assault resulting in
serious bodily injury and burglary is not permitted to present the testi-
mony of a psychiatrist that a person with borderline personality disorder
(like the defendant) who consumes drugs and alcohol (as the defendant
did) is incapable of forming specific intent.
8 8
Finally, the case of Polys v. Trans-Colorado Airlines8 9 serves as a re-
minder that the imperatives of Rule 103 can be used as a rigid barrier to
appellate relief. In that case the plaintiff asserted he suffered head inju-
ries in a plane crash that produced disabling psychological and psychiat-
ric effects. The trial court excluded the depositions of two of the
plaintiff's experts who apparently would have bolstered the plaintiff's
evidence on damages. The problem was that the plaintiff made no offer
of proof as to what the deposition testimony would have been, although
bits and pieces came out during the trial. The Tenth Circuit, faced with
an incomplete record, used all the appellate deference it could muster in
affirming the trial court, stating that "absent offers of proof, we cannot
review the district court's ruling [which excludes the deposition testimo-
nies] for abuse of discretion. ... [The] ruling was not plain error. It was
not error and, even if it was, it did not affect a substantial right of the
[plaintiffs]. Therefore, we will not reverse the district court." 90
IV. HEARSAY
The rule against hearsay often presents interesting and complex
problems. The rule does not, however, actually exclude much hearsay
because of the many exceptions available. A review of the Tenth Circuit
86. Id. at 654.
87. FED. R. EVID. 704(b) provides:
(b) No expert witness testifying with respect to the mental state or condition of a
defendant in a criminal case may state an opinion or inference as to whether the
defendant did or did not have the mental state or condition constituting an ele-
ment of the crime charged or a defense thereto. Such ultimate issues are matters
for the trier of fact alone.
88. United States v. Dennison, 937 F.2d 559 (10th Cir. 1991).
89. 941 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1991).
90. Id. at 1411.
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cases addressing hearsay reveals that the contested evidence was consid-
ered admissible in five out of six cases.
Two cases addressed whether the out-of-court statements were of-
fered for the truth of the matter asserted, the fundamental attribute of
hearsay. In Denison v. Swaco Geolograph Co.,91 the plaintiff in an age dis-
crimination case introduced a document outlining the cost savings ob-
tainable by terminating older, rather than younger employees. The
document was not written by the employer, so it was not a party admis-
sion, but it appeared that the employer had access to the conclusions
contained in the document. The dispositive point, however, was that the
document was not offered to prove the truth of its contents, but to show
that the employer might have been influenced by its contents and was
motivated to fire senior employees first.
9 2
United States v. Bowser 93 also determined that an out-of-court state-
ment was offered for a purpose other than the truth of the matter as-
serted, but with more troubling results. In that case, the defendant was
convicted of selling drugs to anundercover agent. The agent was per-
mitted to testify that an out-of-court declarant told the agent that the
defendant carried a gun and wanted to kill the agent. The defendant
challenged this evidence on both relevance and hearsay grounds, but
the Tenth Circuit opinion conflated the two issues, concluding that the
evidence was not hearsay because it was not offered to prove the truth of
the matter asserted, i.e., that defendant carried a gun and intended to
kill the agent. The statements were introduced, the court stated,
"merely to explain the officer's aggressive conduct toward the defend-
ant. In that context, the statements were relevant." 9 4 The opinion gave
no hint as to why the officer's aggressive conduct was relevant, nor did
the court discuss whether the probative value of the evidence was more
probative than prejudicial under Rule 403. Merely suggesting a non-
hearsay use for an out-of-court statement did not render the statement
admissible; the non-hearsay use must meet all other requirements of ad-
missibility. Additionally, evidence of weapon possession or threats to
kill can be characterized as other crimes, wrongs or acts barred by Rule
404(b). This type of evidence required a much more thorough inquiry
to justify admission for a proper purpose.9 5 Although the error may not
have seriously affected the entire record, the court's treatment of the
issue left all of these questions unresolved.
Two cases addressed hearsay issues that were relatively easy given
the facts provided. In those cases the rules were mechanically applied,
and the counter-arguments had little merit. In United States v. Esparsen,
9 6
a witness was permitted to testify to the out-of-court statements of a
co-conspirator. Such statements were admissible under Rule
91. 941 F.2d 1416 (10th Cir. 1991).
92. Id. at 1423.
93. 941 F.2d 1019 (10th Cir. 1991).
94. Id. at 1021.
95. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text.
96. 930 F.2d 1461 (10th Cir. 1991).
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801(d) (2) (e),97 and were admissible against all parties so long as the
conspiracy was established by a preponderance of the evidence, which
can include the statements themselves as well as independent evi-
dence. 98 Once the court concluded that sufficient evidence of the con-
spiracy existed, the statements were deemed admissible.
The application of another hearsay exception was examined in In re
Lynde,99 a case in which the petitioners sought release of grand jury tes-
timony foruse in a state court civil proceeding. The petitioners were
sued on a promissory note executed in favor of one Rienks and his wife.
Rienks had given grand jury testimony that may have revealed facts
about fraud in connection with the transaction. Rienks then died. The
petitioners sought the disclosure of the transcript to defend against the
suit on the note.
The release of grand jury testimony was permitted only upon a
showing of particularized need, and the petitioners' need could be
shown only if the testimony were admissible in their trial. The court
cited Colorado Rule of Evidence 804 (b)(1), 10 0 which is identical to the
federal rule, and concluded that the grand jury testimony could not
qualify under the former testimony hearsay exception because the party
against whom it would be offered (Mrs. Rienks) did not have an oppor-
tunity or similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross, or
redirect examination. The court would not disclose the grand jury testi-
mony because (among other reasons) it did not appear that petitioners
could have obtained its admission into evidence.101
The relationship between Rules 803(6)102 (the business records ex-
ception) and 803(8)103 (the governmental records exception) was left
97. FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) provides: "(d) Statements which are not hearsay. A state-
ment is not hearsay if-.. .(2) Admission by party-opponent. The statement is offered against
a party and is ... (E) a statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy."
98. Bourjaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171 (1987).
99. 922 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir. 1991).
100. CoLo. R. EvID. 804(b)(1) provides:
Former Testimony. Testimony given as a witness at another hearing of the same or
a different proceeding, or in a deposition taken in compliance with law in the
course of the same or another proceeding, if the party against whom the testi-
mony is now offered, or, in a civil action or proceeding, a predecessor in interest,
had an opportunity and similar motive to develop the testimony by direct, cross,
or redirect examination.
101. In re Lynde, 922 F.2d at 1455.
102. FED. R. EvID. 803(6) provides:
Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, record, or data com-
pilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, opinions, or diagnoses, made at
or near the time by, or from information transmitted by, a person with knowl-
edge, if kept in the course or a regularly conducted business activity, and if it was
the regular practice of that business activity to make the memorandum, report,
record, or data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the custodian or
other qualified witness, unless the source of information or the method or cir-
cumstances of preparation indicate lack of trustworthiness. The term "business"
as used in this paragraph includes business, institution, association, profession,
occupation, and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for profit.
103. FED. R. EVID. 803(8) provides:
Public records and reports. Records, reports, statements or data compilations, in any
form, of public offices or agencies, setting forth (A) the activities of the office or
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unclear in Haskell v. United States Dept. of Agric. 104 In that case, an investi-
gative aide visited defendant's grocery store on several occasions and
wrote immediate reports documenting violations of the rules governing
food stamps, such as the exchange of food stamps for ineligible items.
These "transaction" reports were made whether a violation was de-
tected or not, and were signed by the special agent assigned to the inves-
tigation. The investigative aide was killed in an automobile collision.
The Department of Agriculture, nonetheless, brought an action to dis-
qualify the defendant's store from the food stamp program, using the
transaction reports. The Tenth Circuit upheld the admission of the re-
ports under the business records exception, relying on Abdel v. United
States, 105 an almost identical Seventh Circuit case. The Tenth Circuit
stated, "This conclusion is consistent with numerous cases holding that
records and reports, prepared in the regular course of federal agency
law enforcement investigations, are admissible under hearsay excep-
tions." 106 The opinion then cited several cases, without indicating
whether the basis for admission was Rule 803(6) or Rule 803(8).
Both sections allow the admission of reports of regularly conducted
activity and both give the trial court discretion to exclude reports where
the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of trust-
worthiness. It may make little difference which rule is invoked. How-
ever, there is no explanation in the opinion why the business records
exception was chosen instead of the governmental records exception
when the report in question was of the latter type.
Finally, an appropriate and useful deployment of the residual ex-
ception 10 7 to the rule against hearsay occurred in United States v. Treff.108
In that case, the defendant, a former IRS employee, allegedly.killed his
wife, took his children to a motel, then drove to the home of his former
supervisor at the IRS and threw a molotov cocktail on the roof. Defend-
ant was convicted of an attempt to kill the supervisor, among other
charges. Defendant and his wife had marital difficulties, and on advice
agency, or (B) matters observed pursuant to duty imposed by law as to which
matters there was a duty to report, excluding, however, in criminal cases, matters
observed by police officers and other law enforcement personnel, or (C) in civil
actions and proceedings and against the Government in criminal cases, factual
findings resulting from an investigation make pursuant to authority granted by
law, unless the sources of information or other circumstances indicate lack of
trustworthiness.
104. 930 F.2d 816 (10th Cir. 1991).
105. 670 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1982).
106. Haskell, 930 F.2d at 819 (emphasis added).
107. FED. R. EvID. 803(24) and FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(5). These rules allow the admis-
sion of evidence of otherwise admissible if the court finds:
(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is
more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which
the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general pur-
poses of these rules and the interests ofjustice will best be served by admission of
the statement into evidence. However, a statement may not be admitted under
this exception unless the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party suffi-
ciently in advance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair
opportunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent's intention to offer the state-
ment and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the declarant.
108. 924 F.2d 975 (10th Cir. 1991).
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of her lawyer, she had been keeping a diary of her husband's conduct.
Investigators found the diary with an entry made the day before she was
killed: "Robert ... still angry and upset mood. Finally asked if state
would pay medical bills if he committed himself because he wanted to
kill self and Fay."' 0 9 (Fay was defendant's supervisor.) The wife's hand-
writing was identified by her sister, and the prosecution sought its ad-
mission to prove intent to kill the supervisor.
After eliminating the possibility that marital privilege might exclude
the evidence, 110 the trial court found that the diary had circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness and that the prosecution provided ade-
quate notice to defense counsel of his intent to use the diary entry at
trial. The Tenth Circuit opinion agreed with the trial court's conclu-
sions without much comment and the conviction was affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit's evidence jurisprudence consistently utilizes all
the mechanisms available to avoid reversing trial court rulings on evi-
dentiary matters. These mechanisms serve the interests of efficiency and
also the interests of justice when the case as a whole is not affected by
the erroneous admission or exclusion of evidence. However, care must
be taken lest the easy litanies of the plain and harmless error rules result
in the sacrifice of meaningful appellate enforcement of the rules of evi-
dence. Without appellate guidance, the trial courts' exercises of discre-
tion are effectively insulated from review altogether. Then the Rules of
Evidence themselves will matter very little.






In 1991, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals analyzed a variety of
issues within the scope of Real Property law. In the landlord tenant con-
text, the court considered whether the presence of a defaulting tenant
was a sufficient measure of damages in a breach of contract claim' and
whether a commercial tenant could be relieved from complying with a
"clear and unambiguous" provision in a lease.2 In the area of ease-
ments, the Tenth Circuit discussed when to balance the equities and
public policies of a situation when granting an injunction.3 Finally, in
the sphere of eminent domain, the court discussed vestment of a prop-
erty interest when federal approval is required. 4 This Article will ex-
amine these significant Tenth Circuit decisions.
II. A DEFAULTING LESSEE IS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SHOW
DIMINUTION IN PROPERTY VALUE.
In John A. Henry & Co. v. T. G. & Y. Stores Co.,5 the Tenth Circuit
concluded that evidence by an appraiser 6 showing that a lessee's history
of default would make the property harder to sell was a measure of dam-
ages sufficiently certain to support a claim for diminution in property
value based on breach of contract.
7
A. Factual Background
John Henry agreed to build, at his expense, a 60,000 square-foot
building in exchange for a promise by T.G. & Y. to place one of its
stores in the building. T.G., & Y. then entered into a twenty year lease
that included a clause prohibiting it from halting rent payments. 8 Henry
pledged the lease as security and borrowed approximately $1.5 million
to construct the building.9 T.G. & Y. first occupied the building in 1981
and continued to make timely lease payments through 1986 when Mc-
Crory Corp. purchased T.G. & Y..10
In an effort to scale down operations, McCrory closed 202 T.G. &
Y. stores. McCrory subleased or assigned only 46 of the stores' leases
and employed St erik Company to dispose of the remaining lease obliga-
1. John A. Henry & Co. v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 941 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1991).
2. Car-X Service Systems, Inc. v. Kidd-Heller, 927 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1991).
3. Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Lario Enter., 942 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir. 1991).
4. Sangre De Cristo Dev. Co. v. United States, 932 F.2d 891 (loth Cir. 1991).
5. 941 F.2d 1068 (10th Cir. 1991).
6. Id. at 1071.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 1070.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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tions." I Sterik attempted to terminate its lease with Henry by sending
him a closure notice and offering a lump-sum cash payment. 12 When
Sterik and Henry failed to reach an agreement, McCrory withheld March
and April rent. Henry was forced to seek relief from his lender, South-
land Insurance, because he was unable to pay the mortgage without Mc-
Crory's rental payments.' 3 At McCrory's request, and in exchange for
payment of the March and April rental payments, Henry discussed can-
cellation of the lease with Sterik. The parties were unable to reach an
agreement, and McCrory withheld rent from July 1987 to March 1988.14
Henry narrowly avoided foreclosure during that time but refused to ca-
pitulate to McCrory. Because of Henry's tenacity, McCrory resumed
rental payments in March 1988 and paid back all of the past rent due. 15
In his suit, Henry asserted that McCrory breached the lease agree-
ment by withholding rental payments. 16 He claimed that the presence
of a recalcitrant tenant diminished the value of the property, making it
harder to sell. 17 McCrory argued damages for diminished property
value should be based upon actual efforts to sell the property in the
market place.' 8 Further, evidence of a defaulting tenant alone was too
speculative and indefinite to determine the amount of diminution in
property value. McCrory urged that damages, if any, should not be
based on an incompetent standard, therefore, Henry's claim for breach
of contract should not be submitted to the jury. The jury decided the
question of damages and ultimately found for Henry.' 9
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
In an opinion by Judge Logan,20 the Tenth Circuit rejected Mc-
Crory's argument. The court found that actually attempting to sell the





15. Id. at 1071.
16. Id. Henry also asserted that McCrory's actions tortiously interfered with his mort-
gage contract. The Oklahoma court had not yet recognized this particular claim. Relying
on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 A, cmt. b (1977), the Tenth Circuit sus-
tained Henry's cause of action and found McCrory had indeed tortiously interfered with
Henry's mortgage contract. Id. at 1072.
17. In support of his view, Henry offered the testimony of an experienced real estate
appraiser who stated the property's value had been diminished by $223,000 to $280,000.
Id. at 1071.
18. Henry, 941 F.2d at 1071 (citing Great Western Motor Lines v. Cozard, 417 P.2d 575,
578 (Okla. 1966) (Damages must be ascertainable "in some manner other than by mere
speculation conjecture or surmise, and by reference to some definite standard."). See also
OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 21 (1987) (damages must be clearly ascertainable in both their na-
ture and origin).
19. The jury awarded Henry $100,000.00 actual and $2,000,000.00 punitive damages
based on the contractual interference claim. Id.
20. Sitting as a member of a three judge panel comprised of Honorable Myron H.




property value. 2 1 Evidence need only show the extent of damages as a
matter of "just and reasonable inference." 22 The real estate appraiser's
opinion that the property value was diminished by McCrory's recalci-
trance was "sufficiently certain in nature and origin" that the extent of
damages could be "reasonably inferred." 23 Therefore, the breach of
contract claim had properly gone before the jury.
C. Conclusion
It may appear that the testimony of one appraiser is too speculative
a basis to determine the amount of damages to the value of the property.
However, Oklahoma courts and the Tenth Circuit have previously held
that testimonial evidence may be a sufficient means of determining dam-
ages when the appraiser is experienced and able to articulate how a de-
faulting tenant affects the value of leased property. 24 In Hornwood v.
Smith's Food King No. 1,25 the Nevada Supreme Court considered a fact
situation similar to Henry. The Nevada Supreme Court found that the
testimony of a leasing agent and developer was sufficient to determine
the diminution in property value when an anchor tenant left.2 6 Henry,
signals no departure or expansion of existing Oklahoma or Tenth Cir-
cuit law.
III. A COMMERCIAL TENANT MAY BE RELIEVED FROM STRICTLY
COMPLYING WITH UNAMBIGUOUS TERMS OF RENEWAL
IN A LEASE.
In Car-X Service Systems, Inc. v. Kidd-Heller,2 7 the Tenth Circuit found
that where the balanced equities of a situation allow, a court may relieve
a party from strict compliance with an unambiguous provision in a lease.
A. Factual Background
Olivette G. Kidd-Heller and Jacob Heller entered into a lease agree-
ment with Mr. and Mrs. Tanquary on September 27, 1967 (Tanquary/
Kidd-Heller Lease). The agreement allowed the Kidd-Hellers use and
possession of a parcel of real estate for a ten-year period.28 The lease
also provided three five-year options which, if all were exercised, would
have extended the lease to September 30, 1992.29
Car-X Service Systems entered into a lease agreement with Olivette
21. Henry, 941 F.2d at 1071 ("such direct and specific evidence is not required").
22. Id. (quoting Larrance Tank Corp. v. Burrough, 476 P.2d 346, 350 (Okla. 1970)
(citations omitted)).
23. Id.
24. See General Fin. Corp. v. Dillon, 172 F.2d 924 (10th Cir. 1949); Chorn v. Williams,
99 P.2d 1036 (Okla. 1940); Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Sheets, 62 P.2d 91 (Okla.
1936).
25. 772 P.2d 1284 (Nev. 1989).
26. Id. at 1286.
27. 927 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1991).
28. Id. at 512.
29. Id.
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B. Kidd-Heller and Jacob Heller on March 31, 1977 (Kidd-Heller/Car-X
Lease)30 for use of the same subject property of the Tanquary/Kidd-
Heller lease.3 1 The Kidd-Heller/Car-X lease was for an initial five-year
term with two five-year options,3 2 and required Car-X to exercise its op-
tion to renew at least six months prior to the termination of the current
term.3 3 In addition, Car-X was required to keep liability and property
damage insurance on the property and furnish Kidd-Heller with a certifi-
cate evidencing such coverage.
3 4
The first term of the Kidd-Heller/Car-X lease ended April 30, 1982.
Car-X exercised its first option to renew February 26, 1982, two months
before the lease ended, but four months later than the time by which
Car-X was required to exercise its option.3 5 Initially Kidd-Heller re-
fused to recognize Car-X's belated exercise of its option to renew. Two
months later, however, Kidd-Heller extended the lease for five years. 36
In May of 1986, a dispute arose as to whether Car-X obtained the
proper insurance on the property.3 7 Kidd-Heller's attorney sent Car-X
a letter on May 10, 1986, advising Car-X that the lease was being termi-
nated;3 8 Car-X would not be allowed to exercise its second option to
extend. On February 19, 1987, Car-X received notice that the lease
would be terminated as of April 30, 1987. In response, Car-X notified
Kidd-Heller that it intended to exercise its option to renew the lease for
the second five-year term.3 9 Car-X brought suit in the District Court of
Kansas seeking a temporary restraining order prohibiting Kidd-Heller
from terminating its lease with Car-X.40 Car-X also sought equitable
relief from the lease provision that required exercise of the option to
renew six months prior to the expiration of the current lease term.
4 1
Kidd-Heller argued that under Kansas law, the district court could
not relieve Car-X from complying with a clear and unambiguous provi-
30. Id. On April 7, 1977, Car-X also entered into a sublease agreement with its fran-
chisee, Mufflers of Kansas City, Inc. The agreement made Mufflers subject to the terms
and conditions of the Kidd-Heller/Car-X lease. Id.
31. Id. Only one provision in the Tanquary/Kidd-Heller lease, relating to alterations
in the property, was specifically incorporated into the Kidd-Heller/Car-X lease.
32. Id.
33. Car-X had to furnish written notice and deliver such notice personally or send it
via certified mail to Kidd-Heller. Id. at 512-13.
34. Id.
35. Id. Car-X explained that it had "inadvertently failed to extend the lease in a timely
fashion." Id.
36. Id.
37. During 1985 and 1986, Car-X had in place the required insurance, but failed to
provide a certificate of such coverage to Kidd-Heller. Id.
38. Id.
39. Car-X responded on June 3, 1986, by advising Kidd-Heller that it intended to
continue the lease "until the last option term in 1992, and beyond." Id.
40. Mufflers, the sub-tenant, also joined this suit.
41. Car-X initially argued that the Kidd-Heller/Car-X lease ran concurrent with the
Tanquary/Kidd-Heller lease. Based on this view, the five-year renewal period terminated
on September 30, 1982 not April 30, 1982, therefore, Car-X had timely exercised its op-
tion to renew on March 19, 1987. However, this approach was abandoned during the
course of the suit. Car-X, 927 F.2d at 514-15.
986 [Vol. 69:4
REAL PROPERTY SURVEY
sion of a contract under the guise of equitable relief.4 2 Kidd-Heller re-
lied on the holding of Gill Mortuary v. Sutoris, Inc.4 3 to argue that
equitable relief was not proper. However, the district court determined
that this was an appropriate case for equitable relief. The court relied
heavily on the fact that Car-X gave notice of intent to renew before the
leasehold term expired, and Kidd-Heller had in fact received such no-
tice. 44 In addition, if the option to renew was declared lost, it would do
great harm to Car-X, and allowing Car-X to remain a lessee for an addi-
tional five years would do comparatively little harm to Kidd-Heller.
4 5
Therefore, the court held that Car-X's exercise of its option did extend
the lease term for another five years.
B. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to grant eq-
uitable relief.4 6 The court observed that in Gill Mortuary, that court re-
fused to grant specific performance of two lease agreements. However,
the Gill Mortuary court suggested that equitable relief may be appropri-
ate in cases that presented facts different from those in Gill Mortuary.
4 7
The Tenth Circuit determined that Car-X was so distinguished from that
case. Gill Mortuary involved a lease that expired before the lessee at-
tempted to extend it, whereas, in the instant case, Car-X exercised its
option to renew the lease in clear and unambiguous language when the
current five-year term of the lease was still in force and effect. 4 8 Addi-
tionally, Kidd-Heller received notice of Car-X's intent to extend the
lease, and Car-X's failure to timely extend was not intentional or
willful.
4 9
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court that the balanced
equities of the situation warranted granting an equitable remedy. If the
lease were forfeited, it would cause relatively great harm to Car-X, due
to the amount of money it spent on alterations to the property itself5 0
and the good-will and customer recognition it gained while conducting
business on the premises. 5 1 In the alternative, Kidd-Heller would suffer
relatively little harm if Car-X was allowed to continue its lease. The
lease provided an increase in rental payment for the second five-year
term.52 Kidd-Heller hid also taken no steps to lease the premises to
another tenant.5 3 The Tenth Circuit 'declined to disturb the district
42. Id. at 515.
43. 485 P.2d 1377 (Kan. 1971).
44. Id. at 516.
45. Id. at 516-17.
46. Car-X, 927 F.2d at 516.
47. Id. at 516 (citing Gill Mortuary, 485 P.2d at 1380).
48. Id.
49. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
50. Both Car-X and Mufflers expended in excess of $10,000 for alterations and im-
provements to the property. Car-X, 927 F.2d at 512.
51. Id. at 516-17.
52. The lease provided for an increase of $100.00 per month in the rental payment
for the second five year term. Id. at 513.
53. Id. at 517.
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court's holding.
C. Conclusion
Courts will generally give contractual language its plain meaning
M
and not read any other rights or obligations into an agreement. Often
times in the commercial context, however, situations arise requiring eq-
uitable relief so a lease will not be forfeited due to oversight.5 5 In its
decision, the Tenth Circuit initially stressed the presence of two factors:
(1) Car-X had exercised its option to extend before the lease expired;
and (2) Car-X did not willfully or intentionally fail to renew the lease.
5 6
The court then examined the equities of the situation and concluded
that Car-X should be relieved from strictly complying with the renewal
provision in the lease. Absent a showing of these two factors, however,
the court will not relieve a party from complying with a contractual pro-
vision under the guise of equitable relief.
IV. BEFORE GRANTING A MANDATORY INJUNCTION, THE COURT NEED
NOT CONSIDER EQUITIES OR PUBLIC POLICY IF AN EASEMENT
IS CLEARLY DEFINED, LEGALLY PROTECTED AND
THE ENCROACHING PARTY Is NOT
INNOCENT.
In Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Lario Enterprises, Inc. ,57 the Tenth Circuit
found that an easement owner was entitled to a mandatory injunction.
The district court erred in balancing the equities between the parties
where the easement rights were clearly defined and legally protected
and the encroaching party acted with knowledge of the easement.
A. Factual Background
Mid-America Pipeline Co. (Mid-America) purchased and duly re-
corded certain easements across undeveloped farmland in 1960.58 The
easements granted Mid-America:
the right to clear and keep clear all trees, undergrowth and
other obstructions from the . . . right of way, and Grantor
agrees not to build, construct or create any buildings or other
structures on the herein granted right of way that will interfere
with the normal operation and maintenance of the said line or
lines. 59
Mid-America installed two high-pressure liquid gas pipelines
54. ARTHUR L. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CoNTRars § 535 (3rd ed. 1963).
55. For a general discussion of this matter, see Circumstances Excusing Lessee's Fail-
ure to Give Timely Notice or Exercise of Option to Renew or Extend Lease 27 A.L.R. 4th
266 (1984). See also Linn Corp. v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 424 N.E.2d 676, 678-79 (Ill. App. 3d
1981); Wharf Restaurant, Inc. v. Port of Seattle, 605 P.2d 334, 340-41 (Wash. App. 1979).
56. Car-X, 927 F.2d at 516.
57. 942 F.2d 1519 (10th Cir. 1991).
58. Id. at 1522.
59. Id. The easement in its entirety is reprinted in Mid-America Pipeline v. Lario En-
terprises, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 511, 513-514 (D.Kan. 1989).
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through the easements that were buried thirty to forty-eight inches be-
low ground.60 In the summer of 1988, Mid-America learned of Lario
Enterprises', Inc. (Lario) plans to build an asphalt race track on the
property through which Mid-America had its easements. Mid-America
promptly notified Lario of its easement rights, objected to the construc-
tion and sought a preliminary injunction in the district court of
Kansas.
6 1
The district court first concluded that the asphalt tracks interfered
with the "normal operation and maintenance" of the pipelines under
the language of the easement.6 2 Therefore, the tracks violated Mid-
America's easement rights.63 However, the district court denied the in-
junction based on three factors: (1) Mid-America had an adequate rem-
edy in condemnation or damages; (2) an injunction would place an
undue hardship on the defendants because the tracks were already sub-
stantially constructed; and (3) risk to the public due to Mid-America's
hindered ability to inspect the pipes, in light of the history of the pipes'
safe operation.6 Mid-America appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
B. The Legal Background
The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 936 applies a seven-part test
to determine the appropriate circumstances for granting a mandatory
injunction.6 5 The test primarily focuses on the adequacy of the legal
remedy, the relative hardship of the parties and the interest of the pub-
lic.6 6 When the district court action was brought by Mid-America, the
appropriate test for granting a mandatory injunction had not yet been
determined by the Kansas courts.
67
Before Mid-America appealed the instant case, the Kansas
Supreme Court decided Mid-America Pipeline Co. v. Wietharn.68  In
Wietharn, the Kansas Supreme Court set forth three requirements that a
party seeking injunctive relief must meet: (1) reasonable probability of
injury exists; (2) no adequate remedy at law; and (3) clear entitlement to
60. Mid-America, 942 F.2d at 1522 (quoting Mid-America, 716 F. Supp. at 513).
61. Id. (quoting Mid-America, 716 F. Supp. at 514).
62. The plan for construction of the race track and surrounding facilities is set forth
in Mid-America, 716 F. Supp. at 514.
63. Mid-America, 716 F. Supp. at 515.
64. Id. at 513.
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 936 (1981) provides in pertinent part:
(1) The appropriateness of the remedy of injunction against a tort depends upon
a comparative appraisal of all of the factors in the case, including the following
primary factors:
(a) the nature of the interest to be protected,
(b) the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of injunction and of other remedies,
(c) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit,
(d) any related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff, (e) the relative hard-
ship likely to result to defendant if an injunction is granted and to plaintiff if it is
denied,
(f) the interests of third persons and of the public, and
(g) the practicability of framing and enforcing the order or judgment.
66. Id.
67. Mid-America, 716 F. Supp at 511.
68. 787 P.2d 716 (Kan. 1990).
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a mandatory injunction. 6 9 Unlike § 936 of the Restatement (Second)
of Torts, under Wietharn the court should not balance the equities of a
situation nor consider the public interest 70 where the encroaching party
acted with knowledge of the easement and was, therefore, not
"innocent."
7 1
C. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court's reliance on the
seven part test in § 936 of the Restatement was misplaced. 72 Applying
the criteria set forth under Wietharn, the Tenth Circuit determined that
Mid-America was entitled to an injunction. The court first found that
Lario acted with knowledge of Mid-America's easement. Mid-America's
rights under the easement were clearly defined and properly protected
by law. 73 Under the easement, Mid-America had the right to freedom
from "buildings or other structures on the.., right of way that [would]
interfere with the normal operation and maintenance" of pipelines.
74
Lario argued it innocently believed the race track was not a "building or
structure" contemplated by the easement. Lario constructed the track,
ignorant of the fact they were abridging the easement and, therefore,
innocently encroached upon Mid-America's rights.
7 5
The Tenthi Circuit disagreed with Lario's position. The court
found that despite its professional belief the race track would not inter-
fere with Mid-America's easement, Lario did not proceed with construc-
tion without knowledge or warning of Mid-America's property rights.
7 6
Lario was not innocent and, therefore, not entitled to a balancing of
equities under Wietharn.
The Tenth Circuit then considered the first prong of the Wietharn
test: Whether there was a reasonable probability that Mid-America was
injured by construction of the race track. 77 Focusing on the intent of
the parties, 78 the court initially found the asphalt race track was a pro-
hibited "structure" under the easement. 7 9 The court agreed with Lario
that the term was ambiguous. However, at the time the easements
were executed, Lario was using the property for pasture and agricul-
tural purposes. Mid-America also plotted the pipelines to avoid devel-
oped property.8 0 Therefore, the court found that the race track was
69. Id. at 719-20.
70. Id.
71. Wietharn, 787 P.2d at 725.
72. Mid-America, 942 F.2d at 1524.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 1522.
75. Id. at 1525.
76. Mid-America, 942 F.2d at 1525 (quoting Papanikolas Brothers v. Sugarhouse Shopping
Center, 535 P.2d 1256, 1259 (Utah 1975)).
77. Id.





within what the parties intended the term "structure" to include.8 1
The Tenth Circuit then found the asphalt race track82 interfered
with the "normal operation and maintenance"8 3 of Mid-America's pipe-
lines. The race track impaired Mid-America's ability to detect leaks in
their lines and would increase the expense of repairing the lines.84 Cit-
ing Aladdin Petroleum Corp. v. Gold Crown Properties,8 5 the Tenth Circuit
concluded that this level of interference was material enough to inter-
fere with Mid-America's enjoyment of the easement. 86 Such interfer-
ence constituted actionable injury under the first prong of Wietharn.
The Tenth Circuit found that Mid-America also met the second
prong of Wietharn because it had no adequate remedy at law. In
Wietharn, the court granted a mandatory injunction ordering the re-
moval of four buildings constructed over another one of Mid-America's
pipeline easements.8 7 Similar to the buildings, the Tenth Circuit found
the asphalt race track created a continuing violation that did not cease
with the completion of the track.88 Therefore, damages would inade-
quately remedy the violation.8 9
With little guidance as to what constituted "clear entitlement"
under the third prong of the Wietharn test,90 the Tenth Circuit looked to
the similarity of the facts in Wietharn and Mid-America. In Wietharn, the
Kansas Supreme Court found "clear entitlement" to an injunction. Ac-
cording to the Tenth Circuit, the facts in the two cases were alike, there-
fore, the Tenth Circuit found that Mid-America was "clearly entitled" to
injunctive relief as well.9 1
D. Conclusion
Courts are reluctant to require the destruction of buildings or struc-
tures after substantial construction. Courts regard such destruction as
wasteful. Even if the structure encroaches upon the property rights of
81. Applying similar logic, the Tenth Circuit found that the "fences, concrete barri-
ers, and additional cover" were also "structures" under the easement. Id. The Tenth
Circuit rejected the argument that "structure" is synonymous with "building." Id. at 1527.
82. The court found that the concrete barriers and fences, while "structures" under
the easement, did not "materially interfere" with Mid-America's easement rights, primarily
because they were moveable. Id.
83. Id.
84. Mid-America, 716 F. Supp at 514.
85. 561 P.2d 818 (Kan. 1977).
86. Mid-America, 942 F.2d at 1527.
87. Wietham, 787 P.2d at 725.
88. Id.
89. Mid-America, 942 F.2d at 1528. Lario also argued that Mid-America had the rem-
edy of reverse condemnation because Lario had deeded the property to the City of To-
peka with an agreement that it would be reconveyed after twenty-three years. The Tenth
Circuit dismissed this by stating that it was speculative whether the construction would
constitute a "taking" entitling Mid-America to compensation. Even if it was found to be a
taking, reverse condemnation was a vehicle whereby a party was entitled to money dam-
ages which the court concluded would be inadequate to remedy the easement violation
here. Id.
90. Id. at 1529.
91. Id. at 1529-30.
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another, equity favors keeping the structure intact. However, after Mid-
America, a party claiming violation of easement rights may preclude the
court from considering the equities of a situation by proving their rights
are clearly defined and legally secured.
It may appear that the Tenth Circuit's holding in Kidd-Heller is con-
tradictory to the instant case. Both cases involve unambiguous provi-
sions in contracts granting property rights. In Kidd-Heller, though, the
Tenth Circuit weighed the equities of the situation and relieved Car-X
from strict compliance with the renewal provision in the lease. The
cases can be reconciled, in so far as the court, in both cases, initially
looked at the innocence of the violating parties and the property rights.
In Car-X, the court found the lessee acted innocently and before the un-
derlying lease expired. Additionally, the lessor's actions arguably
showed that strict compliance with the renewal provision was not essen-
tial.9 2 Therefore, the court found the facts of Car-X warranted examina-
tion of the equities. In Mid-America, however, the court found the
easement rights were clear and legally protected. The violating party,
Lario, acted with knowledge of the easement and, therefore, was not
innocent. The court found no circumstances that warranted a consider-
ation of the equities in this case.
The decision in Mid-America upholds the principles of reliability and
certainty in the law. Mid-America performed its obligation to legally se-
cure its property rights. The Tenth Circuit did not allow Lario to bene-
fit from violating those rights merely because it would be wasteful and
costly to destroy the encroaching structure. The holding reflects Lario's
mistake, regardless of the expense and destruction. This decision sends
a message to contractors to be wary of the rights they infringe upon.
Contractors should be discouraged from taking a chance and building
on another's property, in the hope equity will side with them after the
construction is complete.
V. FEDERAL APPROVAL OF A LEASE MUST BE VALID UNDER THE
APPLICABLE CODE SECTION OR THE LESSEE'S INTEREST DOES
NOT VEST FOR PURPOSES OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT TAKINGS CLAUSE.
In Sangre De Cristo Development v. United States,93 the Department of
the Interior (Department) failed initially to validly approve a lease under
the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).94 As a result, the Tenth
Circuit found that Sangre De Cristo Development (Sangre) did not have
a vested property interest in the lease. Sangre, therefore, did not have
standing to assert a claim under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause
9 5
when the lease was later rescinded by the Department.
92. See supra notes 36, 37 and accompanying text.
93. 932 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1991).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 4321.




Sangre negotiated a lease with the Tesuque Indian Pueblo to de-
velop approximately 5000 acres of Pueblo land for a world-class golf
course and residential community.96 The Department approved the
lease,9 7 and Sangre began selling residential lots on the leased land.
Shortly thereafter, two environmental groups filed suit against the
United States seeking to enjoin construction. They claimed the Depart-
ment's approval was invalid because it did not undertake an Environ-
mental Impact Statement 9 8 (EIS) prior to approval. 99 The New Mexico
District Court denied the request for injunctive relief on the grounds
that no EIS was required. 0 0 The Tenth Circuit reversed,' 0 holding
that the Secretary's approval of the lease triggered the need for an
EIS.1
0 2
While the EIS was being prepared, the Pueblo, under new leader-
ship, formally requested that the Department void the lease. 10 3 One
year and three months later, the Department announced it would re-
scind its approval of the lease based upon environmental considerations
and the Pueblo's opposition."° 4 Sangre thereafter went into bankruptcy
and the trustee brought a civil action on behalf of the estate. The
Trustee claimed, inter alia,105 that when the Department rescinded its
approval of the lease, this action constituted a taking under the Fifth
Amendment, 10 6 thereby entitling Sangre to recover just compensation.
B. Legal Background
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which prohibits the
taking of property for public use without just compensation, is directed
at an act by government that attempts to authorize the seizure or de-
struction of property against the owner's will. 107 A two step analysis is
96. Sangre De Cristo, 932 F.2d at 893.
97. Because Sangre was leasing Indian lands to develop for public recreational use,
under 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) (1970) approval of the lease by the Secretary of the Department
of the Interior was required.
98. NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 - 4375. For a general discussion on the purpose and
process of undertaking an Environmental Impact Statement, see JAN IArros, NATURAL RE-
SOURCES LAw 95-111 (1985).
99. Sangre De Cristo, 932 F.2d at 893.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. The Tenth Circuit concluded the Secretary of the Interior's approval of the lease
would have "significantly affected the quality of the human environment," therefore, ap-
proval was a "major federal action." NEPA 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2)(C); Davis v. Morton, 469
F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1972). For a discussion of what constitutes "major federal ac-
tion," see generally FREDERICK ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE
NATIONAL EVIRONMENTAL POLICY Aar 89-105 (1973).
103. Sangre De Cristo, 932 F.2d at 893.
104. Id.
105. Sangre De Cristo asserted several breach of contract and breach of trust claims
that the Tenth Circuit addressed separately.
106. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
107. JULIUS L. SACHMAN, 2 NICHoLs' THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.01 (rev. 3rd ed.
1990).
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used to determine whether a "taking" has occurred.' 0 8 The asserting
party must prove: (1) at the time the taking occurred, the party had a
vested interest in the subject property;10 9 and (2) the government's ac-
tion constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment.' 10
C. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit held that Sangre did not possess a vested interest
in the lease when the Department rescinded its approval."II The first
prong under the Fifth Amendment "takings" test was not met, there-
fore, the court did not address the second."
12
Sangre argued the effect of requiring an EIS, after the Department
approved the lease only enjoined the project from continuing until San-
gre completed the EIS. 13 It did not affect the Department's approval.
The Tenth Circuit declined to accept Sangre's view. The court in-
terpreted NEPA to require an EIS beforie the Department had the au-
thority to approve the lease between Sangre and the Pueblo.
114
Further, agents of a regulatory agency must act within the bounds of
their congressionally delegated authority.' 1-5 The court held it was
outside the bounds of the Department's authority to approve the lease
before the EIS was completed."16 Because the EIS was not completed
prior to approval, the lease was invalid. The Tenth Circuit concluded
that because Sangre had no vested property interest in the lease when
the Department rescinded its approval, Sangre did not meet the first
prong of the Fifth Amendment "takings" test.' 1 7
108. In re Consolidated Atmospheric Testing Litigation, 820 F.2d 982, 988 (9th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988).
109. For instance, it has been held that even though a cause of action is considered to
be a species of property, a plaintiffhas no vested right in any tort claim for damages under
state law. Ducharme v. Merrill-National Labs, 574 F.2d 1307, 1309 (5th Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1002 (1978).
110. In other words, courts consider the nature and extent of the governmental inva-
sion in the second prong of the test. In re Consolidated at 989. For instance, a court con-
cluded that the governmental action did not amount to a "taking" since it did not abrogate
the personal injury claims of the plaintiff. The government merely subjected the plaintiff's
claims to the tort claims procedure under 28 U.S.C. § 2680, which had the practical effect
of allowing the defendant to shield himself from liability based on certain exceptions
under 28 U.S.C. § 2680. Id. at 984.
111. Sangre De Cristo, 932 F.2d at 894.
112. See supra notes 108-111 and accompanying text.
113. Id.
114. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
115. Gray v. Johnson, 395 F.2d 533, 537 (10th Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 906
(1968). See Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d at 594 (Department of the Interior was without
authority to grant a lease where no environmental impact study was conducted prior to
approval of the lease). See also Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384
(1947) (holding that the government is not bound when its agent enters into an agreement
that falls outside the agent's congressionally delegated authority).
116. Sangre De Cristo, 932 F.2d at 894-895. The one who is seeking the approval of the
agency assumes the risk that the agency is acting within its authority. Cray, 395 F.2d at
537.




The Tenth Circuit is the first circuit to address the specific issues
presented in Sangre. If the grant or sale of property rights requires fed-
eral approval, after Sangre, it is uncertain when those rights will vest. It
is clear that the steps an agency takes, or should have taken, before it
gives its approval, are pivotal to determining when property rights vest.
However, the Tenth Circuit provided no guidance on how to ensure that
the proper steps are being taken by an agency. Sangre places a heavy
burden upon those entering property transactions requiring federal
consent. Those acquiring property rights must car~fully scrutinize the
degree of federal approval required, and anticipate what further meas-
ures may be necessary to make the approval valid.
VI. CONCLUSION
The cases decided this term primarily involved landlords and com-
mercial tenants. The Tenth Circuit decisions appear to show no consis-
tent pattern of deference to either property owners or lessors. In Mid-
America, Sangre and Henry, the court's approach focused on a literal in-
tepretation of the property owner's rights. The court was unswayed by
the equities of these cases that supported the lessors. The court en-
gaged in a seemingly opposite analysis in Car-X. There the court con-
cluded that equity warranted relieving the commercial tenant from a
clear provision in his lease.
The analysis of these decisions may vary, but their outcomes reflect
the same message. TheTenth Circuit strikes a balance between main-
taining the integrity of express property rights and the equities of a situ-
ation that demand those rights be overlooked. In following the Tenth
Circuit, courts should first scutinize express property rights, the owner's
authority to grant rights to others and the violating party's innocence. If





RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN ENVIRONMENTAL AND
NATURAL RESOURCES LAW
INTRODUCTION
Increased environmental regulation by governmental agencies has
greatly expanded litigation in the natural resources area, so this year's
land and natural resources survey includes environmental law cases.
The Tenth Circuit regularly defers to agency decisions in environmental
and natural resources cases' and this year's decisions are no exception.
In 1991, the court considered issues arising under a variety of statutes
including: (1) the Clean Water Act (CWA), 2 which establishes regula-
tory and enforcement programs for discharges into waters of the United
States; (2) the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act (CERCLA),3 or Superftind, which establishes financial
responsibility parameters for cleanup of hazardous waste sites and has
resulted in extensive litigation over cleanup costs; (3) the Federal Insec-
ticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),4 which governs the use
and registration of pesticides; and (4) the National Environmental Policy
Act (NEPA), 5 which requires federal agencies to consider environmental
impacts from "major federal actions that have a significant effect on the
quality of the human environment."
This Article surveys select Tenth Circuit cases decided under envi-
ronmental and natural resource laws. Part One discusses certain envi-
ronmental law questions: Does FIFRA preempt local pesticide
ordinances? 6 Do present hazardous waste site owners have a right of
contribution from previous owners when cleanup is not consistent with
National Contingency Plan requirements? 7 Does the Clean Water Act
waive the federal government's sovereign immunity for civil penalty lia-
bility in a citizen suit action?8 What standard of review should the court
apply in determining the adequacy of an Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS)? 9 Part Two considers natural resource and public land ques-
tions: What constitutes final agency action such that a court may compel
by writ of mandamus the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to issue
an oil shale patent?' 0 Is a lease to use tribal land valid in the absence of
1. See, e.g., Quivira Mining Co. v. United States, 765 F.2d 126 (10th Cir. 1985); Na-
tional Cattlemen's Assoc'n v. United States, 774 F.2d 1008 (10th Cir. 1985); Kennecott
Copper Corp. v. United States, 612 F.2d 1232 (10th 1979).
2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387
(1988).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
4. 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1988).
6. See COPARR, Ltd. v. City of Boulder, 942 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1991).
7. See County Line Inv. Co. v. Tinney, 933 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1991).
8. See Sierra Club v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1991).
9. See Sierra Club v. Lujan, 949 F.2d 362 (10th Cir. 1991).
10. See Marathon Oil Co. v. Lujan, 937 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1991). Other Tenth Cir-
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compliance with NEPA?II May a private utility providing power to mu-
nicipalities receive a preference under the law of federal reclamation
and power?
12
PART ONE - ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
I. FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE, AND RODENTICIDE ACT -
COPARR, LTD. V. CITY OF BOULDER
1 3
A. Facts
This case challenges two local ordinances that the City of Boulder,
Colorado (Boulder) enacted to regulate use of pesticides within city lim-
its. COPARR' 4 alleged that Boulder Ordinance Nos. 5083 and 5129,
enacted by Defendant-Appellee Boulder, violated the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution, arguing that FIFRA completely
preempts regulation of pesticides by local political subdivisions.
B. Background
1. FIFRA
Before 1947, states could exercise full regulatory authority over
pesticides. On June 25, 1947,15 Congress enacted FIFRA "to replace
and expand the protection" afforded by the Insecticide Act of 1910,
which was deemed inadequate due to growth in development of new
charcoal compounds and pesticide control products. 16 In 1972, Con-
gress passed sweeping amendments to FIFRA, 17 including "a number of
cuit mineral law cases not reviewed in this Article include Ash Creek Mining Co. v. Lujan,
934 F.2d 240 (10th Cir. 1991) (whether BLM withholding of lands from federal coal leas-
ing program is reviewable final agency action) and Trapper Mining, Inc. v. Lujan, 923 F.2d
774 (10th Cir. 1991) (whether government can reapportion coal leases based on new
laws), cert. denied, 112 S.Ct. 81 (1991).
11. See Sangre de Cristo Dev. Co. v. United States, 932 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1991).
Another Tenth Circuit Native American case not reviewed in this Article involves a patent
border dispute and the scope of the Secretary of the Interior's authority to correct land
patents. Foust v. Lujan, 942 F.2d 712 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, case no. 91-1286 (U.S.
April 27, 1992).
12. See Salt Lake City v. Western Area Power Admin., 926 F.2d 974 (10th Cir. 1991).
The Tenth Circuit also revisited the Dillon Reservoir dispute, involving over forty years of
litigation regarding Denver's water rights. See City and County of Denver Bd. of Water
Comm'rs v. United States, 935 F.2d 1143 (10th Cir. 1991) (regarding the scope of Denver
water rights to fill and use Green Mountain Reservoir).
13. 942 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1991).
14. Plaintiff-appellants in this case are COPARR, Ltd. (Colorado Pesticide Applicators
for Responsible Regulation) and Victor A. Carand. COPARR is a Colorado nonprofit
corporation comprised of trade associations, individuals and companies who are engaged
in the business of commercial pesticide application in the City of Boulder and are subject
to certain provisions of the Boulder ordinances. Victor A. Caranci is an individual who
contracts for the commercial application of pesticides in the City of Boulder. Caranci and
Coparr members face injury in the form of compliance expenses or diminished business or
both, as a result of the enactment and enfdrcement of the Boulder ordinances.
15. See Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rbdenticide Act, Pub.L. No. 80-104, 61
Stat. 163 (1947).
16. See H.R. REP. No. 313,80th Cong., 1st Sess. (1947), repfintedin 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1200-01.
17. See Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 86
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innovations to direct and strengthen federal control- over pesticides."' 18
FIFRA now confers upon EPA broad regulatory and supervisory author-
ity over pesticide and chemical substance application.' 9
EPA promulgated extensive regulations dealing specifically with
pesticide application. 20 EPA pesticide regulations address the follow-
ing: (1) evaluation of toxicological hazards to children and specific re-
lated warnings; 2 1 (2) requirements for pesticide storage and disposal;
2 2
(3) federal and state agency exemptions for emergency use;2 3 (4) pesti-
cide manufacturing registration; 24 and (5) standards for agricultural
worker protection.25 The Colorado statutory. scheme for pesticide regu-
lation parallels the federal statute: "A state may regulate the sale or use
of any federally registered pesticide or device in the state but on!y if and
to the extent the regulation does not permit any sale or use permitted by
this subchapter."
'26
2. The Boulder Ordinances and Preemption
Boulder Ordinance No. 5083, enacted to regulate certain pesticide
uses,2 7 gave the city manager power to enter upon all land within the
city boundary, whether public or private, to inspect and observe pesti-
cide use. In- 1988, Boulder, expanded its pesticide regulatory scheme by
enacting Ordinance No. 5129,28 which created additional controls over
pesticide use, such as pre-application public notice requirements.
2 9
C. The District Court Decision
COPARR argued that Congress possessed power under the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution to preempt a local
ordinance in two ways.3 0 First, if Congress indicates "an intent to oc-
cupy a given field" and the local ordinance falls within that field, then it
is preempted.3 ' Second, if the ordinance "actually conflicts with a...
Stat. 973 (1972), designed to completely revive FIFRA. S. REP. No. 838, 92d Cong. 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3993.
18. Organized Migrants and Community Action, Inc. v. Brennan, 520 F.2d 1161,
1165 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (FIFRA totally altered the preexisting regulatory structure).
19. See 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988).
20. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 152-172 (1988).
21. Id. § 155.
22. Id. § 165.10.
23. Id. § 166.
24. Id. § 167.
25. Id. § 170.
26. 7 U.S.C. § 136v (1988); see CoLo. REv. STAT. § 35-9-105 (1984 & Supp. 1990).
27. Ordinance No. 5083 was codified at BOULDER REv. CODE §§ 6-11-3 to 6-11-9
(Sterling Codifiers, Inc. 1989) (illegal to apply pesticides without a license as required by
the Applicators Act, to fail to maintain 'ecords, to fail to report to the City Manager spills
in violation of federal, state or city law, to fail to comply with various safety precautions, to
fail to notify tenants and employees of any indoor applications of pesticides or to violate
FIFRA, the Pesticide Act, the Pesticide Applicators Act, or any pesticide regulation).
28. Codified at BOULDER REV. CODE §§ 6-10-11, 6-11-12, and 6-10-14 (Sterling
Codifiers, Inc. 1989).
29. Id. §§ 6-11-2, 6-10-11.
30. U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
31. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).
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federal statute,"'3 2 it is invalid. To determine whether Congress invoked
its preemptive power when statutory language is silent, courts often re-
view the statute's legislative history to establish congressional intent.
33
COPARR viewed the comprehensive nature of FIFRA to encompass the
entire field of pesticide regulation, including the pesticide use that Boul-
der sought to regulate. Boulder contended that the ordinance's public
notification requirement was beyond the scope of FIFRA.
There being no disputed questions of fact, COPARR and Boulder
presented the case via cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial
court 34 held that Ordinance No. 5083 was void because it provided for
local enforcement of FIFRA and the Colorado Pesticide Act.3 5 The
court upheld Ordinance No. 5129, ruling that it did not adopt or incor-
porate provisions of federal or state law and did not conflict with
FIFRA.3 6 The court ruled further that Boulder, as a homerule city
under Article X, Section 6 of the Colorado Constitution, had legislative
power to regulate use of pesticides.3 7 COPARR appealed the court's
declaration validating Boulder Ordinance No. 5129 in an attempt to es-
tablish that FIFRA preempts all regulation of pesticides by local govern-
mental entities.
D. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The issue on appeal was whether the court erred in holding that
FIFRA did not preempt local ordinance No. 5129. During the appeal,
the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Wisconsin Public
Intervenor v. Mortier3 8 to review a FIFRA preemption question. The
Tenth Circuit heard oral argument in COPARR, and then stayed its deci-
sion pending a ruling in Mortier. Following the Mortier decision, the
court requested supplemental briefing by the parties.
In Mortier, the petitioners asserted FIFRA does not occupy the en-
tire field of pesticide regulation because it expressly allows more strin-
gent state regulation. 3 9 Petitioners' emphasis on the need for
cooperative federalism in environmental protection apparently per-
suaded the Supreme Court.40 The Court held FIFRA provides no clear
congressional intent to preempt local authority over pesticide regula-
tion, despite the 1972 amendments establishing a comprehensive regu-
latory scheme.4 1 The majority stated:
The specific grant of authority in Section 136v(a) ... does not
serve to hand back to the State's powers that the statute had
32. International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 491 (1987) (quoting Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978)).
33. See R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U.S. 130, 140 (1986).
34. See 735 F. Supp. 363 (D. Colo. 1989).
35. Id. at 367.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. 111 S.Ct. 2476 (1991).
39. 7 U.S.C. § 136v (1988).
40. 111 S.Ct. at 2485-87.
41. Id. at 2486.
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impliedly usurped. Rather, it acts to ensure that the States
could continue to regulate use and sales even where.., a nar-
row pre-emptive overlap might occur.
42
The Supreme Court held all local ordinances might not necessarily
be valid under FIFRA, but this particular regulation did not fall "within
any impliedly pre-empted field."' 43 Following the Mortier decision, the
Tenth Circuit held Boulder Ordinance No. 5129 conformed with both
Mortier and the recently amended Colorado Pesticide Act.44 Although
the Tenth Circuit found the Mortier decision conclusive on the issues
before it, the court noted conflicting state or local pesticide regulatory
schemes could, in fact, be preempted by FIFRA. 45
II. SUPERFUND - COUNTY LINE INV. Co. v. TINNEY
4 6
A. Facts
Tinney owned property in Wagner County, Oklahoma, leased to
Donald and Norma Tulk for use as a landfill from 1978 through Novem-
ber, 1983. The landfill allegedly received and disposed of hazardous
wastes. In 1982, County Line purchased the property from Tinney.
Shortly thereafter, the Oklahoma State Department of Health (OSDH)
forced the landfill to cease operations. In early 1984, the Tulks aban-
doned the landfill. In 1985, Tinney conveyed the property to Plaintiff-
Appellant Wagco, a subsidiary of County Line's parent company. In
early 1986, EPA gave notice to Wagco of the possibility that hazardous
substances deposited at the landfill were being released. Wagco sur-
veyed the site and located buried hazardous waste drums with high
metal concentrations. In late 1986, Wagco met with EPA and OSDH to
discuss the survey results and agreed formally to close the landfill pursu-
ant to OSDH regulations. OSDH approved Wagco's closure plan,
4 7
which was completed in June 1987 with costs in excess of $360,000.
During negotiations with the government, Tinney refused Wagco's re-
quest for financial participation in implementation of the closure plan.
B. The District Court Decision
Wagco brought a cost recovery action against Tinney for costs asso-
ciated with investigating and closing the landfill. Wagco based the ac-
tion on three separate theories: (1) Tinney, as former owner, was jointly
and severally liable under the private cost recovery provisions of CER-
CLA section 107;48 (2) Tinney was liable for contribution under CER-
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. COPARR, 942 F.2d at 727.
45. See Arkansas-Platte & Gulf Partnership v. Van Waters & Rogers, Inc., 959 F.2d 158
(10th Cir. 1992) (FIFRA preempts state tort actions based on labeling and alleged failure
to warn).
46. 933 F.2d 1508 (10th Cir. 1991).
47. Id. at 1510.
48. Id. (citing CERCLA § 107, 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (1988)).
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CLA section 113(f) (3) (B);49 and (3) Tinney was unjustly enriched under
Oklahoma law.50 Tinney filed a motion for summary judgment as to
each claim in the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Oklahoma. Judge Ellison granted summary judgment in favor of Tin-
ney on June 30, 1989, and County Line appealed.
C. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the court's decision de novo, 5 1 particu-
larly, the issue of whether failure to comply with the National Contin-
gency Plan (NCP) barred private cost recovery or a contribution action
under CERCLA. On de novo review, the Tenth Circuit affirms summary
judgment only if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
... the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."
5 2
1. Cost Recovery Under CERCLA Section 107
The first issue reviewed by the Tenth Circuit was whether failure to
comply with the NCP barred a private cost recovery or a contribution
action under CERCLA. Section 107 of CERCLA provides that persons
responsible for disposal of hazardous materials are liable for all costs
incurred consistent with the National Contingency Plan ("NCP"). 5 s The
NCP establishes procedures and standards "for responding to releases
of hazardous substances," 54 and requires public comment whenever re-
medial action is taken. 55 Although the landfill owners viewed closure of
the landfill as a remedial action under the plan,5 6 the district court
found the remedial action improper in four respects: (1) site investiga-
tion; (2) remedy selection; (3) cost effectiveness; and (4) public partici-
pation standards and procedures.
5 7
The Tenth Circuit held that because section 107 allows individuals
to recover private party costs incurred "consistent with the National
49. Id. at 1510-11 (citing CERCLA § 113(f)(3)(b), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(0(3)(B) (1988)).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 1511 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 52(c)); Abercrombie v. City of Catoosa, 896 F.2d
1228, 1230 (10th Cir. 1990)).
52. Id. (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). The statute states: "Any person who at the time of disposal
of any hazardous substances owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous sub-
stances were disposed of ... shall be liable for ... any ... necessary cost of response
incurred by any other person consistent with the national contingency plan."
54. Id. § 9605(a); 40 C.F.R. Part 300 (1988).
55. County Line, 933 F.2d at 1511.
56. A remedial action under CERCLA includes investigation and cleanup actions,
whereas removal action is generally considered for emergency response purposes. 42
U.S.C. §§ 9601(24) and (23). The NCP version in effect during closure of the Landfill
stated:
(a)(1) any person may undertake a response action to reduce or eliminate the
release or threat of release of hazardous substances, or pollutants or contami-
nated. Section 107 of CERCLA authorizes persons to recover certain response
costs consistent with this Plan from responsible parties.
(2) For purposes of cost recovery under § 107 ... a response action will be con-
sistent with the [National Contingency Plan] ....
See 1985 National Contingency Plan, 40 C.F.R. § 300.71 (1988).
57. County Line, 933 F.2d at 1512 (citing § 300.71(a)(2)(ii) of the 1985 NCP).
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Contingency Plan,"5 8 proof of response costs is an element of a prima
fade private cost recovery action under CERCLA. 59 Therefore, CER-
CLA did not provide a remedy to Wagco because Wagco did not incur
costs consistent with the NCP. 60 The Tenth Circuit stated, however,
that some circumstances could permit CERCLA plaintiffs to recover
from a previous owner "even though the plaintiff has not yet established
that all of its claimed response costs were incurred consistent with the
NCP."'6 1 In Wagco's case, a fully developed record existed to make a
determination regarding whether Wagco incurred costs consistent with
the NCP6 2 and the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment on this
issue.
2. Contribution Under CERCLA section 113(f)
Wagco next contended that it did not need to incur costs consistent
with the NCP to receive contribution under section 1 13(f)(3)(b) because
the law creates "an independent, substantive right to contribution."1
63
The Tenth Circuit viewed the provisions in section 113 "as part of the
larger statutory scheme of CERCLA," 64 rather than as an isolated, in-
dependent remedy. The court noted section 113 claims for contribution
could be inconsistent with the NCP Only if another basis for liability ex-
ists. Section 113 must follow the mandate of section 107, because sec-
tion 107 creates the sole basis for liability in this case, which requires
consistency with the NCP.
6 5
3. Unjust Enrichment
Wagco also attempted to recover under a state law theory of unjust
enrichment. The Tenth Circuit upheld dismissal of this claim, holding
that Tinney was not enriched by the cleanup because Wagco introduced
no evidence to show either that it had incurred costs or damages that
were potentially recoverable from Tinney ufider CERCLA or that
OSDH or EPA were contemplating a response action against Tinney.
Therefore, the benefit conferred on Tinney was "speculative at best."
'6 6
Although the result of this case is harsh, it might have limited prece-
dential value. The 1990 revisions to the NCP require "substantial"
rather than "strict" compliance with its provisions, making it less diffi-
cult for a party that engages in a cleanup action to show liability under
58. Id.
59. Id (citations omitted).
60. This case was reviewed pursuait to the 1985 NCP, which required "strict" compli-
ance. In 1990, the NCP was revised to require "substantial" compliance. The court did
not reach the question of whether the 1985 or 1990 NCP should apply as the landfill
closure was deemed to be inadequate under both versions of the NCP. Id. at 1514-15.
61. Id. at 1513.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1516.
64. Id.
65. Id at 1516-18.
66. Id. at 1518.
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section 107, thereby establishing a more readily attainable predicate for
a section 113 contribution claim.
III. CLEAN WATER ACT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY -
SIERRA CLUB v. LUJAN
6 7
A. Facts
The Department of the Interior (Interior), through the Bureau of
Reclamation (Reclamation), owns and operates the Leadville Mine
Drainage Tunnel in Lake County, Colorado. The tunnel possesses a
long and checkered history. In 1944, as part of the war effort, Congress
appropriated $1.4 million to the Bureau of Mines to construct, operate
and maintain a drainage tunnel to drain the Leadville Mining District, a
mountainous area of significant mineralization. However, the federal
government abandoned the incomplete project upon conclusion of the
war. With the onset of the Korean conflict, tunnel construction was
again commenced, but again with limited success. In late 1959, Recla-
mation purchased the tunnel from the Bureau of Mines in an attempt to
acquire the right to water drained from the tunnel for its Fryingpan-
Arkansas project. However, the Colorado courts had determined that
water from the tunnel could not inure to the benefit of Reclamation
merely by virtue of ownership of the tunnel.
68
In 1972, Congress enacted the CWA "to restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters."
'6 9
The Leadville Mine Drainage Tunnel discharged into waters of the
United States, which required a CWA National Pollution Discharge
Elimination System (NPDES) permit. Reclamation obtained a NPDES
permit in 1975, which EPA renewed on several occasions. The NPDES
permit required Reclamation to ensure that drainage from the tunnel
meets specific effluent limitations.
B. The District Court Decision
On January 13, 1989, the Sierra Club and the Colorado Environ-
mental Coalition filed a citizen suit in federal district court alleging that
Interior and Reclamation violated the CWA and the terms of the NPDES
permit. Plaintiffs asked the court to: 1) issue a mandatory injunction
enjoining further permit violations; 2) order the agencies to pay civil
penalties; and 3) declare the agencies in violation of the CWA. The par-
ties entered into a consent decree on the liability question. The federal
government then moved to dismiss the civil penalties claim for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the waiver of sovereign immu-
nity in the CWA is limited and does not authorize assessment of civil
penalties against the United States. Plaintiffs filed a motion for sum-
67. 931 F.2d 1421 (10th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Lujan 1].
68. See Leadville Mine Development Co. v. Anderson, 17 P.2d 303 (Colo. 1932) (tun-
nel drainage subject to appropriation under Colorado Water Adjudication System).
69. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).
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mary judgment on this issue. Concluding that the CWA waiver of sover-
eign immunity authorizes civil penalties against the United States, the
district court denied the federal government's motion to dismiss and
granted plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment. 70 The district
court granted defendants' request to file an interlocutory appeal prior to
determination of the civil penalty amount.
7 1
C. The Tenth Circuit Decision
Largely reciting from the district court opinion, the Tenth Circuit
first reviewed the applicable law.72 It is axiomatic that the United States
as sovereign receives immunity from suit in the absence of its consent,
and Congress must unequivocally express any waiver of sovereign im-
munity.73 Any ambiguity in a waiver of sovereign immunity is to be in-
terpreted in favor of the sovereign. Courts must strictly construe a
waiver in favor of the sovereign and may not extend it beyond the lan-
guage of the statute.74
Defendants conceded that section 313(a) of the CWA waives sover-
eign immunity regarding the "requirements, administrative authority,
and process and sanctions respecting the control and abatement of
water pollution." 75 However, the government contended that this
waiver did not authorize civil penalties against the United States because
the Act did not contemplate such penalties.
The federal government argued the phrase "process and sanctions"
of Section 313(a) must be read together to include only those monetary
sanctions necessary to ensure compliance with judicial process. Citing
McClellan Ecological Seepage Situation v. Weinberger7 6 for support, the gov-
ernment asserted that the CWA evidences a waiver of sovereign immu-
nity only for traditional sanctions imposed to enforce judicial process
and injunctive relief. The McClellan court held that Congress did not
clearly and unambiguously waive civil penalties against federal facilities
in sections 313(a) and 505(a) of the CWA, 77 stating that section 313(a)
"is a compilation of ambiguity." 78 Other courts considering the waiver
of sovereign immunity under the CWA have disagreed with McClellan,
79
70. Sierra Club v. Lujan, 728 F. Supp. 1513, 1518 (D. Colo. 1990).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1988).
72. Lujan 1, 931 F.2d at 1423 (10th Cir. 1991) (citing Library of Congress v. Shaw, 478
U.S. 310, 315 (1986)).
73. Id. at 1423 (citing United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 399 (1976) (quoting
United States v. King, 395 U.S. 1, 4 (1969) and referencing Mitzelfelt v. Department of Air
Force, 903 F.2d 1293, 1294-95 (10th Cir. 1990)).
74. Id. (citing Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680, 686 (1983)).
75. Il at 1425; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1323(a) (1988).
76. 655 F. Supp. 601 (E.D. Cal. 1986).
77. Id. at 605.
78. Id. at 604.
79. See Ohio v. United States Dep't of Energy, 904 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1990), rev'd,
503 U.S. - (1992); California v. Dep't of Navy, 631 F.Supp. 585 (N.D. Cal. 1986), aff'd,
845 F.2d 222 (9th Cir. 1988); Metropolitan Sanitary Dist. of Greater Chicago v. Navy, 722
F. Supp. 1565 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
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holding that the term "sanctions" encompasses civil penalties.8 0 This is
the talismanic issue examined by the Tenth Circuit.
The court first looked to Black's Law Dictionary, which defines
sanction as "that part of a law which is designed to secure enforcement
by imposing a penalty for its violation."8 1 It also looked to the Supreme
Court's Gwaltney8 2 decision that held civil penalties authorized by the
CWA may be interpreted as sanctions. The Circuit Court further noted
the same section of 313(a) that "discusses 'process and sanctions' also
states that the United States [is] liable for 'civil penalties.' "83 The court
concluded that "the sanctions authorized by [Section 313(a)] are also
penalties, particularly when the same statute also permits 'those civil
penalties arising under Federal Law.' ",84
Second, the court looked to section 505(a) of the CWA.8 5 Section
505 permits private citizens to file complaints against any person, in-
cluding the government, alleged to be in violation of an effluent stan-
dard or limitation of the CWA or an order issued by the Administrator
or a state with respect to such a standard or limitation. The statute also
states "the district courts shall have jurisdiction ... to enforce such an
effluent standard or limitation, or such an order, or to order the Admin-
istrator to perform such act or duty, as the case may be, and to apply any
appropriate civil penalties under Section 1319(d) .... 86
The CWA's penalty provision states that any person who violates
the enumerated provisions of the Act, or "any permit condition or limi-
tation implementing any of such sections in a permit issued under...
[the NPDES program] by the Administrator, or by a State ... shall be
subject to a civil penalty. .. ,'87 The government argued the genera-
lized definition of "person" contained in section 502 of the CWA, which
does not include the United States, should be used in interpreting the
citizen suit provision, again citing McClellan in support of its position.
The court adopted plaintiffs' interpretation, however, that the definition
of "person," modified to specifically include the United States in the
citizen suit provision, should be used in interpreting a citizen suit claim
for civil penalties.
The court held the language of sections 313(a) and 505(a) consti-
tutes an express waiver by the United States of its sovereign immunity
for civil penalties, eliminating any need to resort to the legislative his-
tory to justify its decision. Nonetheless, the court did examine the legis-
lative history, and found that it was not inconsistent with its conclusions
concerning the plain language of the statute.8 8
80. See Lujan 1, 931 F.2d at 1425.
81. Id at 1426 (citing BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 1203 (5th Ed. 1979)).
82. Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 53
(1987).
83. Lujan I, 931 F.2d at 1426.
84. Id.
85. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).
86. Id. § 1365(a).
87. Id. § 1319(d).
88. Lujan I, 931 F.2d at 1427.
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Recently in United States Department of Energy v. Ohio,8 9 the United
States Supreme Court effectively reversed the Tenth Circuit Lujan opin-
ion. In an action brought by the State of Ohio for civil penalties under
state CWA and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA)90
programs, the Supreme Court held Congress did not waive federal sov-
ereign immunity from liability for civil penalties imposed by a state for
federal violations of the CWA or RCRA. The Court distinguished pen-
alty provisions that result in sanctions imposed through the judicial pro-
cess to achieve prospective compliance by federal agencies, which are
authorized under the Acts from punitive civil penalties imposed for fed-
eral violations against the federal government not authorized by the
Acts. The Court determined that Congress did not expressly waive fed-
eral sovereign immunity because the penalty provisions of the CWA and
RCRA are ambiguous.
IV. NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AcT - SIERRA CLUB V. LUJAAN
9 1
A. Facts
The Burr Trail, a county road,9 2 serves as an important recreation
corridor connecting the Bullfrog Basin Marina at' Lake Powell with the
Town of Boulder, Utah. The Trail both crosses and borders on public
lands, including recreation and wilderness areas and state lands. Gar-
field County proposed to widen twenty-eight miles of the Trail to ac-
commodate expanding use and create safe travel conditions, for which
the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) prepared an "environmental
assessment" (EA) pursuant to NEPA.9 3 The Sierra Club brought suit
claiming that the proposed widening exceeded the scope of the R.S.
2477 right-of-way and that BLM violated NEPA.9 4 The district court in
that case held that widening was consistent with the scope of the right-
of-way under Utah state law and that the BLM satisfied NEPA's require-
ments.9 5 When Sierra Club appealed, the Tenth Circuit reversed on the
question of whether BLM had satisfied NEPA's procedural requirements
and remanded to BLM on narrowly-defined grounds with instructions
on NEPA compliance. On remand, BLM prepared a supplemental EA,
accompanied by a Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI). Sierra
Club then challenged the FONSI, which eventually led to another Tenth
Circuit appeal.
89. See United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. (1992).
90. 42 U.S.C. § 6901-92 (1988)
91. 949 F.2d 362 (10th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Lujan II].
92. R.S. 2477 right-of-way issues have given the Burr Trial a rich litigation history.
Garfield County holds an R.S. 2477 right-of-way for the Burr Trail. See 43 U.S.C. § 932
(repealed by FLMPA, 706(a) Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2793).
93. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1988).
94. Sierra Club v. Hodel, 675 F. Supp. 594 (D. Utah), rev'd in part, 848 F.2d 1068,
1083 (1988).
95. Hodel, 675 F.Supp. at 617-19.
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B. The District Court Opinion
The United States District Court for the District of Utah upheld the
BLM FONSI. The court applied an arbitrary and capricious standard of
review despite Tenth Circuit law holding that "reasonableness" is the
standard to be applied in evaluating NEPA compliance. Accordingly,
the Sierra Club again appealed.
C. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The primary focus in this chapter of the Burr Trail litigation is the
scope of review used by courts to evaluate NEPA compliance and deter-
mine whether an agency must prepare an EIS. Prior Tenth Circuit cases
apply a "reasonableness" standard of review to an agency's threshold
NEPA determination. 9 6 The Tenth Circuit was faced with the task of
rectifying this standard under the Supreme Court decision in Marsh v.
Oregon Natural Resources Council.97 In Marsh,98 the Supreme Court re-
jected the "reasonableness" standard of review of an agency decision
not to prepare a supplemental Environmental Impact Statement because
it "involves primarily issues of fact," to which the APA arbitrary and
capricious standard applies.99 In dicta, the Court noted that this stan-
dard is also used on review of the agency decision not to prepare an
EIS. 1 00
Circuit courts vary in their interpretation of Marsh. The Eleventh
Circuit altogether rejected the reasonableness test in its review of NEPA
compliance activities. 1i The Tenth Circuit adopted the Eighth Circuit
view, 10 2 applying the arbitrary and capricious standard to factual deter-
minations and maintaining the reasonableness standard for review of
legal questions. As such, the Tenth Circuit specifically reaffirmed its ap-
plication of the reasonableness standard in Park County Resource Council v.
United States Dep't of Agriculture,1 3 as consistent with Marsh. Under this
standard of review, the Tenth Circuit found the BLM FONSI sufficient
under NEPA and upheld it on appeal.
PART Two - NATURAL RESOURCES AND PUBLIC LANDS
I. OIL SHALE PATENTS - MARATHON OIL CO. v LUJAN
10 4
A. Facts
The Marathon decision belongs to a long line of oil shale cases in
96. Lujan II, 949 F.2d at 362.
97. 490 U.S. 360 (1990).
98. Id
99. Marsh, 490 U.S. at 377 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)).
100. Id.
101. North Buckhead Civic Ass'n v. Skinner, 903 F.2d 1533, 1538 (11th Cir. 1990).
102. Goos v. I.C.C., 911 F.2d 1283 (8th Cir. 1990).
103. 817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1987).
104. 937 F.2d 998 (10th Cir. 1991).
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Colorado. 10 5 Plaintiff Marathon Oil Company 10 6 owns six contiguous
association placer mining claims in Western Rio Blanco County, Colo-
rado. Marathon located the claims on April 5, 1918, and they comprise
some 983 acres. After locating its claims, Marathon performed the req-
uisite annual assessment work to maintain its unpatented claims.' 0 7
Marathon Oil began its effort to patent the claims under the Mining
Law of 1872108 in March of 1986. However, from March 1986 through
May 1987, Interior imposed an administrative moratorium on process-
ing oil shale patent applications while the agency developed new regula-
tions governing the definition of "valid discoveries." By December 9,
1987, plaintiffs filed all required proofs for a patent pursuant to 30
U.S.C. § 29. Interior reviewed the application, confirming that plaintiffs
had met all requirements of posting notice, publication, title, improve-
ments, survey, and other necessary final proofs as documented in its
draft final Mineral Report, made available in February, 1989, but took
no further action. Plaintiffs brought suit in late 1989 in the United
States District Court for the District of Colorado to compel final agency
action.
B. The District Court Decision
In its opinion, the district court first resolved whether full compli-
ance with the patent requirements had caused property rights to vest in
Marathon Oil's unpatented oil shale claims. Interior argued that the
patent interests had not vested, because it had not formally issued the
Final Mineral Report approving patenting of the claims. The court re-
lied on a long line of cases ruling that, upon compliance with the several
requirements of 30 U.S.C. § 29 for patenting claims, Marathon Oil's
property rights vest. 10 9 Interior did not appeal this ruling.
The lower court's second ruling was reversed on appeal. The dis-
trict court viewed Interior's duty to issue patents as ministerial in nature
and not discretionary because Marathon had fully complied with all re-
quirements and was merely awaiting signature of the Final Mineral Re-
port. The district court ruled that, although discretion exists in
determining whether a patent application satisfies the requirements of
30 U.S.C. § 29, once it is determined that the applicant satisfies those
requirements, the Secretary of Interior has a nondiscretionary duty to
issue the patent. This case presented novel and compelling facts con-
cerning the Secretary's nondiscretionary role because all parties agreed
105. Those cases are listed at Marathon Oil Co. v. Lujan, 751 F. Supp. 1455, 1457, n.3
(D. Colo. 1990).
106. Plaintiffs include Joan L. Savage, Barbara Cliff Toner, and Frank G. Cooley as
personal representative of the Estate of Cameron Cliff. Marathon Oil Company repre-
sented the interests of all plaintiffs.
107. The case contains an extensive and informative discussion of the history of mining
law.
108. 30 U.S.C. § 21-54 (1988).
109. These cases are listed in Marathon Oily. Lujan, 751 F. Supp. 1455, 1459 (D. Colo.
1990).
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that it was not the patent application itself, but the regulatory process
and moratorium that delayed patent issuance. The court ruled that Inte-
rior abused its discretion in failing to perform a nondiscretionary minis-
terial act, 110 and granted mandamus relief to compel Interior to
perform its duty." 1 The court ordered Interior to "expeditiously com-
plete administrative action" on plaintiffs' patent application and to issue
a patent within thirty days.1 12 The court further enjoined defendants
from failing to complete administrative action and ruled on summary
judgment. 1
13
C. The Tenth Circuit Decision
On the final day allowed by the district court to issue the patents,
Interior appealed. TheTenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined the
primary issues on appeal were: (1) whether the thirty day time limit
mandated by the trial court was too short a period for Interior to finalize
the oil shale patent application decisions, and (2) whether the district
court abused its discretion in reducing Interior's decision to a ministe-
rial act. The Tenth Circuit ruled only on the mandamus relief and not
the other remedies provided by the lower court.
1 14
The three-member panel included Judge Holloway, Judge Ebel,
who wrote the opinion, and Judge Aldisert, sitting by designation from
the Third Circuit. The court reviewed the long history of delay in issu-
ing Marathon's patent, and affirmed the trial court's conclusion that
thirty days is ample time to finalize the patent proceedings. Neverthe-
less, the Tenth Circuit determined that the remaining day left under the
District Court order was not sufficient to fulfill the government review
process, and provided fifteen additional days for completion of final
agency action. 115 The court's ruling on this issue intertwines both prac-
tical and legal considerations. The legal reasoning, embedded in foot-
note 7 of the opinion, 1 16 is that Interior's decisionmaking should not
halt during rulemaking proceedings, because Interior still maintains au-
thority to act under the statute. Therefore, a regulatory moratorium is
not sufficient justification for an agency to avoid timely performance of
its duties. Practically speaking, however, the court noted that even
under the new regulations, the oil shale claims remain patentable.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with Interior on the second issue and
held that the district court abused its discretion in compelling the Secre-
tary to issue the patents because "[t]he Department has not yet deter-
mined officially that all conditions to issuance of the patents have
110. Id. at 1460.
111. Id. at 1464.
112. Id. at 1473.
113. Id.
114. Marathon, 937 F.2d at 498 (other remedies merely duplicated the mandamus
relief).
115. Id. at 502.




occurred."' 1 7 The result is that until agency action is final, an agency
can exercise its discretion and thereby prevent its role from being re-
duced to a purely ministerial function. Thus, until an agency affixes its
signature to a document, it retains discretion to alter its position.
II. LAND USE ON RESERVATIONS - SANGRE DE CRISTO DEVELOPMENT
COMPANY V. UNITED STATES 
1 18
A. Facts
The Sangre de Cristo Development Company (Company), formed
by Sante Fe residents in 1968, negotiated with the Teseque Pueblo
(Pueblo) to build a golf course and residential area on Pueblo land. 19
The Company entered into an agreement leasing 5,000 acres for devel-
opment, which lease was approved by the Department of Interior in
1970.120 When the Company began selling lots, several area landown-
ers and environmental groups claimed that Interior's lease approval was
invalid because it failed to satisfy the requirements of NEPA.12 1 The
groups filed suit to enjoin further development.' 2 2 The Tenth Circuit
held Interior's lease approval was a major federal action significantly af-
fecting the quality of the human environment, 12 3 triggering NEPA pro-
cedural requirements. 124 The court also granted injunctive relief.
12 5
The Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) then began preparing an Environ-
mental Impact Statement (EIS). During this period, the Pueblo leader-
ship changed and formally requested invalidation of the lease. Based on
environmental considerations and the Pueblo's opposition, Interior re-
scinded its approval of the lease. The Company then filed for
bankruptcy.
B. The District Court Decision
The Company brought suit against the United States in the District
Court for the District of New Mexico126 alleging: (1) just compensation
was due under the takings clause of the Fifth Amendment because Inte-
rior's actions deprived it of vested property rights; (2) the United States
was liable under contract and trust theories; and (3) negligent lease ap-
proval prejudiced the Company's exercise of the lease. 12 7 Chief Judge
Juan Burciaga ruled in favor of the United States on all claims.'
28
117. Id. at 501 (Footnote 8 contains further discussion of the legal analysis).
118. 932 F.2d 891 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied Case No. 91-1286 (U.S. April 27, 1992.
119. Id.
120. d at 893 (lease approval by Interior is required under 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) (1970)).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Ia (citing Davis v. Morton, 469 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1972)).
124. Id. (citing NEPA § 4332(C) requirements of an environmental impact study).
125. Ia (citing Davis, 469 F.2d at 597).
126. Id. at 891.
127. Id. at 892-3.
128. Ia at 891.
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C. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The first claim on appeal was for just compensation from an alleged
governmental taking under the Fifth Amendment. 129 To receive "just
compensation," the Company was compelled to demonstrate it held a
vested interest and Interior's action amounted to a taking.'3 0 The Com-
pany argued that the Tenth Circuit's remand instruction in Davis v. Mor-
ton 13 1 evidenced the lease's validity because it ordered the trial court
simply to enjoin the project pending compliance with NEPA. i3 2 On re-
view, however, the Tenth Circuit clarified its earlier opinion, stating it
never reached the question of lease validity.13 3 Relying on its decision
in Gray v. Johnson,13 4 the Tenth Circuit held that a valid approval was
necessary to lease Reservation lands.' 35 To create a vested interest in
the lease, Interior's approval must be "within the bounds of their [sic]
authority" and in the best interests of the Tribe. i3 6 The court invali-
dated the lease because Interior was "without authority to grant the
lease since no environmental impact study was conducted prior to ap-
proval." The Tenth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the takings claim be-
cause an invalid lease vests no property rights.'
3 7
The Company next alleged that the United States, "by virtue of its
pervasive involvement in the contract,"' 3 8 became a party to the
lease' 3 9 and breached the contract. The Tenth Circuit identified the re-
lationship between the parties, holding the Pueblo lessors, the Company
lessee, and the United States with "no property interest in [the] Pueblo's
land."' 40 The statutory section1 4 ' under which Interior approves leases
on Reservation lands did not implicate the United States as a party to
leases between Indian tribes and lessees. 14 2 The United States might
assume liability if it contracted on the Pueblo's behalf, but in this case, it
merely approved the lease.' 43 However, even if the United States
signed the lease as trustee, this alone would not create liability because
the United States is not liable to third parties when contracting on be-
129. Id. at 892.
130. Id. at 894 (citing In re Consol. United States Atmospheric Testing Litig., 820 F.2d
982, 988 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 905 (1988)).
131. 469 F.2d at 598.
132. The Tenth Circuit instructed the court to issue a Writ of Mandamus and to enjoin
the United States from acting on the lease agreement "until the environmental impact of
the project had been studied and evaluated" according to the "mandate of NEPA." 932
F.2d at 894 (citing Davis, 469 F.2d at 595).
133. 932 F.2d at 894.
134. 395 F.2d 533, 537 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 906 (1968).
135. See 25 U.S.C. § 415(a) (1970) (Indian lands may be leased with the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior).
136. 932 F.2d at 894 (citing Gray, 395 F.2d at 537).
137. Id. at 895.
138. Id.
139. The Company tried, but failed, to strengthen this allegation by asserting the
United States acted as a trustee. Id.
140. Id.
141. 43 U.S.C. § 415 (1988).
142. 932 F.2d at 895.




half of Indian tribes. 144 As precedent, the court cited United States v.
Algoma Lumber Co., 14 5 in which Interior approved and entered into, on
behalf of the Klamath Indians, a logging contract with a timber com-
pany. 146 In Algoma, although timber payments were deposited into the
United States treasury and the United States signed the contract, Al-
goma could not recover overpayment from the United States. 14 7 Fi-
nally, even if the United States assumed liability under either contract
or trust theories, by invalidating Interior's lease approval in its Davis
opinion, the Tenth Circuit eliminated any potential liability of the
United States.
148
Reviewing the district court's factual findings under a clearly erro-
neous standard, 14 9 the Tenth Circuit addressed whether the United
States negligently prepared the EIS. The negligence allegedly delayed
finalizing the lease, which delay ultimately led to lease disapproval. The
Tenth Circuit summarily dismissed this claim, holding that the district
court's conclusions were amply supported by the record and were not
clearly erroneous. 150




Utah Power and Light (UP&L) applied for federal power on behalf
of more than 100 of its subscriber cities, towns and counties in Utah and
Wyoming. UP&L interpreted the Reclamation Project Act of 1939 to
authorize power allocations to municipalities as qualified preference en-
tities in the sale of federal hydropower.' 52 UP&L also applied for pref-
erential federal power allocation on its own behalf for resale at cost to its
municipal customers. Alternatively, UP&L contended it could bid for
federal power from the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA). 1
53
WAPA concluded neither UP&L nor its subscribers qualified as "prefer-
ence entities" under reclamation law because the municipalities did not
operate the utility systems directly, and rejected the application on this
144. Id. (citing United States v. Algoma Lumber Co., 305 U.S. 415, 423 (1939)).
145. 305 U.S. 415 (1939).
146. Id.
147. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the validity of Algoma noting that a recent decision
finding the United States liable to an Indian Tribe under a limited trust relationship did
not overrule Algoma because the United States was liable to the Tribe, not to third parties.
Sangre de Cristo, 932 F.2d at 896. See also United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
148. Sangre de Cristo, 932 F.2d at 896.
149. Id- at 897.
150. Id. at 897-898.
151. 926 F.2d 974 (10th Cir. 1991).
152. 43 U.S.C. § 485(h) (1988).
153. WAPA markets power generated from western federal water and power projects,
including the Colorado River Storage Project (CRSP). The CRSP Act (42 U.S.C. §§ 620-
92(o)) governs power marketing in the area of UP&L's application, and it incorporates
federal reclamation law, including § 9(c) of the Reclamation Project Act (43 U.S.C.
§ 485(h)(c)). WAPA, 926 P.2d at 977.
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basis. WAPA further determined UP&L was not eligible to purchase its
power.
B. The District Court Decision
UP&L challenged WAPA's refusal to allocate power in the United
States District Court for the District of Utah. UP&L also challenged cer-
tain WAPA practices, including WAPA's purchase of non-federal power
to meet its firm power obligations154 Judge Thomas Green held for
WAPA, finding WAPA reasonably interpreted federal law governing
preference in the sale of federal hydroelectric power and its decision to
purchase non-federal power to maximize sales of federal power was not
ultra vires.15 5 UP&L appealed the district court's grant of summary
judgment.
C. The Tenth Circuit Decision
The issues on appeal ,ere: (1) whether WAPA reasonably inter-
preted federal preference law in determining that a preference not be
granted to UP&L as agent for the municipalities; (2) whether the Colo-
rado River Storage Project (CRSP) Act prohibited WAPA from purchas-
ing non-federal power; (3) if not prohibited, whether WAPA's proposed
non-federal power purchases were arbitrary and capricious; and (4)
whether Congress authorized WAPA, as an agency in the Department of
Energy ("DOE"), to participate with private utilities in the construction
and financing of transmission lines.
1. Preference Entities under Section 9(c) of the Reclamation
Project Act of 1939
Section 9(c) of the Reclamation Project Act states "preference shall
be given to municipalities and other public corporations or agencies
.. " in the sale of federal hydroelectric power.' 55 WAPA, Reclamation
and DOE consistently interpreted section 9(c) as giving preference only
to municipalities actually operating utility systems, not to every city or
town satisfying the dictionary definition of a "municipality." UP&L ar-
gued that WAPA interpreted section 9(c) contrary to its plain language,
contending the statutory language clearly makes all municipalities pref-
erence entities, so the court should give no deference to WAPA's
interpretation. 1
5 7
The Tenth Circuit identified the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion in Chevron, USA v. Natural Resources Defense Counsel 158 as the prevail-
ing analysis regarding deference to agency decisions. Because Congress
154. Firm power is power that is guaranteed to be a available at all times. WAPA, 926
F.2d at 980 n.4.
155. The District Court certified, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b) that its ruling on the
preference in ultra vires claims was final. Id. at 977 n.1.
156. 43 U.S.C. § 485h(c).
157. UP&L's argument was adopted by Judge Tacha in dissent.
158. 467 U.S. 837, 842-42 (1984).
1014 [Vol. 69:4
ENVIRONMENTAL LA W SURVEY
did not address this precise question in either the statute or its legisla-
tive history, the majority identified the appropriate Chevron test as:
when an administering agency's interpretation of a statute is
challenged, and traditional tools of statutory construction yield
no relevant congressional intent, the reviewing court must de-
termine if the agency's construction is a permissible one.1 5 9
The court then equated the permissible standard with reasonable-
ness. 160 To be reasonable, the agency's interpretation need not be the
only possible interpretation. 161 Finding no clear expression of congres-
sional intent, and concluding that the agencies' longstanding interpreta-
tion of section 9(c) is reasonable, the court upheld WAPA's construction
of the statute. 16 2 The Tenth Circuit noted as reasonable WAPA's con-
clusion that the benefits of preferential access to federal hydroelectrical
power should be enjoyed by the public, rather than the private sector.
2. WAPA's Purchase of Non-Federal Power
UP&L contended WAPA's practice of buying power produced at
non-federal power plants for resale was ultra vires. WAPA purchased
non-federal power to insure a dependable energy supply. UP&L argued
WAPA possessed no statutory authority to make these purchases. The
Tenth Circuit found the plain language of the statute did not prohibit
WAPA from purchasing non-federal power and the statute's legislative
history did not demonstrate congressional intent to prohibit non-federal
power purchases. 163 The Tenth Circuit also rejected UP&L's argument
that WAPA could not interact with non-federal entities absent specific
congressional approval because federal courts long recognized the in-
herent authority to purchase power on credit from other sources when
conditions prevent hydroelectric facilities from functioning at
capacity.'
64
Neither the statute nor the legislative history address how WAPA
may accomplish its required objective of maximizing the sale of federally
produced power at firm rates. In affirming summary judgment, the
court deferred to the administering agency's interpretation of the stat-
ute, and found WAPA authorized to perform those tasks reasonably nec-
essary maximize the sale of federal power at firm rates, which included
acquisition of non-federal power.'
65
UP&L also did not prevail in its claim that WAPA exceeded the
scope of its authority in the volume of its non-federal power purchases.
The Tenth Circuit agreed WAPA did not possess unlimited authority to
159. WAPA, 926 F.2d at 981.
160. Id.
161. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n.11.
162. WAPA, 926 F.2d at 978 (quoting United States v. Shimmer, 367 U.S. 374, 382
(1961)).
163. Id. at 980 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1087, 84th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1956
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2346, 2362).
164. Id. at 980-81 (citing United States v. Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist., 652 F.2d 1341,
1345 (9th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted)).
165. Id. at 980 (citing 43 U.S.C. § 620(o).
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purchase non-federal power. However, the Tenth Circuit noted, when
interpreting general reclamation statutes, federal courts allow power
marketing agencies to purchase non-federal power that is reasonably in-
cidental to the integration of federally-produced hydroelectric
power.1 66 In UP&L's case, Congress directed WAPA to maximize the
sale of federally-produced power and, therefore, authorized it to
purchase such power as necessary to meet its objectives.
16 7
3. Participation in Private Utility Transmission Line Projects
Finally, UP&L contended WAPA possessed no authority to partici-
pate with private utilities in constructing and financing the Craig-Bo-
nanza Transmission Line because this transmission line promoted
WAPA's "brokerage activities." 168 UP&L asserted section 1 of the Colo-
rado River Storage Project (CRSP) Act' 69 authorized only the construc-
tion of specified initial CRSP units. The Tenth Circuit held that CRSP
Act did not prohibit construction of future transmission lines in connec-
tion with the project because Congress granted broad authority to oper-
ate, build and maintain transmission lines.
170
D. The Dissenting Opinion
Circuit Judge Tacha voiced concern as to whether the court must
defer to the agency decision based on the plain language of section 9(c)
of the Reclamation Project Act.' 7 1 Judge Tacha found clear congres-
sional intent regarding a preference for municipalities regardless of
whether they met the agency-imposed municipality operated utility re-
quirement. Judge Tacha referenced a series of cases following Chevron
in which the Supreme Court acknowledged that deferential review did
not replace a federal court's duty to interpret statutes using traditional
rules of statutory construction.1 7 2 The Judge stated:
I can see no difference between the power request of a single
municipality and the request of a group of municipalities repre-
sented by another entity that distributes power to them at cost.
In my view, the congressional intent expressed in the plain lan-
guage of section 9(c) is to provide preference to municipalities
simply based on their status as political subdivisions, not in
their capacity to distribute power.
173
In the dissent's view, WAPA's requirement of direct municipality utility
control to receive preference contradicted the clear congressional man-
166. Id. at 982 (citing Kansas City Power and Light, 115 F. Supp. at 417).
167. The Court applied the arbitrary and capricious standard of review to WAPA's non-
federal purchasing decisions and noted that the scope of review was a narrow one. WAPA,
926 F.2d at 982.
168. Id. at 982-893.
169. 43 U.S.C. § 620 (1988).
170. Id. at 983 (citing Department of Energy Organization Act § 302, 42 U.S.C.
§ 7152(a)(1)(E)).
171. WAPA, 926 F.2d at 983.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 985.
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date that municipalities receive federal power.1 74
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's Chevron 175 decision announced a rule of stat-
utory interpretation, which the Tenth Circuit has interpreted as requir-
ing deference to virtually any and all reasonable agency interpretations
of law. This judicial deference makes it difficult to challenge an agency
interpretation of law because the Tenth Circuit decisions tend to equate
standard of "reasonableness" with "not arbitrary." In the cases sur-
veyed in this Article, the Tenth Circuit found for the defendant, United
States, in four of five cases. 176 By accepting agency interpretations of
law without independent evaluation, the courts abdicate their primary
role to construe the law, especially where an agency interpretation ex-
pands the scope of its jurisdiction. Courts should determine indepen-
dently whether an agency's interpretation of the law is reasonable in
light of congressional intent. Courts should not allow the agency's in-
terpretation of that intent, which is often driven by non-congressional or





175. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 837.
176. Ironically, the one case in which the Tenth Circuit did not rule for the govern-
ment, Sierra Club v. Lujan, 931 F.2d 1421, was effectively reversed by the Supreme Court
decision in United States Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. - (1992).
* Mr. Comer and Ms. Mesmer are associated with the Denver law firm of Saunders,
Snyder, Ross & Dickson, P.C. Ms. Cachey is a second-year law student at University of





During the 1991 survey period, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
addressed four separate areas of securities law. First, in First Golden Ban-
corporation v. Weiszmann, I the court strongly ruled against third-party in-
demnification for liability under section 16(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (1934 Act).2 Second, in Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co.,3
the court addressed the procedural issue of whether an action is barred
for an untimely filing of the complaint under section 13 of the Securities
Exchange Act of 19334 (1933 Act) and held if the statute of limitations
has expired, the complaint must be dismissed regardless of the unusual
complexities of the case. Third, in Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor
Freight, Inc.,5 the court held an interest in an Employee Stock Ownership
Plan (ESOP) is an investment contract under the Securities Act of 1933,
and, as a security, it is not outside the reach of federal securities regula-
tion despite the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 6
Finally, in Garcia v. Cordova,7 the Tenth Circuit held that purchase of
stock did not trigger a rule lOb-5(b) duty to disclose corporate asset
appraisal information to selling shareholders because the speculative
and unreliable nature of the asset information removed the corporate
insider from any disclosure duty. This Article focuses on the distin-
guishing points between each Tenth Circuit decision and the corre-
sponding lower court decision. The Tenth Circuit rigorously
interpreted and precisely applied the federal securities regulations in re-
versing the district court in all but the First Golden decision.
I. INDEMNIFICATION FROM VIOLATIONS OF THE SHORT SWING PROFIT
PROVISION: FIRST GOLDEN BANcoRPORATIoN V. WEISZMANN
A. Introduction
Corporations commonly indemnify employees against liabilities in-
curred in the scope of their corporate functions. The Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 prohibits "insiders" from using their information
access in short term trading of the corporations securities.8 In First
Golden Bancorporation v. Weiszmann, 9 the Tenth Circuit addressed: (1)
whether profits realized by an insider from the purchase and sale of
company securities within a period less than six months may be recov-
1. 942 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1991).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
3. 947 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1991).
4. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988).
5. 940 F.2d 564 (10th Cir. 1991).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
7. 930 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1991).
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78p (1988).
9. 942 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1991).
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ered and (2) whether the insider can subsequently seek third party in-
demnification for liability resulting from a section 16(b) claim under the
1934 Act.10 The court strongly rejected the indemnifications argument
as violative of the public policies underlying federal securities laws. 1
B. Facts
Ronald Weiszmann acquired stock in First Golden through a tender
offer he made for the company. When Weiszmann sold the stock, First
Golden alleged the sale occurred within six months of its acquisition
making Weiszmann liable under section 16(b) of the 1934 Act for profits
from the sale.12 Weiszmann counterclaimed against First Golden and
initiated third-party complaints against both Morgan Stanley, who acted
as Weiszmann's financial advisors, and Lindner Management, the even-
tual purchaser of the stock.13 The primary issue on appeal involved
Weiszmann's request for indemnity with respect to his potential liability
to First Golden. The district court rejected the indemnity claim and dis-
missed the remaining third-party claims with prejudice.' 4 The Tenth
Circuit affirmed the rejection of indemnity, but remanded the third-
party claims for further proceedings.
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit stated there is no right to indemnity for liability
under section 16(b) of the 1934 Act as a matter of law. 15 Section 16(b)
does not require proof that the insider improperly obtained trading in-
formation; proof of an insider relationship that gives rise to potential
improper use of information in a trade is enough.16 The policy behind
section 16(b) is to deter transactions that have a high potential for fraud.
Imposing strict liability for use of insider information in the purchase
and subsequent sale of securities within a period less than six months
achieves this deterrence.'
7
The court highlighted an Illinois case, In re Olympia Brewing Co.,
18
10. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
11. First Golden, 942 F.2d at 728-29 (The Securities Acts are not intended to protect
parties who violate the Acts, and indemnification would undermine the deterrent affect of
the Acts.).
12. Id. at 728.
13. Id. The third-party claims included: 1) indemnity against liability to First Golden;
2) outrageous conduct; 3) breach of contract; 4) fraud; 5) controlling person liability; 6)
principal-agent liability; and 7) negligent misrepresentation. Plaintiffs sought relief in the
third-party claims for reimbursement of attorneys fees and costs incurred during the litiga-
tion, and recovery of commissions and profit realized by Morgan Stanley from the sale of
the stock.
14. The district court stated that third-party actions can be maintained under Rule
14(a) only for claims where the third-party defendant is asserted to be secondarily liable to
the third-party plaintiff for the third-party plaintiff's liability to the primary plaintiff.
Where the liability no longer exists, all subsequent claims are dismissed. Id.
15. Id; 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1988).
16. First Golden, 942 F.2d at 729.
17. Id.
18. 674 F. Supp. 597 (N.D. Ill. 1987).
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which held that Congress did not promulgate the 1933 and 1934 Acts to
protect parties who violated the Acts' provisions or to insure that in-
jured parties were reimbursed. Rather, the Acts were promulgated to
prevent future fraudulent activity.' 9 For these policy reasons, indemni-
fication from liability was rejected as counter to the strict liability of sec-
tion 16(b) violations.
The Tenth Circuit remanded the remaining third-party claims on
procedural grounds. 20 Although the third-party claims were related to
the indemnity claim,2 1 the district court may have overlooked some or
all of the claims as ancillary under Rule 18(a)2 2 since they were separate
claims for damages. To the extent that third-party claims are disguised
indemnity claims for the section 16(b) violation, the Tenth Circuit noted
the appropriateness of dismissing the claims with prejudice. 23 However,
since Weiszmann may have a legitimate claim to recover ommissions
paid to Morgan Stanley, and Morgan Stanley may have a controlling per-
son liability claim under section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934,24 the court should have addressed those third-party claims. 25
D. Conclusion
Section 16 of the Securities Exchange Act acts as a deterrent to
transactions that have a high potential for fraud. To allow indemnifica-
tion from liability for violating the Act would frustrate the strict liability
deterrence by protecting parties who violate the Act. The Tenth Circuit,
in First Golden, held third-party claims valid under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 18(a), but only if they are third-party claims and are not in-
demnity-related.
II. SECTION 13 OF THE 1933 SECURITIES ACT: ANIXTER V. HOME-STAKE
PRODUCTION CO.
A. Introduction
In Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co.,26 the Tenth Circuit addressed
the procedural question of whether an untimely filed action is barred
under Section 13 of the Securities Act of 1933,27 even if the underlying
circumstances are uncommonly complex. The Tenth Circuit held that
regardless of the uncommon complexities, which obscured the fraud,
19. Id. at 612-13.
20. The remaining claims included: controlling person liability, principle-agent liabil-
ity, and negligent misrepresentation. First Golden, 942 F.2d at 730.
21. Id. at 729-30.
22. FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a).
23. First Golden, 942 F.2d at 731.
24. 15 U.S.C. § 78t(a) (1988).
25. First Golden, 942 F.2d at 732; See, e.g., Smith v. Mulvaney, 827 F.2d 558, 560 (9th
Cir. 1987); Globus v. Law Research Serv., 318 F. Supp. 955, 957-58 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), aft'd,
442 F.2d 1346 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 941 (1971); deHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co.,
286 F. Supp. 809, 815-16 (D. Colo. 1968).
26. 939 F.2d 1420 (10th Cir. 1991).
27. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988).
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sufficient warning of the fraud existed to toll the limitation period. Ac-
tions under section 11 or 12(2) of the Securities Exchange Act of 193328
must be brought within one year of the discovery of a fraudulent event,
and no more than three years following the sale of the securities.29
Since the statute of limitations expired, the court dismissed the claim.
B. Background
Plaintiffs Ivan A. Anixter, Blanche Dickenson, and Dolly Yoshida
filed suit in the Northern District of California alleging that Home-Stake
Production Company conspired over a ten-year period to violate federal
securities laws in selling oil and gas production interests. Following
years of procedural manipulations, a jury awarded plaintiffs damages of
approximatey $130,000,000.s ° Home-Stake appealed to the Tenth Cir-
cuit on the timeliness issue. Several dates and events are important to
the Anixter litigation: (1) in 1968, a class action suit was filed against
Home-Stake for violations of sections 10(b) and 17(a) of the federal se-
curities laws; 3 1 (2) in 1970, the SEC investigated Home-Stake; (3) in
1971, the Wall Street Journal reported on an SEC complaint about
Home-Stake's business practices; and (4) in 1973, the IRS and the SEC
investigated Home-Stake's Chapter X reorganization under the Bank-
ruptcy Act of 1938 and the Wall Street Journal coverage of the event.
The Anixter plaintiffs originally filed suit against Home- Stake in fed-
eral court.3 2 The district court denied defendant's motion to dismiss
and tolled the one-year/three year limitation period found in Section 13
of the 1933 Act33 in the "interests of substantial justice" because of the
extraordinary facts and circumstances. 3 4 The court found that the cir-
cumstances of the case were unusual because of the ten-year duration of
the fraudulent scheme that was exacerbated by Home-Stake's alleged
fraud in the courts and violations of SEC rules. These circumstances
mandated the application of the equitable tolling of the statute of limita-
tions to prevent further fraudulent concealment and victimization of the
plaintiff investors.35 As support, the district court repeated a Supreme
Court pronouncement that the fraudulent concealment doctrine "is
read into every federal statute of limitation."'3 6 In addition, the court
noted that federal courts are not powerless "to hold that the statute of
limitations is tolled under certain circumstances not inconsistent with
28. Id. § 77k(l).
29. Id. § 77m.
30. Anixter, 939 F.2d at 1430.
31. Geo. H. McFadden & Bro., Inc. v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 295 F. Supp. 590 (N.D.
Okla. 1968) (class representatives accepted settlement and withdrew the class certification
resulting in dismissal with prejudice).
32. In re Home-Stake Prod. Co. Sec. Litig., 76 F.R.D. 337 (N.D. Okla. 1975).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988).
34. In re Home-Stake, 76 F.R.D. at 344.
35. Id. at 344-45.
36. Id. at 344 (quoting Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946)).
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the legislative .purpose."3 7 The district court concluded that where
there appears to have been a factual allegation that the defendants were
given fair notice of an action in progress, neither the one-year nor the
three-year limitation will bar the action.38
C. Analysis
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis with the Section 13 language
that covers express causes of action under Sections 11 and 12. First, the
court found the statute of limitations clearly stated that discovery of an
action starts the one-year limitation on filing suit. Second, the Tenth
Circuit held this discovery language incorporated the doctrine of fraud-
ulent concealment because the language pegs accrual of a cause of ac-
tion that involves a concealed fraud to the date "after such discovery
should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence."
3 9
Third, the Tenth Circuit held the one-year after discovery provision of
Section 13 will not extend more than three years after the security was
offered to the public, or after its sale.40 Compliance with Section 13
requires that a plaintiff plead and prove facts showing that the filing was
timely with respect to both the one year and three year limitation
periods.
4 1
Senate debate on Section 13 reinforced the Tenth Circuit's reading
of the statute of limitation requirements. 4 2 The Anixter court noted that
all Senate members in the debates, agreed with the need for an absolute
bar, recognizing that liability must be extinguished to free boards of di-
rectors from fear of inheriting liability to suits. 43 The Tenth Circuit
concluded that section 13 is substantive rather than procedural, and un-
timely complaints must be dismissed as a matter of law.
44
The difficult issues involved in Anixter were whether there was suffi-
cient time and warning to discover Home-Stake's fraud and whether the
suit was filed timely. To answer the latter question, the court deter-
mined when the plaintiffs knew or should have known that fraud existed
through the exercise of diligence, which knowledge triggers the statute
of limitations. 4 5 Full knowledge of the existence of a claim is not re-
quired; inquiry notice of possible fraud or misrepresentation is sufficient
to begin the one-year filing limitation.46 The Tenth Circuit held that
37. Id. at 344 (quoting American Pipe & Constr. Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538, 559
(1974)).
38. Id. at 345.
39. Anixter, 939 F.2d at 1434 (quoting Cook v. Avien, Inc., 573 F.2d 685 (1st Cir.
1978) (fraudulent concealment is the common law counterpart of the discovery standard
prescribed by § 13 to limit actions brought under § 12(2), therefore the running of both
statutes of limitations is triggered by identical considerations)).
40. Id (construing 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988)).
41. Id. at 1434.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 1434-35.
44. Id at 1434-36.
45. Id. at 1437.
46. Id.
1992] 1023
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
facts triggering inquiry include any "sufficient storm warnings to alert a
reasonable person to the possibility that there were either misleading
statements or significant omissions involved in the sale."'4 7 The Tenth
Circuit held the Anixter plaintiffs had notice of (1) the 1971 SEC investi-
gation and complaint, (2) the court order for Home-Stake to remedy the
situation and (3) the two Wall StreetJournal articles highlighting Home-
Stake's activities. The Tenth Circuit concluded that since notice re-
quired only constructive knowledge rather than actual knowledge4s and
Home-Stake's passive fraud spanned ten years, this gave sufficient
"storm warnings" to trigger the one-year filing limitation as a matter of
law.
4 9
Finally, the court addressed Home-Stake's assertion that the section
10(b) and Rule lOb-5 claims were also untimely. Relying on Lampf v.
Gilbertson,50 the Tenth Circuit held the one-year/three-year statute of re-
pose would be inconsistent with tolling.5 1 Thus, the Tenth Circuit de-
parted from precedent established in Hackbart v. Holmes52 and Bath v.
Bushkin5 3 in analyzing applicable limitation periods for 10(b) claims.
D. Conclusion
Supported by legislative history and the Supreme Court ruling in
Lampf, the Tenth Circuit decision strongly enforced the Section 13 stat-
ute of limitations against plaintiffs because they had sufficient "storm
warning" to realize a colorable action existed. The court held the stat-
ute of limitation is substantive rather than procedural and therefore eq-
uitable exceptions, which threatened to swallow the clear rules in
Section 13, will no longer be considered. In Anixter, the court warned
plaintiffs that a plain-language reading of statute limitation require-
ments is required and the statute will run from the date of the imputed
constructive knowledge of fraud.
III. EMPLOYEE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS QUALIFY AS SECURITIES:
USELTON V. COMMERCIAL LOVELACE MOTOR FREIGHT, INC.
A. Introduction
In Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc. ,54 the Tenth Cir-
cuit determined (1) whether an interest in an Employee Stock Owner-
ship Plan (ESOP) is an investment contract security under the Securities
Acts5 5 and (2) if a security, whether an ESOP interest is outside the
47. Id. (quoting Cook v. Avier, 573 F.2d 685, 697 (lst Cir. 1978)).
48. Id. at 1438 n.35.
49. Id. at 1438.
50. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
51. Anixter, 939 F.2d at 1441.
52. 675 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1982).
53. 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1990).
54. 940 F.2d 564 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, Pepsico, Inc. v. Uselton, 112 S. Ct. 589
(1991).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 77 (1988) (the Securities Act of 1933); 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988) (the
Securities Act of 1934).
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reach of federal securities regulation due to ERISA.56 The court de-




In SEC v. W.J. Howey Co.,5 8 the Supreme Court held that a financial
relationship constitutes an investment contract where the scheme in-
volves: (1) an investment of money; (2) a common enterprise; and (3)
profits resulting solely from the efforts of others.5 9 After Howey, the
Court in International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel60 determined
whether an employee benefit plan is an investment contract security
under the Securities Acts. Analyzing each element of the Howey test sep-
arately, the Daniel Court held a compulsory, non-contributory pension
plan did not constitute an investment contract subject to regulation
under the Securities Acts.6 1 In addition, this benefit plan must be vol-
untary. 62 An employee with no choice of participation in a plan, rather
than making an "investment," receives a defined benefit. 63 In Daniel,
the compulsory nature of the plan precluded any affirmative investment
decision "to give up a specific consideration in return for a separable
financial interest with the characteristics of a security." 64 Further, since
only the employer contributed to the plan, the employee was only re-
quired to accept employment. While an investment need not take the
form of cash,65 accepting employment and providing labor is not tangi-
ble and definable consideration given in exchange for an interest sub-
stantially resembling the characteristics of a security.6 6
Applying the second and third elements of Howey, the Court deter-
mined that because the plan's success depended on continued employer
contributions and not the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of
56. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988).
57. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 572.
58. 328 U.S. 293 (1946) (The Securities & Exchange Commission, in seeking to en-
join the Howey Company from using the mails and instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce in the offer and sale of unregistered and non-exempt securities in violation of the
Securities Act of 1933, determined whether Howey's instruments were investment con-
tracts thus subject to federal securities regulation.).
59. Id. at 301.
60. 439 U.S. 551 (1979) (questioning whether a participant in a company pension
plan could invoke the Securities Acts in an effort to recover benefits under the plan).
61. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 559.
62. Id. at 554 n.2; see also O'Neil v. Marriott Corp., 538 F. Supp. 1026, 1030 (D. Md.
1982) (defining a voluntary plan).
63. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 554 n.3.
64. Id. at 559.
65. Id. at 560 n.12.
66. Id. at 560 (the employee is essentially selling his labor primarily to obtain a liveli-
hood, not to make an investment). The Court also rejected the argument that the em-
ployer contributions on behalf of the employee constituted an investment into the fund.
Because the contributions for each employee were identical regardless of individual em-
ployee performance or length of service, the contribution does not qualify as an invest-
ment by the employee. Id. at 561.
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others, the plan did not meet either test.67 In addition, any benefit re-
ceived by a participant in the plan was realized by meeting vesting re-
quirements rather than the plans investment success. 68 The Court
determined that viewed as a total compensation package, the possibility
of participating in the plan's asset earnings was far too speculative and
insubstantial to bring the transaction within the Securities Acts.
6 9
C. Facts of Uselton
The plaintiffs were 485 former union employees of Lee Way Motor
Freight, Inc. (Lee Way), a common carrier engaged in the interstate and
intrastate transport of commodities. In 1976, Pepsico, Inc. acquired Lee
Way and operated the company as a wholly-owned subsidiary. In Au-
gust 1984, Pepsico sold Lee Way to defendant Commercial Lovelace
Motor Freight, Inc. (CL). CL solicited Lee Way's union employees to
participate in a wage reduction program, 70 which provided each em-
ployee an interest in CL's ESOP and a profit-sharing plan in return for
the employee's wage reduction. 7 1 Within a year, CL merged with Lee
Way and filed for bankruptcy.
The employees sought relief from CL for revocation of their partici-
pation in the ESOP and recovery of more than $6 million in wages lost
as a result of participation in the wage reduction program. 72 In their
federal securities claim, plaintiffs alleged that their interests in the ESOP
were investment contracts subject to federal securities regulation, pur-
suant to section 2(1) of the 1933 Act73 and section 3(a)(10) of the 1934
Act.74 Additionally, CL's solicitation of Lee Way employees to accept an
interest in CL's ESOP as part of the wage reduction program constituted
a sale of an unregistered security and securities fraud in violation of sec-
tions 5 and 17(a) of the 1933 Act,7 5 and section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.7 6
In December 1987, the district court ruled that plaintiffs' interests in the
ESOP were not investment contracts and were not securities under fed-
eral law. 77 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and
reversed in part.
67. Id. at 561-62 (even where a benefit plan is voluntary and passes the first Howey
test, profits from the plan must result from the efforts of others).
68. Id. at 562.
69. Id.
70. The program was mandatory for Lee Way's non-union salaried employees. Id at
570.
71. The voluntary reduction of 17.35%a from each employee was needed because CL
indicated it would otherwise fail. Id.
72. Plaintiffs also allege that Pepsico's sale of Lee Way to CL and its subsequent reac-
quisition of Lee Way's assets upon CL's bankruptcy were all part of a sham transaction
designed by Pepsico to liquidate Lee Way. Plaintiffs claimed that Pepsico violated federal
and Oklahoma securities laws and claimed its actions constituted common law fraud. Id.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(l) (1988) (defining "security" to include investment contracts).
74. Id. § 78c(a)(10).
75. Id. § 77e.
76. Id. § 78j(b).





Applying Howey to the instant case, the Tenth Circuit determined
that plaintiffs' interests in the ESOP were voluntary and contributory as
a matter law and that the ESOP satisfied Howey's requirements for estab-
lishing the existence of an investment contract.78 Although an "invest-
ment of money" is required, the court noted that cash is not the only
form of contribution that will create an investment contract. The proper
inquiry is whether the economic realities of the transaction as a whole
demonstrated an exchange of value. 79 Unlike the plaintiffs in Daniel,
each employee in this case did more than contribute labor-they delib-
erately chose to surrender a portion of their wages in return for an
ESOP interest in the company.8 0 Thus, the plaintiffs' interests were
contributory as a matter of law.8 1 Further, the court found that a volun-
tary plan is one permitting employees the option to participate.8 2 Here,
each union employee had the option to accept employment under the
wage reduction program or continue under the existing union contract.
Employees electing to join the ESOP voluntarily gave up specific consid-
eration in the form of wages in exchange for a financial interest in the
ESOP.83 For this reason, and because the plan had all the characteris-
tics of a security, the court found that the plaintiffs made a voluntary
investment in a security.84 The second element of the Howey test requir-
ing a "common enterprise" was dispatched by the Uselton court without
analysis.8 5
The Tenth Circuit held the third prong of the Howey test does not
require that "profits come solely from the efforts of others."'8 6 The
Howey test is satisfied if: (1) the enterprise can reasonably be expected to
produce profits in the form of capital appreciation or other earnings re-
sulting from the investment8 7 and (2) the success or failure of the enter-
prise is significantly affected by the managerial or entrepreneurial efforts
of persons other than the investor.88 In this case, both requirements
78. Useton, 940 F.2d at 574.
79. Id. at 575.
80. Id. at 577.
81. Id. at 575. Two other courts have held that wage concessions constitute sufficient
tangible and definable consideration to serve as a "contribution" to an employee benefit
plan for purposes of the Howey test. Id. See Hood v. Smith's Transfer Corp., 762 F. Supp.
1274, 1291 (W.D. Ky. 1991); Harris v. Republic Airlines, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep 93,772 at
98,625-26 (D.D.C. May 18, 1988).
82. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 575.
83. Id.
84. The SEC concurs with the conclusion that an employee who is given a choice
whether to participate in a voluntary pension plan; and decides to contribute a portion of
his earnings to such a plan, has made an investment decision in a security. Id. at 575-76
n.5.
Further, the "save the company, save your job" motivation by CL's wage reduction
program does not make the program involuntary because the union employees were free
to choose not to participate in the program. Id. at 576 n.7.
85. Id. at 576.
86. Id. at 576 n.8.
87. Id. at 576.
88. Id.
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were satisfied because profit from the plaintiff's ESOP interest occurred
through dividend distributions and appreciation in the value of the
stock. The profits from the ESOP plan resulted from the effort of CL's
management and each employee in the plan.89 Since each employee in
the program was dependent on the efforts of others to realize any bene-
fit from the investment decision, the ESOP satisfied the third element of
Howey and is distinguishable from other voluntary, contributory em-
ployee benefit plans. 90
In addition to support from Daniel that the ESOP was an investment
contract, 9 1 the SEC 92 and Congress93 concur with this view. The ad-
ministrative and congressional records regarding employee benefits
support the view that CL's ESOP was a security.
94
1. Securities Acts Regulation of ESOP Interests
Because the ESOP in Uselton was extensively regulated by ERISA, a
question arose as to whether the alternate regulation of ERISA removed
the ESOP investment contract from federal securities laws. 95 An invest-
ment contract is a federally regulated security unless the context re-
quires otherwise. 96 The Supreme Court has interpreted Section 13 of
the 1933 Act to mean that even if an instrument qualifies as a security
due to factual circumstances underlying the transaction, the context of
other federal regulation may still remove the investment from federal
securities laws.
9 7
The Tenth Circuit addressed the question of whether non-securi-
ties-related federal regulations prevented application of the Securities
Acts in Holloway v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co..98 In Holloway, the court
concluded that the fundamental purpose of securities regulation is to
89. Id. at 576-77.
90. Id. A defined benefit plan paying fixed or determinable benefits based on factors
such as age of retirement, is not sufficient. As here, an ESOP with defined contribution
plan produces benefits based on factors such as the amount of contribution and the plan's
investment success. Id. at 577 n.10.
91. Daniel, 439 U.S. at 563-69.
92. The SEC has expressed its view that employee interests in voluntary contributory
employee benefit plans are securities. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 578 n.13.
93. In a report analyzing the need to enact ERISA, the Senate focused on plans that
would be subject to such regulation. The Senate described its understanding that pension
and profit-sharing plans are exempt from coverage under the 1933 Act, unless the plan is a
voluntary contributory pension plan that invests in the employer company's securities in
an amount greater than that paid into the plan by the employer. Id. at 579.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 580.
96. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(I) (1988).
97. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 557-59 (1982); see also Daniel, 439 U.S. at
569-70.
98. 879 F.2d 772 (10th Cir. 1989), vacated, 494 U.S. 1013 (1990). The Supreme Court
vacated and remanded Holloway for further consideration in light of Reves v. Ernst &
Young, 494 U.S. 56 (1990), which considered whether the existence of another regulatory
scheme significantly reduces the risk of a security, thereby rendering application of the
Securities Acts unnecessary. Reves, 494 U.S. at 65. On remand of Holloway, the Tenth
Circuit determined that Reves did not undercut the Holloway analysis and decided Holloway
is still valid and in line with Marine Bank and Daniel. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 580 n.15.
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protect the investor from the sale of worthless securities through mis-
representation.9 9 Federal securities acts achieve this purpose by requir-
ing disclosure to investors of "relevant, accurate information upon
which to base an investment decision" and by providing "meaningful
remedies for investors when the anti-fraud provisions of the laws have
been violated."'10 0 Therefore, if alternate federal regulation "abun-
dandy protects" the investor, the alternate regulation may displace ap-
plication of federal securities laws as duplicative and unnecessary. 10 1
2. Alternate Investor Protection Under ERISA
Whether ERISA provides protection for investors in an ESOP de-
pends on whether the disclosure and remedial purposes of the Securities
Acts are met. 10 2 The disclosure requirement is met if the alternate reg-
ulation either compels disclosure of "relevant, accurate information
upon which to base an investment decision" or allows federal regulators
to act on behalf of investors "to monitor the issuing entity and to take
corrective actions to protect their investments."1 03 The Uselton court
dismissed ERISA as being an invalid alternative regulation to the Securi-
ties Acts for three reasons.
First, although ERISA requires disclosure of an ESOP plan's provi-
sions, the disclosure is provided only to new plan participants'" within
ninety days after the individual joins the plan. 10 5 Further, the ERISA
disclosure is intended only to inform participants of their rights and ob-
ligations under the plan, not to disclose information regarding the
plan's financial soundness. 10 6 Although the information required for
disclosure under the Securities Acts is available to an ERISA plan par-
ticipant upon request 10 7 the information is not automatically provided
for potential participants. In short, ERISA does not disclose the infor-
mation required by Holloway and the Securities Acts.'
0 8
Second, authority for federal monitoring, provided by ERISA's re-
quirement that plan administrators file annual reports with the Secretary
of Labor,10 9 fail to match the disclosure requirements of the Securities
Acts. The Secretary can enforce ERISA funding and fiduciary responsi-
bility requirements on ESOP plan administrators through civil or admin-
99. Holloway, 879 F.2d at 786; see also Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 557-59; Daniel, 439 U.S.
at 569-70.
100. Holloway, 879 F.2d at 786.
101. Marine Bank, 455 U.S. at 558-59.
102. Holloway, 879 F.2d at 786.
103. Id.
104. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(7) (1988) (defining ERISA participant); Uselton, 940 F.2d at 581
n.16.
105. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 581 n.17 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b) (1988)).
106. Id. at 581; 29 U.S.C. § 1022(b) (1988) (general disclosure of the source of financ-
ing and the identity of the organization providing benefits is required).
107. 29 U.S.C. § 1024(b)(2),(4) (1988) (plan administrator must provide the annual
report to a plan participant upon request).
108. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 582.
109. See 29 U.S.C. § 1023 (1988).
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istrative actions,110 though this authority is inadequate for taking
"corrective actions" on behalf of plan participants for the purpose of
protecting participants' investments. I1
Third, federal securities laws can not be carried out effectively un-
less the alternate federal regulation provides a meaningful remedy to
plan participants who claim they were fraudulently induced into joining
the plan. 112 The Securities Acts authorize private damage actions by
investors to recover from persons making false statements of material
fact or who act fraudulently in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security. 13 Additionally, the Securities Acts permit fraudulently-in-
duced investors to rescind the fraudulent transaction and recover the
amount of their investment.1 14 Here, ERISA provided civil enforce-
ment for recovery of benefits under a plan," 15 but provided no specific
remedy for fraud or misrepresentation in connection with an individ-
ual's decision to join an ERISA-regulated plan. 16 A breach of fiduciary
duty claim is also invalid until the individual becomes a participant
under an ERISA plan." 7 Thus, the Uselton court concluded that ERISA
addresses many of the requirements of the Securities Acts, but protects
only post-investment rights under an approved ESOP plan. Pre-partici-
pation fraud and misrepresentation are actionable only under the Secur-
ities Acts.' 18
The court commented on, without deciding, the question of
whether an action could be maintained against a non-fiduciary as a
"party in interest" under ERISA.119 Available authority is split on the
issue of non-fiduciary liability, 120 but the court suggested that a relation-
ship such as between Pepsico and CL could qualify as a statutory viola-
tion potentially subject to redress by a court.
121
110. See id. § 1132(a)(2),(5) (1988).
111. Holloway, 879 F.2d at 788.
112. Id. at 786.
113. The 1934 Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988); SEC Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5 (1990).
114. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 582; see, e.g., Hatrock v. Edward D.Jones & Co., 750 F.2d 767,
773 n.4 (9th Cir. 1984).
115. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1) (1988).
116. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 582. Additional ERISA civil enforcement provisions include
the right to enforce ERISA's plan disclosure, funding, and administrative requirements,
and the right to obtain "appropriate relief" for breach of fiduciary duty by an ERISA plan
administrator or other person who exercises discretionary control or authority over the
plan or its assets. Id. at 582-83; see 29 U.S.C. §§ 1132(a)(2)-(4), 1109 (1988).
117. Useton, 940 F.2d at 583.
118. Id. at 583 n.19. The court also noted the narrow distinctions drawn between ER-
ISA actions allowing recision and restitution of funds from a plan amendment, as opposed
to the recision of plan participation and restitution of employee contributions as in the
Uselton case. Id. at 583 n.20.
119. Id. at 584 n.21.
120. Compare Nieto v. Ecker, 845 F.2d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1988) (non-fiduciaries are not
liable under ERISA) with Brock v. Hendershott, 840 F.2d 339, 342 (6th Cir. 1988) and
Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1220 (2d Cir. 1987) (non-fiduci-
aries are liable under ERISA).




The Tenth Circuit's two-part holding is consistent with both the
SEC's purpose of investor protection and Congress' purposes in creat-
ing ERISA. First, voluntary employee participation in a contributory
ESOP plan is considered an investment contract and therefore a security
that is subject to the Securities Acts. Second, although it extensively reg-
ulates ESOP and duplicates post-investment protection offered by the
Securities Acts, ERISA does not bar investors from invoking the Securi-
ties Acts to protect their pre-investment interests.
IV. AN INSIDER'S, DTrrk To DIsCLOSE MATERIAL FRACTS:
GARCIA V. CORDOVA
A. Introduction
Garcia v. Cordova 122 involved a securities fraud claim Eind the stan-
dards applicable in determining the materiality of insider informa-
tion.1 23 Specifically, the Tenth Circuit addressed the question of
whether the purchase of stock by a corporate insider triggers a duty
under Rule lOb-5(b) 124 to disclose corporate asset appraisal informa-
tion known in the industry as "soft information."'
2 5
B. Background
In 1983, the defendant Gil Cordova became president of Westland
Development Company.' 2 6 Between November 1983 and June 1986,
Cordova purchased a total of 2513 shares of Westland stock from plain-
tiffs. 12 7 Plaintiffs alleged that Mr. Cordova had committed fraud by fail-
ing to disclose the value of certain assets and the results of various
appraisals that had been performed on portions of Westland's holdings.
The purchase price, ranging from $4.62 per share to $8.65 per share,
was lower than what the plaintiffs believed' the shares were really
worth.128 Defendant does not dispute that he knew of the asset appraisal
information.'
29
122. 930 F.2d 826 (10th Cir. 1991).
123. Id. at 827.
124. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988). Rule lOb-5 was promulgated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission pursuant to its authority under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. 15 U.S.C.
§ 7.8j (1988).
125. Garcia, 930 F.2d at 827. Asset appraisals have traditionally been considered "soft
information." Soft information is information about a particular issuer or its securities
that inherently involves some subjective analysis or extrapolation, such as projections, esti-
mates, opinions, motives, or intentions. Hard information is typically historical or other
factual information that is objectively verifiable. Id. at 830.
126. Westland is a community land grant corporation whose primary capital asset is
approximately forty-nine thousand acres of raw land located mostly within the ancient
boundaries of the Atrisco land grant west of Albuquerque, New Mexico. Id. at 827.
127. The plaintiffs, Candido Garcia, Adela Baros, and the Special Administrator of the
Estate of Fedelina Munoz, initially brought separate actions against the defendant. The
complaints were subsequently consolidated into one action in the District Court for the
District of New Mexico. Id. at 826.
128. Id. at 828.
129. The information known to Mr. Cordova included: 1) a land appraisal of the bulk
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In the United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, a
jury entered verdicts against defendant for compensatory and punitive
damages for securities fraud and violation of the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act' 30 violations, and in favor of the defend-
ant on the common-law fraud claims. The district court granted the de-
fendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict in part,
vacating judgment for punitive damages and RICO violations, but de-
nied the motion with regard to securities fraud claim.' 3 1 The Tenth Cir-
cuit concluded that the asset appraisal information was immaterial as a
matter of law due to its speculative and unreliable nature, thereby re-
moving any duty of disclosure; and that the question of securities
fraud'8 2 should not have been presented to thejury.'3 3 The case was
ultimately remanded for reconsideration.'
3 4
C. Analysis
The court concluded that the determination of materiality in this
case was a mixed question of law and fact. Because the issue was more
legal than factual, the court's review was de novo.135 There are two ra-
tionales supporting the court's conclusion. First, Rule lOb-5 provides
that it is unlawful for any person to make any untrue statement or omit a
true statement of material fact in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security. '3 6 Second, insiders involved in securities transactions have
a further affirmative duty to "disclose material facts which are known to
them by virtue of their position but which are not known to persons with
whom they deal, and which, if known, would affect their investment
judgment." 137 Further, if the disclosure cannot be made, the insider is
obligated to abstain from trading.'3 8
In Garcia, defendant was an officer and director of Westland with
access to the asset information in question. The court held defendant to
be an "insider" because of his access to the information, finding he had
a duty to disclose any material information. 139 The question of whether
defendant had a duty to disclose was intertwined with the question of
whether the appraisals were material fact, and was, therefore, more a
of Westland's real estate holdings done for Westland in 1976 for the purpose of determin-
ing how much title insurance to purchase; 2) forty-five separate appraisals of smaller par-
cels of Westland property done between 1971 and mid-1986; 3) Westland's record of
comparable land sales; and 4) an opinion from Morgan Stanley, prepared for Westland's
Board of Directors, valuing the corporation's stock. Id. at 830.
130. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1988).
131. Garcia, 930 F.2d at 826.
132. The court rejected the plaintiffs' claim under any of the subparagraphs (a), (b),
and/or (c) of Rule lOb-5. Id. at 827.
133. Id.





139. Id. at 829.
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question of law than of fact.' 40
The standard for materiality in securities issues is found in TSC In-
dustries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc..1 4 1 In TSC Industries, the Court held that
"[a]n omitted fact is material if there is a substantial likelihood that a
reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote."' 14 2 Although, initially, this appears to be a question of fact, it is to
be resolved as a matter of law where the information is "so obviously
important or unimportant to an investor, that reasonable minds cannot
differ on the question of materiality."' 143 In its analysis, the Tenth Cir-
cuit noted that all parties agreed the information at issue was the type
referred to in the securities industry as "soft information." While ac-
knowledging that courts have taken various approaches to determine the
necessity of disclosing soft information, 14 4 the Garcia court followed the
Fifth Circuit.' 4 5 The dispositive factors identified by the Fifth Circuit
were: the nature of the undisclosed predictive information and the im-
portance, reliability and investor impact of this information, as deter-
mined from the facts of each case.146
In Garcia, the soft information at issue was believed too speculative
and unreliable to require disclosure under Rule lOb-5 as a "material
fact." The court reasoned that the date of an appraisal is a crucial factor
in determining its reliability. 14 7 Here, the 1976 appraisal was done
solely for purposes of determining how much title insurance Westland
should buy and was six years out-of-date at the time of defendant's first
purchase from plaintiffs. Further, the $20 million title insurance policy
was disclosed to all shareholders in a footnote to the financial state-
ments beginning with the first annual report.' 48 Although the court did
not indicate an exact age at which information will be deemed too old,
the court held that six-year-old appraisal information was outdated and
too unreliable to be material.
Second, the forty-five smaller appraisals done for Westland between
140. Id.
141. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976).
142. Id. The materiality standard is not set too low because a minimal standard would
result in avalanches of information that would bury stockholders in trivia, a result the
Court has condemned as "hardly conducive to informed decision making." Id. at 448-49.
The TSC Industries standard was initially applied to materiality under Rule 14a-3 regarding
a proxy statement, although the standard has also been held to apply in the section 10(b)
and the Rule lOb-5 context. Garcia, 930 F.2d at 829 n. 1; see also Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485
U.S. 224, 232 (1988).
143. TSC Indus., 426 U.S. at 450.
144. See Walker v. Action Indus., 802 F.2d 703, 707-09 (4th Cir. 1986) (financial pro-
jections require only voluntary disclosure), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065 (1987); see also Janet
E. Kerr, A Walk Through the Circuits: The Duty to Disclose Soft Information, 46 MD. L. REv. 1071
(1987) (Third Circuit requires disclosure on a case by case basis; Sixth and Ninth Circuits
require disclosure where information is substantially certain).
145. Garcia, 930 F.2d at 830 (citing Isquith v. Middle S. Util. Inc., 847 F.2d 196, 206
(5th Cir.) (the Tenth Circuit did not reveal its analysis of the alternative approaches men-
tioned), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 926 (1988)).
146. Garcia, 930 F.2d at 830.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 830 n.2.
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1971 and mid-1986 addressed no more than two and one-half percent of
Westland's total holdings. 14 9 Any conclusion drawn from the data
would not be significant enough to be considered material. In addition
to the age and quantity of the appraisals, the limited usefulness of the
information to the Westland directors rendered the information imma-
terial for purposes of disclosure under Rule lOb-5(b).
Third, the record of comparable land sales was also held immaterial
due to its age.1 50 Because too few sales had transpired in the period
before the alleged fraudulent purchases, the information was not con-
sidered material.
Fourth, the stock valuation done by Morgan Stanley was presented
in August 1987, well after defendant's last purchase from any plaintiff.
Further, the information presented was speculative and without factual
basis, and was not relied on by Westland directors.' 5 1 The Morgan
Stanley information was held immaterial and not subject to disclosure




Analysis of the duty to disclose soft information varies among the
circuit courts. Most courts hold the age of appraisal information to be a
crucial factor in determining its materiality. 153 In the Tenth Circuit, the
determinative factors include: the age of the information; the quantity
of information; the determination of whether the information was relied
upon by a company in making business decisions; and whether the infor-
mation is available to stockholders in any form. In Garcia, six year old
appraisal information was too old, aggregate appraisals addressing only
two and one-half percent of total holdings were not significant enough,
and the information was disclosed to all shareholders in each of the an-
nual financial statements. The court appeared to rely less on the cur-
rentness of information than on the availability of the information to the
selling shareholders.
149. Id. at 831.
150. Id.
151. In an informal presentation to Westland directors, the Westland stock was valued
at between $40.00 and $100.00 per share. No basis for these figures was given and no
explanation for the wide range was offered. Id. at 83 1.
152. In a final discussion, the court addressed the possibility of district court error with
respect to jury instructions that included the full text of Rule 10(b)-5. The court agreed
that subparagraph 5(b) was applicable to this case and concluded paragraphs 5(a) and/or
(c), while applicable, would not help the plaintiff. Because there was no evidence to sup-
port a reasonable inference that Mr. Cordova employed a "device, scheme or artifice" to
defraud, or that he "engaged in any act, practice or course of business... operating as a
fraud," the district court did not commit error by presenting subparagraphs 5(a) and (c)
with the proper subparagraph 5(b) to the jury. Id. at 831-32.
153. Id. at 830 (citing Interpretative Release Relating to Proxy Rules, Fed. Sec. L. Rep.




Based on the cases analyzed during this survey period, the Tenth
Circuit will probably not be accused of showing favoritism to investor,
seller, or issuer. In First Golden and Garcia, the corporate insider
purchasing securities received the strictest judicial review. In First
Golden, the court found strict liability for the purchase and subsequent
sale of securities within six months. Further, the court followed well-
established precedent in denying the insider's request for relief from
liability through indemnification from a third party. In Garcia, however,
the court permitted the corporate insider's purchase of stock from
shareholders, because the appraisal, or "soft information," allegedly
withheld from shareholders was published in the annual report. More
importantly, the court found the information was outdated and unrelia-
ble, and therefore did not require disclosure to the purchasers.
The investors in Uselton and Anixter also split a victory and loss in the
Tenth Circuit. The Uselton court applied the well-accepted Howey test to
determine that an ESOP was an investment contract and therefore a se-
curity subject to federal security regulation. The court found that
although the ERISA regulation of ESOPs protects participants in the
plan, the regulation does not prevent the Securities Acts from protect-
ing the investor prior to the investment decision. In Anixter however, a
strict interpretation of the section 13 one-year three-year statute of limi-
tations prevented an otherwise valid claim regardless of the complexity
and passive nature of the fraud. The limitations exist in part, for the
protection of corporate issuers who would otherwise forever be in fear
of litigation, and should be evenly applied to all situations, even where it
protects the party committing fraud. After the Anixter decision, each in-
vestor is responsible for observing the "storm signals" that might indi-
cate fraud is afoot.
With each reversal of the lower court, the Tenth Circuit strictly in-
terpreted the federal statutes, gave judicial deference to federal court
precedent, and evenhandedly applied the Securities Acts to all parties. It
appears from these cases that future litigants should appeal to the Tenth
Circuit only after careful analysis of the lower court decisions, and after
paying rigorous attention to statutory interpretation and federal prece-






During 1991,1 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals demonstrated
that the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 ("the Code") is in fact a "mirror
of life,"'2 as the court decided cases involving a wide array of personal
and business experiences and transactions, ranging from oil drilling in
Wyoming to drug running in Belize, and from timeshare units in Park
City, Utah, to retail malls in Concordia, Kansas. Many of these were
cases of first impression in the circuit, and one case3 addressed an issue
of first impression in the federal courts. The Tenth Circuit's approach
to resolving these controversies is instructive to anyone with an interest
in federal tax matters.
Some of the cases decided by the Tenth Circuit in 1991 resolved tax
liabilities dating back to the late 1970's and very early 1980's, and in-
volved the application of "old law." Aside from the obvious commen-
tary these cases provide as to the speed with which the Internal Revenue
Service ("the IRS") and our judicial system process tax controversies,
the cases are a reminder that the Code has undergone a terrifying de-
gree of revision in the interim.4 The flood of tax legislation that charac-
terized the 1980's prompted one commentator to describe the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 as "the latest in a series of attacks of tax legislative
diarrhea that seem to strike the American people, like swine flu or Tai-
wan Flu, about every sixteen to eighteen months." 5 Where appropriate,
* B.S.B.A., Accounting, University of Denver, 1977; Masters in Taxation, Univer-
sity of Denver, 1978; J.D., Stanford University, 1981.
1. This Note examines cases decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals during
1991 in the area of federal income, estate and gift taxation.
2. SeeJAMEsJ. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 1 (6th
ed. 1987) ("There is no such thing as pure tax law. Instead, tax principles relate to events
and transactions that would go on even if there were no federal income tax .....
3. Schroeder v. United States, 924 F.2d 1547 (10th Cir. 1991).
4. In the 1980's, the Code has been amended by, inter alia, the Economic Recovery
Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981); the Tax Equity and Fiscal Re-
sponsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-248, 96 Stat. 324 (1982); the Subchapter S Revi-
sion Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669 (1982); the Tax Reform Act of 1984
(Division A of the Deficit Reduction Act of 1984), Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494 (1984);
the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-397, 98 Stat. 1426 (1984); the Tax
Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986); the Revenue Act of 1987
(Title X of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987), Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101
Stat. 1330 (1987); the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
647, 102 Stat. 3342 (1988); the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989 (Title VII of the Om-
nibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989); Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103 Stat. 2106 (1989); and
the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1990 (Title XI of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act of 1990), Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 (1990). The year 1991 passed without
the enactment of any major federal tax legislation.
5. Charles 0. Galvin, Tax Refom: What? Again? A Rose by any Other Nam..... in 39
MAJOR TAX PLANNING 1200, at 12-1 (1987).
1037
DENVER UNIVERSITY LI W REVIEW
this Note will point out where the relevant provisions of the Code may
have been amended, and how the issue might be treated today.
I. APPLICATION OF THE STEP TRANSACTION DOCTRINE TO RECAST
PURPORTED REORGANIZATION INTO PARENT-SUBSIDIARY
LIQUIDATION: ASSOCIATED WHOLESALE GROCERS,
INC V. UNITED STATES 6
A. Background
The gross income of a taxpayer includes all gains and losses derived
from dealings in property. 7 Gain from the sale or other disposition of
property is computed as the excess of the amount realized therefrom
over the adjusted basis of the property, and loss is calculated as the ex-
cess of the adjusted basis over the amount realized. 8 As a general rule,
the entire amount of gain or loss realized upon the sale or exchange of
property must be recognized unless otherwise specifically provided in
the Code.9
Corporate liquidations are not immune from this general rule, and
the amount received' ° by a shareholder as a liquidating distribution
from a corporation is treated as made in full payment in exchange for
the shareholder's stock." However, under an important exception to
this rule, no gain or loss is recognized on the receipt by a parent corpo-
ration of property distributed in complete liquidation of a subsidiary
corporation,' 2 provided that certain requirements' s are satisfied.'
4
Upon receipt of the property distributed by the subsidiary, the parent
will take a "carryover" basis in such property, that is, a basis which is the
same as it was in the hands of the subsidiary. 15
6. 927 F.2d 1517 (10th Cir. 1991).
7. I.R.C. § 61(a)(3) (1988).
8. Id. § 1001(a).
9. Id § 1001(c).
10. The amount received is generally measured by the amount of money and the fair
market value of other property received in the liquidation. Idt § 1001(b).
11. Id. § 331.
12. Id. § 332(a).
13. The requirements of I.R.C. § 332(b) include: (1) the corporation receiving the
property was, on the date of the adoption of the plan of liquidation, and has continued to
be at all times until the receipt of the property, the owner of stock in such other corpora-
tion meeting the requirements of I.R.C. § 1504(a)(2) (that is, the ownership consists of at
least 80% of the total voting power of the stock of the other corporation, and has a value
equal to at least 80% of the total value of the stock of such other corporation); and either
(2) the distribution is by such other corporation in complete cancellation or redemption
of all its stock, and the transfer of all the property occurs within the taxable year, or (3) the
distribution is one of a series of distributions by the other corporation in complete cancel-
lation or redemption of all its stock in accordance with a plan of liquidation under which
the transfer of all the property is to be completed within three years from the close of the
taxable year during which is made the first of the series of distributions under the plan.
14. The transactions at issue in Associated Wholesale Grocers occurred in 1980, under a
slightly different version of I.R.C. § 332(b). The stated requirements were revised by the
Tax Reform Act of 1986, but only to cross-reference the more specific rules of I.R.C.
§ 1504(a)(2) in the first of the three requirements noted above.
15. I.R.C. § 334(b) (1988). The carry-over basis rule applies only to the parent meet-
ing the 80% stock ownership test described supra note 13. Although Associated Wholesale
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Absent the provisions of I.R.C. § 332, gain or loss would be recog-
nized by a parent corporation upon the liquidation of its subsidiary 16 as
the difference between the fair market value of the assets received and
the parent's basis in its stock of the subsidiary.1 7 The fact that I.R.C.
§ 332 acts to disallow losses as well as to shield gains makes it a double-
edged sword that can lead to harsh results. For example, assume parent
PQR purchased all the outstanding stock of subsidiary STU five years
ago for $500,000. STU's only asset was a parcel of vacant land worth
$500,000, in which STU had a basis of $250,000. If the land, and there-
fore STU's stock, is today worth only $400,000, I.R.C. § 332 would deny
recognition of PQR's $100,000 economic loss upon a complete liquida-
tion of the subsidiary. Moreover, PQR would take a carryover basis of
$250,000 in the land, and would recognize a gain of $250,000 if it then
sold the land for its $400,000 fair market value, despite the fact that,
overall, PQR has suffered a $100,000 economic loss over the course of
the transaction.
On the other hand, if PQR simply sold its STU stock for $400,000,
the $100,000 loss-measured by the difference between the sale pro-
ceeds and PQR's $500,000 basis in the STU stock-could be properly
Grocers related to a 1980 transaction, and thus was determined under provisions of I.R.C.
§ 334(b) in effect prior to the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, the Tax
Reform Act of 1986 and the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988; the
amendments made to I.R.C. § 334(b) by those tax bills would not today affect Super Mar-
ket Developers's calculation of its basis in the stock received from its subsidiary. This is
particularly true because Associated Wholesale Grocers acquired the Weston Investment
stock by tender offer in 1976, some four years prior to the transaction at issue. If the
acquisition had occurred within two years of the adoption of a plan of liquidation, the
taxpayers could have taken advantage of the prior version of I.R.C. § 332(b)(2), which
codified the principle of Kimball-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 74
(1950), aff'd per curiam, 187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir. 1951). That case provided that when a
parent acquires a subsidiary and within two years adopts a plan of complete liquidation of
the subsidiary, the parent's basis in the subsidiary's assets will be determined by reference
to the parent's basis in the stock of the subsidiary, and will not be carried over from the
subsidiary. The prior provisions of I.R.C. § 332(b)(2) were repealed by the Tax Equity
and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, and were replaced by the elective provisions of
I.R.C. § 338. See Kansas Sand & Concrete, Inc. v. Commissioner, 462 F.2d 805 (10th Cir.
1972) (Where merger of subsidiary into parent fell under the literal terms of both the tax-
free reorganization provisions of I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A) and the liquidation provisions that
included prior I.R.C. § 334(b)(2), the latter took precedence and parent was required to
use its basis in the subsidiary stock to determine its basis in assets received from the sub-
sidiary, rather than use a carryover basis from the subsidiary.).
16. A related issue concerns the recognition of gain or loss by the subsidiary upon the
distribution of its assets in complete liquidation. The transaction which was the subject of
Associated Wholesale Grocers occurred prior to the repeal of prior I.R.C. § 337, which pro-
vided that no gain or loss was recognized by liquidating corporations that adopted so-
called "12-month plans of liquidation." Today, I.R.C. § 336(a) requires a corporation to
recognize gain or loss on the distribution of its property in complete liquidation, as if the
property were sold to the distributee at its fair market value. However, Weston Invest-
ments would today be protected by the current version of I.R.C. § 337(a), which provides
that no gain or loss is recognized by the liquidating corporation on the distribution with
respect to property distributed to an 80%o shareholder in a complete liquidation to which
I.R.C. § 332 applies. Gain (but not loss) will be recognized on property distributed to
minority shareholders. I.R.C. § 336(d)(3) (1988).
17. The loss disallowance rules of I.R.C. § 267 do not apply to corporate liquidations
either in 1980 or today. Id § 267(a)(1).
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claimed. 18 For this reason, parent-subsidiary taxpayers occasionally find
themselves in the position of desiring to avoid the operation of I.R.C.
§ 332 when a complete liquidation of the subsidiary would otherwise
yield a loss. 19 This might occur, for example, if STU owned many par-
cels of land, and the goals of PQR were to terminate the corporate exist-
ence of STU, dispose of some of the STU assets and cause the
remainder of the STU assets to be owned outright by PQR. Such was
the dilemma of the taxpayers in Associated Wholesale Grocers.
B. Facts
In 1980, Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. ("Associated Whole-
sale Grocers") owned all the capital stock of Super Market Developers,
Inc. ("Super Market Developers"), which in turn owned approximately
99.97% of the total outstanding shares of Weston Investment Co.
("Weston Investment"). Weston Investment was a publicly-traded hold-
ing company that owned a number of corporate supermarkets. During
1980, Associated Wholesale Grocers decided to discontinue allowing
Super Market Developers to own and operate grocery stores through
subsidiaries such as Weston Investment.
Super Market Developers could have caused Weston Investment to
be liquidated, thus enabling all Weston Investment's grocery stores to
be owned outright by Super Market Developers. Unfortunately, Super
Market Developers had paid $11,727,716 for the Weston Investment
stock, whereas Weston Investment's basis in its assets was apparently
only $9,374,458 and the apparent fair market value of the Weston In-
vestment assets was approximately $9,349,703.20 If Super Market De-
velopers was to wind up owning outright the grocery stores and other
assets owned by Weston Investment, a complete liquidation of Weston
Investment would have fallen within the rules of I.R.C. §§ 332 and 334,
so that no loss would be recognized by Super Market Developers, and it
would take a carry-over basis of $9,374,458 in Weston Investment's as-
sets. The difference between the fair market value of Weston Invest-
ment's assets and the $11,727,716 that Super Market Developers had
paid for the Weston Investment stock, otherwise recognizable as a loss
in the absence of I.R.C. § 332, could not be claimed as such.
18. Ia § 1001.
19. The loss arises by virtue of I.R.C. §§ 331(a), 1001(a) and 1001(c).
20. The opinions of both the district court and the Tenth Circuit are somewhat con-
fusing on this issue. The Tenth Circuit identified the $9,374,458 as "the carryover basis
representing the market value of Weston's assets," Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v.
United States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1518 n.1 (10th Cir. 1991), but this statement is a non sequitur.
In fact, the figure apparently represented Weston Investment's basis in its underlying as-
sets. The district court states that Super Market Developers's basis in its Weston Invest-
ment stock was $11,727,716, and that the capital loss reported by the taxpayers was
$2,353,258, Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 720 F. Supp. 887, 888
(D. Kan. 1989), a result that can only be obtained by comparison to the $9,374,458 figure.
The latter figure is not mentioned at all in the district court's opinion, however, and it is




It so happened that Weston Investment itself owned various subsid-
iaries, one of which was Weston Market, Inc. ("Weston Market"). The
grocery store owned by Weston Market was managed by Thomas Elder,
who expressed an interest in buying Weston Market. Associated Whole-
sale Grocers, Super Market Developers and Weston Investment seized
upon Elder's interest in acquiring Weston Market as an opportunity to
recruit him in a transaction that would provide him with ownership of
Weston Market, transfer ownership of all the grocery stores directly to
Super Market Developers, and allow Associated Wholesale Grocers to
claim a capital loss in excess of $2 million on its consolidated federal
income tax return.
In December of 1980, a two-step transaction was consummated be-
tween Weston Investment, Super Market Developers and a newly-
formed corporation wholly owned by Elder called Elder Food Mart, Inc.
("Elder, Inc."). In the first step, Weston Investment was merged into
Elder, Inc., with Elder, Inc. as the surviving corporation. Rather than
exchanging Elder, Inc. stock in the merger, however, Elder, Inc. ex-
changed $300,000 in cash and a non-interest bearing demand promis-
sory note in the amount of $9,049,703 for the Weston Investment
stock.2 1 This consideration was distributed among the Weston Invest-
ment shareholders, with part of the cash earmarked to cash out Weston
Investment's minority shareholders.
In the second step, under a so-called "Agreement and Plan of Reor-
ganization" which took effect "immediately following the time of effec-
tiveness of the merger,"' 22 Super Market Developers bought back all the
assets acquired by Elder, Inc. under the merger agreement except for the
stock of Weston Market. In exchange for those assets, Super Market
Developers paid an amount equal to the principal amount of the promis-
sory note given by Elder, Inc. in the merger and now held by Super
Market Developers, plus an amount equal to the cash received by the
cashed-out minority shareholders.23 The net effect was that the
$9,049,703 represented by the promissory note simply became a
"wash," and Elder, Inc. had essentially paid $300,000, less the amounts
used to cash out Weston Investment's minority shareholders, to acquire
all the stock of Weston Market. For its part, Super Market Developers
was now the outright owner of all the grocery stores formerly owned by
Weston Investment, which had been merged out of existence, and had
essentially provided no consideration other than the cash used to cash
out Weston Investment's minority shareholders. Consistent with the
two-part nature of the transaction, Associated Wholesale Grocers and
Super Market Developers treated the merger aspect of the transaction as
21. Although technically a merger under state law, the transaction was apparently re-
ported as a taxable event by Associated Wholesale Grocers, presumably because the
merger did not satisfy (and most likely was specifically structured not to satisfy) thejudi-
cially-created "continuity of interest" test required to be met for the merger to qualify as a
tax-free reorganization under I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(A).
22. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 927 F.2d at 1518-19.
23. lId at 1519.
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giving rise to a reportable loss of $2,353,258,24 and claimed that loss as
a long-term capital loss in their consolidated federal income tax return
for 1980.25
The merger-and-repurchase nature of the transaction as structured
was clearly aimed at circumventing I.R.C. § 332 and creating a tax loss
for Associated Wholesale Grocers and Super Market Developers on
their consolidated return. Predictably relying upon the well-known
"step transaction doctrine," the IRS denied Associated Wholesale Gro-
cers's capital loss. Associated Wholesale Grocers sued in district court
after its administrative claim for refund was denied. The district court
granted summary judgment for the government, 2 6 and the Tenth Cir-
cuit affirmed.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
Associated Wholesale Grocers presented the Tenth Circuit2 7 with an op-
portunity to consider the application of the step transaction doctrine to
corporate restructurings designed to avoid unwanted results under the
Code. Under the judicially-created step transaction doctrine, "a series
of formally separate steps may be amalgamated and treated as a single
transaction if they are in substance integrated, interdependent, and fo-
cused on a particular end result." 2 8 By thus "linking together all inter-
dependent steps with legal or business significance, rather than taking
them in isolation," federal tax liability may based "on a realistic view of
the entire transaction."
'2 9
From the time of Gregory v. Helvering,30 courts have consistently
strived to elevate substance over form in an attempt to weed out those
transactions which are a "mere device which put on the form of a [de-
sired corporate arrangement] as a disguise for concealing its real charac-
ter."3 1 The issue in Associated Wholesale Grocers, then, was whether the
form of the transaction was to prevail for federal income tax purposes, or
24. Again, the figures noted by the district court and the Tenth Circuit are difficult to
verify. See supra note 20.
25. The same end result could have been achieved by structuring the transaction as a
liquidation of Weston Investment, followed by a sale by Super Market Developers to Elder
of the stock of Weston Market now owned directly by Super Market Developers, for some-
thing less than $300,000. However, the liquidation transaction would not have given rise
to gain or loss under I.R.C. § 332, and Super Market Developers would have taken a carry-
over basis from Weston Investment in the Weston Investment assets. Super Market Devel-
opers would have thus owned those assets with both a basis and a fair market value of
approximately $9.3 million. The potential capital loss of over $2 million would have been
lost forever.
26. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 720 F. Supp. 887 (D. Kan.
1989).
27. The three-judge panel consisted of Judge Seymour, Judge Moore and Judge
Brorby.
28. 1 BORIS I. BrrrKER, FEDERAL TAXATioN OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GiFrs 4.3.5, at
4-48 (1981).
29. Id. at 4-52.
30. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
31. Id. at 469.
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whether the substance of the transaction3 2 was to be recognized and given
effect. While recognizing that I.R.C. § 332 is not optional or elective,
and that a number of planning possibilities are evident which may allow
a corporation to avoid the application of that section,3 3 the Tenth Cir-
cuit noted that such planning possibilities are not immunized from step
transaction analysis.
8 4
After a brief review of the major Supreme Court decisions dealing
with the step transaction doctrine,3 5 the Tenth Circuit noted that courts
and commentators have identified three tests used in evaluating the step
transaction doctrine: the "end result" test, the "interdependence" test,
and the "binding commitment" test.3 6 Noting that the first two tests are
the most frequently applied,3 7 the court proceeded to summarize each.
Under the "end result" test, "purportedly separate transactions will
be amalgamated into a single transaction when it appears that they were
really component parts of a single transaction intended from the outset
to be taken for the purpose of reaching the ultimate result." s3 8 The "end
result" test thus resembles the substance over form principle, under
which "the end result of the series of interrelated steps controls the tax
consequences of the whole."'3 9 The "interdependence" test, on the
other hand, "focuses on the relationship between the steps, rather than
on the 'end result.' ",40 This test examines "whether on a reasonable
interpretation of objective facts the steps were so interdependent that
the legal relationships created by one transation would have been fruit-
32. The IRS claimed that the transaction constituted a parent-subsidiary liquidation
of Weston Investment by Super Market Developers, followed by a sale of the Weston Mar-
ket stock by Super Market Developers to Elder, Inc., with Super Market Developers contin-
uing to own all the other assets formerly held by Weston Investment.
33. See, e.g., 11 JACOB MERTENS, JR., THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 42.55,
at 142 (1990). For example, the parent can dispose of sufficient stock to fail the 80%
ownership test. Alternatively, the subsidiary might intentionally retain assets beyond the
periods specified in I.R.C. §§ 332(b)(2) and (3). Cf Rev. Rul. 77-150, 1977-1 C.B. 88.
34. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc. v. United States, 927 F.2d 1517, 1525 (10th
Cir. 1991). The taxpayer in Associated Whole4ale Grocers had taken the position that the step
transaction doctrine simply does not apply to transactions under I.R.C. § 332. However,
the Tenth Circuit viewed the cases cited by the taxpayer as inapposite for this proposition.
35. Commissioner v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726, 738 (1989) (describing the step transaction
doctrine to mean "interrelated yet formally distinct steps in an integrated transaction may
not be considered independently of the overall transaction"); Minnesota Tea Co. v.
Helvering, 302 U.S. 609, 613 (1938) ("A given result at the end of a straight path is not
made a different result because reached by a devious path."); Gregory v. Helvering, 293
U.S. 465 (1935).
36. The "binding commitment" test was announced by the Supreme Court in Com-
missioner v. Gordon, 391 U.S. 83 (1968), but subsequent decisions have tended to limit
Gordon to its facts. Associated Wholesale Grocers, 927 F.2d at 1522 n.6.
37. The Tenth Circuit did not necessarily state that the "end result" and the "interde-
pendence" tests will be the only two tests that will be applied in the future, and it is possi-
ble that the Tenth Circuit might apply other formulations in appropriate circumstances.
38. Associated Wholesale Grocers, 927 F.2d at 1523 (quoting DAVID R. HERWrrz, BusINESS
PLANNING 804 (1966)).
39. Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe R.R. Co. v. United States, 443 F.2d 147, 151 (10th
Cir. 1971)). The individual tax significance of each step in the transaction is irrelevant if
the steps, when viewed as a whole, amount to a single taxable transaction. Crenshaw v.
United States, 450 F.2d 472, 475 (5th Cir. 1971).
40. Associated Wholesale Grocers, 927 F.2d at 1523.
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less without completion of the series." 4 1 The Tenth Circuit then went
on to apply the "end result" and "interdependence" tests to the facts at
hand. If the Associated Wholesale Grocers transaction could be shown to fall
within the scope of either of the two tests, I.R.C. § 332 would apply and
the capital loss claimed by the taxpayers would be disallowed.
The Tenth Circuit first concluded that the "end result" test had no
application to I.R.C. § 332. On the authority of Granite Trust Co. v. United
States,4 2 the court concluded that I.R.C. § 332 is simply not an "end re-
suit" provision, but "'rather one which prescribes specific conditions
for the nonrecognition of realized gains or losses, conditions which, if
not strictly met, make the section inapplicable.' -43
The Tenth Circuit then turned its attention to the "interdepen-
dence" test. In evaluating this test, the court considered whether "the
steps were so interdependent that the legal relationships created by one
transaction would have been fruitless without a completion of the se-
ries." 44 Following a review of the documents utilized in the two-step
transaction,4 5 the court had little trouble concluding that the various
41. Randolph E. Paul & Philip Zimet, Step Transactions, in SELECTED STUDIES IN FED-
ERAL TAxATION 200, 254 (2d Series 1938).
42. 238 F.2d 670 (Ist Cir. 1956).
43. Associated Wholesale Grocers, 927 F.2d at 1524 (quoting Granite Trust Co., 238 F.2d at
675). Given that I.R.C. § 332 provides a road map by which taxpayers can structure sub-
sidiary liquidations to avoid gain or loss, finding the "end result" test to be inapplicable
seems entirely correct. Otherwise, as the Granite Trust court had concluded, "taxpayers
can, by taking appropriate steps, render [I.R.C. § 332] applicable or inapplicable as they
choose, rather than be at the mercy of the Commissioner on an 'end-result' theory." Gran-
ite Trust Co., 238 F.2d at 676. For example, if the "end result" test applied, a taxpayer
attempting a parent-subsidiary liquidation who failed to follow the requirements of I.R.C.
§ 332 could nevertheless argue that the transaction should be treated as if it had satisfied
these requirements because the "end result" of the liquidation otherwise fell within the
scope of that section. Such an "end result" argument becomes, in effect, an "end run"
argument, rendering the technical requirements of I.R.C. § 332 a nullity.
44. Paul & Zimet, supra note 41.
45. The termination clause in the merger agreement (the first step in the arrange-
ment) expressly stated that the merger agreement terminated if the reorganization agree-
ment (the second step) terminated prior to the merger's closing date. Thus, the two steps
were contingent upon one another. The "merger agreement would bear no fruit unless
the two-step series could be completed." Associated Wholesale Grocers, 927 F.2d at 1528.
Moreover, the interconnection between the two transactions was sometimes explicitly ac-
knowledged by the documents. For example, the reorganization agreement specifically
provided that Super Market Developers was to purchase from Elder, Inc. the following:
[A]II of the assets of every kind and description acquired by [Elder, Inc.] pursuant
to the Agreement of Merger, except for the shares of common stock of Weston.
As part of the consideration [Super Market Developers] agrees to assume and
discharge all of the obligations and liabilities of [Elder, Inc.] which were formerly
the obligations and liabilities of [Weston Investment] and which became the obli-
gations and liabilities of [Elder, Inc.] pursuant to the Agreement of Merger.
The effective date of the merger agreement was actually set forth in the reorganization
agreement, and the closing of the transactions described in the reorganization agreement
were to take place on the same day as the merger date, immediately following the time of
effectiveness of the merger. In addition to buttressing the interdependence of the two
steps, this provision placed the two steps as occurring at essentially the same point in time.
This close timing of the steps was also relied upon by the Tenth Circuit in evaluating the
step transaction doctrine, as it has by other courts and commentators.
Whether the Tenth Circuit would have found it more difficult to apply the "interde-
pendence" test in the absence of these explicit provisions in the documents is uncertain,
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steps of the arrangement were sufficiently interdependent so as to in-
voke the step transaction doctrine, with the result that the claimed capi-
tal loss was disallowed.
The taxpayer in Associated Wholesale Grocers contended that the step
transaction doctrine simply has no application where a valid or legiti-
mate business reason for structuring the transaction in a particular man-
ner can be identified. Here, Associated Wholesale Grocers argued that
the elimination of Weston Investment's minority shareholders provided
a sufficient business purpose to override the application of the step
transaction doctrine. After noting that the relationship between the step
transaction doctrine and a purported "valid business purpose" doctrine
was unclear, the Tenth Circuit "reject[ed] the contention that a valid
business purpose bars application of step transaction analysis in this




Application of the step transaction doctrine in Associated Wholesale
Grocers was a matter of first impression for the Tenth Circuit. The case
shows that the Tenth Circuit is willing to apply the step transaction doc-
trine with vigor in appropriate circumstances, and its recognition and
application of the "end result" test and the "interdependence" test
should be kept in mind by taxpayers and their advisors when structuring
corporate reorganizations.
II. SUBSTITUTE RETURN PREPARED BY INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE NOT
A "FILED RETURN" FOR PURPOSES OF DISCHARGEABILITY IN
BANKRUPTCY: BERGSTROM V. UNITED STATES
4 8
A. Background
The Code permits the Secretary of the Treasury ("the Secretary")
to prepare a federal income tax return for any person who fails to do so
as required by law. 49 In the context of a liquidation proceeding under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code, an individual debtor may not receive
a discharge from any debt for a tax with respect to which a return, if
but provisions such as these certainly made the task easier. Cf BrrrKER at 4.3.5. ("At
one extreme, if the parties have agreed to take a series of steps, no one of which will be
legally effective unless all are consummated, application of the step transaction doctrine is
ordinarily assured.").
46. Associated Wholesale Grocers, 927 F.2d at 1527.
47. The Tenth Circuit shared "the government's skepticism as to the alleged signifi-
cance of taxpayer's claimed business purpose." Id. Since the "taxpayer never made any
inquir... as to the willingness of the minority shareholders to sell their.., shares ... at
any price ... we reject the suggestion that taxpayer's 'purpose' in designing the merger
and reorganization transaction was to resolve that problem." Id. at 1527 n.16.
48. 949 F.2d 341 (10th Cir. 1991).
49. I.R.C. § 6020(b)(1) (1988). The substitute return may be prepared on a Form
1040, In re Chastang, 116 B.R. 833 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990), or on a Form 870, In re
D'Avanza, 101 B.R. 787 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1989).
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required, was not filed.50 The issue in Bergstrom was whether a substitute
return prepared by the IRS, but never signed by the taxpayer, consti-
tutes a "filed" return for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, so that the
tax shown on the substitute return is dischargeable in a Chapter 7
liquidation.
B. Facts
Bergstrom had failed to file federal income tax returns for 1979,
1980 and 1981. The IRS prepared substitute returns for those years.
Bergstrom did not participate in the preparation of the substitute re-
turns, nor did he sign them. The substitute returns calculated Berg-
strom's tax liability based upon information obtained from his W-2 and
1099 forms; however, the returns did not include any deductions. Based
upon the substitute returns, Bergstrom was mailed a statutory notice of
deficiency for each of the three years.
Subsequent to receiving the notice of deficiency, Bergstrom filed a
Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. The case was determined to be a "no
asset" case, and a final decree was entered on April 12, 1989. However,
the bankruptcy court subsequently reopened the case on Bergstrom's
motion when the IRS began collection proceedings based on claimed
deficiencies arising from the 1979, 1980 and 1981 notices of deficiency.
Bergstrom then filed a motion to determine tax liability, which the bank-
ruptcy court denied. Bergstrom appealed the denial to the district
court, which affirmed. In its "Order Affirming Decision of Bankruptcy
Court With Findings,"'5 1 the district court found that the issues raised in
the case were matters of first impression in the Tenth Circuit, and that
the body of law in the area was sparse.52 Bergstrom appealed to the
Tenth Circuit.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
To determine whether substitute returns prepared by the IRS
should be considered filed returns for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code
discharge rules, entitling Bergstrom to a discharge of the tax liability
arising out of the substitute returns filed for him, the Tenth Circuit5 3
first considered the language of section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy
Code.54 The court found that this statute clearly provides that "[a]n
individual's tax liability is nondischargeable in bankruptcy when the lia-
50. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(1)(B)(i) (1988).
51. The district court decision was unreported.
52. Bergstrom, 949 F.2d at 342.
53. ChiefJudge McKay, Judge Barrett and Judge Brorby constituted the three-judge
panel.
54. 11 U.S.C..§ 523(a) (1988) provides in relevant part that:
(a) A discharge under Section 727 .... does not discharge an individual debtor
from any debt-
(1) fora tax...
(B) with respect to which a return, if required-
(i) was not filed ....
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bility results from the individual's failure to file a return." 55 The Tenth
Circuit noted that the legislative history of this section also provides that
"included in the nondischargeable debts are taxes for which the debtor
had not filed a required return as of the petition date or for which a
return had been filed beyond its last permitted due date."' 56 "[Tihe
debtor should not be able to use bankruptcy to escape these kinds of
taxes [arising from his deliberate misconduct]. Therefore, these taxes
have no priority in payment from the estate that survive as continuing
debts after the case."
57
The Tenth Circuit then disagreed with the district court's conclu-
sion that the body of law in this area was sparse. In fact, the Tenth
Circuit noted, "[m]any other courts have addressed the issue of whether
a substitute return constitutes a filed return, and they have found that it
does not."58 In In re Pruitt,59 the law and its policy underpinnings were
succinctly stated as follows:
Plaintiff's interpretation of 26 U.S.C. § 6020 and
§ 523(a)(1)(B), would result in encouragement of non-filing of
tax returns. Any taxpayer could simply refuse to file a tax re-
turn for a taxable year. Eventually, the IRS would file a substi-
tute return on behalf of the taxpayer pursuant to § 6020. The
filing of such a substitute return is a simple administrative step
which allows the assessment and collection process to begin.
The result of completing this necessary IRS administrative pro-
cedure would be to effectively excuse the non-filing taxpayer
from his own deliberate misconduct. After a few years the
taxes would then be ordinarily dischargeable. Such an inter-
pretation would render § 523(a)(1)(B) a nullity.
The plain language of the section, as well as the purpose
behind its enactment, require that the debtors have filed the
return.
6 0
In the Tenth Circuit's view, the provisions of the Code allowing the
Secretary to prepare a substitute return "provides the IRS with some
recourse if a taxpayer fails to file a return . ., but.., it does not excuse a
taxpayer from the filing requirement." 6 1 Finding itself in complete ac-
The rule is equally applicable to discharges under Chapter I I and Chapter 13.
55. Bergstrom, 949 F.2d at 342.
56. S. REP. No. 95-989,95th Cong., 2d Sess. 78 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5787, 5864.
57. S. REP. No. 95-1106, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1978).
58. Bergstrom, 949 F.2d at 343. The cases include In re Wrench, 129 B.R. 649, 651
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1991); In re Chastang, 116 B.R. 833, 834 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1990); In re
Crawford, 115 B.R. 381, 382-83 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1990) ("The return must have been filed
by the debtor in order for the tax obligation to be dischargeable under § 523(a)(1)(B).");
In re D'Avanza, 101 B.R. 787, 789 (Bankr. M.D.Fla. 1989); In re Hofmann, 76 B.R. 853, 854
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1987); In re Haywood, 62 B.R. 482, 485 (Bankr. D. Ill. 1986) (Section
523(a)(1)(B) was meant to "encourage honest and self-generated reporting by taxpayers,
not to immunize non-reporting debtors who, once caught, seek to discharge their discov-
ered tax obligations along with other debts in Bankruptcy.").
59. 107 B.R. 764 (Bankr. D. Wyo. 1989).
60. Id at 766.
61. Bergstrom, 949 F.2d at 343.
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cord with the prior decisions, and unwilling to allow Bergstrom to re-
ceive any advantage from his failure to file returns for the years in
question, the Tenth Circuit held that "substitute returns do not consti-
tute filed returns in the absence of the signature of the taxpayer."
62
Although conceding that substitute returns prepared by the Secretary
are considered to be "prima facie good and sufficient for all legal pur-
poses" 6 3 by the Code, the Tenth Circuit nevertheless concluded that the
return prepared by the Secretary "must be signed by the delinquent tax-
payer before it can be accepted as the filed return of the taxpayer."
64
Bergstrom had never signed the substitute returns; therefore, they could
not be considered "filed" by him, and no discharge of the tax liability
arising from the returns was available.
In a related issue, Bergstrom had contended that penalties assessed
in connection with the substitute returns were dischargeable because
they were imposed on an event which occurred more than three years
prior to the filing of bankruptcy. 6 5 The district court had agreed with
the IRS that such penalties were not dischargeable. However, in a later
case,6 6 the Tenth Circuit held that tax penalties assessed in connection
with tax years more than three years prior to the filing of bankruptcy
were dischargeable. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit reversed the determi-
nation of the district court, and held that the penalties imposed on Berg-
strom's 1979, 1980 and 1981 federal income tax returns were
dischargeable because they related to an event occurring more than
three years prior to his 1988 bankruptcy petition.
D. Summary
Although a matter of first impression in the Tenth Circuit, the
nondischargeability of tax liabilities arising from the filing of a substitute
return is supported by substantial law in the bankruptcy area.
67 Pruitt
well articulates the strong and persuasive policy reasons for the require-
ment that discharges are only available for returns actually "filed" by the
debtor. As now acknowledged by the Tenth Circuit, taxpayers should
not be rewarded in bankruptcy by extending discharges to them as to tax
liabilities that they have attempted to keep secret and have not volunta-
rily reported.
III. PRESUMPTION OF CORRECTNESS AFFORDED TO STATUTORY NOTICES
OF DEFICIENCY: ERICKSON V. COMMISSIONER
6 8
A. Background
Notices of deficiency issued by the Commissioner of Internal Reve-
62. Id.
63. I.R.C. § 6020(b)(2) (1988).
64. Bergstrom, 949 F.2d at 341. See I.R.C. § 6020(a) (1988).
65. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7)(B) (1988).
66. In re Roberts, 906 F.2d 1440 (10th Cir. 1990).
67. See supra note 58.
68. 937 F.2d 1548 (10th Cir. 1991).
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nue ("the Commissioner") in a civil tax case 69 are presumptively cor-
rect, and the taxpayer who wishes to challenge the notice bears the
burden of coming forward with sufficient evidence to overcome the pre-
sumption of correctness. 70 However, there must be some reasonable
foundation for the notice in order to preserve the presumption, and
where the notice lacks a rational basis, the presumption does not ap-
ply. 7 1 Thus, purely arbitrary notices are not entitled to a presumption
of correctness. 7 2 In Erickson, the Tenth Circuit was asked to apply these
standards to a notice of deficiency issued to a convicted drug trafficker.
A related issue raised by Erickson involves the manner in which the
Commissioner will be allowed to reconstruct a taxpayer's taxable in-
come to provide a mathematical basis for the deficiency asserted in the
notice. It is well-established that the Commissioner has
great latitude in making determinations of liability, particularly
where the taxpayer files no returns and refuses to cooperate in
the ascertainment of his income. Thus, [the Commissioner] is
entitled to use any reasonable means of reconstructing income.
Further, he is given greater latitude in. determining which
method of reconstruction to apply where the case involves an
illegal enterprise in which the taxpayer has failed to file a return
and has kept no records.
73
One method of reconstructing income, the cash expenditures method of
reconstruction, assumes "absent some explanation by the taxpayer, that
the amount by which a taxpayer's expenditures during a taxable period
exceed his reported income has taxable origins." 74
B. Facts
In May 1983, Sidney Erickson took off from Belize in a Cessna 404.
The flight was monitored by United States customs officers through the
use of a transponder planted in the Cessna. Erickson was arrested after
his plane was forced down by the officers onto an airfield in Moses, New
Mexico. Erickson was the sole occupant of the plane, which was found
to contain approximately 2420 pounds of marijuana. Erickson was sub-
sequently convicted in federal court of importing marijuana and pos-
sessing it with intent to distribute, and his conviction was affirmed by the
Tenth Circuit in 1984.
7 5
Erickson maintained three bank accounts in various locations, each
69. See I.R.C. § 6212 (1988).
70. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933); Jones v. Commissioner, 903 F.2d
1301, 1303 (10th Cir. 1990); Zell v. Commissioner, 763 F.2d 1139, 1141 (10th Cir. 1985).
If the taxpayer can rebut the presumption, the burden of proof shifts to the
Commissioner.
71. Jones, 903 F.2d 1301, 1304 (10th Cir. 1990); Llorente v. Commissioner, 649 F.2d
152, 156 (2d Cir. 1981).
72. )lorente, 649 F.2d at 156.
73. Carson v. United States, 560 F.2d 693, 693-94 (5th Cir. 1977).
74. Erickson v. Commissioner, 937 F.2d 1548, 1553 (10th Cir. 1991); Burgo v. Com-
missioner, 69 T.C. 729, 742 (1978).
75. United States v. Erickson, 732 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1984).
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of which reflected very low balances in 1983. Nevertheless, Erickson
had managed to pay for various expenses in 1983 totalling approxi-
mately $75,000 in either cash or cashier's checks. 76 Erickson owned a
second plane and maintained a hangar in Grand Junction, Colorado,
and some of his expenses related to the maintenance of the plane and
the hangar. Additionally, the Commissioner estimated Erickson's
purchase price for the 2420 pounds of marijuana at $200,000.
In 1984, the Commissioner issued a statutory notice of deficiency to
Erickson, which reconstructed his income by reference to his cash ex-
penditures. 7 7 Upon review of a petition filed by Erickson, the Tax Court
upheld the Commissioner's determination 78 despite Erickson's claim
that the 1984 notice of deficiency was unsupported by any factual basis
and was therefore arbitrary and erroneous. Erickson appealed to the
Tenth Circuit, which affirmed.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, Erickson argued that there was an insufficient factual
basis to support the presumed correctness of the 1984 notice of defi-
ciency, unless the Commissioner could produce evidence directly con-
necting him to the business of illegal drug activity as a source of taxable
funds, i.e., proof of drug sales or proof that he actually purchased the
marijuana. The Tenth Circuit 79 disagreed, holding that the Commis-
sioner was only required to link Erickson to the liquid assets connected
to the activity to preserve the presumption. Summarizing prior cases,8 0
the court stated the following:
Once the Commissioner demonstrated sufficient minimal facts
to show an ownership interest in assets possessed by the tax-
payers, the presumption of correctness remained with the no-
tice of deficiency and the taxpayers had the burden of
satisfactorily explaining how they came to possess the liquid as-
sets, and to show why the assets did not represent taxable in-
come in the year in question.
8 1
Erickson apparently argued, at least implicitly, that he was merely a pi-
lot-for-hire, or "mule," and did not have an ownership interest in the
marijuana. This argument, however, was not necessarily supported by
76. These expenditures included the payment of his appearance bond in the amount
of $50,000, paid to the Clerk of the Court in Albuquerque, New Mexico in $20 bills.
77. Including the estimated $200,000 purchase price for the marijuana and the
$50,000 appearance bond, these expenditures totalled to $275,079. The notice of defi-
ciency asserted an income tax deficiency for 1983 in the amount of $202,217 including
additions to tax.
78. Erickson v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 352 (1989).
79. Judge Anderson and Judge McWilliams, together with Judge Wayne E. Alley,
United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation,
made up the three-judge panel.
80. Delaney v. Commissioner, 743 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1984); Schad v. Commissioner,
87 T.C. 609 (1986), aff'd withoutpublished opinion, 827 F.2d 774 (11 th Cir. 1987); Tokarski
v. Commissioner, 87 T.C. 74 (1986).
81. Erickson v. Commissioner, 937 F.2d 1548, 1551-52 (10th Cir. 1991).
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the record 2 and, on balance, the Tenth Circuit viewed Erickson's cash
transactions and his ownership of a hangar and two planes as consistent
with a proprietary interest in the plane's cargo.
The possession or ownership of marijuana, of course, is not a taxa-
ble transaction. Erickson's ownership or possessory interest in the
seized marijuana would be relevant to the presumed correctness of the
notice of deficiency only if it was probative of associated transactions
indicating cash receipts by Erickson that would be taxable. The ques-
tion thus became whether Erickson's possession of the marijuana was
sufficient evidence of cash transactions entered into by him in connec-
tion with an income-producing activity.
The Tenth Circuit disposed of this question by recognizing the
cash-intensive nature of the drug trade. The court stated that it was not
an
impermissible stretch to assume that someone who is import-
ing more than a ton of marijuana into the United States by air
paid for the drugs in cash at a time proximate to the date of the
shipment. This is enough to provide a rational underpinning
for the notice of deficiency. .... 83
The Tenth Circuit thus allowed the Commissioner to "boot-strap" his
way to showing that Erickson possessed taxable funds, by pointing to
the fact that Erickson was in possession of a commodity generally known
to trade only in a cash market.
84
The Tenth Circuit would have sustained the notice of deficiency
based solely on the Commissioner having provided a factual foundation
upon which it was rational to conclude that Erickson had an ownership
or possessory interest in the marijuana, and thus funds that (in the ab-
sence of an explanation) were taxable. Both Erickson and the govern-
ment, however, apparently believed that it was necessary to examine the
government's actual application of the cash expenditures method of in-
come reconstruction utilized to generate the notice of deficiency. Erick-
son argued that the Commissioner's application of the cash
expenditures method of income reconstruction was deficient in this case
because the Commissioner had failed to establish Erickson's net worth
at the beginning and the end of taxable year 1983. According to Erick-
son, the failure of the Commissioner to do so precluded the Commis-
sioner from ruling out the possibility that Erickson's cash expenditures
82. During the course of the criminal proceedings, Erickson had filed a motion to
suppress on the basis that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the airplane,
which had been violated by the government when it installed the transponder to monitor
the flight. Following a suppression hearing, the district court determined that Erickson
had failed to establish a legitimate expectation of privacy by proving lawful ownership or a
sufficient possessory interest in the plane containing the marijuana. However, during that
hearing, Erickson admitted that he had an "ownership or possessory interest" in the mari-
juana cargo. Id. at 1549.
83. Id. at 1552.
84. The Tenth Circuit reserved judgment on the situation where the taxpayer is in
possession or has ownership of illiquid assets. "In a proper case such evidence may pro-
vide sufficient linkage to other evidence to justify a notice of deficiency." Id. at 1552 n.4.
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in 1983, including those made to purchase the marijuana, came from
savings derived from a nontaxable or previously taxed source of funds
owned by Erickson at the beginning of the year but dissipated by the
time of his arrest.
The Tenth Circuit refused to accept the proposition that the Com-
missioner must establish opening and dosing net worths "for drug traf-
fickers who specialize in secrecy, deception, and evasion." 8 5 To retain
the presumption of correctness for the notice of deficiency, "the Com-
missioner is not obliged to establish a net worth when applying the cash
expenditures method for notices of deficiency in civil tax cases"8 6 if the
Commissioner has reasonably linked the taxpayer to specific expendi-
tures in issuing a notice of deficiency based on those expenditures. The
Tenth Circuit thus upheld the Tax Court's determination that Erickson
had failed to carry his burden of proving that the notice of deficiency
was arbitrary or erroneous.8 7
D. Summary
The Tenth Circuit viewed the Erickson case as one "which has been
searching for a coherent legal theory in the wrong places." 8 8 Although
both the taxpayer and the government had apparently spent considera-
ble energy addressing the technical requirements of the cash expendi-
tures method of reconstructing income, "[tihere is only one rule, that
there be some rational underpinning [for the notice of deficiency]. Es-
tablishing a minimal evidentiary foundation can be done in a variety of
ways, and no rigid formulations are required."8 9 Here, the Commis-
sioner had established a rational basis for the notice of deficiency by
providing a factual foundation linking Erickson to a source of unre-
ported income. Having thus preserved the notice's presumption of cor-
rectness, the Commissioner prevailed on the overall merits when the
taxpayer offered no evidence to overcome the presumption.
While Erickson seems to provide a relatively lax evidentiary hurdle
for the Commissioner to dear in preserving the presumption of correct-
ness afforded to his notices of deficiency, the factual setting should be
kept in mind. The Tenth Circuit has shown itself to be fairly open-
minded in considering taxpayer challenges to the correctness of notices
of deficiency in other contexts. At the end of 1991, in Hagen v. Commis-
85. Id. at 1554. The Tenth Circuit viewed this undertaking as a "daunting burden"
and one "likely to be so wildly inaccurate through no fault of the Commissioner as to be of
little real probative value." Id"
86. Id.
87. A finding by the Tax Court that a taxpayer has failed to carry his burden of prov-
ing that the notice of deficiency is arbitrary or erroneous is factual and may not be set aside
unless dearly erroneous. 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a) (1988); FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Marathon Oil
Co. v. Commissioner, 838 F.2d 1114 (10th Cir. 1987); Dolese v. Commissioner, 811 F.2d
543 (10th Cir. 1987). On the other hand, findings of law and of ultimate fact are subject to
de novo review. Pollei v. Commissioner, 877 F.2d 838 (10th Cir. 1989).




sioner,90 the Tenth Circuit concluded that the taxpayer had made a legiti-
mate challenge to the reasonableness of the method used by the IRS to
reconstruct his income, 9 1 and that the IRS had not adequately re-
sponded to the challenge in its brief on appeal. The case was remanded
to determine if the IRS could adequately address the taxpayer's argu-
ments and establish a rational basis for the method it used to calculate
the asserted deficiencies. Thus, although the presumption of correct-
ness is strong, it can be overcome and the burden can be shifted to the
IRS by showing that the underlying theory of income reconstruction is
faulty or illogical.
IV. GUARANTEE BY SHAREHOLDER OF S CORPORATION'S DEBT DOES
NOT CREATE BASIS IN SHAREHOLDER'S STOCK: GOATCHER V.
UNITED STATES
9 2 
AND URI V. COMMISSIONER
9 3
A. Background
Under Subchapter S of the Code, corporations may elect to be
treated as pass-through entities for federal income tax purposes. 94 Cor-
porations filing the appropriate election, and thereby becoming "S cor-
porations," will be treated in a manner similar, although not identical, to
partnerships. Items of an S corporation's income, gain, loss, deduction
and credit are not taxed to the corporation, but are "passed through"
and allocated among its shareholders on apro rata basis, based upon the
shareholders' relative interests in the corporation.9 5
An S corporation that generates a taxable loss during the year must
allocate that loss pro rata among its shareholders. However, the aggre-
gate amount of losses and deductions that may be taken into account
and deducted by a shareholder in an S corporation for any taxable year
may not exceed the sum of the adjusted basis of the shareholder's stock
in the corporation 9 6 and the shareholder's adjusted basis of any indebt-
edness of the S corporation to the shareholder.9 7 A shareholder in an S
90. The Order andJudgment of the Tenth Circuit is unpublished, but can be found at
92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,030. The Order and Judgment has no precedential value
and may not be cited or used by any court within the Tenth Circuit, except for purposes of
establishing the doctrines of law of the case, resjudicata, or collateral estoppel. lOT CIR.
R. 36.3.
91. The method at issue was the bank deposits method of income reconstruction,
which reconstructs income by reference to deposits and withdrawals from the taxpayer's
bank accounts. The taxpayer was a registered securities broker-dealer, and he argued that
the IRS had not valued his beginning and closing inventories of securities properly and
had not appropriately reconstructed the manner in which he should report short sales.
Ultimately, this method was claimed to illogically reflect the taxpayer's cost of goods sold
as reflected in the notice of deficiency.
92. 944 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1991).
93. 949 F.2d 371 (10th Cir. 1991).
94. I.R.C. §§ 1361-1379 (1988). A Subchapter S election can be made if the defini-
tional requirements of I.R.C. § 1362 are satisfied.
95. Id- § 1366(a).
96. Id § 1366(d)(1)(A).
97. Id § 1366(d)(1)(B). The basis of the shareholder in her stock (and in the indebt-
edness of the S corporation owed to her) is increased and decreased pursuant to the ad-
justment and ordering rules set forth in I.R.C. § 1367.
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corporation that is expected to generate substantial operating losses is
therefore well advised to structure his affairs to maximize the basis of his
stock in the S corporation, and not unduly "waste" the resulting loss
deduction.
98
When an S corporation needs to borrow funds, tax counselors gen-
erally advise that the shareholders, rather than the corporation, obtain
the loan and then either contribute the loan proceeds to the corporation
as a contribution to capital, thus increasing the shareholders' bases in
their stock, or loan those proceeds to the corporation, thus creating ba-
sis in the form of indebtedness of the corporation to the shareholders.
Occasionally, shareholders do not receive or heed such advice, 99 and
later argue that the manner in which the funds were actually borrowed
nevertheless created additional basis for the shareholders, against which
they may claim allocable losses of the S corporation. This situation typ-
ically occurs when the corporation borrows the funds directly and the
shareholders guarantee repayment of the loan. The shareholders then
argue that the guarantee is akin to a capital contribution to the corpora-
tion, thus increasing the basis of their stock.
Courts have been split as to whether a shareholder of an S corpora-
tion may successfully claim that the adjusted basis in his stock includes a
pro rata share of the amount of a corporate loan he personally guaran-
tees. In Selfe v. United States,100 the Eleventh Circuit approved a theory
of prorated inclusion of personal loan guarantees in basis. The Elev-
enth Circuit looked to whether the lender relied primarily on the share-
holder or the corporate entity for repayment of the loan, and remanded
the case for a factual determination of this issue. In Estate of Leavitt v.
Commissioner' 0 ' and Brown v. Commissioner,10 2 the Fourth and Sixth Cir-
cuits, respectively, disapproved the Selfe-type analysis, determining that
S corporation shareholders must abide by the form of the transaction as
structured by them, "rather than using hindsight to construct an expla-
nation of the transaction which gives them the best tax result."' 0 3
Under this analysis, the S corporation shareholder must actually be
called upon to make good on the loan and, once having made payment
on the loan, may add the amount of that payment to the basis of his
stock.
B. Facts and the Tenth Circuit's Opinions
The taxpayers in Goatcher were a husband and wife who had formed
98. Under I.R.C. § 1366(d)(2), any loss or deduction which is disallowed for any taxa-
ble year by reason of the basis limitations is treated as having been incurred by the corpo-
ration in the succeeding taxable years with respect to that shareholder; that is, there is an
indefinite carry-over of the disallowed loss or deduction, which may be claimed by the
shareholder only when she has developed additional basis in her S corporation stock.
99. Of course, in some cases, practical, legal, or financial considerations may preclude
such an arrangement.
100. 778 F.2d 767 (11th Cir. 1985).
101. 875 F.2d 420 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 958 (1989).
102. 706 F.2d 755 (6th Cir. 1983).
103. Uri v. Commissioner, 949 F.2d 371, 373 (10th Cir. 1991).
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an Oklahoma corporation electing status as an S corporation to con-
struct and operate a cable TV system in four Oklahoma communities.
After contributing $1000 to the capital of the corporation, the share-
holders caused the corporation to borrow in excess of $1,000,000 in a
series of loans that were personally guaranteed by the taxpayers. The
taxpayers were never called upon to pay the guarantees. In 1982 and
1983, the corporation generated approximately $91,000 of operating
losses, which the taxpayers claimed on their personal income tax re-
turns. The IRS limited the pass-through of these losses to the amount
of the taxpayers' $1000 initial capital contribution. After unsuccessfully
suing the government in district court for the amount of the resulting
tax deficiency,' 0 4 the taxpayers appealed to the Tenth Circuit, which
affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit'0 5 adopted the reasoning of Leavitt, holding that
there must be an economic outlay on the part of the shareholder to in-
crease the basis of his stock in an S corporation.' 0 6 A personal guaran-
tee, in and of itself, does not satisfy the economic outlay requirement,
being merely a promise to pay in the future if called upon to do so. The
taxpayers predictably argued that, in substance, the guarantee amounted
to a loan to the taxpayers followed by their contribution of the loan to
the corporation. While sympathetic to the plight of the taxpayers, the
Tenth Circuit did not feel itself "free to call a carrot a cabbage to
achieve a desired result"' 0 7 and affirmed the district court's denial of
the loss deductions.
Uri involved two taxpayers, Cathaleen Uri and Stevens Townsdin,
who were partners in an accounting firm. In 1980, the taxpayers had
formed The Old Opera House Mall Company, a Kansas corporation that
elected to be taxed as an S corporation, for the purposes of renovating a
building in downtown Concordia, Kansas, and opening a small shopping
mall on the premises. Uri and Townsdin each contributed $10,000 in
cash to capitalize the corporation, and each received 50% of its stock.
The corporation then borrowed money from a local bank to repay in-
terim loans for construction and equipment. The loan was Secured by
the real estate and assets of the corporation, and by the personal guar-
antees of Uri and Townsdin. The Small Business Administration ("the
SBA") also guaranteed 90% of the loan.
The mall opened inJuly 1981, but byJuly 1982 had ceased all retail
operations. The SBA sent Uri and Townsdin demands under their guar-
antees after the note went into default and was accelerated. In response,
both Uri and Townsdin filed petitions under Chapter 7 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code, and the personal guarantees were discharged. Ultimately,
the corporation also filed for Chapter 7 liquidation. The Commissioner
104. The decision of the district court was unreported.
105. Judge Anderson, Judge Tacha and Judge Brorby constituted the three-judge
panel.
106. Goatcher v. United States, 944 F.2d 747, 751 (10th Cir. 1991).
107. Id. at 752.
1992] 1055
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
disallowed all pass-through corporate losses to the shareholders in ex-
cess of their $10,000 capital contributions for tax years 1982 and 1983.
The taxpayers filed unsuccessful petitions in the Tax Court1 0 8 and ap-
pealed to the Tenth Circuit.
The Tenth Circuit l0 9 was unmoved by the taxpayers' apparent con-
tention that the Chapter 7 liquidations somehow differentiated their
case from Goatcher, Leavitt, Brown and Harris v. United States. 110 The sig-
nificant personal loss suffered by them in bankruptcy did not satisfy the
requirement that there be an actual economic outlay by the shareholders
with respect to the guarantee in order to create additional basis in their
stock. I 11
C. Summary
The Tenth Circuit has clearly rejected Selfe in favor of the more
rigid requirement that taxpayers must follow the road map set out in the
Code to receive basis credit for loans to S corporations. Arguments of
"substance over form" will not carry the day for S corporation share-
holders who fail to properly structure their affairs. The treatment of S
corporation loans is simply another area of tax law where form must be
scrupulously observed if the desired tax results are to be achieved.
112 If
the shareholders of an S corporation in the Tenth Circuit are to maxi-
mize their ability to claim their allocable share of the corporation's oper-
ating losses, any loan to the S corporations should first be carefully
structured as a loan to the shareholders and not to the corporation. The
shareholders must then either contribute the proceeds of the loan to the
corporation, or loan the proceeds to the corporation, to receive "credit"
in calculating the shareholders' bases in their S corporation stock or
debt against which they may claim such losses.
V. AUTHORITY OF THE COMMISSIONER TO REQUIRE CHANGES IN




The Code provides that whenever the use of inventory is necessary
in order clearly to determine the income of any taxpayer, inventory is to
108. Uri v. Commissioner, 56 T.C.M. (CCH) 1217 (1989).
109. Judge Holloway, Judge Baldock and JudgeJ. Thomas Greene, United States Dis-
trict Court for the District of Utah, sitting by designation, made up the three-judge panel.
110. 902 F.2d 439 (5th Cir. 1990). In Harris, the Fifth Circuit joined the Fourth and
Sixth Circuits in their treatment of this issue, leaving the Eleventh Circuit alone in its
"facts and circumstances" analysis.
111. The taxpayers in Uri had also argued that the loan was in substance a loan to the
taxpayers and a subsequent contribution by them of funds to the corporation because it
had been made by the lender primarily on its assessment of, and reliance upon, the
strength of the taxpayers' personal financial worth and income. This argument was unsuc-
cessfully made in Goatcher and was rejected here as well.
112. Cf supra note 43.
113. 937 F.2d 510 (10th Cir. 1991).
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be taken by the taxpayer on such basis as the IRS may prescribe "as
conforming as nearly as may be to the best accounting practice in the
trade or business and as most clearly reflecting the income."' 14 Under
the applicable Treasury Regulations, the taking of inventory and the
utilization of an appropriate inventory accounting method are necessary
in every case in which the production, purchase, or sale of merchandise
is an income-producing factor.' 5
The Regulations further state that in "any case in which it is neces-
sary to use an inventory, the accrual method of accounting must be used
with regard to purchases and sales unless otherwise authorized."
' 16
However, the Commissioner may authorize a taxpayer "to continue the
use of a method of accounting consistently used by the taxpayer, even
though not specifically authorized... if, in the opinion of the Commissioner,
income is clearly reflected by the use of such method."' " 7 Ralston Development
Corp. presented the Tenth Circuit with an opportunity to apply the
"clear reflection of income" test for the first time in the circuit.
B. Facts
Ralston Development Corp. was engaged in the business of manu-
facturing water treatment control system parts and components. These
water control systems were apparently sold to Ralston's customers and
maintained by Ralston under maintenance contracts. For many years,
Ralston had used the accrual method of accounting for financial state-
ment purposes, but had used the cash receipts and disbursements
method of accounting in preparing its federal income tax returns.
1 1 8
114. I.R.C. § 471 (1988). Generally speaking, the issues arising under inventory ac-
counting include such questions as whether the basis of valuation is to be cost or lower of
cost or market; whether the inventory flow assumption is to be last-in, first-out (LIFO),
first-in, first-out (FIFO), or some other assumption; and whether the "full absorption"
method of inventory costing for manufacturers has been properly applied. None of these
issues were presented in Ralston Development Corp. Rather, the case centered around the
broader question of whether Ralston was entitled to use the cash receipts and disburse-
ments method of accounting, as opposed to the accrual method of accounting insisted
upon by the IRS.
115. Treas. Reg. § 1.471-1 (1960). Under Treas. Reg. § 1A71-2 (as amended in 1973),
it is acknowledged that I.R.C. § 471 provides two tests which each inventory accounting
method must satisfy. The method must (1) conform as nearly as possible to the best ac-
counting practice in the trade or business; and (2) clearly reflect income.
116. Treas. Reg. § 1A46-1(c)(2)(i) (as amended in 1987) (emphasis added). The
Tenth Circuit did not focus on the possible argument that Ralston was not engaged in the
purchase and sale of inventory, but was rather a manufacturer. It does not seem inappro-
priate, however, to require manufacturers to use accrual accounting if merchandising or-
ganizations must use that method.
117. Id. § IA46-1(c)(2)(ii) (emphasis added). It should be noted that, for tax years
beginning after December 31, 1986, a "C corporation"--which is presumably the type of
entity selected by Ralston-may not use the cash receipts and disbursements method of
accounting unless it is a "qualified personal service corporation" or has gross receipts of
not more than $5,000,000. I.R.C. § 448 (1988).
118. Under the cash receipts and disbursements method of accounting, "all items
which constitute gross income (whether in the form of cash, property, or services) are to
be included for the taxable year in which actually or constructively received" and expendi-
tures "are to be deducted for the taxable year in which actually made." Treas. Reg.
§ 1.446-1(c)(1)(i) (as amended in 1987).
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Although Ralston's federal income tax returns had been audited several
times over the years, the IRS had always approved Ralston's use of the
cash method for federal income tax purposes.
Ralston was once again audited in 1982, for its 1979, 1980, and
1981 tax years. As a result of this audit, the IRS determined that Ral-
ston's use of the cash method of accounting did not clearly reflect Ral-
ston's income, and required that Ralston switch to the accrual method of
accounting. 1 19 This and other adjustments resulted in sizeable tax defi-
ciencies for 1980 and 1981, which Ralston paid and for which Ralston
instituted a refund action in district court. Ajury trial resulted in ajudg-
ment for Ralston. 120 The government appealed to the Tenth Circuit,
which reversed.
C. The Tenth Circuit Opinion
On appeal, 12 ' Ralston conceded that inventories were a income-
producing factor in its business. Therefore, the issue was whether the
IRS had abused its discretion in determining that the cash method of
accounting utilized by Ralston did not clearly reflect its income.
122 If
the cash method of accounting did not dearly reflect Ralston's income,
the accrual method would be mandated.
123
The test developed by courts to determine whether a particular ac-
counting method clearly reflects income has come to be known as the
"substantial identity of results" test. Under this test, a taxpayer's
method of accounting is "sustainable only if it achieves results that are
virtually identical to the results that would be achieved under an accrual
method."124 This somewhat harsh test reflects the high degree of defer-
ence that courts consistently pay to the Commissioner in reviewing an
IRS determination that a particular accounting method used by a tax-
payer with inventories does not dearly reflect income.1 25
In Ralston, there were substantial differences between the results
119. Under the accrual method of accounting,
income is to be included for the taxable year when all the events have occurred
which tax the right to receive such income and the amount thereof can be deter-
mined with reasonable accuracy. Under such a method, deductions are allowable
for the taxable year in which all the events have occurred which establish the fact
of the liability giving rise to such deduction and the amount thereof can be deter-
mined with reasonable accuracy.
Id. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii).
120. There was no reported decision at the district court level.
121. The three-judge panel consisted of Judge Logan, Judge Moore and Judge J.
Thomas Greene, United States District Court for the District of Utah, sitting by
designation.
122. The accrual method insisted upon by the Commissioner applied to Ralston's en-
tire accounting system, not just to its inventories. "If the taxpayer must use inventories,
the Commissioner may also require it to adopt the accrual method." Knight-Ridder News-
papers, Inc. v. United States, 743 F.2d 781, 789 (11 th Cir. 1984). Of course, the greatest
monetary impact resulting from such a switch will be felt in the inventory area, since the
purchase and sale of inventory will comprise the largest element of taxable income.
123. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(2)(i) and (ii) (as amended in 1987).
124. Ralston Development Corp. v. United States, 937 F.2d 510, 513 nA (10th Cir.
1991) (citation omitted).
125. See, e.g., Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 532-33 (1979).
1058 [Vol. 69:4
TAXATION SURVEY
obtained under the accrual method of accounting and the cash method
of accounting. The difference was apparently attributable to the fact
that certain contract retentions recognized by Ralston delayed the inclu-
sion in income of various amounts otherwise receivable from customers
purchasing the water control systems. Under the cash method of ac-
counting employed by Ralston, those receivables would not be included
in income until received. Under the accrual method of accounting, the
receivables would be currently included in income and matched against
the related expenses incurred by Ralston in the construction of the
water control systems. When compared to the use of the cash method of
accounting, utilization of the accrual method increased Ralston's gross
income by 157% in 1979, 36% in 1980 and 48% in 1981.126
Ralston argued that, notwithstanding these differences, the use of
the cash method of accounting, consistently applied over the years,
"clearly reflected" its income for the years in question. The Tenth Cir-
cuit's response is indicative of the high burden that taxpayers carry in
contending that some method of accounting, other than one sanctioned
by the IRS in the particular circumstance, clearly reflects income. The
Tenth Circuit simply viewed these contentions as essentially irrelevant
in the face of the fact that Ralston's cash method of accounting yielded
results that were not consistent with the accrual method of accounting
prescribed by the IRS. 12 7 Ralston had not contested the government's
calculation of the substantial differences achieved under the two meth-
ods of accounting for the years in question; thus, the Tenth Circuit had
little choice but to reverse ihe district court and uphold the Commis-
sioner's imposition of the accrual method of accounting.
D. Summary
Ralston Development Corp. is illustrative of the considerable burden
borne by taxpayers in the Tenth Circuit who use an accounting method
other than the accrual method prescribed by the IRS if those taxpayers
utilize inventories that are an income-producing factor. Unless the two
methods achieve a substantial identity of results, so that there is virtually
no difference between the two methods with respect to their impact on
the taxpayer's taxable income, the Commissioner's determination will
prevail, even if the taxpayer's method clearly reflects income in a gen-
eral sense.
126. Ralston Development Corp., 937 F.2d at 513.
127. In fact, courts have upheld the determination of the Commissioner where the dif-
ferences between the method preferred by the taxpayer and the method prescribed by the
Commissioner have been almost nonexistent. For example, in Wilkinson-Beane, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 420 F.2d 352-(lst Cir. 1970), the First Circuit held that the Commissioner
did not abuse his discretion when the difference between the two methods over the course
of five years was less than two-tenths of one percent. lId at 356.
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VI. No JUDiciAL REVIEW FOR INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE'S REFUSAL




If the amount of any tax imposed under the Code is not paid on or
before the last date prescribed for payment, interest on the underpay-
ment is imposed from the due date to the date paid 129 at statutorily
prescribed rates.13 0 The Internal Revenue Service has consistently
taken the position that it does not have the statutory authority to abate
this interest.1 3 ' However, new I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1), enacted as part of
the Tax Reform Act of 1986, now authorizes the Secretary of the Treas-
ury to abate interest to the extent that it is attributable to IRS errors or
delays in performing ministerial acts. 132 Selman examined whether a
taxpayer may obtain judicial review of an IRS decision not to abate
interest.
B. Facts
Robert Selman's 1981 and 1982 tax returns were audited in 1984.
The audit was concluded in 1985, and the IRS assessed substantial tax
deficiencies. Selman timely filed a written protest to the proposed ad-
justments. It was not until May 1987 that Selman and the IRS reached a
tentative settlement agreement. The settlement agreement was ac-
cepted by the Commissioner in August 1987, and the IRS assessed a
deficiency for 1981 and 1982, together with statutory interest for the
period during which the deficiency was outstanding.
In October 1987, before paying the assessed interest, Selman filed a
request with the IRS to abate a portion of the interest pursuant to the
provisions of I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1).13 3 Selman's argument was that the
128. 941 F.2d 1060 (10th Cir. 1991).
129. I.R.C. § 6601(a) (1988).
130. Id. § 6621.
131. "Except as specifically provided by statute,... there is no authority for waiving
interest on delinquent taxes or for refunding on equitable grounds interest that has been
legally assessed or collected." [2 Administration] I.R. Man. (CCH) pt. 5175.1(1), at 6303
(Oct. 31, 1989).
132. I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1) (1988) provides as follows:
(E) ASSESSMENTS OF INTEREST ATTRIBUTED TO ERRORS AND DELAYS BY INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE
(1) IN GENERAL
In the case of any assessment of interest on-
(A) any deficiency attributable in whole or in part to any error or delay
by an officer or employee of the Internal Revenue Service (acting in his
official capacity) in performing a ministerial act....
the Secretary may abate the assessment of all or any part of such interest for any
period. For purposes of the preceding sentence, an error or delay shall be taken
into account only if no significant aspect of such error or delay can be attributed
to the taxpayer involved, and after the Internal Revenue Service has contacted
the taxpayer in writing with respect to such deficiency or payment.
133. The request is filed on Form 843. See Rev. Proc. 87-42, 1987-2 C.B. 589.
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IRS, through its own errors or delays in performing ministerial acts,13 4
had caused the accumulation of at least a portion of the interest. The
IRS denied Selman's request, and over the next two years Selman paid
both the assessed tax and the interest. After filing an unsuccessful claim
for refund with the IRS, Selman brought a refund suit in district court,
contending that the IRS had abused its discretion in denying his abate-
ment request. The district court granted the IRS's motion to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that Selman's cause of action did not fall
within its subject matter jurisdiction, and alternatively, that even if the
court had subject matter jurisdiction, the decision whether to abate in-
terest was committed to agency discretion and was therefore not subject
to judicial review. 135 Selman appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit13 6 affirmed the district court.
Although the Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court did have
subject matterjurisdiction over the action,' 3 7 it nevertheless affirmed on
the basis that the decision to abate interest is committed to agency dis-
cretion by law, and judicial review of the decision is therefore precluded.
134. The ministerial acts were not identified in either the district court or the Tenth
Circuit opinions. As to the nature of the ministerial acts envisioned, the legislative history
notes that the new law
applies only to failures to perform ministerial acts that occur after the IRS has
contacted the taxpayer in writing.... The committee intends that the term 'min-
isterial act' be limited to nondiscretionary acts where all the preliminary prerequi-
sites, such as conferencing and review by supervisors, have taken place.... The
IRS may define a ministerial act in regulations.
S. REP. No. 99-313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 208-9 (1988). Temp. Treas. Reg. § 301.6404-
2T(b)(1) (1987) defines a ministerial act as "a procedural or mechanical act that does not
involve the exercise ofjudgment or discretion, and that occurs during the processing of a
taxpayer's case after all prerequisites, such as conferences and review by supervisors, have
taken place." Examples set forth in id. § 301.6404-2T(b)(2) indicate that the phrase will be
narrowly construed, and specifically does not include decisions to delay examinations be-
cause of work priorities or resource limitations.
135. Selman v. United States, 733 F. Supp. 1444 (W.D. Okla. 1990). The district court
followed the reasoning and conclusions of Horton Homes, Inc. v. United States, 727 F.
Supp. 1450 (M.D. Ga. 1990), noting that "a case closer in point cannot be found." Selman,
733 F. Supp. at 1445. Addressing the identical issue, Horton Homes had concluded that the
court lacked subject matterjurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1988), and that even if
it did have jurisdiction, the "no law to apply" standard developed in the text required a
conclusion that there is no right of judicial review under the Administrative Procedures
Act. On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with the first conclusion, but agreed with
the second. Horton Homes, Inc. v. Commissioner, 936 F.2d 548 (11th Cir. 1991). The
procedural history of Horton Homes thus closely parallels that of Selman.
136. Judge Logan and Judge Baldock, together with Judge Myron H. Bright, United
States Senior CircuitJudge for the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting by designation,
constituted the three-judge panel.
137. The jurisdictional question centered on the application of 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(1)
(1988), which grants district courts original jurisdiction in actions brought to recover taxes
"alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected," or to recover "any
sum alleged to have been excessive ... under the internal-revenue laws." The district
court had focused solely on the first half of the statute and dismissed Selman's complaint
after concluding that his claim of abuse of discretion by the IRS did not amount to illegally
or erroneously collecting a tax. The Tenth Circuit reminded the district court that it also
had jurisdiction over claims based on allegedly excessive sums, and concluded that Sel-
man's was such a claim.
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Selman had contended that the Administrative Procedure Act' 3 8
extended authority to the district court to review the actions of the IRS
under the circumstances of his case. Under the Administrative Proce-
dure Act, however, judicial review cannot be obtained where either
"(1) statutes precludejudicial review; or (2) agency action is committed
to agency discretion by law."' 13 9 Since I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1) does not ex-
pressly preclude judicial review, the first exception did not apply, and
attention was focused on the second exception.
140
In considering whether the IRS's decision to abate interest under
I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1) is one that is "committed to agency discretion by
law," the Tenth Circuit noted that the second exception is triggered "in
those rare instances where 'statutes are drawn in such broad terms that
in a given case there-is no law to apply.' "141 In this connection, the
Supreme Court has stated that
even where Congress has not affirmatively precluded review,
review is not to be had if the statute is drawn so that a court
would have no meaningful standard against which to judge the
agency's abuse of discretion. In such a case, the statute ("law")
can be taken to have "committed" the decisionmaking to the
agency's judgment absolutely.
14 2
Selman argued that there was a meaningful standard against which
to judge the IRS's exercise of discretion. Selman pointed to a statement
in the congressional committee reports that "the provision be utilized in
instances where failure to abate interest would be widely perceived as grossly
unfair."' 4 s The Tenth Circuit disagreed, stating that:
Such an amorphous statement as "widely perceived as grossly
unfair" hardly provides a reviewing court with substantive stan-
dards by which to evaluate agency action .... [A]fter reviewing
the statement in context, we are convinced that Congress in-
tended this statement as an admonition to the Secretary to use
this authority sparingly, not as a substantive standard defining
when to abate. 14
4
As further support for its conclusion, the Tenth Circuit pointed out
138. 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-706 (1988).
139. Md § 701(a).
140. In Brahms v. United States, 18 Cl. Ct. 471 (1987), the Claims Court held that a
decision by the IRS not to abate interest under I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1) was not judicially re-
viewable. The court seemed to conclude that I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1) was a statute that pre-
cluded review by its terms because of the discretionary, rather than the mandatory, nature
of the IRS's authority to abate interest. In Selman, the Tenth Circuit employed the
mandatory-discretionary distinction to support its conclusion that the second exception
found in 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) applies to preclude review, rather than the first.
141. Selman v. United States, 941 F.2d 1060, 1063 (10th Cir. 1991) (quoting Citizens
to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 403, 410 (1971) (citation omitted)). At the
district court level, the taxpayers had argued that the "no law to apply" standard laid down
in Overton Park was "without foundation and fatally flawed," and urged the district court to
adopt a different test. Selman v. United States, 733 F. Supp. 1444, 1446 (W.D. Okla.
1990). The district court declined the invitation to depart from Supreme Court precedent.
142. Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).
143. H.R. REP. No. 99-426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 844 (1986); S. REP. No. 99-313, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 208 (1986) (emphasis added).
144. Selman, 941 F. 2d at 1063-64.
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that the language of I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1) is permissive, and not
mandatory. 14 5 The Tenth Circuit also noted that the legislative history,
as embodied in both the House and Senate reports, states that "[t]he
Act gives the IRS the authority to abate interest but does not mandate that it
do so (except that the IRS must do so in the case of certain erroneous
refunds ... ).-146 The distinction drawn by the legislative history be-
tween the authority and the obligation to abate interest "dearly evinces
Congress's intent to commit the abatement of interest pursuant to sub-
section (e)(1) to the discretion of the Secretary."' 4 7 Given the lan-
guage, structure and legislative history, of I.R.C. § 6404(e) (1), the Tenth
Circuit concluded that "Congress meant to commit the abatement of




Selman is unwelcome news for taxpayers who are assessed interest
on an underpayment of tax and who believe that a portion of the interest
assessment is due in whole or in part to errors or delays by ,the IRS.
Since it is now fairly established that judicial review is not available,
practical experience leads one to the pessimistic conclusion that abate-
ments under I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1) will be sparingly granted by the I.R.S.
VII. STATUS OF RESERVED INTEREST IN OIL AND GAS LEASE
DETERMINED TO BE OVERRIDING ROYALTY RATHER THAN
PRODUCTION PAYMENT: YATES V CoMMIsSIONER 
14 9
A. Background
When the owner of an oil and gas lease assigns his rights in the
145. I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1) (1988) states that "the Secretary may abate the assessment."
(Emphasis added). The word "'[m]ay,' unlike 'shall,' is not a word of command, but of
permission." Bergen v. United States, 569 F.2d 1197, 1198 n.3 (Ct. Cl. 1977), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 939 (1977). This language is to be contrasted with the language utilized in I.R.C.
§ 6404(e)(2) (1988), relating to interest abatements on erroneous refund checks. There,
the "Secretary shall abate the assessment of all interest on any erroneous refund .... " Id.
(emphasis added). "The fact that Congress employed both permissive and mandatory lan-
guage indicates that Congress intentionally sought to commit the former to the agency's
discretion while controlling the agency's action in the latter." Selman, 941 F.2d at 1064.
Selman had also argued that the doctrine of "no law to apply" should be curtailed by
the strong presumption favoring judicial review, which can only be overcome by clear and
convincing evidence of a contrary legislative intent. See, e.g., Abbott Lab. v. Gardner, 387
U.S. (1967). According to the Supreme Court, this burden can be carried "whenever the
congressional intent to preclude judicial review is 'fairly discernable in the statutory
scheme.'" Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 351 (quoting Data Process-
ing Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970)). Based upon the its analysis of the permis-
sive nature of I.R.C. § 6404(e)(1), the Tenth Circuit concluded that "congressional intent
to preclude judicial review is 'fairly discernible in the statutory scheme' of I.R.C.
§ 6404(e)." Selman, 941 F.2d at 1064.
146. Selman, 941 F.2d at 1064 (quoting H.R. REP. No. 99-426, 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
844 (1986); S. REP. No. 99-313, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 208 (1986)).
147. Id.
148. Id. The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 1991. Horton Holmes,
Inc. v. United States, 936 F.2d 548 (11th Cir. 1991). See supra note 135.
149. 924 F.2d 967 (10th Cir. 1991).
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lease and retains an interest in either production or proceeds of produc-
tion, the interest of the assignor may take various forms. Generally, the
retained interest will be structured as an overriding royalty. If the re-
tained interest is a royalty, the assignment transaction will be treated as
a sublease and payments made to the holder of the royalty will be taxed
as ordinary income, subject to cost or percentage depletion. °50 If the
retained interest is structured as a "production payment," however, the
transaction will be treated as a sale, and income in respect of the pro-
duction payment may be reported as capital gain.
151
A production payment has been defined by the Supreme Court as
"the right to a specified sum of money, payable out of a specified per-
centage of the oil, or the proceeds received from the sale of such oil, if,
as and when produced."' 5
2
If an interest is to be classified as a production payment, the right
must have an expected useful life of shorter duration than the economic
life of the burdened mineral property. 153 In other words, the life of the
retained interest cannot be coextensive with the life of the burdened
property. In this regard, the Fifth Circuit, in United States v. Morgan,154
has stated the test as follows:
(1) Could ordinarily prudent persons dealing in mineral lands
or mineral leases, with knowledge of all facts then generally
known or ascertainable, upon reasonable inquiry, pertaining to
the lands and lease... involved, have reasonably expected, on
150. See I.R.C. §§ 613 and 613A (1988). The availability of percentage depletion to a
particular mineral interest owner is subject to various definitional and mathematical
limitations.
151. Whether a particular receipt constitutes ordinary income or capital gain had
greater consequences prior to the enactment of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, which elimi-
nated the income tax bracket differential between ordinary income and capital gains.
However, that differential has been reinstated to a slight extent, see id § 1(h), and propos-
als are continuously being presented in Congress to reinstate a more substantial income
tax bracket differential between ordinary income and capital gains. See, e.g., § 2101 of
H.R. 4210, the ill-fated Tax Fairness and Economic Growth Act of 1992, passed by both
Houses of Congress on March 20, 1992, but immediately vetoed by President Bush.
Moreover, the characterization of an item as capital gain or loss has continuing signifi-
cance in the calculation of net capital gain or loss, see id § 1222, and limitations on the
deductibility of capital losses, see id § 1211.
152. Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404, 410 (1940).
153. Treas. Reg. § 1.636-3(a)(1) (1973) defines the term "production payment" as the
following:
[A] right to a specified share of the production from mineral in place, (if, as, and
when produced), or the proceeds from such production. Such right must be an
economic interest in such mineral in place. It may burden more than one mineral
property, and the burdened mineral property need not be an operating mineral
interest. Such right must have an expected economic life (at the time of its creation) of shorter
duration than the economic life of one or more of the mineral properties burdened thereby. A
right to mineral in place which can be required to be satisfied by other than the
production of mineral from the burdened mineral property is not an economic
interest in mineral in place. A production payment may be limited by a dollar
amount, a quantum of material, or a period of time. A right to mineral in place has an
economic life ofshorter duration than the economic life ofa mineral property burdened thereby
only if such right may not reasonably be expected to extend in substantial amounts over the
entire productive life of such mineral property.
(Emphasis added).
154. 321 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1963).
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or about [the date of the assignment] that the alleged oil pay-
ment then reserved by taxpayer upon the .. assignment by
him of the mineral lease... would be paid out before the expi-
ration of the lease, and (2) did [taxpayer] then so expect? 155
Addressing the first, or objective, prong of this test, the Morgan
court noted:
[The IRS] has acknowledged in private letter rulings that the
possible classification of an oil payment as an overriding royalty
because its life may be coextensive with the life of the property
out of which it is payable can be successfully avoided by putting
a "floor" on the oil payment which would make it impossible
for the economic interest to extend over the life of the prop-
erty. For example, if the assignment creating the oil payment
provided that the interest would be extinguished when the esti-
mated recoverable reserves were reduced to a specified
amount, the term of the oil payment would not be coextensive
with the life of the property .... 156
These tax strategies were put to the test in Yates.
B. Facts
Yates had acquired three separate oil and gas leases of federal min-
erals through the federal noncompetitive lottery of oil and gas leases
conducted by the Bureau of Land Management of the U.S. Department
of Interior. 57 One of the leases, acquired in 1975, covered acreage in
Golden Valley County, North Dakota, while the other two leases, ac-
quired in 1977, covered acreage in Campbell County and Converse
County, Wyoming. 158 Yates had paid a $10 filing fee and a $1 per acre
annual delay rental for each lease. Yates assigned the Wyoming lease
acreage in 1981, and the North Dakota lease acreage in 1982, to three
separate corporations interested in exploring the acreage for oil.' 59
Each of the three lease assignments reserved an "overriding royalty" to
Yates that would terminate when 90% of the oil or gas had been pro-
duced. 160 In structuring the assignment, Yates and his advisor Mc-
155. I at 786.
156. Id. at 787 n.3 (quoting CLARK W. BREEDING & A. GORDON BURTON, INCOME TAXA-
TION OF OIL AND GAS PRODUCTION § 2.07 (1961)).
157. As required by 30 U.S.C. § 226(c) (1988), the lottery system leases were not
within known geological structures of a producing oil or gas field.
158. Campbell and Converse Counties are located in the Powder River Basin, which
attracted much drilling activity in the early 1980's.
159. For his $30 investment, and after paying annual delay rentals of approximately
$3735 per year, Yates received $112,000 from Davis Oil Co. for the Converse lease,
$309,147 from Lear Petroleum Exploration for the Campbell County lease, and $250,000
from Anadarko Production Co. for the Golden Valley lease. Yates v. Commissioner, 92
T.C. 1215, 1218 (1989).
160. The lease assignments designated the retained interests as overriding royalties;
however, this fact does not control the classification of the retained interest for federal
income tax purposes. See Commissioner v. P.G. Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1950); Morgan,
321 F.2d 781. Treas. Reg. § 1.636-3(a)(2) (1973) also provides in part that:
A right which is in substance economically equivalent to a production payment
shall be treated as a production payment... regardless of the language used to
describe that right, the method of creation of such right, or the form in which
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Caw16 1 were apparently attempting to heed the advice cited in
Morgan 16 2 by placing a "floor" on the payment which would make it
impossible for the economic interest to extend over the entire life of the
burdened property.
Taking the position that the income should be classified as a pro-
duction payment, Yates reported the income paid to him by the lease
assignees as capital gain.1 63 The IRS took the position that the retained
interest was an overriding royalty, and thus the payments received by
Yates in 1981 and 1982 were advance payments on the royalties prior to
production, taxable as ordinary income subject to depletion. 16 4 Yates
filed a petition with the Tax Court, which sided with the IRS. 16 5 Yates
appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit16 6 summarized the applicable Treas-
ury Regulations as generally requiring that a "production payment"
contain the following factors: (1) the income must derive from a right
to a specific share of a production; (2) this right must have an expected
economic life, at the time of its creation, of shorter duration than the
economic life of the mineral property; (3) the right must be an eco-
nomic interest in the mineral in place; (4) this right may only be satis-
fied by the production of the minerals; and (5) this right must be limited
such right is cast (even though such form is that of an operating mineral interest).
Whether or not a right is in substance economically equivalent to a production
payment shall be determined from all the facts and circumstances....
The language in each of the three lease assignments was essentially identical, provid-
ing that:
Assignor hereby excepts and reserves an overriding royalty of [varying percent-
ages] of the proceeds received from the sale of all (8/8ths) of the oil and gas
which may be produced.., from said lands ... until such time as the then estimated
recoverable reserves... are IOro or less whereupon said overriding royalty shall automatically
terminate....
Yates v. Commissioner, 924 F.2d 967, 969 (10th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added). The per-
centages were: Converse County, 5%; Campbell County, 7.5%o; and Golden Valley
County, 6.25%. Yates, 92 T.C. at 1218.
161. Jack McCaw was a landman and was manager of the land department at Yates
Petroleum Corp. Yates, 92 T.C. at 1217.
162. See supra text accompanying note 156.
163. The corporate assignors all deducted the payments as royalties. Yates, 92 T.C. at
1220.
164. The deficiencies were $131,475 for 1981 and $52,497 for 1982. Id. at 1216.
165. Yates, 92 T.C. 1215. Paraphrasing the Morgan test, the Tax Court analyzed the
question by inquiring:
[W]hether there was a reasonable prospect that the retained share of proceeds
from the oil produced from any of the subject properties, up to the time that 90
percent of the recoverable reserves had been extracted, would in substance be
paid out prior to the extraction of 100 percent of the recoverable reserves, and
whether petitioners so expected.
Id. at 1226.
Based upon Yates's own evidence that the prospects of productivity were one chance
in five, the Tax Court concluded that at the time of the assignments the likelihood of
commercial production was small. Id. at 1229. The payments from the corporate assignees
were thus held to be advances against an overriding royalty, taxable as ordinary income.




by either a dollar amount and a quantum of mineral or by a period of
time. 16 7 The parties and the court agreed that only the second of these
requirements was at issue in this case.
As stated in the Treasury Regulations, the right "must have an ex-
pected economic life (at the time of its creation) of shorter duration than the
economic life of one or more of the mineral properties burdened
thereby."1 68 The Tenth Circuit approved the standard applied by the
Tax Court1 6 9 and restated the standard in language employed by the
Fifth Circuit in Morgan:
[C]ould ordinarily prudent persons dealing in mineral
lands or mineral leases, with knowledge of all facts than gener-
ally known or ascertainable upon reasonable inquiry pertaining
to the lands and lease here involved, have reasonably expected
on [the date of each lease assignment], that the alleged oil pay-
ment then reserved by taxpayer... would be paid out before
the expiration of the lease, and .. .did [taxpayer] then so
expect?1
70
There was little question that Yates had a subjective expectation
that the lease acreage would be productive.' 7 ' The Tenth Circuit thus
turned to an examination of whether Yates had a reasonable objective
expectation that the reserved oil payment be paid out before the expira-
tion of the lease. If he did not, then the reserved interest would be
viewed as running coextensively with the life of the underlying lease,
and would thus be classifiable as a royalty.' 72 Stated another way, there
167. Yates v. Commissioner, 924 F.2d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1991). The definition is
distilled from Anderson v. Helvering, 310 U.S. 404 (1940), and Thomas v. Perkins, 301
U.S. 655 (1937).
168. Treas. Reg. § 1.636-3(a)(1) (1973) (emphasis added).
169. See supra note 165.
170. Yates, 924 F.2d at 970-71 (quoting United States v. Morgan, 321 F.2d 781, 786
(5th Cir. 1963)).
171. As to the Campbell County acreage, McCaw was encouraged by the fact that Lear
was obligated under the lease to drill a well within six months to a depth sufficient to test
the Minnelusa formation, and had already drilled a producing well one-half mile from the
lease property which was producing 400 barrels of oil per day. As to the Golden Valley
County acreage, McCaw knew that Anadarko was drilling an offset well to a depth of
10,000 to 12,000 feet at a cost of approximately $1 million. Based on seismic data, he
believed that the Golden Valley lease acreage was on the same oil field as this well, a belief
reinforced by the significant retained interest Anadarko was willing to give to Yates on top
of the large cash payment. Finally, McCaw believed that the Converse County lease acre-
age was located over an area with potentially five different productive zones, based on his
study of maps, well completion cards and petroleum information bulletins. Yates v. Com-
missioner, 92 T.C. 1215, 1219-20 (1989).
172. See Morgan, 321 F.2d at 786. In Morgan, the taxpayer assigned an oil and gas lease
for $71,400 and an oil payment of $10 million payable out of 1/16th of production. The
lease was wildcat, the nearest production being two miles away. The district court granted
the taxpayer's motion for summary judgment based on a literal reading of the Anderson
test, see supra text accompanying note 152, and held the interest to be a production pay-
ment. The Fifth Circuit, noting that the tax laws deal with economic realities and not legal
abstractions, fashioned the test quoted supra text accompanying note 155, and remanded.
On remand, the district court concluded that it was "not reasonable [on the date of assign-
ment] that anyone could have reasonably expected the sum of $10,000,000 to be paid
before the expiration of the lease" and held the payment to be an advance against an
overriding royalty. Morgan v. United Sates, 245 F. Supp. 388, 390 (S.D. Miss. 1964).
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cannot be an objective expectation that the oil payment will be paid out
prior to the expiration of the lease unless there is also an objective ex-
pectation that the lease will have production from which payment can be
made. The question thus became whether Yates's retained interest pos-
sessed "an expected economic life." In the view of the Tenth Circuit,
the word "expected"
[n]either notes nor means a mere possibility of production.
Some reasonable degree of certainty, but less than absolute, is
thus required. The regulations requires this expectation to ex-
ist and be measured at the time of its creation which, in the
instant case, would mean at the time each lease was assigned as
this was the time when the overriding royalty was created.
7
The expert witnesses for the IRS had testified that the chances of
obtaining production from the leases were anywhere from 1 out of 25 to
1 out of 1 2 0 .174 Yates had pointed to the fact that there were productive
wells in the vicinity of the lease acreage Yates had assigned. However,
the Tenth Circuit found that Yates had been able to identify only one
productive well in the vicinity of each of the leases, whereas there were
many dry holes in the same vicinity. The Tenth Circuit noted that many
factors, other than the mere existence of a producing well in the vicinity,
are to be taken into account in determining the probability of obtaining
production from particular lease acreage.
Relevant circumstances would include numerous factors such
as available geological and seismic information; the cost of
lease acquisition; the costs of exploring, drilling and produc-
ing; the price of oil and the price of its treatment and transpor-
tation costs; the probable pay-out; the prices received by the
taxpayer; the proximity of production as well as many other fac-
tors. It would be a rare case if any one or two of these factors
were alone controlling.
75
Considering all the evidence, the Tenth Circuit agreed that the objective
prong of the Morgan test had not been satisfied, and the payments to
Yates were properly characterized as advances on an overriding royalty,
taxable as ordinary income.
The Tenth Circuit conceded that "a taxpayer who attempts to cre-
ate a 'production payment' from nondeveloped property bears a difficult
burden of persuasion." 176 The court noted, however, that "it is not an
impossible burden. The significant issue remains the same, i.e., whether
there exists a reasonable likelihood of production on the lease assigned
as of the date the production payment is being reserved." 17 7 The fact
that Yates subjectively believed that there was a slight possibility of pro-
duction was not enough to carry his burden of proof, since some reason-
173. Yates, 924 F.2d at 970.
174. Id at 971. Under the evidence most favorable to Yates, the prospects of produc-
tivity were I out of 5, a figure accepted by the Tax Court. Yates, 92 T.C. at 1229. Such
findings of fact are not to be set aside unless dearly erroneous. See supra note 87.
175. Yates, 924 F.2d at 971-72.




able degree ofcertainty is required to satisfy the objective prong of the
Morgan test. "Oil and gas developers are 'world class' optimists and the
fact they may regard a slight chance of production being obtained as a
'reasonable expectation' does not make it so."117
D. Summary
Given the relatively insubstantial difference in income tax brackets
applicable to ordinary income and capital gains under current law, clas-
sification of a retained interest as an overriding royalty or a production
payment would not seem to have much current urgency. However, if an
income tax bracket differential is reinstated in the future, Yates provides
essential guidance for taxpayers concerning the standards the Tenth
Circuit will apply-and the burden that will be imposed-in determining
whether a particular retained interest is a "production payment."
Although the Tenth Circuit did not adopt aper se rule that no production
payment can ever be created out of nonproducing property, 179 a tax-
payer's burden will be particularly high when the retained interest re-
lates to undeveloped or unproven property.
VIII. PROPERTY DOES NOT "PASS" TO SURVIVING SPOUSE FOR
PURPOSES OF THE MARITAL DEDUCTION WHEN SURVIVING
SPOUSE SURRENDERS HER SURVIVORSHIP RIGHTS IN
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTE OVER ESTATE:
SCHROEDER V. UNITED STATES 
1 8 0
A. Background
The federal estate tax is imposed upon the value of every dece-
dent's taxable estate.18 1 The phrase "taxable estate" is defined as the
value of the decedent's "gross estate"'1 2 less certain deductions 18 3 al-
lowed under the Code. From an estate tax planning standpoint, the
marital deduction provided under I.R.C. § 2056 is the most important.
Under I.R.C. § 2056, "the value of the taxable estate shall.., be deter-
mined by deducting from the value of the gross estate an amount equal
to the value of any interest in property which passes or has passed from the
decedent to his surviving spouse."' 1 4 The marital deduction will be
available only if the property claimed to give rise to the marital deduc-
tion is considered to have "passed" from the decedent to the surviving
spouse.
As to property held jointly between a decedent and a surviving
178. Id
179. I&
180. 924 F.2d 1547 (10th Cir. 1991).
181. I.R.C. § 2001 (1988).
182. The value of the "gross estate" is determined by including the value of all the
decedent's property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, wherever situated, at the time
of his death. Id § 203 1(a). A series of important evaluation and inclusion rules are set
forth in id §§ 2032 to 2046.
183. Id §§ 2053 to 2056A.
184. Id. § 2056(a) (emphasis added).
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spouse, the Code specifically provides that an "interest in property shall
be considered as passing from the decedent to any person if... such
interest was, at the time of the decedent's death, held by such person
and the decedent ... in joint ownership with right of survivorship."
18 5
In Schroeder, a case of first impression in the federal estate tax area, the
Tenth Circuit was faced with the question whether property "passed"
from a decedent to his surviving spouse when the property had been
held in joint tenancy by the decedent and the surviving spouse, but the
surviving spouse had surrendered her survivorship rights to the prop-
erty in settlement of a dispute with the decedent's daughters from a pre-
vious marriage.
B. Facts
Thomas and Peggy Woodmansee were married for approximately
eighteen years. Thomas had two adult daughters from a previous mar-
riage, Martha Schroeder and Lou Ann Waters. Unbeknownst to Schroe-
der and Waters, Thomas created a substantial stock account with Merrill
Lynch in early July 1981, naming himself and Peggy as joint tenants with
a right of survivorship. Ten days later, Thomas executed a will provid-
ing that his property be placed in trust, the income from which was to be
used to provide for Peggy during the remainder of her life, with the
corpus of the trust to be divided equally between Schroeder and Waters
at Peggy's death. Both Schroeder and Waters executed an affidavit stat-
ing that they knew of the provisions of the will and of their father's in-
tent, and that both intended to honor their father's wishes. Two months
later, when the fair market value of the stock account was approximately
$229,843, Thomas died.
Pursuant to Peggy's survivorship rights in the stock account, the ac-
count passed directly to Peggy at Thomas's death and did not pass
through Thomas's will.1 8 6 Schroeder and Waters, however, felt that
185. Id § 2056(c)(5) (1988).
186. Although the property represented by the joint stock account did not pass to
Peggy pursuant to the terms of Thomas's will, under I.R.C. § 2040(a), the value of
Thomas's interest in the stock account would have been includable in determining his
gross estate. It should also be noted that the amount of a decedent's interest in jointly-
held property that is includable in the gross estate is not necessarily equal to his "interest"
in that property. The amount included is measured by the owners' relative monetary con-
tributions to the property. For example, the fact that A and B each own a one-half interest
in Blackacre as joint tenants does not mean that one-half the value of Blackacre will be
includable in A's gross estate upon her death. IfA had paid for Blackacre, the entire value
of Blackacre would be includable in her gross estate. Conversely, if B had provided all the
consideration in purchasing Blackacre, A would include nothing. See RICHARD B. STE-
PHENS ET AL., FEDERAL ESTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 4.12[4] (6th ed. 1991).
Presumably, however, only one-half of the stock account was includible in Thomas's
gross estate, under the "qualified joint interest" rules of I.R.C. § 2040(b). At the time of
Thomas's death, these rules provided that only one-half of a qualified joint interest is in-
cludible, and defined the term "qualified joint interest" to mean any interest in property
held by the decedent and the decedent's spouse as joint tenants or as tenants by the en-
tirety, but only if (a) the joint interest was created by the decedent, the decedent's spouse,
or both; (b) in the case of personal property, the creation of thejoint interest constituted a
gift in whole or in part; and (c) in the case of a joint tenancy, only the decedent and the
decedent's spouse are joint tenants. As a result of the enactment of the Economic Recov-
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Peggy had a "moral duty" to leave the principal of the stock account to
them and their children, consistent with the estate plan reflected in the
dispositive provisions of Thomas's will.
In February 1982, Peggy placed the stock account into a trust hav-
ing a neutral trustee to "maintain the peace and keep from being
sued."'18 7 One-fourth of the quarterly income from the trust was to be
distributed to Peggy, three-eighths to Schroeder, and three-eighths to
Waters. At Peggy's death, the principal in the trust account was to be
distributed in equal shares to Schroeder and Waters or their issue.
Thomas's interest in the joint stock account was included in the
gross estate on the estate tax return, and was also claimed as part of the
federal marital deduction under I.R.C. § 2056.188 The IRS disallowed
the portion of the marital deduction which was based upon the stock
account. The estate paid the deficiency and unsuccessfully claimed a re-
fund. Schroeder's husband, the executor of the estate, commenced a
refund suit in district court, which proved to be unsuccessful.1 8 9 On
appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The question before the Tenth Circuit1 90 on appeal was whether
Thomas's interest in the joint stock account "passed" to Peggy within
the scope of I.R.C. § 2056, so that the property qualified for the marital
deduction. The estate's position, of course, was that the property did
"pass" to Peggy, since the stock account was held in joint ownership
with right of survivorship at Thomas's death. 19 1 If the position of the
estate were accepted, the principal of the joint stock account would have
passed to Thomas's daughters without the imposition of an estate tax at
the parental level.
This result is inconsistent with the legislative purpose of the marital
deduction, which is to allow property to pass without the imposition of
an estate tax within the marital unit when one spouse dies. Absent the
existence of the marital deduction, an estate tax would be imposed on
ery Tax Act of 1981, a qualified joint interest is now defined as any interest in property
held by the decedent and the decedent's spouse as (a) tenants by the entirety, or (b) joint
tenants with right of survivorship, but only if the decedent and the spouse of the decedent
are the onlyjoint tenants. I.R.C. § 2040(b)(2) (1988). The qualified joint interest rules are
designed to sidestep the obvious difficulties inherent in determining the relative monetary
contributions that each spouse makes to marital property.
187. Schroeder v. United States, 696 F. Supp. 1426, 1428 (W.D. Okla. 1988).
188. Thomas died September 17, 1981. At that time, I.R.C. § 2056(c)(1)(A) limited
the marital deduction to the greater of $250,000, or 50% of the value of the gross estate
(calculated with certain adjustments). The Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 repealed
I.R.C. § 2056(c), and for estates of decedents dying after December 31, 1981, the marital
deduction is unlimited as to property passing to the surviving spouse in a manner other-
wise qualifying for the deduction.
189. Schroeder, 696 F.Supp. 1426.
190. The three-judge panel was comprised of ChiefJudge McKay, Judge Seymour, and
Judge John L. Kane, United States District Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by
designation.
191. See supra text accompanying note 185.
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the gross estate of the first spouse to die, and imposed again when their
surviving spouse dies, leaving the property to the children of the marital
unit. The children would receive the property only after an estate tax
had been imposed twice at the parental level.
The pre-1982 marital deduction provided a partial solution to this
problem and paid some deference to the notion that transfers between
spouses, being transfers within a single marital unit, should not be
taxed, or at least should not be fully taxed. As part of the "family orien-
tation" of the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, the marital deduc-
tion became unlimited, giving full effect to the notion that transfers
between spouses in the marital unit should not be taxed.' 92 The legisla-
tive history accompanying the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 pro-
vides that:
Because the maximum estate tax marital deduction gener-
ally is limited, under present law, to one-half of a decedents'
adjusted gross estate, the estate of a decedent who bequeaths
his entire estate to his surviving spouse may be subject to estate
taxes even though the property remains within the marital unit.
When the surviving spouse later transfers the property (often
to their children), the entire amount is subject to transfer taxes.
The cumulative effect is to subject their property to tax one and
one-half times, i.e., one-half upon the death of the first spouse,
and again fully upon the death of the second spouse. This ef-
fect typically occurs in the case of jointly held property. Be-
cause this additional tax falls most heavily on widows, it is often
referred to as the "widow's tax."
Although the committee recognizes that this additional tax
can be minimized through proper estate planning, it believes
that an individual should be free to pass his entire estate to a
surviving spouse without the imposition of any additional tax
193
The legislative history of the marital deduction clearly evinces an
understanding that the estate tax will be imposed upon the ultimate
transfer of the property to the next generation, although no estate tax is
to be imposed upon transfers between members of the marital unit. If
Thomas's estate plan had been structured so that his interest in the joint
stock account passed instead to the testamentary trust' 94 or directly to
Thomas's daughters, no marital deduction would be allowable. The es-
tate was in effect arguing that it could do indirectly what could not be
done directly, that is, pass property from the marital unit to the next
generation without the imposition of an estate tax.195
192. "[A] husband and wife should be treated as one economic unit for purposes of
estate and gift taxes, as they generally are for income tax purposes. Accordingly, no tax
should be imposed on transfers between a husband and wife." S. REP. No. 97-144, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 126 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N 105, 228.
193. H.R. REP. No. 97-201, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 158-64 (1981).
194. Subject to the possibility of structuring the arrangement as a "qualified termina-
ble interest property" trust, or "QTIP trust." I.R.C. § 2056(b)(7) (1988).
195. Peggy did not report the transfer of the stock account into the new trust on a gift
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Before addressing whether the property "passed" to Peggy, the
Tenth Circuit first considered the IRS's primary contention that the
matter was controlled by the "will contest regulation," which provides
that:
(1) If, as a result of a controversy involving the decedent's
will, or involving any bequest or devise thereunder, his surviv-
ing spouse assigns or surrenders a property interest in settle-
ment of the controversy, the interest so assigned or
surrendered is not considered as having "passed from the de-
cedent to his surviving spouse."
(2) If, as a result of the controversy involving the dece-
dent's will, or involving any bequest or devise thereunder, a
property interest is assigned or surrendered to the surviving
spouse, the interest so acquired will be regarded as having
"passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse" only if the
assignment or surrender was a bona fide recognition of en-
forceable rights of the surviving spouse in the decedent's es-
tate. Such a bona fide recognition will be presumed where the
assignment or surrender was pursuant to a decision of a local
court upon the merits in an adversary proceeding following a
genuine and active contest. However, such a decree will be ac-
cepted only to the extent that the court passed upon the facts
upon which deductibility of the property interest depends. If
the assignment or surrender was pursuant to a decree rendered
by consent, or pursuant to an agreement not to contest the will
or not to probate the will, it will not necessarily be accepted as
a bona fide evaluation of the rights of the spouse. 196
The Tenth Circuit pointed out that the will contest regulation is
consistent with the legislative history of I.R.C. § 2056, which provides:
If the surviving spouse takes under the decedent's will, the
interest passing to her is determined from the will. In this con-
nection proper regard should be given to interpretations of the
will rendered by a court in a bona fide adversary proceeding.
If, as a result of a controversy involving a bequest or devise to
the surviving spouse, such spouse assigns or surrenders an in-
terest in property pursuant to a compromise agreement in set-
tlement of such controversy the amount so assigned or
surrendered is not deductible as an interest passing to such
spouse.1
9 7
The Tenth Circuit found that the will contest regulation, when read
together with the legislative history, reflected at least two aspects that
seemed to be absent under the facts in Schroeder. First, the regulations
and the legislative history can be fairly read to implicitly require that the
''will contest" or "controversy" arise in some sort of formal adversarial
tax return, nor did she report the transfer as a sale of the account on her income tax
return.
196. Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(d) (1958).
197. S. REP. No. 1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1948), reprinted in 1948 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1163, 1226.
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proceeding, involving litigation and a judicial determination of the par-
ties' rights, or at least a settlement of such litigation. Second, the will
controversy must be one "involving the decedent's will, or involving any
bequest or devise thereunder."
The IRS relied heavily upon cases which had expansively applied
the will contest regulation to disallow claimed marital deductions. In
Citizens & Southern National Bank v. United States,19 8 the decedent had died
intestate owning property in Florida and in Georgia. After the dece-
dent's death, his wife and his son from a previous marriage entered into
an agreement under which she received $40,000 from the son in ex-
change for her statutory interest in the Georgia and Florida properties.
Relying upon the will contest regulation, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the
IRS's disallowance of the marital deduction based on the value of the
Florida and Georgia properties, and limited the deduction to the
$40,000 actually received by the surviving spouse.
The Fifth Circuit had relied upon the Second Circuit's broad inter-
pretation of the will contest regulation in United States Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner.1 99 In that case, the decedent intended to give his wife a life estate
with a power of appointment over a portion of his New York estate and
to have his wife inherit his villa in France. The latter disposition was
blocked by a French requirement that his daughters execute certain doc-
uments, which they refused to do. After negotiations, the daughters
agreed to execute the appropriate documents in exchange for the wife's
agreement to relinquish her power of appointment over the decedent's
New York property. The Second Circuit concluded that the wife could
not claim her marital deduction for the value of the New York property,
holding that the marital deduction was to be taken only for the property
which the wife actually received after the terms of the settlement agree-
ment had been fulfilled, i.e., the French property, which did not qualify
for the marital deduction. The Second Circuit stated that "[w]hen the
resolution of a controversy between the beneficiaries regarding the de-
cedent's property culminates in an agreement by which the surviving
spouse relinquishes property which qualifies for the marital deduction in
return for property which does not so qualify, [the will contest regula-
tion] is applicable."'
20 0
The Tenth Circuit strongly indicated that it would not follow either
United States Trust Co. or Citizens & Southern if faced with similar facts. The
court first pointed out that both the Second and Fifth Circuits had inter-
preted the phrase "contest" as used in the will contest regulation to in-
clude mere arms-length negotiations among beneficiaries. In the Tenth
Circuit's view, this is not enough to trigger application of the will contest
regulation. 20 1 The court likewise criticized the approach of Citizens &
198. 451 F.2d 221 (5th Cir. 1971).
199. 321 F.2d 908 (2d Cir. 1963).
200. Id. at 910-11.
201. The court described United States Trust Co. and Citizens & Southern as having ex-
panded the reach of the will contest regulation "well beyond its plain language.... to
included arms-length negotiations conducted between parties who have potentially adverse
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Southern in interpreting "the decedent's will, or involving any bequest or
devise thereunder" to "include transfers of property at death under in-
testacy statutes or spousal election." 2 02 The court declined to adopt
such as expansive interpretation when the property did not pass under
Thomas's will, or involve a bequest or devise under the will, but was
instead transferred pursuant to Peggy's right of survivorship.
Peggy's rights in the present case to ... the joint account do
not arise under Thomas' will. It is undisputed that Peggy sur-
rendered this property in settlement not of a will contest, but of
a more general controversy over the rightful passing of
Thomas' property considered as a whole. By its plain terms,
therefore, the will contest regulation is not dispositive here.
2 0 3
The Tenth Circuit then turned to the key question under I.R.C.
§ 2056: whether the stock account "passed" from the decedent to
Peggy. The court recognized that transfers of property by survivorship
rights concerning joint interests "passed" within the meaning of the
Code's marital deduction provision. Nevertheless, the court stated that
the stock account property did not "pass", to Peggy. Borrowing from
the reasoning of United States Trust Co. and Citizens & Southern, the court
construed the statutory "passing" requirement to mean "property to
which the surviving spouse retains her rights after resolution of all dis-
putes concerning the decedent's property, '20 4 regardless of the me-
dium by which the property passes.
[W]e find the reasons those courts articulated to broaden the
reach of the regulation to be persuasive in our own analysis of
what Congress intended by the "passing" requirement in the
marital deduction statute. To the extent a surviving spouse
surrenders her share of the decedent's property to other bene-
ficiaries not entitled to the marital deduction to avoid litigation
concerning her rights, it defies common sense to conclude that
this property "passed" to the surviving spouse.20 5
As support for its conclusion, the Tenth Circuit reiterated the con-
gressional purpose behind the marital deduction:
The marital deduction was designed to eliminate the "double-
taxation" that would result when the same property became
subject to tax upon the death of each spouse. Once property
passes outside of the interspousal unit, however, this exception
no longer applies. Under Schroeder's proposed interpretation,
property may exit the spousal unit without ever creating a taxa-
ble event. Congress clearly did not intend to replace double-
taxation with tax avoidance. 20 6
positions. Under this view, no litigation is required, much less court adjudication of vari-
ous parties' rights to the property of the deceased." Schroeder v. United States, 924 F.2d
1547, 1553 (10th Cir. 1991) (emphasis added).
202. Id.
203. Id
204. Id at 1553-54 (quoting Citizens & Southern Nat'! Bank v. United States, 451 F.2d
221, 227 (5th Cir. 1971) (emphasis added)).
205. Id. at 1554.
206. Id at 1555.
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Peggy did not retain any rights in the stock account after resolution
of the dispute, and the legislative purpose of the marital deduction
would be frustrated if the estate could claim a marital deduction with
respect to Thomas's interest in the account. The Tenth Circuit thus
held that no marital deduction was allowable for the value of Thomas's
interest in the account at his death.
D. Summary
As noted, Schroeder is a case of first impression not only in the Tenth
Circuit, but in the general area of federal estate taxation. The Tenth
Circuit's conclusion that the stock account did not "pass" to Peggy
within the meaning of I.R.C. § 2056, despite the nonapplicability of the
will contest regulation, rests squarely on firm policy grounds. If a con-
trary view were taken, beneficiaries could stage friendly "controversies"
with the goal of claiming a martial deduction for property that comes to
rest outside the marital unit in the next generation.
The Tenth Circuit's unwillingness to expansively apply the will con-
test regulation may also indicate a more general philosophy that the
Treasury Regulations should be construed narrowly, and invoked only
when the language of the Regulations is by its terms expressly relevant.
When interpreting and applying the broader provisions of the Code it-
self, however, the Tenth Circuit seems perfectly willing to invoke legiti-
mate policy concerns to reach proper results.
Schroeder did not resolve the proper treatment of property that a sur-
viving spouse receives from others in return for her relinquishment of
rights in the property otherwise qualifying for the deduction. The will
contest regulation again would appear to be inapplicable, because there
would be no true "will controversy," and because the controversy would
not involve the decedent's will or bequests or devises thereunder.
Under the analysis of United States Trust Co. and Citizens & Southern, how-
ever, which focuses on the state of affairs as they exist after all disputes
have been resolved, the property received by the surviving spouse in
exchange for relinquishing rights in jointly-held property should qualify
for the marital deduction, just as the $40,000 payment qualified in Citi-
zens & Southern.
IX. JUDGMENT CREDITOR'S CHOATE LIEN IN AFTER-ACQUIRED
PROPERTY PRIMES LATER-PERFECTED FEDERAL TAX LIEN:
McDERMOTT v. ZIoNS FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
2 0 7
A. Background
The Code grants a lien in favor of the United States upon all prop-
erty and rights to property, whether real or personal, belonging to any
person liable to pay any tax who neglects or refuses to pay the same
207. 945 F.2d 1475 (10th Cir. 1991).
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after demand.20 8 The general rule under the Code is that the general
federal tax lien arises at the time the assessment is made209 and contin-
ues until the liability for the amount so assessed is satisfied or becomes
unenforceable by reason of lapse of time.
2 10
The priority afforded competing federal tax liens and state-created
liens is a matter of federal law. 211 Secured creditors will generally have
priority over the federal tax lien if their state-created liens were fully
perfected and choate before the federal tax lien arose at the time of as-
sessment.212 Judgment lien creditors, however, are afforded special
treatment under the Code. The Code provides that the general federal
tax lien is not valid against any judgment lien creditor until notice
thereof has been filed by the IRS. 213 McDermott was an interpleader ac-
tion centering on the competing claims of a judgment lien creditor and
the IRS in real property located in Salt Lake County, Utah.
B. Facts
Zions First National Bank ("Zions") had obtained ajudgment in the
amount of $67,977.67 against the McDermotts onJune 22, 1987. Zions
properly docketed the judgment in Salt Lake County on July 6, 1987.
Under Utah law, Zions's lien attached to all of the McDermotts' real
property located in the county.2 14 The IRS obtained its lien by filing a
Notice of Federal Tax Lien on September 9, 1987. As a result of this
filing, the IRS's lien attached to all the McDermotts's owned and after-
acquired real and personal property. 215
On September 23, 1987, the McDermotts acquired title to real
208. I.R.C. § 6321 (1988). The lien secures the amount of the deficiency, plus any
interest, additional amount, addition to tax, assessable penalty and costs.
209. Assessments are little more than bookkeeping notations entered by the IRS on the
taxpayer's account indicating that the amount has been administratively determined to be
due and payable.
210. I.R.C. § 6322 (1988).
211. United States v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the U.S., 384 U.S. 323, 328
(1966); Allan v. Diamond T Motor Car Co., 291 F.2d 115, 116 (10th Cir. 1961). The gen-
eral federal tax lien" 'creates no property rights but merely attaches consequences, feder-
ally defined, to rights created under state law.'" Avco Delta Corp. of Can. Ltd. v. United
States, 459 F.2d 436, 440 (7th Cir. 1972) (quoting United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 51, 55
(1958)).
212. United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81 (1954).
213. I.R.C. § 6323(a) (1988). In Colorado, such notice is deemed to have been pro-
vided by the IRS (a) with respect to real property, upon the filing of a Notice of Tax Lien
with the Office of the Clerk and Recorder for the county in which the real property is
located; and (b) as to personal property, upon the filing of a Notice of Tax Lien with the
Colorado Secretary of State. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 38-25-102 (Supp. 1990).
214. Utah law provides:
From the time the judgment of the District Court or Circuit Court is docketed
and filed in the Office of the Clerk of the District Court of the County it becomes
a lien upon all the real property of the judgment debtor, not exempt from execu-
tion, in the county in which the judgment is entered, owned by him at the time or
by him thereafter acquired during the existence of said lien.
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-22-1 (1992) (emphasis added).
215. Even though not specifically stated in I.R.C. § 6321, the general federal tax lien
applies to after-acquired property. Glass City Bank v. United States, 326 U.S. 265 (1945).
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property in Salt Lake County. 2 16 The McDermotts already had a pur-
chaser for this property. However, in order to obtain title insurance for
the property to complete the sale, the McDermotts were required to ob-
tain releases from Zions and the IRS. The parties entered into an es-
crow agreement under which Zions and the IRS released their claims to
the Salt Lake County property, but reserved their rights to the cash pro-
ceeds of the sale. The escrow agreement provided that the priority of
the competing claims of Zions and the IRS would remain identical to the
priorities they held in the Salt Lake County property. 2 17 The escrow
agreement also called for the McDermotts to institute an interpleader
action so that a court could determine who was entitled to priority in the
proceeds of the sale.
In the district court,2 18 the IRS argued that its lien should have pri-
ority over the lien held by Zions because the latter was not "choate"
when the IRS filed its Notice of Tax Lien since the McDermotts did not
yet own the property. The district court sided with Zions in an unre-
ported decision, and the IRS appealed.
C. The Tenth Circuit's Opinion
The issue before the Tenth Circuit 2 19 was whether Zions's non-con-
tingent, or choate, lien on all of the McDermott's real property, per-
fected prior to the federal tax lien, took priority over the federal lien
when the competing lienors were each claiming an interest in after-ac-
quired property. As noted above, judgment lien creditors are among
the creditors who have priority over federal tax liens when their liens are
fully perfected and "choate" prior to the filing of the federal govern-
ment's Notice of Tax Lien. "The doctrine of choateness is intended to
protect the standing of federal liens. 'Otherwise, a State could affect the
standing of federal liens, contrary to the established doctrine, simply by
causing an inchoate lien to attach at some arbitrary time. ... ,220
216. The McDermotts had originally sold this property to two individuals in 1981, tak-
ing back a note and a deed of trust which secured the note with the purchasers' interest in
the property, such interest being conveyed to the public trustee. The purchasers defaulted
and, after some interim struggles and maneuvers, the McDermotts succeeded in getting
the trustee to notice a sale of the property, at which the McDermotts repurchased the
property by submitting a credit bid and assuming an underlying mortgage. McDermott v.
Zions First Nat'l Bank, 945 F.2d 1475, 1477-78 (10th Cir. 1991).
217. The escrow agreement provided, in relevant part:
The respective priorities of the parties to the cash proceeds shall be identical to
the priorities of the respective liens of the parties as they existed against the real
property as of September 23, 1987, after BruceJ. McDermott successfully bid and
purchased the property at the Trustee's Sale, notwithstanding the change in form
of the collateral.
Id. at 1477.
218. The interpleader action was originally brought by the McDermotts in state court,
but the United States removed the case to federal court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1)
(1988).
219. The three-judge panel consisted of Judge Tacha, Judge Seth and Judge Howard
C. Bratton, United States District Court for the District of New Mexico, sitting by
designation.
220. McAllen State Bank v. Sacenz, 561 F.Supp. 636, 639 (S.D. Tex. 1982) (quoting
United States v. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. 81, 86 (1954)).
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Whether a lien is choate is a federal question.22 1 For a prior lien on all
of a person's real or personal property to take priority over a federal tax
lien, the lien must be "perfected in the sense that there is nothing more
to be done to have a choate lien-when the identity of the lienor, the
property subject to the lien, and the amount of the lien are
established."
22 2
The Treasury Regulations acknowledge the judicially-created cho-
ateness doctrine in defining the term "judgment lien creditor" for pur-
poses of the Code.2 23 The position of the IRS on appeal in McDermott
was that the "property subject to the lien" had not been established as
required by this definition, and that the lien was therefore not choate.
Because the choateness doctrine requires that the property subject to
the lien be established, the IRS argued, a judgment lien creditor can
only acquire a perfected or choate lien with respect to property owned
by the debtor at the time the judgment creditor obtains his lien. There-
fore, after-acquired property of the debtor would be subject to a supe-
rior federal tax lien if that lien was perfected by filing after the judgment
lien creditor obtained his lien, but before the debtor obtained owner-
ship of the property to which the competing liens attach. Since Zions's
judgment lien did not become choate until September 23, 1987, when
the McDermotts acquired title to the real property in question, the IRS's
lien, as perfected by its Notice of Federal Tax Lien filed on September 9,
1987, would take priority. The Tenth Circuit rejected the IRS's position,
holding that a judgment lien creditor having a choate lien on all of a
person's real property will take priority over a later-perfected federal tax
lien, even when the IRS and the judgment creditor are claiming after-
acquired property.
In support of its decision, the Tenth Circuit relied primarily on
United States v. Vermont. 224 In Vermont, the State of Vermont and the
United States held almost identical general tax liens upon all the tax-
payer's real and personal property. Vermont's lien arose approximately
221. United States v. Security Trust & Say. Bank, 340 U.S. 47, 49-50 (1950).
222. City of New Britain, 347 U.S. at 84.
223. The definition states that:
The term "judgment lien creditor" means a person who has obtained a valid
judgment, in a court of record and of competent jurisdiction, for the recovery of
specifically designated property or for a certain sum of money. In the case of a
judgment for the recovery of a certain sum of money, ajudgment lien creditor is a
person who has perfected a lien under the judgment on the property involved. A
judgment lien is not perfected until the identity of the lienor, the property subjet to the lien, and
the amount of the lien are established. Accordingly, ajudgment lien does not include
an attachment or garnishment lien until the lien has ripened into judgment, even
though under local law the lien of the judgment relates back to an earlier date. If
recording or docketing is necessary under local law before a judgment becomes
effective against third parties acquiring liens on real property, a judgment lien
under such local law is not perfected with respect to real property until the time
of such recordation or docketing. If under local law levy or seizure is necessary
before a judgment lien becomes effective against third parties acquiring liens on
personal property, then a judgment lien under such local law is not perfected
until levy or seizure of the personal property involved....
Treas. Reg. § 301.6323(h)-l(g) (1976) (emphasis added).
224. 377 U.S. 351 (1964).
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three and one-half months prior to the federal tax lien. As in McDermott,
the United States argued that a state-created lien had to attach to spe-
cific property in order for it to take priority. The Supreme Court held
that both liens were equally perfected as to all the taxpayer's property
and were choate at the time the liens arose.2 25 Therefore, when both
governments attempted to satisfy their liens with the same after-ac-
quired property, Vermont's lien took priority since it arose first.
2 26
The Tenth Circuit concluded that Zions's lien was no less choate
than was Vermont's in United States v. Vermont. Zions's lien "was not con-
tingent, it was docketed, specific in amount, and fully enforceable
against any real property owned by the McDermotts in Salt Lake County
during the pendency of the lien."' 2 27 The Tenth Circuit thus concluded
that "judgment lien creditors who perfect their liens before the filing a
federal tax lien have priority," 2 28 even where the property against which
the competing liens are asserted is after-acquired property.
D. Summary
McDermott should allay any fears of judgment lien creditors about
the priority of their liens over competing federal tax liens with respect to
after-acquired property. If the judgment lien creditor's lien becomes
choate prior to the filing of notice of the federal tax lien under the cho-
ateness doctrine, as reflected in the Treasury Regulations and as inter-
preted by the courts, the federal lien will not prime the judgment lien.
X. No DEDUCTION FOR INTEREST ATRIBUTABLE TO NONRECOURSE




The Code generally allows taxpayers to deduct "all interest paid or
accrued within the taxable year on indebtedness. '2 0 However, for such
225. Id. at 358-59.
226. Id at 354, 359.
227. McDermott v. Zions First Nat'l Bank, 945 F.2d 1475, 1481 (10th Cir. 1991).
228. Id
229. In an unpublished Order and Judgment ("the Order"), 937 F.2d 616 (10th Cir.
1991), the Tenth Circuit affirmed the Tax Court's decision in Ames v. Commissioner, 58
T.C.M. (CCH) 1470 (1990). The Order is reprinted at 91-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
50,363. The Order has no precedential value and may not be cited or used by any court
within the Tenth Circuit, except for purposes of establishing the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. 10TH CIR. R. 36.3.
230. I.R.C. § 163 (1988). The taxable year at issue in Ames was 1981. Subsequently,
I.R.C. § 163 was substantially amended, particularly by the Tax Reform Act of 1986. To-
day, the deductibility of interest generally turns on the classification of that interest as
either "investment interest" (generally deductible only to the extent of net investment
income, see id. § 163(d)); "qualified residence interest" (consisting of either acquisition
indebtedness or home equity indebtedness with respect to any qualified residence of the
taxpayer, subject to various definitional and other limitations, see id. § 163(h)(3)); interest
paid or accrued on indebtedness allocable to a trade or business (generally, fully deducti-
ble); or "personal interest" (generally all types of consumer interest other than the forego-
ing, fully nondeductible for 1991 and later tax years, see id. § 163(h)).
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interest to be deductible, there must be a valid and legitimate "indebt-
edness" in respect to which the interest is payable.231 Special consider-
ations arise when the debt is nonrecourse and the secured lender may
only look to the encumbered property in the event of default. Courts
will generally not view nonrecourse debt as legitimate if the amount of
the obligation bears no reasonable relationship to the value of the prop-
erty securing the payment of the debt. Where the amount of the indebt-
edness far exceeds the fair market value of the property securing the
debt, the borrower/taxpayer will be considered as having no economic
incentive to meet the debt service payments because the taxpayer will
never obtain any equity in the property. All other things being equal, the
taxpayer will be viewed as having no other incentive but to simply aban-
don the property to the secured lender. Since the indebtedness is un-
likely to be repaid in these circumstances, it will not ordinarily be
recognized for tax purposes.
232
B. Facts
Henry Ames was one of several taxpayers who participated in a tax
shelter arrangement involving fifty-two vacation homes in the Park City,
Utah, area. In 1980, Ames233 purchased a timeshare unit in one of these
vacation homes, which gave him the right to occupy the home for one
day each year. The purchase price wals $2775, of which Ames paid $650
down, leaving an unpaid principal of $2125. The sales contract with the
seller of the vacation homes23 4 called for interest to be paid on the
$2125 at the rate of 188%o ($3995) per year for the first fourteen years,
and 47% ($998.75) per year for the remaining sixteen years. Ames
agreed to pay $465 per year for the first ten years to be applied to inter-
est. No further principal or interest payments were required until thirty
years from the purchase date, when a balloon payment of principal and
accrued but unpaid interest equal to $69,475 would be due and payable.
At that time, because the debt was nonrecourse, Ames was effectively
faced with the choice of either forfeiting his interest in the timeshare
unit to his lender, or making the balloon payment of $69,475 and be-
coming the owner of the timeshare unit.
231. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 81 (1960); Durkin v. Commissioner,
872 F.2d 1271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 824 (1989); Norton v. Commissioner, 474
F.2d 608 (9th Cir. 1973); Narver v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 53, aff'd without published opin-
ion, 670 F.2d 855, (9th Cir. 1982).
232. See, e.g., Lebowitz v. Commissioner, 917 F.2d 1314 (2d Cir. 1990); Odend'hal v.
Commissioner, 748 F.2d 908 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1143 (1985); Estate of
Franklin v. Commissioner, 544 F.2d 1045 (9th Cir. 1976). In addition, highly contingent
or speculative obligations, recourse or nonrecourse, are not recognized for federal income
tax purposes. Fox v. Commissioner, 731 F.2d 230 (4th Cir. 1984); Brountas v. Commis-
sioner, 73 T.C. 491 (1979).
233. In actuality, the husband-and-wife taxpayers formed a partnership, "Ames and
Ames," to avoid Utah usury law. The partnership then elected to utilize the accrual
method of accounting.
234. Kilburn Vacation Home Shares, Inc. owned the vacation homes. Kilburn had con-
verted the homes to time shares, dividing each home into 350 days and reserving the
remaining 15 days for maintenance and cleaning. The timeshare units were then marketed
though a dealer, Affiliated Development Corp., and by secondary dealers.
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In 1980 and 1981, the taxpayers claimed a deduction for interest in
the amount of $3995.235 The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's
disallowance of the interest deductions, finding that the investment in
the timeshare units did not constitute genuine indebtedness. 23 6 The
taxpayers appealed.
23 7
C. The Tenth Circuit's Order
At the Tax Court level, the taxpayers had theorized that the
timeshare unit would appreciate from 12.7% to 23% per year during the
life of the purchase contract, due to inflation and other factors. It was
therefore contended that the purchase was a sound business investment,
and that the property would have a fair market value at all times equal to
the amount of the payoff figure for the loan. The Tax Court, while in no
way accepting these projections, had concluded that the opposite was
true. Due to the fact that the interest rate was front-loaded at 188% for
the first fourteen years, and then accrued at the rate of 47% per year for
the final sixteen years, the payoff figure for the indebtedness would al-
ways be much higher than the fair market value.
23 8
The Tenth Circuit 23 9 concluded that the "record well supports this
conclusion" 2 40 and accepted the findings of the Tax Court.24 1 It
235. This represented an approximate write-off ratio of 8.6:1 as compared with the
annual payment of $465.
236. Ames v. Commissioner, 58 T.C.M. (CCH) 1470 (1990).
237. There were many other participants in the Park City arrangement, whose appeals
lie variously in the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeal. The
Fifth and Ninth Circuits have both recently affirmed the Tax Court's decision in Ames with
respect to some of these taxpayers. See Lukens v. Commissioner, 945 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.
1991); and Hildebrand v. Commissioner, 92-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,350.
238. The Tax Court had also examined whether the $2775 purchase price for the
timeshare unit bore any relationship to its actual fair market value, or alternatively,
whether the purchase price was inflated. After an extensive review of the testimony prof-
fered by various expert witnesses from both parties, the Tax Court found that the
timeshare unit had a fair market value of $791.80 on the date it was purchased, an amount
that was far less than the purchase price of $2775. Thus, even if the Ames' expert witness
was accurate in his assessment of the percentage increases in fair market value that could
be expected over the life of a contract, those percentage increases, when applied to the
lower figure of $791.80, would never cause the fair market value of the property to exceed
the accrued amount of the debt.
This disparity between the fair market value and the payoff amount would con-
tinue throughout the life of the loan. Petitioners would never have any equity in
the property; in fact, they would always have a negative equity because the payoff
amount would always exceed the fair market value of the property.
Ames, 58 T.C.M. at 1490.
239. The three-judge panel was composed ofJudge Anderson,Judge Tacha and Judge
Brorby.
240. Ames v. Commissioner, 91-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 50,363 at 89,289.
241. The determination of the Tax Court concerning the fair market value of property
such as the timeshare unit is a finding of fact reviewable under the clearly erroneous stan-
dard. Morris v. Commissioner, 761 F.2d 1195 (6th Cir. 1985). The Tax Court is free
either to accept or to reject expert testimony if the testimony does not withstand careful
analysis, and may disregard proffered expert opinion altogether and reach a determination
of value based upon its own evaluation of the evidence in the record. Helvering v. Na-
tional Grocery Co., 304 U.S. 282 (1938); Silverman v. Commissioner, 538 F.2d 927 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 938 (1977); In re Williams' Estate, 256 F.2d 217 (9th Cir.
1958); Parker v. Commissioner, 86 T.C. 547 (1986). The Tenth Circuit rejected the tax-
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"would be highly unlikely that the obligation would ever be paid" be-
cause it would always "cost far more to pay the debt than the property
would be worth."'24 2 The court concluded that the only "economic in-
centive to retain this timeshare unit was the hoped-for ability to deduct
from federal taxes far more interest than would ever be paid."
'2 43
In light of these determinations, the Tenth Circuit had little trouble
upholding the Tax Court's determination that the indebtedness had no
economic substance. The Commissioner's disallowance of the claimed
interest deductions was therefore upheld.
D. Summary
Ames should come as no surprise. The Tax Court and the Tenth
Circuit followed accepted precedent in holding that interest payable in
connection with nonrecourse obligations may not be deducted under
the Code in circumstances where the amount of the nonrecourse indebt-
edness far exceeds the fair market value of the property. The aggressive
tax shelter scheme fashioned in Ames was particularly vulnerable to this
analysis. In such cases, the debt will be viewed as having no substance,
and the interest deductions attributable to the debt will be swept
away.2 4
4
payers' contention on appeal that the Tax Court had erroneously excluded the conclusion
of its expert witness, had not given proper consideration to the admission of the Commis-
sioner's expert with respect to the projected rate of inflation over the next thirty years, and
had not paid sufficient deference to the opinions of experts about the fair market value of
the timeshare unit on the date of purchase. Ames, 91-2 U.S. Tax. Cas. 1 50,363 at 89,289.
242. Ames, 91-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 50,363 at 89,289.
243. Id
244. The Tenth Circuit's Order reserved comment on the merits of Pleasant Summit
Land Corp. v. Commissioner, 863 F.2d 263 (3rd Cir. 1988), cert. denied sub nom. Commis-
sioner v. Prussin, 493 U.S. 901 (1989), and its application to the Ames' timeshare unit. In
Pleasant Summit, the Third Circuit held that a proportionate interest deduction should be
allowed to the extent of the fair market value of the collateral, at least in circumstances
where the incentive of the taxpayer and the lender would be to compromise the nonre-
course debt to amount of the pledged property's fair market value. The Tenth Circuit
declined to consider the "partial deduction" theory since Ames had raised the issue for the
first time on appeal. For a discussion of (and apparent disapproval of Pleasant Summit, see
Lukens v. Commissioner, 945 F.2d 92, 97-99 (5th Cir. 1991).
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CONSIDERING "CLAIMS CRISIS" CLAIMS CLEARLY
ARTHUR BEST*
Introduction. Critics of lawyers and tort law argue that a "claims cri-
sis" is undermining the nation's competitiveness, and that legal doc-
trines favor plaintiffs by encouraging insignificant claims and directing
too much compensation to all types of claims.' Proponents of that view-
point might be surprised that the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' deci-
sions in 1991 showed evenhanded treatment of important federal torts
issues concerning the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA")2 and proce-
dural and evidentiary principles, and concerning state law torts issues
raised in diversity cases. While the decisions of one circuit may not rep-
resent national trends and while a single year's work may not wholly
demonstrate the court's direction, a qualitative assessment of the deci-
sions is possible: they contradict the allegation that current tort litiga-
tion routinely favors plaintiffs.
General Description of Decisions. Several of the Tenth Circuit's FTCA
decisions are consistent with a restrictive trend that broadens the gov-
ernment's immunity under the discretionary functions exception. One
decision, however, exposed the United States to liability for the actions
of an alleged "independent" contractor at a public hospital.3 Applying
federal procedural doctrines, the court found that a $25 million punitive
damages award in a products liability case was excessive, but not based
on prejudice, and it reduced the amount by half rather than ordering a
new trial. Applying the Federal Rules of Evidence in several instances,
the court held that trial judges improperly excluded testimony by plain-
tiffs' experts.
Clarifying or applying state law, the court of appeals held that Indi-
ana's statute of repose for product liability cases does not violate the
United States Constitution, refusing to invalidate a pro-defendant legis-
lative choice. Another decision that contradicts the alleged plaintiff-ori-
ented trend in tort law held that, even after the adoption of comparative
fault, Wyoming's application of the rescue doctrine continues to include
an absolute requirement of a reasonable belief by the plaintiff that res-
cue was needed.
In decisions favoring plaintiffs, the court of appeals held that
Oklahoma and Kansas doctrines allow recovery in products liability
cases where the plaintiff's evidence of the defendant's noncompliance
* Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, University of Denver College of Law.
1. See, e.g., Peter W. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences (1988);
Studies cited in American Law Institute, Reporters' Study "Enterprise Liability for Per-
sonal Injury," 1 A.L.I. Reporters' Study 4 (1991).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 2680 (1988).
3. Bird v. United States, 949 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir. 1991).
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with the relevant standard is only circumstantial, that Colorado's statute
of limitations for personal injuries includes the anniversary date of the
injury, and that Colorado precedents currently permit punitive damages
for negligence in the context of breach of contract.
Federal Tort Claims Act Decisions. In three decisions, the court of ap-
peals applied the "discretionary function exception" of the FTCA, re-
lieving the United States of liability for claims "based upon the exercise
or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary
function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the
Government .... -4 The cases are Zumwalt v. United States,5 involving a
hiker's injury at a national monument and a claim that a trail was marked
inadequately; Johnson v. United States,6 involving a climber's death in a
national park and claims that recreational climbing was inadequately
regulated and that a rescue effort should have been started sooner and
accomplished better; and Redmon v. United States,7 involving a pilot's
death in a plane crash and claims that the Federal Aviation Administra-
tion ("FAA") negligently certified the pilot and negligently failed to be-
gin enforcement proceedings against him.
In analyzing these cases, the court of appeals relied on Berkovitz v.
United States.8 Berkovitz requires a two-step analysis. First, the court
must decide whether the challenged conduct is a matter of choice for the
employee or was specifically prescribed by a statute, regulation or
policy:
[T]he discretionary function exception will not apply when a
federal statute, regulation, or policy specifically prescribes a
course of action for an employee to follow. In this event, the
employee has no rightful option but to adhere to the directive.
And if the employee's conduct cannot appropriately be the
product of judgment or choice, then there is no discretion in
the conduct for the discretionary function exception to
protect. 9
Second, where challenged conduct involves an element of judg-
ment: a court must determine whether that judgment is the kind that the
discretionary function exception was designed to shield.... The excep-
tion, properly construed, therefore protects only governmental actions
and decisions based on considerations of public policy.' 0
A more recent Supreme Court decision, United States v. Gaubert,l
makes it clear that when government policy found in a statute, regula-
tion or agency guidelines allows an employee to exercise discretion, "it
must be presumed that the agent's acts are grounded in policy when
4. 28 U.C.C. § 2680(a) (1988).
5. 928 F.2d 951 (10th Cir. 1991).
6. 949 F.2d 332 (10th Cir. 1991).
7. 934 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1991).
8. 486 U.S. 531 (1988).
9. Id. at 536.
10. Id. at 536-37.
11. 111 S. Ct. 1267 (1991).
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exercising that discretion. ' ' 2 Gaubert stated:
For a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss, it must allege
facts which would support a finding that the challenged actions
are not the kind of conduct that can be said to be grounded in
the policy of the regulatory regime. The focus of the inquiry is
not on the agent's subjective intent in exercising the discretion
conferred by statute or regulation, but on the nature of the ac-
tions taken and on whether they are susceptible to policy
analysis. 13
In Zumwalt, the plaintiff was injured at Pinnacles National Monu-
ment, while hiking with his family on a trail identified in a Parks Service
pamphlet. Markers along the trail correspond to points of scenic inter-
est. The plaintiff became confused as to the trail's direction and walked
a few steps to his right. He then slipped on loose gravel, slid down an
incline, fell through the roof of a cave and landed on the cave floor suf-
fering severe and permanent injuries. He sought damages claiming that
the government had been negligent in its operation of the National
Monument.' 4 The district court granted a summary judgment motion,
holding that the challenged conduct involved protected policy
judgments.1
5
The plaintiff attempted to show that his cause of action was permis-
sible under the first Berkovitz requirement. The Park Service had de-
cided to construct and mark the trail on which he was injured, and had
also produced a Management Plan calling for improvements to the trail
to increase safety. The plaintiff argued that implementing these two
Park Service actions did not call for the exercise of any discretion.' 6
The court'of appeals rejected this contention, stating that the Park Ser-
vice actions were general in nature, and included no time limits. Neces-
sarily, park personnel would have to use individual judgment in
identifying portions of the trail that were hazardous, and in deciding
what types of improvements were necessary.'
7
Under the second Berkovitz requirement, the plaintiff asserted that
failing to warn hikers of the trail's dangers did not implicate any social,
economic or political policy judgments.18 That argument was plausible,
in light of earlier Tenth Circuit cases with similar facts where the FTCA
actions were permitted to be maintained for injuries allegedly caused by
failures to warn of thermal pools 19 or dangerous swimming condi-
tions.20 The court of appeals held, however, that the absence of signs in
the current case was part of an overall policy decision to maintain the
12. Id. at 1274.
13. Id. at 1275.
14. The plaintiff alleged negligent operation, ownership, maintenance, control, in-
spection or failure of inspection, and management. Zumwalt, 928 F.2d at 952.
15. Id. at 951-52.
16. Id. at 953-54.
17. Id. at 954.
18. Id. at 955 (quoting Boyd v. United States, 881 F.2d 895, 898 (10th Cir. 1989)).
19. Smith V. United States, 546 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1976).
20. Boyd v. United States, 881 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1989).
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trail in a wilderness state.2 1
The court supported that conclusion by referring to Park Service
Management Policies stating that wilderness areas will be administered
"in such manner as will leave them unimpaired for future use and enjoy-
ment as wilderness .. -22 The court quoted but did not specifically
refer to another portion of those Policies stating that " '[s]igns and
markers may be provided only where they are necessary for visitor
safety, management, or resource protection.' ",23 In Smith v. United
States24, there was testimony by a ranger that warnings were not given
because of a decision that they were not necessary, rather than because
of an overall plan to avoid use of warning signs.2 5 In Boyd v. United
States,2 6 there was no showing that omission of warnings to snorklers
and swimmers was based on any public policy considerations. The court
of appeals summarized the basis for distinguishing the earlier cases by
stating that "[t]he decision to leave the Trail in its wild state, whether
explicit or implicit, related directly to the overall scheme set out in the
Management Policies." 27 It held that decisions such as those challenged
by the plaintiff, which are components of an overall policy decision, are
protected by the discretionary function exception.
In Johnson,28 the plaintiff's decedent became separated from three
companions while climbing a mountain in Grand Teton National Park.
His companions completed the descent and then reported to rangers
that the decedent was overdue. Because of confusion over the identities
of various climbers, a decision to search for the decedent was delayed.
When the rangers finally undertook a helicopter search, they found the
decedent's body in about twenty minutes. He had apparently died from
hypothermia about six hours after rangers had first been notified that he
was missing. Allegedly, a helicopter search instituted when rangers
were first informed of the possible danger would have saved the dece-
dent's life. The district court granted summary judgment to the govern-
ment. On appeal, the court affirmed the summary judgment ruling
under the discretionary function exception.
The plaintiff sought to challenge Park Service decisions about the
warnings given to visitors concerning the hazards of mountain climbing,
as well as decisions not to require use of safety equipment and not to
"clear" the mountain at the end of each day. Those decisions were dis-
cretionary under the first part of the Berkovitz analysis, the court held,
because they were not prescribed by specific statutes or regulations. 29
With regard to the second portion of the Berkovitz analysis, the court
21. Zumwalt, 928 F.2d at 955.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 953-54 n. 3.
24. 546 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1976).
25. Id. at 877 n. 5.
26. 881 F.2d 895 (10th Cir. 1989).
27. Id. at 955.
28. 949 F.2d 332, 334-35 (10th Cir. 1991).
29. Id. at 336-37.
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held that the decisions involve public policy considerations, and are thus
the type of discretionary conduct that is meant to be insulated from judi-
cial scrutiny under the FTCA. The court referred to testimony describ-
ing the implicated policies, including a policy of recognizing that "many
Park visitors value backcountry climbing as one of the few experiences
free from government regulation or interference."
30
The plaintiff also alleged that rangers had responded negligently to
information that a climber was in danger. The court held that the Park
Service decisions about the timing of a rescue effort were also protected
from suit. The Service is not controlled by a specific statute or regula-
tion, so it passed the first prong of Berkovitz. To establish that they also
satisfy the "policy considerations" requirement, the court reviewed the
factors involved in rangers' decisions of this type. Those factors in-
clude: (1) limited human and economic resources; (2) visitors apprecia-
tion of the dangers of climbing and value "the individual freedom of a
backcountry experience;"''s and (3) variation in the risks inherent in a
climber's being overdue caused by terrain, the number of climbers, the
weather and the presence or absence of a leader at the scene. The court
concluded that the rangers' decisions are "grounded in social and eco-
nomic policy" 3 2 because they involve the balancing of these various fac-
tors. On that basis, application of the FTCA was properly prohibited.
In Redmon, wrongful death plaintiffs alleged that the decedent's
death in an airplane crash was caused by an FAA employee's negligent
change in the decedent's pilot certification. The district court dismissed
the claim on the basis of the discretionary function exception. That re-
sult was affirmed by the court of appeals.3 3 The employee changed the
decedent's certificate to conform to regulations issued by the FAA; the
agency had ruled that pilots who were rated for instrument flying (flying
by instruments where visibility is too low for ordinary piloting) on sin-
gle-engine aircraft could carry that rating over to multi-engine aircraft
without a practical flight test. That decision and a related grace-period
decision "fit squarely" within the agency's discretion to act to assure
safety in air commerce and to make decisions about use of its limited
resources to promote the goal of air safety.3 4
The Redmon plaintiffs also alleged that an FAA inspector violated
"specific mandatory" regulations when he failed to investigate and take
enforcement actions against the decedent. 35 That characterization of
their cause of action was motivated by Berkovitz, since failure to follow
prescribed requirements is conduct that is outside the protection of the
discretionary function exception. The court of appeals quoted portions
30. Id. at 337.
31. Id. at 339.
32. Id.
33. Redmon, 934 F.2d at 1157 (remand required because the district court had dis-
missed on the basis of lack of subject matter jurisdiction; the proper'treatment was sum-
mary judgment for the government).
34. Id. at 1156.
35. Id.
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of the statute and regulations, however, and characterized them as hav-
ing a "discretionary tone,"'3 6 and therefore different from the nondiscre-
tionary licensing and approval provisions at stake in Berkovitz. The
statute permits the Secretary of Transportation to reexamine any certi-
fied airman and amend, modify, suspend or revoke the airman's certifi-
cate if "safety in air commerce or air transportation and the public
interest requires. . .. ,"37 The corresponding regulations are similar in
stating that investigation of violation reports is discretionary.5 8 The
court stated that decisions concerning specific enforcement actions in-
herently involve a balancing of the goal of air safety and the "reality of
finite agency resources ... ",9
While Redmon seems clearly to be the type of case that the Congress
intended to cover by the discretionary function exception, the two Park
Service cases, Zumwalt and Johnson, present closer questions. To exag-
gerate the positions taken by the court of appeals in those cases, it could
be argued that they hold that park rangers can give inadequate consider-
ation to requests for help because resources are limited, and that park
administrators can ignore their own conclusions that better signs are
needed on a trail because questions of social policy are involved in con-
sidering whether to act reasonably in response to a request for rescue or
in following an agency's general plan for increasing safety on trails.
In its most recent opinion on this subject, the Supreme Court pro-
vided an example of conduct by a government employee that involves
discretion, but is not shielded by the discretionary function exception: if
a government official "drove an automobile on a mission connected with
his official duties and negligently collided with another car, the excep-
tion would not apply." 40 For the court of appeals, the way a park worker
responds to a rescue request is significantly different from the way that
same worker might respond, while driving, through heavy traffic making
decisions about whether to pass or stay in a lane. Berkovitz may require
that result, but the court of appeals seems highly willing to find social
policy implications (and thus characterize behavior as discretionary) in
conduct as mundane as failing to post signs that decision-makers have
described as needed or failing to respond to a claimed need for rescue.
That stance towards applying the teachings of the Berkovitz case strongly
contradicts claims of pro-plaintiff litigation trends.
Two decisions on procedural points also represent positions that
contradict the "claims crisis" image of compensation-oriented courts
routinely favoring plaintiffs. In Bradley v. United States,4 1 the plaintiff
specified his injury, in the required presentation of his claim to the rele-
36. Redmon, 934 F.2d at 1157.
37. 14 U.S.C. app. § 1429(a) (1988).
38. 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.3 and 13.5 (1991).
39. Redmon, 934 F.2d at 1154 (quoting United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797,
820 (1984)).
40. United States v. Gaubert, I11 S. Ct. 1267, 1275 n. 7 (1991).
41. 951 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1991).
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vant agency, as" 'in excess of $100,000.' ,42 The court of appeals held
that this claim was not definite enough to satisfy the statute's require-
ment of a "claim for money damages in a sum certain."'43 That failure
could be relied upon by the United States as a complete defense. The
court stated: "[w]e sympathize with Plaintiff's plight and recognize the
harsh result of our decision .... -144 But despite that empathy, the deci-
sion represents a point of view that narrows, rather than broadens,
plaintiffs' access to redress. On parallel facts, the Fifth Circuit reached
the opposite result, holding that a similar statement regarding the
amount of a claim complied with the government's need for information
used to determine its treatment of a plaintiff's claim.45
On another procedural issue, in Aldrich Enterprises, Inc. v. United
States,4 6 the Tenth Circuit consolidated its authority by abrogating its
practice of applying the "local judge" rule to give deference to interpre-
tations of state law by district court judges in FTCA cases. It reached
that result by analogy to Salve Regina College v. Russell,47 that dealt with
the issue in the context of diversity cases.4 8 If appellate courts are more
sensitive to broad policy problems than trial courts may be, then de-
creasing deference to trial court rulings may moderate the effect of any
pro-plaintiff trends influencing litigation at the trial level.
In one FTCA case, a district court's pro-defendant ruling was re-
versed. In Bird v. United States,49 the wrongful death plaintiff sought
damages for the death of his wife at a hospital operated by the United
States. The plaintiff claimed that the death was caused by negligence
on the part of a certified nurse anesthetist. The district court denied
recovery, finding that the nurse was an independent contractor and not
an employee of the United States.50 Closely reviewing the facts found
by the district court, the court of appeals stressed that the power to su-
pervise and control the nurse was vested in the hospital. It noted:
[s]ome concepts and relationships are inherently implausible-
a two-year old yearling, a white blackbird.., a certified regis-
tered nurse anesthetist serving in a hospital in the circum-
stances of this case under the license, supervision and control
of a surgeon or physician anesthesiologist as an integral part of
a government operating team, but at the same time as an in-
dependent contractor.5 1
Therefore, the court placed responsibility for the nurse's negligence on
the United States, and remanded the case.
42. Id. at 270.
43. 28 C.F.R. § 14.2(a) (1991).
44. Bradley, 951 F.2d at 271.
45. Martinez v. United States, 728 F.2d 694 (5th Cir. 1984).
46. 938 F.2d 1134 (10th Cir. 1991).
47. 111 S.Ct. 1217 (1991).
48. In applying that result to FTCA cases, the court relied, in part, on David Good-
night, Chaos on AppeaL" The Tenth Circuit's LocalJudge Rule, 67 DENv. U. L. REv. 515 (1990).
49. 949 F.2d 1079 (10th Cir. 1991).
50. Id. at 1080.
51. Id. at 1088.
1992] 1091
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
If our legal system were truly experiencing a pro-plaintiff revolu-
tion, one would expect the Tenth Circuit to interpret the FTCA excep-
tions narrowly, permitting the greatest number of victims of accidental
injuries to sue the government. Redmon, Zumwalt and Johnson show no
tendency in that direction. Neither is the result in Bradley, where "excess
of $100,000" was not a clear enough statement of the plaintiff's claim,
evidence of a pro-compensation trend. Furthermore, the abrogation of
the local judge rule in Aldrich Enterprises may be difficult to classify as
favoring either plaintiffs or defendants in general, but since it effects a
small reinforcement of the appellate court power, it may have a slightly
conservative impact. Only Bird is balanced against these decisions, re-
versing a government victory where the facts of the wrongdoer's em-
ployment were overwhelmingly clear to the appellate court.
Additional Federal Substantive Law. The court of appeals clarified re-
quirements of the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act,
sometimes referred to as COBRA. 52 Congress intended the statute to
prevent private hospitals from avoiding treatment of low income and
indigent patients. It covers any hospital that operates an emergency de-
partment and receives Medicare payments, and provides that when a
person presents himself for examination and treatment of a medical
condition, the hospital must give a screening examination to determine
whether an emergency medical condition exists. The hospital may not,
in general, transfer the person out of the hospital until his emergency
medical condition is stabilized.
In Abercrombie v. Osteopathic Hospital Founders Association,53 the jury
charges covered situations where a hospital complies with or violates
both of the COBRA requirements noted above, but were unclear as to
the hospital's liability if it failed to comply with any one of the two re-
quirements. Special interrogatories showed that the jury believed that
the hospital had complied with all of the statutory requirements, so any
error in the instructions was harmless.54 Nonetheless, the court of ap-
peals said that instructions should state that failure to comply with either
requirement subjects a hospital to liability.55
Furthermore, the court stated that this liability is strict, and does
not require a showing of negligence. A portion of the statute provides
for civil fines on proof that a hospital or its agent has negligently vio-
lated the statute, but the section establishing civil enforcement by indi-
viduals omits the word "negligently." This reflects a strict liability
standard.
56
52. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988). The acronym "COBRA" comes from Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 Pub. L. No. 99-272 § 9121, 100 Stat. 82, 184-
671.
53. 950 F.2d 676 (10th Cir. 1991).
54. Id. at 684.
55. Id. at 680.
56. Id. at 680-81. See also Stevison v. Enid Health Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 710, 713 (10th
Cir. 1990)(language stating that hospital "must" provide medical screening is mandatory
and imposes strict liability).
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Federal Procedure and Evidence Issues. One of the Tenth Circuit's 1991
torts cases exemplifies current tort law controversies. In Mason v. Texaco,
Inc.,57 the defendant failed to provide adequate warnings of the health
risks associated with use of its product, and the plaintiff's decedent, al-
legedly because of the defendant's failure, contracted cancer and died.
Liability for wrongful death was established and damages were set at $9
million in actual damages and $25 million in punitive damages. 58 The
court of appeals reduced the punitive damages by half, deciding that
although the award was excessive it was not the result of tainted jury
deliberations. 5 9 Another aspect of the case is highly significant. The
victim filed suit in 1978, and died in 1979. It was not until the end of
1991 that the court of appeals affirmed thejudgment against the defend-
ant. In broad outline, this case shows a major flaw of the torts system in
operation: it delivers a large sum of money to deserving plaintiffs, but
makes them wait a very long time to get it. Because the compensatory
damages were delayed so long, a kind of under-compensation has oc-
curred, despite the vast amount ultimately awarded.
Significantly, the Mason court analyzed the punitive damages award
by stating that "[i]t is well settled that mere excessiveness in the amount
of an award may be cured by a remittitur, whereas excessiveness which
results from jury passion and prejudice may not be so cured. In that
case, a new trial is required."'60 The appellate court agreed with the trial
court's rejection of the claim that the punitive damages award was the
product of passion, prejudice or bias. Detailing the district court's re-
view of relevant factors that could have supported the jury's verdict, the
appellate court supported its view against a finding of impermissible in-
fluence in regard to the amount of the award. Nevertheless, the court
used its remittitur power by reference to an earlier trial of the same case
in which the plaintiff sought only $8 million in punitive damages and did
not appeal the jury finding that no punitive damages were appropriate.
The court of appeals apparently relied upon the inconsistency be-
tween the jury's verdicts in the first and second trials of the as its basis
for ordering the remittitur. This may contradict the court's own quota-
tion from the concurring opinion of Justice Kennedy in Pacific Mutual
Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip,6 1 asserting that variation injury verdicts is a
necessary consequence of the use ofjuries in single cases as opposed to
the creation of a permanent body of decision makers. Following the
logic of Justice Kennedy, the disparate results by the two juries on the
question of punitive damages could have been considered an acceptable
consequence of our jury trial system. 6 2 Instead of reaching that conclu-
sion, the court of appeals chose to moderate the size of the judgment.
Some have cited the courts' willingness to intervene this way as the best
57. 948 F.2d 1546 (10th Cir. 1991).
58. Id. at 1548-550.
59. Id. at 1561.
60. Id.
61. 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).
62. Mason, 948 F.2d at 1559.
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approach to limiting occasional extraordinarily large verdicts, in con-
trast to the imposition of statutory limits on the size of verdicts. Thus
the Tenth Circuit's action may be characterized as neither pro-plaintiff
nor pro-defendant, but rather as a moderate response to the problems
posed by unusually large punitive damage awards.
In several cases, the court of appeals took the straight-forward posi-
tion that the Federal Rules of Evidence on expert testimony63 incorpo-
rate only minimal restrictions on the introduction of expert testimony.
In torts litigation, availability of expert witnesses may have crucial effects
on outcomes, and defendants will typically contend that experts offered
by plaintiffs do not have expertise adequately focussed on the topics in
dispute. The Tenth Circuit's opinions give full effect to the Congres-
sional choice embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence, and reject a
narrower approach that might have been available to trial judges under
earlier standards.
Illustrative of the appellate court's treatment of expert witness qual-
ification is its decision in Wheeler v. John Deere Co.,64 upholding the trial
court's admission of expert testimony. The trial court permitted a plain-
tiff's expert in a products liability case to testify that farm machinery,
manufactured by the defendant, was dangerous beyond the expectation
of the ordinary user. The witness was a mechanical engineer with exper-
tise in design of farm equipment; the court of appeals stated that inher-
ent in his field of work is "anticipation of how such equipment will be
perceived and used by consumers."'6 5 On that basis, it held that the tes-
timony was properly admitted.
6 6
State Law Decisions. The Tenth Circuit's decisions involving the ap-
plication of state law cover an array of issues that show both pro-plaintiff
and pro-defendant resolutions. These decisions are partly controlled by
state precedents and partly adopted within the narrow ambit for the
court's own interpretation of state law issues.
For example, an Indiana statute of repose for product-related inju-
ries was challenged as violative of the United States Constitution, in Al-
exander v. Beech Aircraft Corp.6 7 In line with decisions from the Seventh
Circuit, the Tenth Circuit rejected the challenge, stating that an unac-
crued cause of action is not a property right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. A limitation on product-related causes of action can there-
fore legitimately be imposed by a statute of repose that is related to leg-
islative purposes such as "avoiding the risks and cost of litigation to
manufacturers after a lengthy passage of time."
6 8
In a suit applying Wyoming law, the court of appeals applied the
63. Fed. R. Evid. 702 & 703.
64. 935 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1991).
65. Id. at 1100.
66. For a discussion of other evidence cases see Sheila Hyatt, Evidence Survey 69 DENy.
L. REv. (Aug. 1992).
67. 952 F.2d 1215 (10th Cir. 1991)(a Kansas district court applied Indiana law).
68. Id. at 1225.
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rescue doctrine in an action brought by the mother of a child. 69 The
child was erroneously given an overdose of medicine by hospital person-
nel. As the mother rushed to the hospital to be with the child, she was
injured in an auto accident. She sought damages for her injuries from
the hospital. The court of appeals held that, under the facts most
favorable to the plaintiff, the mother could not have had a reasonable
belief that a rescue was necessary since she knew that the hospital, where
the improper treatment had occurred, was caring for her child. For that
reason, the district court had properly granted summary judgment to
the defendant hospital.
70
The appellate court rejected the plaintiff's claim that Wyoming's
adoption of comparative negligence should be treated as modifying the
rescue doctrine's requirement that the plaintiff have had a reasonable
belief that rescue was needed. The court took this position with only a
brief reference to Wyoming's requirement of a "reasonable undertak-
ing" of a rescue.7 1 A comparative negligencejurisdiction may, however,
reasonably take the opposite view. For example, a recent decision of the
Michigan Supreme Court holds that a rescuer's own subjective belief
that rescue is needed can justify use of the rescue doctrine, so long as
that belief is reasonable, even if the intended object of the rescue is actu-
ally safe at the time the rescue is attempted.72
In product-related injury cases, plaintiffs sometimes have difficultly
establishing the precise manner in which injury occurred. In cases ap-
plying Kansas and Oklahoma law, the Tenth Circuit has held that cir-
cumstantial evidence can be adequate proof that a power tool's design
contributed to a victim's injury, 73 and that a gas pipeline was inade-
quately constructed, inspected or maintained.' 4 Requiring direct evi-
dence of how a power tool severed a victim's fingers or of the exact
connection between an explosion and a gas supply line maintained by a
utility would provide complete protection for the product sellers from
liability for injuries that were most likely caused by their products. Most
states clearly reject that view. Likewise, the court of appeals applied
Kansas and Oklahoma precedents to avoid this result.
In other state law cases, the court of appeals clarified two issues in
Colorado law. In the first, Simon v. Wisconsin Marine Inc.,T5 the issue was
whether the Colorado statute of limitations for personal injury actions
included the anniversary day of the injury. The court of appeals con-
cluded that a suit filed on the second anniversary of the injury was
timely, holding that a Colorado Supreme Court decision had reached
69. Dinsmore v. Board of Trustees of the Memorial Hosp., 936 F.2d 505 (10th Cir.
1991).
70. Id. at 507-08.
71. Id. at 507.
72. Solomon v. Shuell, 457 N.W.2d 669 (Mich. 1990).
73. Werth v. Makita Electric Works, Ltd., 950 F.2d 643 (10th Cir. 1991).
74. Goodwin v. Enserch Corp., 949 F.2d 1098 (10th Cir. 1991).
75. 947 F.2d 446 (10th Cir. 1991).
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that result by implication.76 In.a second suit, involving a defective onion
seed,7 7 the defect caused large losses to a commercial farmer. The
court of appeals held that Colorado law permits exemplary damages in
breach of contract cases, where negligence, such as mislabeling by a
seed distributor, produces foreseeable injury.78 This ruling permitted
the plaintiffs to recover a judgment that included $1.2 million for emo-
tional distress and exemplary damages.
Conclusion. Surveying one year's work of the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals shows that the tort system continues to operate with a variety of
doctrines that are far from one-sided. The FTCA cases show full com-
pliance with the United States Supreme Court's restrictive interpreta-
tions of the discretionary function exception. On the other hand, the
court has applied the Federal Rules of Evidence as generously as any
torts plaintiff could wish. On state law issues, the court affirmed the
constitutionality of a pro-defendant statute of repose and adopted a pro-
defendant interpretation of Wyoming's rescue doctrine. It also, how-
ever, approved applications of state law that permit personal injury
plaintiffs to recover with only circumstantial evidence of the link be-
tween defendants' conduct and their injuries. Despite the claim that the
torts system has suffered a qualitative change in the pro-plaintiff direc-
tion, the 1991 pattern of litigation in the Tenth Circuit resembles pat-
terns from previous years.
76. See Dillingham v. Greeley Publishing Co., 701 P.2d 27 (Colo. 1985).
77. Lutz Farms v. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 F.2d 638 (10th Cir. 1991).




During the survey period,' four opinions by the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals highlight the power wielded by government agencies
in transportation law - from controlling motor carrier routes to shield-
ing the government and private parties from tort liability.2 First, in Sulli-
van v. Scoular Grain Co.,3 the Tenth Circuit ruled a venture, which moved
and stored grain by rail, was not a common carrier, thus frustrating
plaintiff's attempt to bring suit under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act (FELA).4 In another case, Redmon v. United States,5 the Tenth Circuit
deferred to an agency safety inspector's discretionary decision to grant a
pilot license, which may have resulted in a fatal plane crash, thus shield-
ing the FAA from liability under the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA).
6
In a third case, State Corp. Commission of Kansas v. Interstate Commerce Com-
mission,7 the Tenth Circuit deferred to the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission's decision, thus overriding an earlier state agency's refusal to
allow Greyhound Bus Carrier to drop three existing routes which were
necessary due to public need. Finally, in a fourth case, Pilots Against Ille-
gal Dues (PAID) v. Air Line Pilots Association (ALPA) 8, the Tenth Circuit
held an airline union appropriately charged nonunion members negoti-
ating and administrative expenses incurred outside of the bargaining
unit. All four reported cases demonstrate the substantial judicial defer-
ence given agency interpretations of statutes and discretionary func-
tions, often over legitimate state concerns. In transportation law, the
Tenth Circuit highly regards the expertise of the agencies and thus,
rarely overturns their decisions.
I. SULLIVAN V. SCOULAR GRAIN Co. OF UTAH 9
A. Facts
Defendant, Scoular Grain Company of Utah (Scoular Venture) is a
joint venture formed by agreement between Freeport Center Associates
(Freeport), a commercial warehouse lessor, and Scoular Grain Company
(Scoular Grain), which unloads and stores grain adjacent to railroad
1. The cases surveyed include all Tenth Circuit cases decided in 1991 that relate to
transportation.
2. In a fifth case, Polys v. Trans-Colorado Airlines, Inc., 941 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir.
1991), the issue on appeal was procedural, and thus beyond the scope of this article.
3. 930 F.2d 798 (10th Cir. 1991).
4. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
5. 934 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1991).
6. See 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (1988).
7. 933 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1991).
8. 938 F.2d 1123 (10th Cir. 1991).
9. 930 F.2d 798 (10th Cir. 1991).
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tracks owned and maintained by several commercial railroads.' 0 The
joint venture agreement provided that each venturer participate in the
control and management of the venture. Further, profits and losses are
shared according to an agreed formula."
While unloading grain, plaintiff Sullivan was severely injured, re-
sulting in the amputation of his left arm and left leg. Scoular Venture
paid Sullivan $200,000 in workman's compensation for these injuries,
but Sullivan sought court awarded damages and filed suit against Scou-
lar Venture, Scoular Grain, Freeport, and several other parties, under
FELA.12 FELA establishes a cause of action against a "common carrier
by railroad" for "any person suffering injury" while employed by the
carrier.' 3 The lower court granted summary judgment for the defend-
ants on this issue and Sullivan appealed.'
4
B. Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit ruled Scoular Venture was not a common carrier
under FELA. Sullivan based his argument on the four-part test set forth
by the Fifth Circuit in Lone Star Steel Co. v. McGee. 15 Sullivan contended
there was a genuine issue of material fact remaining as to whether Scou-
lar Venture was a common carer.
Although other circuits adopted the Lone Star test, 16 the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that the test merely provides a list of factors for courts to keep
consider when deciding whether a carrier is a "common carrier."' 7 The
Tenth Circuit instead followed the self-defining test of the Supreme
Court established in Wells Fargo & Co. v. Taylor,'8 which defines a com-
mon carrier as one who operates a railroad as a means of carrying for
the public - that is to say a railroad company acting as a common car-
rier. 19 The Tenth Circuit also followed a later Supreme Court case,
which clarifies the self-defining test by stressing the requirement that an
entity subject to FELA liability must operate a "going railroad."' 20 Con-
sequently, Scoular Venture, which owned or leased miles of railroad




13. FELA establishes a cause of action against a "common carrier by railroad" for an
injury wholly or partly due to the carrier's negligence, while the individual was employed
by the carrier. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1988).
14. Sullivan, 930 F.2d at 800-01.
15. 380 F.2d 640, 647 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 977 (1967). The four-part test
requires that to be a common carrier, the service be (1) actual performance of rail service;
(2) part of total service contracted for by a public member-, (3) performed as part of a
system of interstate rail transport with common ownership between itself and a railroad or
contract with railroads holding itself out to the public; and (4) remuneration for services is
received.
16. See, e.g., Aho v. Erie Mining Co., 466 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1972); Pickney v. Oro Dam
Constructors, 441 F.2d 806 (9th Cir. 1971).
17. Sullivan, 930 F.2d at 801.
18. 254 U.S. 175 (1920).
19. Id. at 187.
20. Edwards v. Pacific Fruit Express Co., 390 U.S. 538, 540 (1968).
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ily a grain storage venture. Thus, Scoular Venture was not considered a
common carrier under FELA because they were not a going railroad.
2 1
The Scoular decision rests solely on the Tenth Circuit court's primary
characterization of the company in determining whether it is a common
carrier. Although the challenging plaintiff is left with little guidance as
to how the Tenth Circuit will characterize a company, the court is stand-
ing by its test. For example, in a recent unreported case, a steel com-
pany, which maintained an in-plant rail system and shipped goods via a
"short haul" common carrier owned by the same holding company, was
not classified as a common carrier2 2 and there was no liability under
FELA. The district court, relying on the Lone Star test, granted summary
judgement in favor of Sheffield Steel Company. The court stressed that
Wells Fargo and Pacific Fruit provide the relevant test, not Lone Star, yet
the decision was affirmed on appeal. The result is that Tenth Circuit
plaintiffs will not collect damages under FELA from a company not de-
fined as an interstate railroad company.
II. REDMON v. UNITED STATES
2 3
A. Facts
Relatives of a pilot killed in a crash brought a wrongful death action
against the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). Dr. Charles Ewing,
along with his wife and other passengers, was killed while he attempted
to navigate a twin engine Piper Seneca II through a severe thunderstorm
over the Ogden, Utah area. 24 Ewing was licensed by the FAA to operate
a multi-engine airplane with passengers over land in instrument flight
rules (IFR) conditions. 25 Such conditions exist when the pilot cannot
successfully operate the airplane visually under normal visual flight rules
(VFR) and must rely solely on the flight instrument panel.
One FAA flight inspector restricted Ewing to a VFR-only mul-
tiengine license and required Ewing to pass an IFR flight test for mul-
tiengined aircraft. 26 Ewing did not pass this test.2 7 Later, another FAA
inspector granted Ewing his IFR status upon discovering Ewing had
been IFR rated for single engine planes because Ewing was within an
FAA grace period permitting pilots to transfer their IFR rating when
commencing multiengine training. Instead of requiring passing an IFR
flight test, the inspector removed the VFR-only restriction. 28
Ewing's relatives, based on the grace period rule, challenged the
removal of the VFR-only restriction by the FAA inspector claiming neg-
ligence by the inspector proximately caused the crash. Additionally,
21. Sullivan, 930 F.2d at 800-01.
22. Keizor v. Sheffield Steel Co., No. 91-5043, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS 240, *8 (N.D.
Okla.Jan. 6, 1992).
23. 934 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1991).
24. Id at 1152-53.
25. Id. at 1152.




DENVER UNIVERSITY LA4W REVIEW
they claimed the inspector's failure to initiate an enforcement action
against Ewing proximately caused the crash.
B. Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit determined the FAA's decision to permit pilots
rated IFR for single engine crafts to carry over their ratings to mul-
tiengined planes fell within the discretionary function exception to the
FTCA.2 9 The inspector's decision not to investigate and take enforce-
ment action against Ewing fell within the discretionary function excep-
tion.30 The Tenth Circuit noted that the aircraft certification process is
inherently discretionary. In making its determination, the court quoted
United States v. Varig Airlines3 1 and reaffirmed the broad scope of the dis-
cretionary function exception. 32 Similarly, the inspector's decision not
to investigate was consistent with the Federal Aviation Act 33 and prop-
erly claimed as a discretionary function. The court emphasized that the
discretionary function exception applies regardless of whether the
agency has abused its discretion.3 4 In Redmon, the Tenth Circuit contin-
ued its tendency to broadly use the discretionary function exception to
bar tort actions against the FAA and other government entities,3 5 al-
lowing FTCA tort actions only when purely operational functions are
involved.
36




Greyhound Bus Carrier applied to the Kansas Commerce Commis-
sion (KCC) for permission to abandon three existing routes. The KCC
denied the application because it was inconsistent with the public inter-
29. Id. at 1155-56 (citing United States v. Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. 797, 820 (1984).
(agency employees following agency directives are shielded from tort liability if agency
directives stem from discretionary function)).
30. Id. at 1157.
31. Id. at 1154 (quoting Varig, 467 U.S. at 819).
32. Redmon, 934 F.2d at 1154 n.1.
33. "The Secretary of Transportation may, from time to time .... re-examine any civil
airman." 49 U.S.C. App § 1429(a) See also 14 C.F.R. §§ 13.3 & 13.5 (1989) (investigations
by the FAA are discretionary in nature).
34. Redmon, 834 F.2d at 1157.
35. See Weiss v. United States, 889 F.2d 937 (10th Cir. 1989) (Forest Service's deci-
sion to adopt an FAA provision regarding removal of obstructive objects was an exercise
of discretionary regulatory authority); Wendler v. United States, 782 F.2d 853 (10th Cir.
1985) (FAA's decision to suspend an aerial crop duster's commercial pilot certificate was a
discretionary function); Colorado Flying Academy, Inc. v. United States, 724 F.2d 871
(10th Cir. 1984) (trial court correctly applied the discretionary function exception despite
negligent designing and maintaining of the Denver Traffic Control Area which was the
proximate cause of a mid-air collision).
36. See United States v. Murray, 463 F.2d 208 (10th Cir. 1972) (FTCA tort action
allowed because the flight runway operator's duty to hear airplanes and light the runway
was an operational, not discretionary, function).
37. 933 F.2d 827 (10th Cir. 1991).
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est.38 After a full KCC investigation and four public hearings, the KCC
determined that any benefit to Greyhound from abandoning the routes
was outweighed by financial impairments suffered by communities along
the routes.3 9 Subsequently, Greyhound applied to the Interstate Com-
merce Commission (ICC) under the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982
(Bus Act),40 which gives the federal agency power to override a state's
rejection of a carrier request. The ICC granted Greyhound's request
because KCC failed to meet its burden of showing that suspension of the
three routes was either inconsistent with the public interest or was an
unreasonable burden on commerce. 4 1 In making this determination,
the ICC accorded great weight to Greyhound's contention that current
passenger revenues were less than the state's cost of providing
transportation. 42
B. Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the history of the Bus Act, noting that
ICC supremacy controls the ensuing conflicts when the state agency and
ICC differ about route discontinuance. 43 Next, the court reviewed the
ICC's criteria for deciding whether discontinuance is inconsistent with
the public interest.44 In determining the relation of revenues to variable
costs for the routes under consideration, the ICC accepted Greyhound's
approach of calculating variable costs by multiplying its system-wide
per-mile variable cost by the number of miles traveled annually.4 5 The
KCC objected to this method of calculation and proposed instead that
Greyhound's data should be adjusted to include "off-route revenues"
generated by passengers entering and leaving the routes.46 The KCC
also claimed the ICC misapplied a standard of the Bus Act, which re-
quires the ICC consider the availability of reasonable alternative
transportation.
4 7
The Tenth Circuit concluded the ICC's findings were not arbitrary
and capricious or an abuse of discretion.4 8 First, the court recognized
and deferred to the ICC's expertise.4 9 Next, it noted the ICC did not
accept Greyhound's data without an appreciation of the underlying
methodology. 50 The court also noted the ICC's observation that it must
consider the policy of the Bus Act which favors exit from unprofitable
38. Id. at 828-29.
39. Id. at 829.
40. 49 U.S.C. § 10935(a) (1988).
41. State Corp. Comm'n, 933 F.2d at 830.
42. Id. at 829. The Bus Act requires a revenue/cost analysis. 49 U.S.C. § 10935(g)(1)
(1988).
43. See State Corp. Comm'., 933 F.2d at 828.
44. Id. at 828-29.
45. Id. at 830.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 832.
48. Id. at 833.
49. Id. at 832.
50. Id.
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routes.
5 1
This Tenth Circuit decision reveals how federal agency deregula-
tion has negatively impacted the state's public interest. The KCC had
made an informed and thorough investigation to determine that re-
moval of these bus routes would result in several communities lacking
alternative transportation, but this was insignificant when compared to a
federal agency mandate to drop unprofitable routes. In overruling the
KCC, the ICC cited as determining factors (1) no funding by the state to
Greyhound, and (2) significant loss on each route canceled. Unless the
state will subsidize routes that the carrier and the ICC deem unprofita-
ble, the state citizens will be left without service. Although the ICC
stated that a KCC subsidy offer might mitigate the unprofitability of the
routes,5 2 the standard for balancing the public need or public impact
was left undefined. Under State Corp. Commission, deciding the public in-
terest requirement of a transportation route is an agency discretionary
function leaving states nearly powerless to enforce public policy
considerations.




In the last case reviewed, a labor dispute, involved pilots of United
Airlines (PAID) who do not belong to Air Line Pilots Association
(ALPA), the exclusive bargaining representative for all United Air Line
pilots. PAID are required to either join ALPA or pay for expenses in-
curred in representing the pilots because ALPA and United entered into
an agency shop arrangement. 54 PAID alleged ALPA violated both the
Railway Labor Act and their constitutional rights by using the agency
fees for purposes not akin to collective bargaining. 5 5 PAID also alleged
ALPA impermissably charged nonunion pilots for expenses incurred in
activities at other airlines.
5 6
The district court held that ALPA may use fees for expenses at
other airlines outside the immediate bargaining unit.57 ALPA may di-
vide litigation costs among all constituents, not just the pilot's own air-
line, because successful collective bargaining at one airline effects other
airlines. 58
51. Id. at 833. See also Pennsylvania Public Utility Comm'n v. United States, 749 F.2d
841 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (noting that when costs exceed revenues, the Bus Act creates a pre-
sumption in favor of discontinuing the route).
52. Id. at 830.
53. 938 F.2d 1123 (10th Cir. 1991).
54. Id. at 1125.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See id. at 1128.
58. Id. at 1128 & 1128 n.3.
1102 [Vol. 69:4
TRANSPORTATION SURVEY
B. Tenth Circuit Decision
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding
that fees can be used for appropriate expenses outside the immediate
bargaining unit, but not for litigation expenses involving airlines other
than United. 59 The court held that under Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Associa-
tion 60 chargeable activities must be germane to collective bargaining.
The court further held ALPA properly charged PAID members for ne-
gotiating and administrative expenses incurred outside United's bar-
gaining unit. ALPA reasonably divided negotiation costs among all
employees, because negotiation with one airline had positive effects
upon the other airlines.
CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit deference to agency authority and statutory in-
terpretation is a common thread through all the transportation cases
surveyed. Although the judiciary played a significant role in determin-
ing what constituted a common carrier under both the Bus Act in State
Corp. Commission and FELA in Sullivan, the Tenth Circuit demonstrated
its deference to agency discretion and expertise in Redmon and State Corp.
Commission. For example, in Redmon, the government was found exempt
from liability under the Federal Tort Claims Act when the agency exer-
cised a discretionary function. Furthermore, the court noted that the
discretionary function, especially prevalent in FAA licensing,6 1 applies
whether or not the discretion involved is abused. 62
Nevertheless, in State Corp. Commission, the Tenth Circuit deference
to a federal agency can override even a state agency's determination of a
public policy consideration under the Bus Act. Finally, in PAID, judicial
deference to the Railway Labor Act defeated attempts by individual pi-
lots to recover dues spent outside of their interest.
Craig Negler
59. Id. at 1134.
60. 111 S.Ct. 1950 (1991).
61. Redmon, 834 F.2d 1151 at 1154 (citing Varig, 467 U.S. 797).
62. Id. at 1157. See 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).
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